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ABSTRACT 
The principal theme of this research is its insistence that we must consider the -ýwways in 
which ideas are formed through a political process if we are to understand why social 
policy is configured in a particular way and why this configuration changes to a certain 
direction over time. This research examines the sorts of ideas, a series of laws, and a 
framework of legislation that matter greatly in shaping social policy within a society (i. e. 
South Korea) at a different stage of industrialisation to Western counterparts, which has 
begun its economic development from different initial levels and cultural traditions and has 
undergone authoritarian governments and military regimes. 
The central argument of this research is that ideas become powerful in shaping social 
policy, not just because they are autonomous following a logic of their own but because 
they are mediated, modified and sometimes metamorphosed by political contexts, 
conditions, and decisions. Institutional change is facilitated by this complex interplay of 
internal sources that hold decision-making power, and both internal and external sources of 
instability that condition decisions of political incumbents, and historical events that 
dislocate the established continuity of the existing policy path. It is this framework that 
imposes specific constraints on the choice of policy strategies that in turn creates a 
particular path and determines the available course of action. 
For this reason, the ideas that only relate to normative conceptions of what can be ideally 
achieved are less influential than the ideas that identify the historically complex and 
uncertain settings of political forces. By analysing these ideas that accommodate and 
challenge social policy in times of uncertainty and that differentiate it from other policy 
areas, we can better explain why policy changes occur. In other words, when ideas connect 
to the balance of those political forces, they are likely to become more powerful than 
otherwise. It is under this logic that ideas can become powerful in reshaping the politics of 
social policy and it is this ideational logic that can offer us the opportunity to analyse 
institutional possibilities instead of impossibilities, and to fuse the politics of change and 
the politics of possibility because policy-making is a process that not only faces constraints 
but is also a process that requires creativity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades the East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of South 
Korea (hereafter Korea), Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have become an intriguing 
subject area in the social sciences. This is not only because these four countries have 
converged on a distinctive path to growth different from the Latin American NICs - Brazil, 
Argentina, Mexico - but also because their growth patterns have formed a new development 
orthodoxy that has achieved a relatively egalitarian distribution of income. This new 
development orthodoxy has brought about the idea that the East Asian NICs may have 
undergone a distinctive path to welfare development too. Much of the literature on the East 
Asian NICs is therefore about the field of development economics, comparative political 
economy, and the uniqueness of welfare systems. In this fast growing subject area, however, 
there have been some critical elements missing or lacking within the discussion which 
should be brought into the analysis. 
Three Wave Studies on the East Asian Countries 
There have been three waves of studies on the East Asian countries. The first wave studies 
have two broad paradigms that have dominated thinking on the economic development of 
the East Asian NICs. The first paradigm takes the idea that these NICs have marked 
astonishing economic growth by adopting the principles of neoclassical economics 
(Friedman and Friedman, 1980). As East Asia's experience shows, they argue, neoclassical 
economics is superior to nonclassical economics for rich and poor countries alike (White and 
Wade, 1985). The second paradigm assumes that the international economy is a 
hierarchically ordered system of dominance and argues that the `postulate of external 
dominance' explains the periphery's (East Asian NICs) development (Haggard, 1990: 16). 
However, both these liberal and dependency perspectives share common weaknesses such 
that they neglect the ways in which 'domestic political forces constrain economic policy and 
shape state responses to the external environment' (Haggard, 1990: 21). 
The increasingly prevalent criticisms of these first wave studies have brought about the 
necessity of the second wave studies that paid a great deal of attention to the field of 
comparative political economy. While the role of the state in the market-oriented economy 
was discussed by the first wave studies, these second %\-a\ e studies pay more attention to the 
sociopolitical and institutional bases for the unique capacity of the East Asian NICs (e. g. 
Deyo, 1987c; Haggard 1990; Haggard and Moon, 1990; Hughes, 1988; Wade. 1990,1992). 
These studies appear to be influential not only in providing more systematic explanatory 
frameworks but also in bringing politics back into the discussion. This political economy 
approach has since been dominant in explaining the economic growth in the region on the 
one hand, and the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 on the other (e. g. Chang. Ha-loon, 
1998; Chang, Palma and Whittaker, 1998; Chang, Park and Yoo, 1998; Haggard, 2000: 
Wade, 1998a, 1998b). 
In short, academic enquiry and interest have been centred around the field of development 
economics and comparative political economy. These first and second wave studies on the 
subject have shared two common objectives that were also shared by the third wave studies 
from the early 1990s. The first objective was to investigate whether the East Asian countries 
provide any distinctive model that might be emulated by the West. The second objective was 
to construct or to develop a theory. Japan was the first country for Western scholars to turn 
to followed by the East Asian NICs, as the existing paradigm of predominantly 
Western-centred welfare regime typologies has been challenged by examples drawn from 
this set of countries'. One set of literature argues for the uniqueness of welfare systems in the 
region (e. g. Goodman and Peng, 1995; Jones, 1990,1993), while the other set maintains a 
pessimistic view on their distinctiveness (Esping-Andersen, 1997,1999; White and 
Goodman, 1998). 
In fact, these third wave studies are numerically substantially inferior to the first and second 
wave studies. Yet, as these third wave studies become an important academic and political 
enquiry or debate, they have made a significant contribution to broadening the knowledge on 
the region by bringing the idea of political economy, democratic legitimacy and welfare 
systems into the discussion in a more systematic and integrated way. These studies have 
identified the significance of domestic politics in each country where distinctive historical 
For a country by country comparison, especially to Japan, see Gould (1993). Kato (1991); for 
theoretical application to a number of East Asian countries as a totality, see Esping-Andersen (1999), 
Goodman and Peng (1995,1996), Holliday (2000), Hutton (1995), Jacobs (1998,2000), Jones (1990, 
1993), Kwon, Huck-Ju (1998a), 'MacPherson (1992), Midgley (1986); for an East and West. Orient 
and Occident, or Fast-: \sian and : Anglo-Saxon dialogue, see Rose and Shiratori (1986), Said (1978), 
White and Goodman (1998). 
trajectories were followed. Kwon (1998a: 66), for example, argues that the history of East 
Asian welfare states is most importantly determined by the distinctive institutional matrix of 
politics in each country'. 
The Purpose of the Research 
There is little doubt that these three waves of studies on the East Asian countries have 
produced a substantive body of theory. However, there are three critical points that have 
largely been underestimated within the studies on social policy in the East Asian NICs. First, 
much of the literature on social policy tends to argue that countries in the region have 
developed their social policies as a strategic political concern against economic and social 
requirements. Intentional explanation has been over-emphasised while any use which 
excluded unintended results has been downplayed and impoverished. In the analysis of social 
policy, we need to embrace both what is intended and what occurs as a result of the intention. 
In a memorable phrase, Titmuss (1974: 1.31) once observed that `social policy is all about 
social purposes and choices between them'. The conflicts between these choices, he further 
argues, simultaneously involve `the means-ends equation'. We take that assertion seriously 
and trace this means-ends equation that brings about a great deal of debate over the true 
intentions of state policies and their political outcomes. Policy is more than the intended 
course of action (Heclo, 1972). We need to encompass both purposive action (i. e. the 
intended course of action) and the actual behaviour implementing the intention (i. e. the 
actual behaviour attempting to effect the goals). For this reason, the first objective of this 
research is to argue that we should consider the questions of what has not been done as 
equally importantly as what has been done. In so doing, a course of action or inaction should 
2 also be considered as importantly as specific decisions or actions. 
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The rationale of this first purpose of the research can be linked with theories of power. By criticising 
Dahl's empirical study of New Haven (1961), Bachrach and Baratz (1962: 948) argue that `power is 
exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised 
when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional 
practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which 
are comparatively innocuous to A'. From their later study on anti-poverty programmes in Baltimore 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970), they have shown how those who have been subject to the existing 
unequal value allocation have suppressed and thwarted both latent and manifest challenges to the 
prevailing allocation. They have also shown how challengers with outside aid have been able to shift 
this prevailing 'mobilization of bias'. For a further development of the debate, see Lukes (1974). 
There is another important point that can be drawn from this `politics matters' thesis and its critique 
(sec Castles and NicKinlay. 1979; Castles, 1981). While Dahl's research was a landmark study using 
case studies of key community decisions, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) have also found it important to 
3 
Second, political actors operate within structural constraints. Some of the constraints derive 
from the political institutions within which actors operate, others are economic in origin. 
These constraints are often under conditions of uncertainty. Uncertainty about the cause of 
problems and the effects of the previous decisions causes actors to search for better policies. 
Yet, there has been a lack of exploration about this uncertainty and complexity that each 
country has faced through their distinctive historical paths. Haas (1992: 4) argues that `state 
actors are uncertainty reducers as well as power and wealth pursuers'. Little is known about 
how state actors reduce this uncertainty and what conditions their actions. In order to capture 
this principle of indeterminacy (Popper, 1957), we need to develop a more systematic and 
holistic framework for the analysis of social policy. Thus, the second objective of this 
research is to construct a framework to explain how actors make decisions, under what 
conditions and in what context. This objective is set out to explore the process of how 
policies emerge and develop. 
Third, policies change in many different ways. Some policies are new and innovative, while 
others are merely incremental refinements of earlier policies (Hogwood and Peters, 1983). In 
answer to the question of why policies change, a pluralist, corporatist or Marxist view 
presupposes relatively passive or defensive actions taken by a government in favour of social 
forces and conflict (Nordlinger, 1981). These conflict-based theories tend to ignore an 
important source of influence that epistemic communities maintain in shaping the 
intellectual premises and performance measures employed by policy-makers. However, 
following Heclo's (1974) lead, such an insight into the role of ideas in the policy process has 
become a central area that political scientists and policy analysts are engaged in3. For 
example, Haggard (1990) pays attention to the importance of ideas in comparing and 
explaining development paths of each country. He disentangles the influence of ideas and 
argues that `the plausibility of ideological arguments for policy choice increases with the 
degree of autonomy of political elites from societal or international constraints' (Haggard, 
1990: 47). Yet, Wade (1992) criticises Haggard's research suggesting it remains abstract in 
conduct case studies in correcting Dahl's neglect of `nondecision-making'. Given this, we shall use 
case studies in order to demonstrate the importance of both decisions and non-decisions in the analysis 
of social policy in Korea. 
For detailed discussion, see Chapter 1. 
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providing answers to why changes occur. Given the immaturity of the research examining 
the role of ideas in the development of the East Asian NICs, the third objective of this 
research is to argue that by focussing on the role of ideas, we may better understand how 
policy changes occur and how decision-makers come to recognise interests under conditions 
of uncertainty. 
The Methods of the Research 
In order to achieve the research objectives outlined above, this thesis examines: (1) how 
social purposes are constructed; (2) what conflicts emerge and how these conflicts become 
resolved (or mediated) by whom (or what); and (3) where these processes occur under what 
conditions. These questions will be answered in reference to Korean social policy' 
development. This is not only because Korea has been one of the fastest growing economies, 
yet at the same time subject to a further investigation for its economic downturn, but also its 
substantial welfare policies are relatively unknown to outsiders. Though a few case studies 
have investigated the determinants of social policy development in Korea, little is known 
about how specific policies have been configured and implemented, the consequences of 
these dynamic and sequential processes and how we interpret and evaluate these changes. 
This research investigates these issues through its distinctive historical path. 
Methodologically, we shall use the historically-oriented interpretative policy analysis on the 
basis of a historico-descriptive method. Ragin (1987: 3) argues that this is a `type of empirical 
study in a way that it attempts to account for specific historical outcomes or processes chosen 
for study because of their significance for current institutional arrangements or for social life 
in general'. Castles (1989: 12) also made plain: 
JA] historical approach is essential not merely in providing analytical leverage on the role 
of human agency in the public policy equation but, no less important, in making it possible 
to treat structural contexts as a totality, rather than as mere rankings or weights on a series 
of discrete variables. History reveals the one sense in which it is meaningful to say that the 
sum is more than its parts: the sense in which human action is embedded in its particular 
context. ' 
Given the historiographic nature of this research, the diachronic (i. e. based on time series 
data) rather than synchronic analysis is of central use -which could benefit from secondary 
analysis by analysing data collected at different times on similar issues. This secondary 
analysis enables us to employ longitudinal research designs (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996: 306). At the same time, the `documentative method' (see Jones. 
1985: 27-31) using both primary (official and other records) and secondary documentary 
sources (constructive descriptions included) shall be used for 'conceptual (armchair) 
theorising', the usefulness of which is pointed out by Jones (1985: 29): 
`The value. .. lies not so much in whether any particular theory is considered to be right or 
wrong, but in the extent to which various of the conceptual frameworks put forward turn out 
to be useful aids to the interpretation of social policy material. ' 
The historiographic material used in this thesis is obtained through documentary research 
and interviews. As a secondary analysis and as a part of unobtrusive (non-reactive) measures 
of data collection, documentary research was carried out by using archival records such as 
actuarial records, electoral and judicial records, government documents, the mass media, and 
private records such as autobiographies (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: Ch. 
13). For the analysis of the sociopolitical conditions examined in this thesis, we have made 
an extensive usage of political and diplomatic records including reports of proceedings in the 
National Assembly (equivalent to `Hansard' in Britain), content analysis of presidential 
speeches, newspaper articles, monthly periodicals, and related laws and regulations. Scott 
(1990: 59) argues that these administrative papers are `the single most important category of 
documentary sources used in social research'. Also, official statistics produced by 
government, government affiliated organisations, and a number of think tanks have been 
collected for a longitudinal and nationwide analysis. However, statistical compilations of 
longitudinal data sets are not always readily available, partly because the official department 
or organisation responsible for producing the documents and statistics had not firmly been 
settled before 1961, and partly because data sets are often not available in a consistent 
manner. Hence, most tables and figures produced in this thesis have been reconstructed using 
various sources including up-to-date statistics available through the Internet supplied by 
government departments. Yet, a great effort has been made to use the same source of 
time-series data in order to maintain the same standard of data collection and to minimise 
possible errors. 
In addition to these secondary sources and documents, semi-structured qualitative interviews 
have been conducted using the elite-interviewing technique (see Dexter, 1970). There are 
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several advantages to secondary analysis which has a rich intellectual tradition in the social 
sciences. Nonetheless, this method also has certain inherent limitations such as access to 
data, and the possibility of insufficient information about the ways in which the data was 
collected. More importantly, there is likely to be an inevitable gap between the use of 
primary data and its secondary use as far as specific research purposes and intentions behind 
the data collection are concerned (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: 305-308). 
For this reason, the analysis of primary data has been used in order to bridge potential gaps 
and also to find out officially unknown ideas and processes which sometimes go beyond the 
findings from administrative records. The interviewees were selected on the basis of their 
possession of expertise in welfare policy from among high ranking government officials who 
have been involved in the design and making of social policy and from those involved in the 
implementation of such policy. Interest group members and a former member of a think tank 
were also interviewed since the influence of their involvement in policy making has changed 
and has been considered to be of great significance. All interviews were recorded, 
transcribed, and translated. A topic guide of a core list of questions at each interview was 
prepared. Although all interviews were conducted based on a different list of questions, some 
questions were asked many times if the interviewees were thought of as being in possession 
of similar knowledge. 
Organisation of the Thesis 
The outline of this thesis is broadly divided into two periods, before and after 1987, that 
being the point at which the political source of government was legitimised by way of 
democratisation. This is also the point at which the history of struggle between the open and 
the closed society reflects. Interestingly, this division can also be seen as a distinction 
between the `traditional stage' and `transitional stage' (Peters, 1972)4. 
The thesis is composed of six chapters including the Conclusion. The first chapter is 
organised into four sections. The first section elaborates an ontological question of what 
4 
Peters (1972) argues that in the traditional stage of policy formation, the `levels of expenditure and 
policy are influenced largely by the ideas of the political decision-makers, and relatively little by the 
socioeconomic and political conditions of the society. ' The political system variables and mass 
participation measures become important during the transitional stage. In the `modern stage'. 
socioeconomic variables become more critical than political variables in policy changes. 
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social policy is and how it is different from a welfare state. This question is important in 
examining images, values and ideas embodied in social policy programmes. In the second 
section, we review the literature that identifies the principal theoretical approaches on the 
relationship between social policy and social development. Instead of being exhaustive or 
doing justice to all individual theories, ww, e review five Western-driven theories or 
perspectives of welfare state development, followed by a review of their application to the 
Korean case in the third section. Then, we turn to examine the most compatible and helpful 
theoretical approaches for examining the role of ideas in shaping social policy. By reviewing 
these approaches, we develop a conceptual framework for analysing the policy formation 
and changes in the last section of this chapter. It is argued that the process of policy formation 
and change can be better understood in a triangular formation of political context, 
conditions, and decision-making points. In this chapter, we also introduce important analytic 
concepts which are operationalised in the process of policy change. 
This framework is then developed in four subsequent chapters. These four empirical chapters 
are designed to test the validity of the framework, analysing the emergence of central social 
programmes in Korea before and after 1987, the politics of implementing these programmes 
and the contemporary potential for further development of the Korean welfare state. In the 
second chapter, we ask two questions: (1) why and how are social policies introduced and 
modified? (2) why do some social issues fail to become the subject of policy initiatives? In 
order to answer these questions, we first examine the historical underpinnings of the Korean 
nation state formation. Then, we turn to analyse the role of ideas under the authoritarian 
military governments. By identifying the key actors and key issues through case-studies, we 
investigate pervasive legacies behind the institutional structure. It is argued that the 
configuration of social policy in Korea was greatly affected by the role of ideas. However, 
the original ideas were often metamorphosed by the institutional structure, the mediation of 
which occurred during the process of interplay between political contexts, conditions and 
decision-making points. 
The third chapter examines the expansion and consolidation of social policy in transitional 
politics. We identify and discuss different sources of power and their influence in shaping 
social policy. By examining four case-studies of social policy making, it is argued that 
democratisation has brought about substantial changes in the process of social policy 
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making. However, it was not democratisation per se that became a determining factor in 
shaping social policy but its implication that required decision-makers to follow principles 
institutionalised in the form of rules and norms. When principled reasons are required for 
proposed courses of action, ideas become important. 
In the previous two chapters, we identify the political processes that have metamorphosed 
the original ideas in the making of social policy. In the fourth chapter, we examine the 
institutional structure of social policy in Korea. We analyse four major social insurance 
programmes and the public assistance programme by identifying principled ideas embodied 
in social programmes and by examining the politics of implementing these programmes. It is 
argued that when social consensus is required, political expediency can no longer be an 
effective means to an end. This principle of political expediency has increasingly become a 
functionally disruptive element in reforming social programmes. 
In the fifth chapter, we explore the contemporary potential for further development of the 
Korean welfare state. First, we identify how international competitiveness from a global 
economy has influenced social policy development in Korea. Second, we then turn to 
examine the government's restructuring strategies in response to the economic crisis. Third, 
by bringing the issues of poverty and redistribution into the discussion, we evaluate the 
overall effectiveness and efficiency of state welfare. It is argued that external pressures on 
social policy become stronger as domestic politics are challenged by global forces. Yet, 
policy changes are still greatly affected by domestic politics. In this context, we can identify 
distinctive ideas institutionalised in the Korean welfare state. 
In the final chapter, these themes are integrated and some conclusions drawn by developing 
a broad view of the factors that conditioned the progress of values behind economic growth 
and social policy development. We also identify the historical elements that rendered one 
rather than the other value more influential at one particular time in history than another. 
Finally, we demonstrate the value added in the research as a whole by underlining the 
significance of our analysis, pointing out the limitations in our material, and suggesting the 
possibilities of further research. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Possibility of Social Policy 
1.1 Introduction 
A history of welfare state development is a history of conflict between what is socially desirable 
and what is economically feasible. The welfare state emerged at the moment that these opposing 
interests of economy and society were required to be integrated by state intervention (Briggs, 
1961). For example, Hall (1984) argues that the emergence of the British welfare state was 
possible because these two opposing ideas were met by the hands of social reformers 
(Beveridge) and of economists (Keynes). However, the underlying assumptions in the era of the 
`Keynesian consensus' no longer obtain. There has been growing perception on a trade-off 
between social security and economic growth, between equality and efficiency. Accordingly, the 
increasing challenges after the `Golden Age' have brought about a converging trend that stresses 
human capital investment in the guise of `productive social policy' (Esping-Andersen, 1996). In 
the East-Asian NICs, productive social policy is taken to mean the supremacy of economic 
policy over social policy (Holliday, 2000). 
This economy versus society paradigm was developed by a variety of schools of thought 
including functional and structural accounts. Yet, this socioeconomic analysis ignores the 
formulation and transmission of concepts and ideas, thereby treating them as a residual problem 
(Ashford, 1986a). Given this, the aim of this chapter is to suggest that the explanatory 
frameworks and rules associated with the development of welfare states require modifications 
and a wide range of applications to a somewhat unknown context. For this reason, we organise 
this chapter into four sections. We first examine political and social policy values of welfare and 
conceptual challenges to them in constructing welfare states. We then move onto different 
theoretical hcrspectives primarily developed in Western academia. In the next section, we turn 
to review how Korean scholars have applied these theories to the Korean case. In the following 
section, \VVc build up a theoretical framework that guides this research in the analysis of policy 
formation and change. 
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1.2 Political Values of Social Policy: Positive or Negative? 
In the search for the institutional roots of welfare states, Ashford (1986a: 31) correctly, argues 
that `the main problem of the nineteenth-century liberal thinkers was not that they lacked an 
image of welfare, but that they had too many of them'. These images were formed into different 
institutional shapes in specific political situations. In other words, how these images were 
filtered and buffered varies to a particular political context. Nonetheless. what is commonly 
found in most welfare states is that they are meant to favour ideas of redistribution or equality. 
These ideas originated from the problem recognition such that the ubiquity of the challenges to 
capitalism needs a response (Pierson, 1991: 100). T. H. Marshall (1950,1963) argues that liberal 
democracy and its heritage, capitalism, constitute two institutional pillars that underlie the 
construction of welfare states. In defining the welfare state, Thoenes (1962) adds to this a new 
form of responsibility that guarantees collective social care to its citizens. Therefore, the welfare 
state is `a form of society characterized by a system of democratic, government-sponsored 
welfare placed on a new footing and offering a guarantee of collective social care to its citizens, 
concurrently with the maintenance of a capitalist system of production' (Thoenes, 1962: 125). 
From this definition, it becomes clear that the welfare state cannot be understood in isolation 
from capitalism and democracy. On the one hand, the welfare state was a `necessary element in 
an efficient and competitive capitalist economy' in the early postwar years (Gough, 1996: 209). 
On the other hand, as Hall (1984) puts it clearly, the determining base that integrated two 
opposing ideas by the hands of Beveridge and Keynes might be the fully fledged coming of 
democracy during the period of 1880 to 1920 in Britain. 
There is little doubt that the historical and political transformation of nineteenth-century liberal 
democratic states into what is now called the welfare state involved an institutional change of 
great significance as well as its legacy of capitalism (Ashford, 1986b: 97). The capitalist system 
was a logical component of liberal society which has required a certain degree of modification 
and restriction. Political democracy, in comparison, is not only the institutional means of 
making the welfare state possible, but is also a powerful means of forcing political elites and 
ruling-class political representatives to accept welfare state arrangements (Offe, 1987: 509). In 
other words, democracy provides a reasonable guarantee for the survival of a welfare state. Yet, 
Thoenes (1962: 127-137) argues that it is not a prerequisite for the good functioning of the 
welfare state. Rather democracy contains very difficult elements to deal \v ith. Offe (1987: 5 11) 
also argues that the `mutually supportive relationship of mass democracy and the welfare 
stateness no longer amounts to a convincing hypothesis'. because 'there are many 
indications... that lead us to expect that democratic mass politics will not work in the direction 
of a reliable defense of the welfare state' (italics in original). In an ideal setting perhaps, 
elements of the welfare state may be introduced by democratic means and methods that are 
controlled and kept in being. In practice, however, welfare programmes are not introduced for 
purely democratic reasons. They are sometimes introduced even if their introduction has not 
been desired by either citizens or the parties representing the citizens. How social policy fits in 
with this contradictory context is the subject that we now turn to. 
Esping-Andersen (1999: 33) argues that `social policy has existed as long as there has been some 
kind of collective political action in address to a social risk'. This implies that social policy can 
exist without welfare states but the converse is not possible. For him, `social policy means 
public management of social risks' (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 36). As many others have argued, 
social policy can be a bridging instrument that mitigates conflicts between different risk 
categories (Baldwin, 1990; Giddens, 1998). However, it is also clear that social policy can be a 
means of legitimising political and economic institutions and setting limits for how much social 
distance can be acceptable before conflict emerges (Flora and Heindenheimer, 1981; Mishra, 
1977; Offe, 1984; Oyen, 1986; Piven and Cloward, 1971; Titmuss, 1958). In the Marxist 
analysis of social policy, social policy is often seen as the main form and mechanism of control 
in the form of repression, exploitation and co-optation (Piven and Cloward, 1971; Squires, 
1990; Janowitz, 1975,1976). By contrast, social policy can function as a defence mechanism to 
the interests of a minority against those of the majority (Higgins, 1978: 193). For some, social 
policy undermines work-incentives and economic competitiveness (Friedman and Friedman, 
1980; Hayek, 1944,1960; Murray, 1984; Wilson, 1987). For others, social policy can make a 
positive impact on the national economy (Gough, 1996; Gramlich, 1997; Haller with Gough, 
1991, Rimlinger, 1966). In short, social policy can be an effective social engineering technique 
for securing the efficient functioning of a particular society. The point is that social policy 
cannot be devoid of social and political meaning. Its interpretative functions can vary to the 
context of what it aims to achieve in a distinctive sociopolitical setting. We need to know why 
1? 
social policy exists in what form for whom. 
In the practical context of social policy, social welfare is principally an operational concept 
wherein the idea of welfare refers primarily to physical and material well-being. Even within 
this limited scope of social services, however, the provision of welfare is highly contentious for 
there are many different and conflicting views of what is good for whom (Spicker, 1988: 4-5). 
These conflicting views can manifest in a continuum, of which one may constitute a `society of 
positive welfare', and the other may compose of a `society of negative welfare'. The relationship 
between these two types of society may not always be clear because social policy values 
underpinning social programmes may become merely symbolic and diminishes during the 
political process, and at the same time, they may serve purposes other than those which they 
were designed to meet (Oyen, 1986). This is often the case also because 'welfare provisions may 
pull in contradictory directions. The issue is not that social services generally control people, but 
that welfare provision can be spoiled by the use of power in a way which works against the 
interests of the recipients' (Spicker, 1988: 102). Similarly, it is possible to demonstrate extreme 
definitions of the relationship between citizenship and social policy. `For some, citizenship is 
enhanced and extended by the existence and use of social services. For others, citizenship is 
debased by reliance upon such aid' (Pinker, 1971: 201). 
Given this, the idea that altruism is valued as an authentic part of human consciousness in the 
construction of welfare states requires critical re-thinking. Pinker (1979) criticises the 
conventional wisdom of welfare scholarship built around contrasting concepts (e. g. altruism 
versus egoism, collectivism versus individualism, social market versus economic market). He 
argues that the political and ideological dispositions of scholars, particularly Titmuss, interpret 
welfare in a disembodied and sanctimonious way. The analysis based on a notion of altruism is 
blind to institutional and historical realities and to the organised sentiments of ordinary people 
about obligation and entitlement. Instead, he emphasises the importance of variations in political 
and cultural histories of different societies (Pinker, 1979)1. 
Regarding cultural elements embedded in the idea of welfare, Fukuyama (1996) places a particular 
emphasis on the idea ot'trust. The idea of tnist indicates that economic activity is fundamentally motivated 
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Altruism is genuinely constituted by moral order and primarily concerned with the motivation 
for an action, thereby confining itself within the one-way communication rather than the 
relationships between a person and a society as in the case of integration, or between a person in 
relation to a group as of solidarity. For this reason, altruism tends to ignore mutual 
responsibilities essentially embodied in state welfare arrangements. The idea of welfare always 
appears in the form of the product of varying degrees of compromise between numerous 
sectional interests such as class affiliations (Pinker, 1979: 225). From its nature and its 
compromises, a certain decision must be made in the ordering of welfare priorities and choices 
between social purposes, which in nature cannot always be of a permanent kind (Pinker, 1979; 
Titmuss, 1974; Klein et al., 1996). The welfare interests of one section of the population are 
frequently advanced by state welfare at the expense of another. As the national economy 
generates greater wealth, a larger proportion of citizens become involved. Yet, the political logic 
of resource allocation remains unequal. Hence, the universalistic arrangements of social welfare, 
or the collectivist approach of social policies end up as a functioning residual. Therefore, it 
seems fair to conclude that `social welfare, in one form or another, is the professed aim of most 
political and economic activities' (Pinker, 1971: 9). 
A distinction between the residual and the institutional model can be read as an ideal-typical 
form of a `society of negative welfare' and a `society of positive welfare'. Under the residual 
model, it is assumed that the vast majority of a population is supported by its own channels of 
welfare. Hence, the residual model favours self-reliant individualism and the classical liberal 
market mechanisms. The benefit level is generally low and means-testing is placed at the centre 
which draws a clear distinction between deserving and undeserving poor. By contrast, the 
institutional or universal model addresses the entire population and `embodies an 
institutionalized commitment to welfare' (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 20). The individual's welfare 
by something more than individual self-interest. The level of trust inherent in the society is the key to 
determining the quality of economic performance and its attendant social implications. In a similar vein, 
Offe (1987) considers trust as reciprocity, solidarity or justice in validity of beliefs that solidarities and 
modes of normative integration enable the state to be a welfare state. Thus, culture-specific arrangements 
of welfare in different societal settings bring about the idea of whether welfare policy is to be solidaristic, 
embracing a vision of social citizenship and seeking to assure for all a common core of equality regardless 
of class-based social hierarchy in civil society. 
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is the responsibility of the social collective, and the principle of social citizenship and property 
rights are fully guaranteed by the state. Hutton (1995: 264) also argues that if a welfare system is 
meant to function to provide a high degree of social protection with the visible expression of 
social solidarity, universal programmes are desirable. 
Baldwin (1990: 36) argues that the basic premise of solidaristic welfare is its implicit 
universality. But the solidarity of social policy can only be realised when those who are 
sufficiently powerful also see their interests to be best safeguarded. He argues further that the 
activities of relief-giving can rarely be advantageous to those in great need unless risk, 
redistributive advantage and political clout coincide. Therefore, `not until otherwise privileged 
groups discovered that they shared a common interest in reallocating risk with the disadvantaged 
was a real redistribution of burdens possible' (Baldwin, 1990: 292),. However, the issue here is 
not whether universalism is undoubtedly superior to selectivism in achieving the solidarity of 
social policy but that its political values may function better in integrating different risk 
categories without disadvantaging privileged groups. In a similar vein, as Reddin (1970) argues, 
it is misleading to debate universal versus selective benefits as a discussion of absolutes or 
diametrically opposed systems because a service may be universally available but its use may be 
severely restricted between groups. A universal service may be selectively financed through the 
fiscal system. For this reason, a universal service may in practice not conform to the image 
conjured up by the notion of benefit provided for rich and poor alike. In short, the principles of 
welfare become meaningful when they are viewed along the line of their political underpinnings. 
In sum, ideas underpinning the construction of welfare states are essentially double-edged. 
Some ideas may be positive representing altruistic and egalitarian qualities. But not until these 
In shaping the solidarity of social policy, Baldwin (1990: 51-52) addresses three issues that provide a 
gauge of solidarity and social citizenship embodied in social insurance. First, it was the quintessential 
characteristic of universalism that generated a victorious era of wartime reform in Britain and 
Scandinavia. Second, tax-financing as a corollary of universalist reform rather than the contributory 
principle broadened the common risk pool and narrowed the gap between those who stood to gain or lose. 
Third, as a mark of solidarity, egalitarian distribution of resources in accord with equal human worth, 
rather than economic prowess, were best achieved by flat-rate or uniform benefits, not by an 
earnings-related approach. 
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ideas are translated into policy is their positivity meaningful. This raises the question that 
political values of social policy may have to be redefined. It is worthy of examining whether 
social policy can serve as a bridge or a barrier in the conversion of ideas into a particular 
organisational form or policy. These conflicting concepts and ideas underlying political values 
of social policy are however entirely Western-driven. A wider application is required for theory 
construction. How these Western-built theories of welfare position themselves and serve as a 
valid or invalid explanatory framework in the development of social policy elsewhere is the 
subject of the next section. 
1.3 Conflicting Theories and Explanation of Welfare State Development 
In Korean academia, the determinants of social policy development have become an 
increasingly popular subject area since the early 1980s3. Mostly Western-built theories of 
welfare have been employed in Korean academia, ranging from the logic of industrialism and 
neo-Marxism through historical institutionalism and political economy. However, because of 
the substantial amount of literature on the determinants of social policy development in Korea, 
both written in English and in Korean, an exhaustive review of its entirety can be a very 
challenging task. Yet, it is still plausible to make five groupings regarding their criticality and 
applicability. These are: (1) logic of industrialism; (2) neo-Marxism; (3) corporatist approach; 
(4) state-centred approach; and (5) historical institutionalism. This section examines these 
perspectives and their subsequent criticisms in turn followed by the applications made by 
existing literature to the case of Korea, both in the form of comparative studies and single case 
studies in the next section. 
I 
After the Beveridge Report `Social Insurance and. -1llied Services' (Beveridge, 1942) was translated by 
the Committee for Social Security (CSS) in 1966, a substantial amount of literature on the development 
of welfare states was translated into Korean especially from the early 1980s (e. g. Furniss and Tilton, 1977; 
Mishra, 1977) through the second half of the 1980s (e. g. George and Wilding, 1976; Mishra. 1984; 
Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965) to the first half of the 1990s (e. g. Gough, 1979; O'Connor, 1973; Offe, 
N84; Pierson. 1991). 
16 
1.3.1 The Logic of Industrialism 
The sociological tradition of perspectives on social policy has developed in conjunction with 
theories of the welfare state which operate with political implications. The central account of 
social policy development is readily associated with the functionalist theory of welfare which is 
intended to perform political functions. Proponents of the `logic of industrialism``' argue that 
normative consensus is a more important determinant of social policies than ideological 
conflict. In other words, the basic premise of these pluralist industrialism approach is that 
industrialisation causes new social needs while economic growth provides the material basis for 
social policy expansion to meet these new social needs, thereby the welfare state is on the whole 
egalitarian in result (Kerr et al., 1973; Wilensky, 1975: Ch. 2). 
The logical conclusion that has been drawn from this premise is convergence theory or 
technological determinism. Kerr et al. (1973) argue that the process of industrialisation causes 
all countries to move to a point where they were converging and growing more alike. This 
industrial development indirectly leads to greater social equality through higher welfare 
spending from which those in need benefit most. In his comparative historical analysis of social 
security development in countries with different political, social and economic traditions, 
Rimlinger (1971) also argues that modern social security systems emerge in the 
liberal-individual (e. g. England, France and America), the patriarchal (e. g. Germany) and the 
collective tradition (e. g. Russia) in order to provide for social needs through broadly similar 
forms of welfare intervention. Further to this, Wilensky's (1965,1975) long-standing interest in 
the discussion about the cause of welfare development in different societies confirms that 
economic growth is the root cause of the development of the welfare state as a historically 
inevitable process. 
This view that understands social policy development as evolutionary quantifies the level of 
public expenditure which ranks societies as a device for distinguishing the `welfare state 
leaders' from the `welfare state laggards'. Wilensky (1975: xiii) concludes that: 
4 
Also known as the 'pluralist industrialism approach', or the `logic of industrialisation thesis' or the 'laws 
of capitalist de\'clohment', or the `embourgeoisement thesis', or the `middle-range theory of social 
stratification' in a similar vein with the nmacro-theories of convergence and the 'end of ideology'. 
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`economic growth and its demographic and bureaucratic outcomes are the root cause of the 
general emergence of the welfare state - the establishment of similar programs of social security, 
the increasing fraction of GNP devoted to such programs, the trend toward comprehensi% e 
coverage and similar methods of financing. In any systematic comparison of many countries 
over many years, alternative explanations collapse under the weight of such heavy, brittle 
categories as "socialist" versus "capitalist" economies, "collectivistic"" versus "individualistic"" 
ideologies, or even "democratic" versus "totalitarian" political systems. Ho« ever useful they 
may be in the understanding of other problems, these categories are almost useless in explaining 
the origins and general development of the welfare state. ' 
In short, industrial development is the decisive factor of welfare effort to explain the basis for 
social policy expansion. Thus the introduction of welfare provisions is shared by different 
industrial societies. 
In consequence, ideological factors and partisan politics are believed to be of little or no 
significance (Korpi, 1989: 311). The `end of ideology' which came to be known as the end of 
history' thesis assumes that the idea of a future classless society is hardly realistic (Fukuyama, 
1989,1992). This classless society has been the major concern of Marxist theories on the 
development of communism as an inevitable path. Fukuyama's idea of the `end of history' is 
based on the notion of `convergence' where future society will be based on liberal capitalist 
democracy which will appear in both western and eastern worlds. This contention that ideology 
no longer matters tends to consider politics as merely a technological matter and therefore the 
stability and the legitimacy of the state seem to be bound on technological success and 
prolonged economic growth (Carrier and Kendall, 1971: 210). This clearly generates the danger 
of a legitimation crisis. Habermas (1976: 46) argues that once the economic system is required to 
be steered by the imperatives, even while the steering imperatives are carried through, the 
requisite level of mass loyalty can hardly be maintained. This is because the political system 
requires an input of mass loyalty that is as diffuse as possible. 
All ideologies are historically bound and none can be eternally valid (George and Wilding, 
1994: 4). A certain ideological explanation of the situation could be a correct diagnosis at a 
particular point in time but wrong at another. There is also no clear international trend of 
convcrgcncc and this convergence thesis tends to ignore the important structural variations in 
the organisational and institutional features of welfare states. Moreover growth patterns based 
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on liberal democracy fail to explain the propositions of pluralism where those in dire need and 
excluded would benefit most from the development of the welfare state. 
1.3.2 Three Perspectives of Neo-Marxism 
Another functionalist account of welfare state development is neo-Marxism. The underlying 
propositions of social policy development from neo-Marxism are that social policy is regarded 
as either a response or preemptive mechanism. It is a response because political elites introduce 
welfare programmes in response to labour disputes (i. e. the Bonapartist interpretation), and it is 
preemptive since social policy is a strategic apparatus to repress and control society (e. g. 
Bismarck's social insurance legislation). 
The accounts of welfare state development under the heading of neo-Marxism are divided into 
three perspectives: Instrumentalism, structuralism, and the political class struggle approach. 
First, as the closest perspective to the classical Marxist theory, the role of the state is viewed as 
an instrument which attempts to perform on behalf of the capitalist's interests. It criticises the 
role of the state in political pluralism where the state is viewed as a mediator from the neutral 
stance to represent and mediate the common interests between a variety of interest groups. This 
instrumentalism is based on the idea that the economic organisations in capitalist societies are 
monopolised by the capitalist, accordingly political organisations too are strongly influenced by 
them. Social policy is thus determined by the capitalist depending on the necessity of capital 
accumulation. Social policy is a response to the crisis of capital accumulation such as the period 
of depression or political challenge led by the popular movement. 
The instrumental notion of neo-Marxism is best seen by Miliband (1977: 9 1), arguing that `the 
intervention of the state is always and necessarily partisan: as a class state, it always intervenes 
for the purpose of maintaining the existing system of domination, even where it intervenes to 
mitigate the harness of that system of domination'. Therefore, welfare reforms basically 
function as a form of social control rather than of social investment (Miliband, 1991). Neither 
the basic structure of the capitalist society nor status, income, and political power of those who 
have already been influential is affected by social policy. 
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Second, in contrast to instrumentalism, structuralism stresses the objective relation between the 
state and the capitalist. The structure of the capitalist economy itself rather than 
instrumentalising state organisations enables agreement between the state function and the 
capitalist's interests. That is, regardless of the influences from the capitalist, the state should 
necessarily function to preserve order and to sustain and enhance the conditions for capitalist 
economic activities (Gough, 1979; O'Connor, 1973: Offe, 1984). The state might pursue 
welfare provisions against the capitalist with a certain degree of autonomy in order to strengthen 
the long term stabilisation of the economy. Skocpol (1980) labels this structuralism as 'political 
functionalism' and argues that the political system can only function in the interests of 
capitalists in the long term when a relatively autonomous state not directly controlled by 
capitalists remains stable. Accordingly, political conflicts especially challenged by the working 
class can be threatening. Thus, controlling and dismantling the labour force is one of many 
important functions of the welfare state. Welfare provisions therefore can be expanded as a part 
of a co-operative strategy of control (Diven and Cloward, 1971). 
The third perspective is based on political class struggle which rejects the idea that the welfare 
state does not exist in either the long or short term interests of capitalists. The welfare state is 
characterised by the determinants of political and class struggle between capitalists and 
labourers. Increasing power of the working class can therefore enable the state to exist truly for 
them. The development of the welfare state is regarded as the triumph of the working class 
against capitalists. In this sense, this perspective lies in the same vein with the social democratic 
model5. 
5 
By contrast to the fact that both functionalist accounts tend to have downplayed the significance of 
political struggles in industrial or capitalist democracies (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986: 136), the social 
democratic model embraces both the pluralist view and neo-Marxism. The social democratic model 
accepts a belief in the role of pressure groups and of great individuals in reform. Influenced by the ideas 
of Marshall on citizenship and by principles of the Fabian Society in many ways, the social democratic 
model begins with the idea of Keynesian economic theory (although Keynes was not a social democrat in 
the Fabian sense), whereby the government can influence the economy to achieve economic ends (George 
and Wilding, 1994: 91). This social democratic model shares the ideas of neo-Marxists in the sense that 
both have focussed on political class conflict between the working class and capitalists in advanced 
capitalism. Yet, the social democratic model pays more attention to the political side of class struggle in 
nee-Nlarxist theory. It is however somewhat different from logic-of-industrialism and neo-\larxist 
functionalists in that while functionalists underplay the role of politics. social democrats consider politics. 
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The neo-Marxist analysis of how a capitalist system works indicates three inter-related reasons, 
why the welfare state emerges. First, state action to promote the needs or requirements of capital 
(accumulation); second, state pre-emptive action which was seen in Bismarck's social insurance 
legislation in the 1880s (legitimation); and third, a response to class conflict. Whilst the topic of 
the welfare state is originally absent from the classical Marxist literature for self-evident 
historical reasons (Therborn, 1986), neo-Marxism accepts the idea of a democratic capitalist 
state. However, since the neo-Marxist analysis of welfare places ideology as contributing to the 
legitimacy as well as securing the stability of a democratic capitalist state (Taylor-Goobv, 
1981: 433), there are two basic and mutually contradictory functions which must be fulfilled by 
the capitalist state (O'Connor, 1973: 6,1984). On the one hand, the state has an important role to 
play to maintain or create the possible capital accumulation which will be able to generate 
profits. These profits however eventually become the main source of its own power. On the 
other hand, the state must harmonise society which may be violated by losing its legitimacy. The 
loss of legitimacy results from the state's coercive forces to accumulate capital of one class at the 
expense of others. These contradictory functions of the capitalist state are first accounted for by 
the framework of ideas used by the ruling class in coercing and persuading others to maintain the 
status quo. Neo-Marxist scholars such as Miliband (1973), O'Connor (1973) and Gough (1979) 
see the suitability of the state as a vehicle for maximising welfare by way of persuasion. The 
other account of neo-Marxist analysis of ideology is best seen by the works of Habermas (1976), 
especially party politics to be of great significance. The welfare state develops as a social democratic party 
or labour party becomes powerful. The party in this line represents the working class, and highly 
centralised labour unions. Wilensky's (1981) notion of `Catholic party power' and Borg and Castles' 
(1981) findings of right-wing parties' antagonistic representation to social spending also endorse the 
significance of party politics. Therefore, although labour is inferior to capital in the market, this economic 
inferiority can be compromised by their capacity for collective action in democratic politics. The social 
democratic model deserves credit in that it has further expanded its explanatory categories above and 
beyond economic variables. The problem of this account is however that even though it applies best to the 
relative expansion of national social expenditures after the Second World War, it has failed to provide 
answers to the questions of when, how, and why social policies were created and expanded in 
industrialised capitalist democracies (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986: 142). Also, the social democratic model 
cannot explain \v by there was working class hostility to the state provision of welfare when state welfare 
measures were first introduced (Pierson, 1991: 54). Rimlinger (1971) argues that in the initial stage of 
welfare state de\ elopment, the working class refused the idea because the expansion of welfare provision 
could weaken the autonomy of the labour union or could function as a means of control to reduce wages. 
Thus, though the social democratic model can best apply to the development of Scandinavian welfare 
states, it can hardly be generalised. 
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Ginsburg (1979,1991) and Offe (1984). They argue that both the self-activity of the dominant 
class and the material relations of a particular kind of social life under particular circumstances 
create a climate of ideas which make persuasion more acceptable. 
The third aspect of neo-Marxist analysis lies in the class-based theories. The welfare state is 
understood as the outcome of a long process of a working-class struggle against entrenched 
opposition from the capitalist class and its allies (George and Wilding, 1994: 74). This power 
resources approach in other words assumes that the fundamental power resources in advanced 
industrial societies are divided by economic or capital resources. These resources derive from 
the labour control based on the market mechanism and by political power resources from the 
capacity of collective action (Korpi, 1989: 3 12). Therefore, the working-class mobilisation 
theory or the labour movement theory explains that the development of the welfare state is 
dependent upon the strength of the labour movement and its political ability to implement 
collective welfare provisions through electoral control of the state. Similarly, proponents of the 
mass disruption thesis (e. g. Piven and Cloward, 1971) argue that social policies have improved 
by elites' responses to protest by the poor and workers. But it is also argued that this thesis only 
works when and where the existence of regular institutional channels for influencing social 
policies by working classes and other organised democratic power are challenged (Skocpol and 
Arnenta, 1986: 139). 
By and large, therefore, neo-Marxists conceive the extent of class struggle as the key 
determinant of the nature of any welfare state that develops. The welfare state is regarded as a 
form of social control which is the crucial difference from approaches exemplified by the 
logic-of-industrialism. Accordingly, even if both the logic-of-industrialism theorists and 
neo-Marxists approaches are deterministic and have utilised functionalist reasoning to predict 
the converging patterns of social policy, neo-Marxists argue rather differently from the 
structure-functionalists in the area of social policy development. This is so in the sense that 
social policies are viewed by neo-Marxists as facilitating social reproduction which is 
essentially required in advanced capitalism. Consequently, welfare provision in capitalist 
society is not for poverty elimination but merely for ensuring that the poor can physically 
survive. The reason for this is that capitalism requires a reserve labour force which will be 
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remaining as a threat of unemployment to workers. Ginsburg (1979: 47) argues that this role of 
the welfare state is achieved by the social security system as a backup of wage cut strategy so as 
to improve the capitalists' competitiveness. The idea of welfare from the neo-'Marxist point of 
view is perhaps best explained by Offe (1984). He argues that the welfare state is itself highly 
dependent upon the prosperity and continued profitability of the economy instead of being a 
separate and autonomous source of well-being which provides incomes and services as a 
citizen's right. Hence the welfare state has structural limits to its powers as evidenced by its 
reliance on tax revenue (Offe, 1984). 
Neo-Marxist accounts however fail to explain existing patterns of welfare provision such as the 
continuous expansion of the welfare state and the emphasis given to the disadvantaged in 
society, Different countries may respond differently to similar accumulation demands. Countries 
with similar levels of democracy may result in quite different systems and levels of wclfare. The 
diversity of modem political life and the pressures and constraints of democratic politics are 
exceedingly simplified and disregarded by excessive focus on economic determinism that blinds 
neo-Marxism to be able to address similarities and diversities between different countries. 
1.3.3 The Corporatist Approach 
The corporatist approach has placed its theoretical core of power at the complex tripartite 
arrangements involving the state, organised employers (capital), and organised labour. State 
control over prices and markets including wages and investment decisions appears to be 
considerable. Trade unions and business organisations are incorporated by a political structure 
in national planning (Taylor-Gooby and Dale, 1981: 250). However, there appears to be a 
significant difference between corporatist theory and labour movement theory in terms of 
power. The former tends to accept an `end of ideology' perspective in the sense that strong 
labour movements are viewed as distinct from labour dominance. A compromise between 
capital and labour is mediated by the state within a capitalist framework. On the other hand, 
labour movement theory rejects the idea of `end of ideology' as well as that of capitalist 
hegemony. It sees therefore the welfare state as a staging post towards socialism where the 
labour movement is to obtain control over the state for its ultimate end. In this sense, the closest 
ideological stance to this theory is Democratic Socialism. Labour movement theory is 
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interpreted as closer to radicalism than corporatist compromise. Notwithstanding. both theories 
of power have a common feature of the power structure of modern societies. They recognise the 
existence of the large organised interest group engaging in a bargaining process of compromise 
where the state plays a mediating role. 
The essential features of corporatism are that an economy of the corporatist principle is 
primarily based on private ownership with considerable state intervention in the market 
economy by way of a system of wage and price controls and decisions on investment. Moreover, 
the state plays a central role in planning the national economy by incorporating business 
organisations and the trade unions. Another important characteristic of corporatism is that the 
acute class conflict in association with the left is taken for granted by its supporters because state 
intervention under corporatism goes to its maximum limit and almost all areas of social life are 
politicised, thus generating social conflict. Social policy is sometimes viewed as a product of 
this bargaining procedure which generates concessions from the state. These concessions may 
harm capital but the state otherwise remains authoritarian and repressive. 
Corporatist theory places the active role of political elites at the centre of the development of 
social policy. According to Offe (1984: 29), there are three possible circumstances where 
corporatist mechanisms are most feasible. First, when national traditions of opposition by 
capital and labour to the state are weak. Second, when levels of political repression are high and 
third, where uninterrupted economic growth makes a `positive sum game' between capital and 
labour possible. Yet Offe also notes that all of these circumstances cannot be fulfilled, hence his 
suggestion goes beyond the corporatist solution. Social policy develops in the form of social 
services introduced by political elites in order to manipulate organised groups such as trade 
unions and to strengthen the state power in relation to economy as well as society. This in turn 
enables them to maintain social order led by structural integration and equilibrium. Whereas the 
logic of industrialisation thesis, in strong association with the functionalist theory of welfare, 
proposes that industrial development is a key determinant of welfare effort and change, 
corporatist theory explains the role of political elites as a mediator to manage problems created 
by industrialisation. In sum, corporatist explanations of the development of social policy are 
concerned with the analysis of structures in the period of industrialisation. Thus, social policy is 
24 
viewed as `a consequence of the purposeful action of the state in its attempt to maintain an 
integrated corporate structure' (Midgley, 1986: 226). 
Nonetheless, the weakness of corporatist theory lies in various forms. First, there are various 
usages of the concept of corporatism that have obscured meaning. On the one hand, it has 
become very nebulous for it has been used almost everywhere. On the other hand, it is strictly 
attached to a unique phenomenon (Schmitter, 1974: 85). For instance, Esping-Andersen (1990) 
uses `corporatist' to describe the conservative welfare states, while Mishra (1990) uses it to 
describe the social democratic welfare states. The point is made by Ginsburg (1991: 75) that this 
discretionary usage of terms in addition to the synonymous usage of `socialist' and `social 
democratic' by Esping-Andersen engenders a source of confusion. 
Second, the term `corporatism' has been presented in the form of wide variations. Mishra 
(1984: 102) has classified the welfare state model into the pluralist or differentiated welfare state 
and the corporatist or integrated welfare state. In the former, social welfare is seen as distinct 
from the economy and welfare policies are fragmented and residual as seen in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, whereas in the latter, the economy and social welfare are 
interdependent and integrated. Corporatism, the ideal-typical features of the integrated welfare 
state, carries `the logic of collective responsibility for the social economy beyond Keynesianism' 
as seen in the case of Austria and Sweden (Mishra, 1984: 105). Mishra (1984: 106-107) also 
made a clear distinction between liberal (democratic) and authoritarian (dictatorial) forms of 
corporatism. The former is seen as a voluntary and gradual development of corporatism whereas 
the latter is involuntary and imposed by a ruling elite in which political competition and trade 
unions are forcibly integrated by the state apparatus. These variations generate much confusion. 
Third, more theoretically, according to corporatist theory, the more corporatist the polity of a 
country, the larger the welfare state in the form of corporatist arrangements. The more 
corporatist a country, the larger the gap between welfare provisions for the organised and the 
unorganised. This means that we should expect the political equality of citizens in large welfare 
states to be less than in less-developed welfare states' (Therborn, 1986: 142). In other words, it 
is logically expected that the marginalised population of non, or weakly-organised groups in 
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strongly corporatist societies should be more marginalised than those in the weakly corporatist 
or non-corporatist countries. Empirically, this is shown to be wrong because highly corporatist 
countries such as Sweden have been more effective in alleviating relative poverty than weakly 
corporatist countries such as the United States (Therborn, 1986: 144). 
Finally, corporatist theory has been less developed than it might be in the sense that the highly 
corporatist societies such as Sweden, Norway and Austria typically identified by corporatist 
theory have exhibited the largest working-class power resources (Korpi. 1983: 40). This means 
that class solidarity may be a more important determinant than monopolistic, centralised interest 
organisations (Baldwin, 1990: 299; Therborn, 1986: 142). 
Much that has been discussed so far relates to demands of external groups on the government. 
The statists criticize that these demand theories fail to take the state itself seriously as an 
independent actor and as an independent variable. Do the statists provide a distinctly superior 
model of political explanation to the models they criticize? This is the question that we now turn 
to answer. 
1.3.4 The State-Centred Approach 
As an early variant of new (polity-centred) institutional isms which will be discussed in detail 
later in this chapter, the state-centred approach on social policy formation takes the idea that 
instead of similar demands of national circumstances, the state responds in a different way based 
on its particular structure. In other words, while structure-functionalists (industrialism and 
neo-Marxism) see the development of social policy as the functional requisite of 
industrialisation and monopoly capital accumulation, and the social democratic model and 
interest group politics view it as the increasing demand of welfare stimulated by pressure groups 
and working class political conflicts, the state-centred model accepts the idea that all of these 
models have affected the development of the welfare state but are mediated by the state which is 
seen as the active political actor (Evans et al., 1985a; Skocpol and Amenta, 1986: 147-149). That 
is, states are reconceptualised as `autonomous actors and as consequential structures and sets of 
policies' if not entirely but partially (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986: 147). 
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The key actors from the statist perspective are state managers including political elites, 
administrators and policy experts as advisers, those visionary state officials and political leaders 
who have propelled the important part of social policy formation (Ashford, 1986a; Orloff and 
Skocpol, 1984). Further, state structures and policy legacies are conceived as a crucial 
determinant of politics and social actions. Krasner (1984: 225) clarifies one of the characteristics 
of statist arguments that: 
`Political life is characterised, not simply by a struggle over the allocation of resources, but also 
periodically by strife and uncertainty about the rules of the game within which this allocative 
process is carried out'. 
This approach basically pays a great deal of attention to claims that: first, the development of the 
welfare state is primarily determined by key interventions between an inter-state system of state 
managers or executives and policy-relevant expertise (Orloff and Skocpol, 1984); second, 
welfare states develop through a specific process of political learning (Heclo, 1974) which 
considers the actual processes and conditions of policy making and administration; and third, the 
historiographic approach of statism highlights the historical legacy which may have been largely 
ignored by many general theories. 
The weakness of statism however is that the approach has a limited capability to generalise how 
welfare states develop, since statism or the Skocpolian approach stresses a specific historical 
analysis above and against general theory (Amenta and Skocpol, 1986; Skocpol, 1985). Any 
particular pattern of welfare states is not thereby envisaged. Further, the impact of large social 
forces tend to be ignored (Almond, 1988: 872). The borderline between society and the state is 
also sometimes vague, and when agreement is reached, whether borderlines are historically 
constant remains unsolved. Statism furthermore tends to pay less attention to the relation 
between the state and society since a strong state in relation to its social setting does not 
necessarily mean that it ends up providing the most effective solutions to policy problems 
(Ashford, 1986a: 27). 
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1.3.5 Historical Institutionalism 
The emergence of the `new institutionalism' was an attempt to make `comparative politics' 
more explicit. Institutions are seen to be critical in examining both the consequences that they 
may have for actors and actions within their domains and the genesis of and transformation of 
institutional arrangements themselves (Scharpf, 2000: 763). Mostly developed by American 
political scientists, new institutionalists criticise the old tradition of comparative politics that 
they suggest was often deeply normative and compared simply by juxtaposing descriptions of 
different institutional configurations in different countries, hence failing to facilitate explicit 
comparative explanatory theory. Therefore, by incorporating a more behaviouralist approach6, 
new institutionalists attempt to explain systematic differences across countries that had been 
obscured by previous theories (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 3-4). Its core argument is the 
emphasis on institutions as intervening or intermediate variables that shape behaviour and 
political outcomes (Gorges, 2001: 165; Krasner, 1984: 224). 
The aim of any institutional analysis is to find out the relationship between institutions and 
individual behaviour and distinctive political outcomes produced by this relationship. Yet, there 
has been no unified body of thought about what this new institutionalism is and how it differs 
from other approaches. Rather, different schools of thought within the new institutionalism have 
been identified by those who are interested in comparative politics and comparative political 
economy. Nonetheless, all different schools of thought seek to elucidate `the role that 
institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes' (Hall and Taylor, 
1996: 936). Historical institutionalism arose from the works of comparative political scientists. 
While rational choice institutionalism? evolves from rational choice theory and sociological 
6 
Behaviouralists argued that, `in order to understand politics and explain political outcomes, analysts 
should focus not on the formal attributes of government institutions but on informal distributions of 
power, attitudes, and political behavior. Moreover, in contrast to what was perceived as the atheoretical 
work of scholars in the formal-legal tradition, the behavioralist project as a whole was explicitly 
theoretical' (Thelon and Steinmo, 1992: 4). 
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Rational choice institutionalism derives from traditional rational choice theory. Its theoretical origins can 
go , is far back as classical political economy of the eighteenth century. 
Not surprisingly, thus, this 
approach emerged predominantly out of new institutional economics (e. g. North, 1990: Shepsle, 1978, 
19 (), 19'9), 1991; Williamson, 1975,1985). It was then applied to the study of American politics, 
28 
institutionalising from organisation theory, historical institutionalism developed in response to 
the group theories of politics and structural-functionalism in political science during the 1960s 
and 1970s (Hall and Talyor, 1996: 937). Historical institutionalists begin with the idea that the 
renamed as `public choice theory' (e. g. Moe, 1984,1995; North, 1990; Shepsle. 1978,1986,19 89,1991; 
Williamson, 1975,1985). As much economic theory begins with a series of assumptions (e. g. 
game-theory, Pareto-optimum, Nash-equilibrium), rational choice institutionalism starts with an 
assumption that actors are utility maximisers. In order to maximise their utility, they are likely to deduce 
the `preferences of the actors from the structure of the situation itself (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 8). 
Hence, this approach pays primary attention to the use of a series of bargaining games or strategies in order 
to solve individual collective action problems (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 943). As the classic prisoner's 
dilemma game in economic theory shows, for example, the prisoner's choices for the strategies are defined 
and constrained by the changes of the rules (institutions) in order to maximise his or her self-interests. 
Political outcomes are therefore determined by strategic interaction between actors. In this context, 
because institutions structure strategic interactions between actors, institutional arrangements are the key 
to guaranteeing that the actors take a `collectively-superior course of action' (Hall and Taylor, 
1996: 944-945). However, the rational approach or the rational-comprehensive approach has been 
criticised by the incrementalists (Lindblom, 1959; Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993; Simon, 1957). They 
argue that political and bureaucratic roles are complex. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) arrive at an argument 
that organisations may not reach the most rational decision as it is unrealistic or impracticable. This 
incrementalism suggests politics is based on ad hocism and situational expediency rather than rational 
utility maximising. Moreover, this approach fails to explain why a set of policies are adopted by 
decision-makers at particular times and places. Decision making can be rational at ceratin times; at other 
times it is incremental. At the beginning of a programme, for instance, policy-makers may rank their 
objectives to select the preferred option, but once the programme is in place decisions may become 
incremental. 
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If the rational choice approach arose from the works of economists, sociological institutionalism derived 
from the works of sociologists. Sociological institutionalists see rational action itself as socially 
constructed. Powell (1991: 187) made this point clear, arguing that `even the most efficiently-minded 
organizations rely on socially constructed beliefs such as more is better'. Thus, while rational choice 
institutionalists contend that strategic calculations of individuals are affected by institutions, sociological 
institutionalists argue that institutions affect their most basic preferences and very identity too. Hall and 
Taylor (1996: 949) point out that `if rational choice theorists often posit a world of individuals or 
organizations seeking to maximize their material well-being, sociologists frequently posit a world of 
individuals or organizations seeking to define and express their identity in socially appropriate ways'. 
Thus, in contrast to a `logic of instrumentality' modelled by rational choice institutionalists, sociological 
institutionalists understand the relationship between institutions and actions as a `logic of (social) 
appropriateness'. Rothstein (1996) argues therefore that institutions inform the relevant actors about what 
they ought to prefer in the specific situation. He made plain that `institutions not only determine actors' 
preferences but also to some extent create them. Institutions create or socially construct the actors' 
identities, belonging, definitions of reality and shared meanings. In a given institutional setting, the agent 
usually does not calculate xvhat action would enhance his or her utility the most. Instead, by reference to 
the institutional setting... tiw'hat is the appropriate action for such an individual in this situation' (Rothstein, 
1996: 147). Hall and Talyor (1996: 951) also concur that cultural ly-specific repertoires can be a decisive 
factor when a highly instrumental actor makes their choice. Actors choose the strategies that may be 
atthcted by the institutional environment. 
29 
assumptions considering political actors as rational maximisers are overly confining. Instead, 
they tend to follow Simon's model of 'bounded rationality' whereby human behaviour is 
`limited' though not `irrational' (Simon, 1957,1985). 
Given this, historical institutionalists argue that institutions shape not just actors' strategies, as 
rational choice institutionalists have argued, but also their goals. This approach therefore 
suggests that individual preferences are not simply determined by actors' own self-interests. 
Rather, preferences are often socially and politically constructed and sometimes in conflict. 
Because more than one, often conflicting, interests are involved in preference formation, 
historical institutionalists argue that the political processes should be examined within the 
structure of how particular coalitions are formed (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). In this respect, 
historical institutionalism owes its theoretical groundings to pluralism or interest-group politics 
on the one hand and structural functionalism from neo-Marxism on the other. 
Compared to the state-centred approach which takes institutions and political beliefs more 
seriously (Krasner, 1984: 228), historical institutionalists have made an attempt to link initially 
state-focussed analysis of institutions with other social and political institutions in order to find 
out the logic behind structural interactions that generate distinctive national trajectories. For 
example, by comparing the British and French economy, Hall (1986) made an extensive linkage 
between the state and society. He argues from the contemporary historical institutionalist point 
of view that there is a certain institutional logic to the process of economic intervention within 
which interests are articulated, ideas are disseminated, and market behaviour is constructed. 
Also, most studies conducted by this school are exclusively guided by the method of 
cross-national comparisons of public policy (e. g. Hall, 1986, Immergut, 1992b; Pierson, 1994b). 
However, especially, where and when the historical institutional analysis is confined to a 
country-specific case study (e. g. Skocpol, 1992), this approach tends to be eclectic and diffuse. 
Nonetheless, the historical institutionalist framework captures critical junctures. Thelen and 
Steinmo (1992: 10) made plain: 
`This approach has been applied in a wide range of empirical settings, but in each case what has 
made this approach so attractive is the theoretical leverage it has provided for understanding 
policy continuities over time within countries and policy variations across 
countries... institutionalists have constructed important analytic bridges: between state-centered 
30 
and society-centered analyses by looking at the institutional arrangements that structure relations 
between the two, and between grand theories that highlight broad cross-national regularities and 
narrower accounts of particular national cases, by focusing on intermediate-level variables that 
illuminate sources of "variation of a common theme. "' 
Hall and Taylor (1996) have also pointed out that historical institutionalism is distinctive in that 
it pays attention to a particular concern with contingency and the unintended consequences of 
strategic action, with the distribution of power, often unevenly distributed across social groups 
in the polity, and with a focus on the path dependency of institutional change. The core 
arguments of historical institutionalism are also made by March and Olson (1989: 5-6): 
`[I]nstitutions and behavior... evolve through some form of efficient historical process. An 
efficient historical process.. . 
is one that moves rapidly to a unique solution, conditional on 
current environmental conditions, and is independent of the historical path. ' 
Thus, historical institutionalists have been especially attentive to historical development. 
Historical institutionalism develops further to provide a theoretical basis which offers an image 
of social causation. This image of social causation is `path dependent' and can explain changes 
that occur during the process of political interactions. 
First, an image of social causation is `path dependent' in the sense that the same operative forces 
will not always generate the same results everywhere. The `effect of such forces will be 
mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past' (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 941). Largely drawn from Tilly's contention (Tilly, 1994), Hay and Wincott 
(1998: 955) clarify the term `path dependence' as `the order in which things happen affects how 
they happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain point itself constrains the trajectory after 
that point; and the strategic choices made at a particular moment eliminate whole ranges of 
possibilities from later choices while serving as the very condition of existence of others. ' Early 
analysts of the historical institutional tradition put a special emphasis on the impact of existing 
`state capacities' and `policy legacies' on subsequent policy choices (Weir and Skocpol, 1985). 
But later analysts of the tradition have developed it one step further. For instance, Pierson (1993, 
1994b, 2000a) has developed this notion of a `path' to development by paying particular 
attention to the process of `policy-feedback' or `increasing-returns' in policies that are costly to 
shift. He argues that increasing returns provide an answer to the question of why broadly similar 
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countries developed highly specialised comparative advantages. The reason is that positive 
feedback effects help countries that gain a lead in a particular field to consolidate that lead over 
time. Pierson (2000a: 255) points out that: 
`Comparative advantage is not simply given, it is often created through a sequence of events 
over time ... A single gain in knowledge can be applied in many settings and can lead to dramatic improvements in productivity. Economic growth generates the positive feedback that defines 
increasing returns processes. ' 
Second, although historical institutionalists by and large view `change' as the consequence of 
strategic action in an institutional context that favours certain options over others, they also 
believe that institutions are not the only causal force in making a change. Socioeconomic 
development and the diffusion of ideas are also considered to be important factors. In other 
words, how political ideas are filtered through institutional structures in the formation of 
specific policies should be answered by giving due attention to the role of ideas in shaping 
institutional trajectories (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 956-957). 
In answer to this question, along with the relationship between structures and agents, Hall and 
Taylor (1998) argue that not just institutions but ideas (new ideas) can change the basic and 
strategic preferences of actors. Because actors' preferences are multiple in nature, how to define 
the relevant issue will affect the choice that actors make. The kind of ideas that might matter to 
actors also appears important. The kind of ideas could range from information about the causal 
relations that govern the world or the likely behaviour of other actors to moral visions about 
what is good or what is bad (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a). A course of action chosen by 
actors is likely to be governed by a repertoire of ideas, rather than a set of ideas because ideas are 
the `building blocks of action' (Hall and Taylor, 1998: 962). 
Although historical insitutionalism has been seen as an alternative to existing grand theories, it 
has also been subject to criticisms. It seems possible to summarise three sets of criticisms. First, 
rational choice theorists criticise historical institutionalism as inelegant, atheoretical and 
storytelling or historical narratives. The reason for this is partly because many studies in this 
srlýool have been motivated by `substantive issues rather than a narrow theoretical program' 
(Inimergut, 1998: 27) and partly because it has been seen as a mere synthesis of a series of 
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existing theories. The point has been made clear by Immergut (1998: 2,7). arguing that the 
historicist stress on indeterminacy and uniqueness mitigates against theory building'. 
Hay and Wincott (1998) also argue that a distinction made by Hall and Taylor (1998) between 
calculus and a cultural approach within historical institutionalism is basically a distinction 
between rational choice and sociological institutionalism. To an extent, this may be one of the 
strengths that historical institutionalists provide. By linking different variables instead of 
pointing to particular variables that are often decisive, historical analyses focus on the balance 
between `necessary complexity' and `desirable parsimony' (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 12-13). 
Fiorina (1995: 109) nonetheless points out that `institutionalism is not an approach or a set of 
commitments. Rather, institutions are subject matter to be approached in different ways by 
scholars with different interests operating out of different traditions. Here, as elsewhere, let a 
thousand flowers bloom'. Immergut (1998: 27) argues that the historical institutionalists tend to 
criticise a dominant model by showing where the facts do not fit. But this leaves them wavering 
between the `moral anarchy of postmodernism' and `falling back into the social determinists' 
reduction of social justice to the coordinates of the social structure'. 
Another criticism comes from inside the school, arguing that partly because institutionalists tend 
to place a great deal of emphasis on institutional constraints instead of institutional possibilities, 
the earlier approaches of the tradition have been relatively confined in the terrain of policy 
outcomes. This in turn means researchers offer few explanations of change and possibility 
focussing instead on continuity and impossibility (Ikenberry, 1988; Krasner, 1984; Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992). Though the recent historical institutionalists are increasingly looking for the 
answer to why and how institutions change, they do not take into account normative questions 
about institutions, ideas and changes. While they argue that institutions are shaped 
by human 
beings who are `conscious and deliberating, and more or less rational' (Rothstein, 1990: 318), 
they ignore the question of why institutions should be arranged to benefit human beings. This 
impossibility theorem endangers the `possibility of social policy' that raises normative enquiries 
such that the world can and should be changed to become a better place to 
live. Unlike social 
determinists such as Marxists, it is unclear where historical institutionalists position themselves 
in an ideological spectrum ranging from social reformer to system conformer. 
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The last set of criticisms comes from comparative political economists, arguing that historical 
institutionalists emphasise the causal significance of institutional arrangements and neglect the 
effects of other structural variables. For example. Pontusson (1995: 130) arrives at his argument 
that the `causal significance of economic-structural variables ought to be an object of empirical 
analysis rather than being dismissed to clear the way for an analysis of the effects of political or 
intermediate-level institutions'. Then, he concludes that `we should pay more systematic 
attention not only to economic institutions but also to a range of economic-structural variables 
that lie beyond the conventional confines of institutional analysis' (Pontusson, 1995: 143 ). 
1.3.6 Discussion 
Each theory exhibits a rather different mode of explanation. Nonetheless, some of then such as 
functionalist welfare-industrialisation, neo-Marxism, and corporatism, tend to share common 
features. The emergence of modern statutory welfare provision, for instance, is based on 
industrialisation and the role of political elites is placed at the centre even though purposeful 
initiatives of operating programmes vary depending on their objectives (Midgley, 1986: 227). 
To figure out the distinctive positions of each theory, theories of the welfare state can be 
summarised by questioning each theory's distinctive treatment of `who benefits from the 
welfare state? ' In answer to this question, proponents of the logic of industrialism have 
demonstrated that the socially marginalised group tends to benefit from the welfare state9. The 
social demands of the disadvantaged group resulting from industrialisation are largely fulfilled 
through the welfare state. In contrast, both the corporatist theory or interest group politics and 
neo-Marxism disagree with the fact that welfare states develop on behalf of the marginalised 
groups such as the poor and low wage workers. The difference lies in the sense that the 
disadvantaged groups are still excluded as the welfare state develops because of the nature of the 
capitalist economy from the neo-Marxist point of view and, from the corporatist viewpoint, that 
the marginalised groups fail to be integrated due to their fundamentally weak political power. 
9 
The social democratic model shares this view and explains that as this marginalised group - the working 
class - has enlarged its political power, welfare states have thereby developed. 
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As we have seen, historical institutionalism does not pro\ ide explicit answers to this question. 
However, the benefits of the historical institutionalist approach stand out in demonstrating the 
relations between particular kinds of politics and specific institutional arrangements. This 
approach helps to identify cross-national differences and the persistence or changes of patterns 
or policies over time. By focussing on the institutions that shape political strategies, people' 
ideas, attitudes, and preferences, it offers a `framework for directly confronting the central 
question of choice and constraint in understanding political life' (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 28). 
There is little doubt that historical institutionalism provides many strategic advantages in the 
analysis of social policy development. In addition, Reich (2000) argues that in analytic terms a 
different form of institutionalism is most compatible with different respective policy domain. 
Given this, historical institutionalism seems best suited for its explanatory power in the context 
of redistributive policies10. 
Despite a number of strategic advantages, its theoretical applicability is not always valid. For 
example, Gorges (2001) has applied the new institutionalist approach to the case of social 
dialogue in the European Union (EU), and concluded that it cannot account for why the social 
dialogue was institutionalised in a particular form at a particular time. Kwon (1999a) has 
adopted this approach and argued that it has a strategic advantage in the analysis of social policy 
development in Korea. He argues that `most social policy decisions have been made in a 
confined institutional terrain, to which only a small number of decision makers had access until 
the democratisation process began' (Kwon, Huck-Ju, 1999a: 17). However, as he clearly points 
out, this assertion is only valid before the democratisation movement. As seen earlier through 
the review of a wide range of literature, other political institutions apart from a small group of 
decision makers have increasingly become critical in the process of decision making. Shin 
(2000b: 56) also points out that most studies within historical institutionalism pay little attention 
to the interrelationship between economic policy and social policy, thereby providing little 
10 
Reich (2000: 512) argues that `historical patterns of development are very influential in the broad 
determination of "who gets what", limiting the propensities for change in an environment where the state 
looms so importantly in the context of primarily domestic considerations. Domestic interests therefore 
compete within an environment where external factors may condition the size of the pie, but not how it 
gets divided-the latter being strictly a zero-sum game'. 
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explanation of the dynamic linkage between them. This is because historical institutionalism 
tends to focus on the `regularities of policy reform that are typical of the resilient institutional 
characteristics of different political economies' (Shin, Dong-Myeon. 2000b: 56). We now turn 
to review how these Western-built theories of welfare have been applied to the development of 
social policy in Korea. 
1.4 Theoretical Application to the Development of Social Policy in Korea 
The development of social policy in Korea has been extremely incremental and ad hoc, and on 
a discontinuous and piecemeal basis. However, theoretical application has been made by various 
schools of thought. First, mostly carried out by economists, the early studies on the development 
of social security in Korea share the tradition of the functionalist approach. Social policy 
develops as the national economy begins to grow, they argue. Park (1975) stresses that social 
security programmes should be designed in order to maintain a balance within the broad 
framework of socioeconomic development. Kwon (1993b) argues that social development in 
Korea has lagged behind its economic growth because of overarching development strategies. 
These studies have made important contributions to understanding the development of social 
policy in Korea in that social development cannot be ignored in the paradigm of economic 
growth. In other words, the emphasis was given to the relationship between economic growth 
and the gradual expansion of social expenditure spending. Nonetheless, they fail to explain why 
a set of welfare programmes came to be introduced at a particular point in time. Also, their 
emphasis on the government expenditure approach ignores the variation of items, financing 
mechanisms, and service delivery of welfare' 1 
Second, the application of neo-Marxist perspectives can be subdivided into two streams. The 
first application has evolved from the social control functions of social policy. Ham (1986) 
argues that by analysing welfare laws and welfare expenditures as dependent variables, social 
welfare had been used as the means of social control from the First to the Fifth Republic of 
Korea (1948-1988). The governments introduced a series of welfare laws and increased welfare 
II 
For more detailed criticisms on the government expenditure approach, see Castles (1994); Korpi (1989); 
K\von (1997). 
6 1 
expenditures during the period of political turmoil evidenced by constitutional violation for 
example but returned back to as they were when the issues of political illegitimacy no longer 
remained at stake. The other application has derived from the idea of monopoly capitalism 
perspectives. For instance, Moon (1993) argues that as capitalism develops. monopolistic 
capitalism is exposed by intensified contradictions and that, in turn, these contradictions became 
threatening to the given regime so it introduces social policy measures to counter these threats. 
Both these applications open the way to a deeper understanding of the various roles and 
functions of social policies. Nonetheless, these explanations are bound to a specific type of 
political regime. They also fail to account for the increasingly beneficial character of the social 
security system in modern Korea. More importantly, they ignore the fact that the unintended 
consequences of welfare state legislation may significantly strengthen the defensive powers of 
the working class. 
Third, under the corporatist tradition, there seem to exist two waves of interpretation. First, the 
earlier school of corporatism reaches the conclusion that the underdevelopment of state welfare 
in Korea is caused by the weak structure of corporatist arrangements between labour, capital, 
and the state (Choi, Jang-Jip, 1984,1987,1989; Im, Hyug Baeg, 1987; Shim-han, Young-hee, 
1986-1987). In other words, state labour policy had by and large been authoritarian, coercive and 
exclusionary until the late 1980s. Consequently, there was no tripartite agreement amongst large 
business organisations and their workers and the state in the period of 1960s to the end of 1980s 
in Korea, because interest representation organised by workers had been excluded from these 
bargaining procedures. Second, after the democratisation movement (see Chapter 2), company 
welfare began and continued to grow. This transition enabled employees to achieve better 
welfare provisions, yet by providing welfare benefits, employers were able to control their 
employees where necessary (Park, Charnim, 1996). Therefore, social policy is seen as a product 
of bargaining procedures which generate concessions from the state 
12. 
12 
For the detailed criticisms about the application of corporatism to the development of state welfare in 
Korea, see Chapter I. 
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Fourth, while working class mobilisation thesis or interest group politics has not exclusively 
been applied to the development of state welfare in Korea due largely to the across-the-board 
weaknesses of its applicability, the fourth category became an important part of studies 
produced by those who paid a great deal of attention to political variables. These studies vary 
greatly in their central concern of analysis ranging from (1) state-autonomy; (2) the nature of 
political regime; and (3) the process of policy-making. They differ from previously 
normative-based studies in which Western-built welfare states are set a model to emulate in 
order to suggest the future orientations of the Korean welfare state (e. g. Koh, Se-Hoon, 1992; 
Lee, Sang-Young, 1997; Rhee, Sang-Yoon, 1990; Won, Yong Chan, 1992). The first 
perspective derives from the state-centred approach with a clear focus on the correlation 
between state-autonomy and welfare expenditures or welfare policies. The state is viewed as an 
actor that provides resources from this perspective (Chung, Moo-Kwon, 1992). This study has 
focussed on the configuration of the executive branch, especially between economic and social 
ministries, and argued that the more autonomous the state is, the lower the level of welfare 
expenditures, while the lesser the autonomy of the state, the higher the level of welfare 
expenditures. Another approach was made by Kwon (1999a) from the same perspective but he 
has focussed on the political interests of state elites and policy experts. He argues that the 
political and institutional logic behind social policy in Korea has been primarily determined by 
the `politics of legitimation'. He explains that a set of social policy programmes were introduced 
at a particular time in Korean history in order to legitimise the activities of those in power. 
The second perspective has focussed on the nature of the political regime as a framework that 
produces welfare policies (Seong, Kyoung-Ryung, 1990,1995: Ch. 9; Im, Hyug-Baeg, 1989). 
These studies argue that under the authoritarian regime, social factors such as the power of 
interest groups are weak concerning the making of welfare policy, while political response in 
relation to social demands is likely to be elastic under the democratic regime. These studies have 
explained why democratisation occurs from the correlational dynamics between the state and 
society. Democratisation is seen to be a critical factor in developing welfare programmes. 
Working-class mobilisation thesis or interest group politics therefore also comes to be critical in 
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the process of democratisation13. 
The third perspective has focussed on the process of policy making by examining detailed cases 
of welfare programmes. Using qualitative research methods, these studies have at their core the 
analysis of the role of major actors, but differ in terms of the central attention of the analysis, 
placing emphasis on different aspects such as political elites, especially bureaucratic elites, 
executive branches, and the National Assembly. These 'studies have enabled us to conduct 
micro-analyses of the process of policy-making by examining dynamic correlations in policy 
formation. Some of these studies have focussed on the role of executive branches (Oh, 
Chung-Soo, 1987; Chun, Nam-Jin, 1981), bureaucratic elites (Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 1981), and 
relations between interest groups and the state's response in the process of health insurance 
making from the institutional perspective (Park, Chan-Ung, 1997). Others have paid more 
attention to the role of the National Assembly (Huh, Man-Hyung, 1995; Song, Hee-Jun, 1992) 
and the dynamic relations between political actors within it (Choi, Jeong-Won, 1998). Finally, 
if studies under the fourth category have focussed on political factors in the process of 
policy-formation, others have paid more attention to the development of political economy 14, 
and attempted to find the linkage between economic policy and social policy (Lee, Hye-Kyung, 
1999; Shin, Dong-Myeon, 2000a, 2000b). These studies explain the development of social 
policy in Korea within the framework of economic policy while stressing the historical 
13 
The timing of welfare reforms is by and large contingent and dependent upon the interest and skills of state 
decision makers. Notwithstanding, normal procedures of policy making can be simplified and speeded up 
during times of threat by working class or other popular movements to the existing social and political 
order (Therborn, 1986: 159). Further, perspectives of those who are in opposition movements on welfare 
are of considerable importance as seen in the invalid applicability of the working-class mobilisation thesis 
to Korea since trade unions made no efforts to enforce the introduction of welfare programmes once their 
political power was acquired through political struggle (Kwon, Huck-Ju, 1999a: 15). 
14 
This tradition asks whether the economic logic, which is often regarded as impeccable, is immune to 
political and traditional values. It thus involves a careful consideration of the pull factor of supply 
including political determinants of policy making, the timing and the nature of social reforms, and its 
relations with exogenous factors such as political turbulence and electoral period (e. g. the timing of 
introducing four major social insurance programmes: the Industrial Accidents Insurance Programme in 
1964, the National Health Insurance Programme in 1965, the National Pension Programme in 1988 and 
the Employment Insurance Programme in 1995). 
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transformation of the state welfare system. They have broadened the scope of analysis in the 
development of state welfare in that socioeconomic and political variables have been 
systematically integrated. Changes of regime and institutional arrangements, for example, are 
given attention. 
In sum, there is little doubt that general theories have both strategic advantages and 
disadvantages in the analysis of the development of social policy in Korea. However, the later 
application made by the fourth and final category has enabled us to enlarge a scope of analysis. 
These studies have captured important variables including socioeconomic structure and 
international market, social coalitions, the requirements of economic policy, and policy legacies. 
Surprisingly however, very little is known about the role of ideas, especially those embodied in 
social programmes: (1) how the initial intentions of these ideas have been formed; (2) how these 
ideas go through the process of policy-making that often results in metamorphosis of the original 
notions; (3) how particular ideas take a particular institutional form at a particular time in 
history; (4) where those ideas come from (the sources of ideas); and (5) the conditions under 
which particular norms and rules are diffused and adopted. These questions should be answered 
in the process of policy formation, implementation, and evaluation because ideas themselves 
cannot cause outcomes (Jacobsen, 1995; Yee, 1996). They must still be translated into a 
particular organisational form or policy (Gorges, 2001). Answers to these questions would 
contribute to solving the puzzles of how ideas matter given the overdetermined nature of 
dependent variables and the significance of other independent variables. In order to answer these 
questions, we now turn to build up a new framework. 
1.5 A Framework for Polio' Formation, Change and Outcomes 
Institutional change and political outcomes are not only shaped by institutions themselves but 
also by exogenous, non-institutional or systemic variables. Historical institutionalists have made 
a major contribution to introducing a number of useful explanatory variables including policy 
ideas, yet these variables seem to be laid out on a per-need basis rather than with any regularity. 
In order to place these variables in a logical framework that may better explain policy formation, 
change and outcomes, we have developed a triangular formation of social policy making as seen 
in Figure 1.1. This model aims to simplify the vast array of decisions and form,, of behaviour that 
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characterise social policy making. Because the policy process is complex and apparently chaotic. 
there is a need to impose some conceptual order on the policy process in order to comprehend it. 
If models try to include the role of all the political actors who have some say in decision-making 
and tried to take account of the many disjunctures and contingencies, they might not be able to 
do any more than describe the complexity. We now turn to the operational grounds of ideas, to 
the process of their interaction, and to the results and outcomes of social policies. 
Figure 1. l has a number of implications for the correlation between the making of social policy, 
the structure of social policy, and the outcomes of social policy. Figure 1.1 illustrates that how 
ideas are configured under what condition and in what context (Box 1); how this formation 
becomes institutionalised (Box 2); and how this process becomes subject to evaluation (Box 3). 
It implies that the process of social policy formation is not in a linear continuum. Critical 
decisions taken by decision-makers are affected by conditions and contexts, as well as their 
subsequent consequences. Box I is formed in triangular formation because variables interact 
and are subject to coordination. No single variable determines the optimum status. This model 
focusses on the dynamics and processes of a political system in its own context. 
Figure 1.1 A Systematic Model for the Social Policy Process 
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1.5.1 Policy, Ideas, Policy Learning and Policy Transfer 
Ideas are interpreted differently by those who interpret institutional choices and changes in a 
different way. Rational choice institutionalists believe that the founders of institutions trv to 
institutionalise particular sets of rules and choices to prevent future defection. Thus, institutions 
are a product of deliberate choice and reflect a certain equilibrium. Yet, institutional outcomes 
are not in uniformity. Utility maximisers could be satisfied by many different institutional 
outcomes. From this, ideas are introduced in their analysis. For them, ideas serve as a focussing 
device, facilitating the selection of one best equilibrium. They introduce ideas in their analysis 
of institutions in order to answer the question of what accounts for institutional choice and 
change. The answer is that ideas help `actors achieve their desired ends' (Garrett and Weingast, 
1993: 178). 
For some historical institutionalists, ideas are brought in as an explanatory variable in specific 
attempts to link society and the state. Ashford (1986a: 30) argues that `perhaps the most brutal 
distortion imposed on our interpretation of welfare states by the socio-economic analyses is that 
the formulation and transmission of concepts and ideas necessarily becomes a residual 
problem'. In other words, the intricacies of the struggle of ideas are excluded in the analyses of 
welfare states. The significance of the role of ideas becomes increasingly clearer in the hands of 
those who are engaged in a historical approach. According to Hall (1993), the ideas that actors 
share affect policies that change over time. The `policy paradigm' is a causal factor in a process 
of institutional change that occurs through changes in either the instruments and means they 
employ to pursue their goals, or the goals and ends themselves' 5. Hall (1989b) also argues that 
15 
Inspired by Kuhn's (1970) `scientific paradigm', Hall (1993) has developed an interpretive framework 
that distinguishes three subtypes of changes in a `policy paradigm'. First order change occurs when there 
are changes in instrument settings influenced by experience and new knowledge while the overall goals 
and instruments themselves remain the same. Second order change occurs when both policy instruments 
and their settings change in response to past experience change while the hierarchy of goals behind policy 
remains the same. Third order change occurs when there are changes in all these three components of 
policy change. This third order change rarely takes place but when it does, it is likely to reflect a 'very 
different process. marked by the radical changes in the overarching- terms of policy discourse' while the 
first and second order change reflects a process that `adjusts policy without challenging the overall terms 
of a given policy paradigm'. In short, `if first and second order changes preserve the broad continuities 
usually found in patterns of policy, third order change is often a more disjunctive process associated wk ith 
periodic discontinuities in policy' (Flail, 1993: 279). 
42 
the policy makers' response to Keynesian ideas and their subsequent diffusion have been 
conditioned not only by the economic viability of those ideas, but also by their administrative 
and political viability. Given this, we argue that this process of conditioning would greatly 
influence the formation of social policy. The process of conditioning often results in the 
metamorphosis of the original ideas. Original ideas, whether they are right or wrong and just or 
unjust, may not be institutionalised in their original form. Ideas can become a politicised 
instrument which can have a major impact on policy change 16. 
A successful application of ideas to policy choice over time requires a greater specification of 
how ideas emerge and change or evolve and are selected for (Haas, 1992: 27). The construction 
of ideas and their dissemination are greatly affected by `policy learning' or `policy transfer' 
which is also an important part of policy change. Primarily developed by comparative policy 
analysts, a focus on learning as the source of policy change challenges existing conflict-based 
theories. Learning theory is also advantageous in explaining how political actors or decision 
makers take a certain course of action under conditions of uncertainty. Heclo (1974: 305) points 
out that `politics finds its sources not only in power but also in uncertainty - men collectively 
wondering what to do'. 
Conceptually, policy learning is a collective term that encompasses five conceptions of learning 
- political learning (Heclo, 1974), government learning (Etheredge, 1981), policy-oriented 
learning (Sabatier, 1987,1988), lesson-drawing (Rose, 1988,1991,1993) and social learning 
(Hall, 1993). Yet, Bennett and Howlett (1992: 278) argue that these concepts are not, in fact, 
interchangeable. They have different origins and describe different aspects of the learning 
process. For instance, Heclo (1974) identifies the high level politicians and civil servants to be 
key actors of policy learning. For Etheredge (1981), key actors extend to most civil servants and 
10 
Hood (1994: 2-18) identifies four possible forces of the cause of policy change ranging from new ideas, the 
pressure of interests, changes in environments, to the legacies of previous policies (see also Joo, Jaehyun, 
1999a, 1999b). I lowever, wie should bear in mind that `interests are interpenetrated by ideas, but then 
ideas must be shown to exert influence untainted by the interests they have just been shown to 
interpenetrate' (Jacobsen, 1995: 286). In other words, 'ideas and interests are "not separate entities, only 
analytically separable ones"' (Jacobsen, 199-5: 309). Further, these factors have overlapping elements and 
there are certainly grey areas bet%v cen each of them. 
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state organisations, while Sabatier (1987,1988), Rose (1988,1991,1993) and Hall (1993) consider 
complex arrangements of state and societal actors in various types of domestic and transnational 
policy networks and policy communities as key actors. In discussing different types of learning, 
Heclo (1974) is concerned with the substance and process of policy. In Etheredge's (1981) view, 
it is organisational features of state bureaucracies that key actors learn. For Sabatier (1987, 
1988) and Rose (1988,1991,1993), what is learned is instruments and programmes adopted by 
governments to implement policies. In Hall's (1993) view, learning affects fundamental beliefs 
and values which underlie public policies, thereby actors learn both policy goals and the means 
of implementing policy. 
Despite all these differences outlined by different scholars, each concept has one notion in 
common. That is, policy learning refers to `a commonly described tendency for some policy 
decisions to be made on the basis of knowledge of past experiences and knowledge-based 
judgements as to future expectations' (Bennett and Howlett, 1992: 278). Policy learning is often 
carried out by studying past initiatives. Criticisms and lessons learned from past experiences 
inform contemporary choices. At the same time, lessons learned can be both positive and 
negative. Yet, positive lessons do not necessarily result in positive impact on policy change 
because political actors operate within structural constraints. This policy learning approach can 
offer the answers to the questions of how ideas are formed and diffused through institutional 
structure. 
To an extent, policy learning is one of many different forms of policy transfer'7. In other words, 
both policy learning and policy transfer are concerned with the `process in which knowledge 
about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in 
the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or 
place' (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 344). However, the distinction between the two can be made 
by asking whether the process of policy learning or policy transfer takes place on a voluntary 
basis. While most cases of policy learning assume that it occurs voluntarily, policy transfer can 
17 
Doltiowv itz and Marsh (1996: 357) defines policy transfer as `the process by which actors borrow policies 
developed in one setting to develop programmes and policies within another'. 
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also occur involuntarily, thereby policy transfer sometimes being a term preferred to policy 
learning (see Dolowitz, Greenwold and Marsh, 1999). Voluntary policy transfer occurs in many 
cases, two of which are Thatcher's adoption of a dependency culture and Labour's borrowing of 
welfare to work policy from the United States. Involuntary or coercive policy transfer rarely 
occurs, but when it does, it often involves supra-national institutions that play a key role. For 
example, when the East-Asian financial crisis occurred in the late 1990s, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) stipulated certain economic and social policies that had to be 
implemented if a loan was to be granted. 
The analysis of the policy transfer or policy learning process enables us to identify both main 
categories of actors who are engaged directly or indirectly in the process of policy making and 
different categories of a subject for policy change. Identifying the key actors will enable us to 
examine different motivations that different actors have. At the same time, identifying different 
categories of a subject for policy change will enable us to analyse the relationship between 
policy change and policy failure, and between policy configuration and policy implementation. 
In short, policy transfer may shape policy change, but at the same time, it may also lead to 
implementation failure (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 2 1). This is however not to argue that policy 
transfer is the sole explanation of any policy development but to argue that the analysis of policy 
change requires the analysis of policy transfer which may or may not be contextually explicit. 
1.5.2 Decision-Making Point, Conditionality and Contextuality 
The first box in Figure 1.1 illustrates a triangular formation in which policy ideas, policy 
learning and policy transfer operate. The first component of this triangular formation is a 
`decision-making point'. This includes veto points that are `points of strategic uncertainty that 
arise from the logic of the decision process itself (Immergut, 1992a: 66). Immergut (1992a, 
1992b) has brought in the concept of the `effective point of decision', and argued that the ability 
of executive governments to introduce new policies is constrained by the rules of the game. 
These rules of the game are primarily formed by constitutional rules and electoral results. These 
institutional and political hurdles direct decision-making along different path in different 
politics. A small change in the rules of the game however may change the location of the veto 
points and their strategic importance. Different policy outputs result (e. g. specific pieces of 
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legislation), depending on the location of the effective point of decision, ranging from the 
executive arena, the parliamentary arena, or the electoral arena. 
However, we shall not use the term `effective point of decision' in favour of the point of 
decision-making because important policy decisions are not always effectively made. Further, 
the point of decision-making may stay in one particular position or may vary with time and 
change. If we narrow down our analytic focus only on the concept of veto points rather than the 
general location of decision-making points, we are likely to undermine the role of other political 
actors such as policy experts, executive ministries, policy administrators, political parties, 
interest groups and the National Assembly. Given a variety of actors engaged in the process of 
policy-making, policy network analysts have developed the concept of `epistemic and 
epistemic-like communities' as carriers of ideas. They argue that the question of how an idea has 
or has not impacted on policy requires an examination of the particular network or community 
involved. For example, Haas (1992: 27) points out that the `ideas would be sterile without 
carriers, who function more or less as cognitive baggage handlers as well as gatekeepers 
governing the entry of new ideas into institutions'. Haas (1992: 3) also defines an epistemic 
community as `a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain 
or issue-area'. Members of epistemic communities are often not involved in the 
decision-making process. Yet, this knowledge-based network plays a role in reducing 
uncertainty that decision-makers confront by articulating the causal relationships of complex 
problems, helping them identify their interests, identifying salient points for negotiation, 
framing the issues for collective debate, and proposing specific policies and/or programmes' 8. 
By focussing on the role of epistemic communities, we shall argue that the construction of social 
policy is greatly affected by the political infiltration of an epistemic community into governing 
institutions. The analysis of epistemic community will also enable us to answer how ideas are 
constructed and accepted, how these ideas are diffused, and why some ideas prevail over others. 
lti 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 12) identify that policies are `broader statements of intention' and `generally 
denote the direction policy-makers wish to take', while programmes are `the specific means of the course 
of action used to implement policies'. Thus, 'each policy can have multiple programs, while a program is 
a complete course of action in and of itself. 
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The second component of triangular formation is `conditionalitv'. Largely drawn from the 'logic 
of situation' identified by Popper (1957: 149), it implies that the conditions of society are in a 
constant flow that cannot be the same again thus preventing any possible outcomes being 
repeated. For instance, welfare reform or social progress cannot only be explained by the 
decision made by decision-makers but also by conditions on which it may depend. Also, the 
present conditions are at least partially conditioned by their past. In this respect, it contains 
`policy legacies' identified by historical institutionalists (Weir and Skocpol, 1985). The actual 
historical patterns of revolutions were explained by Skocpol's examination on both international 
and domestic political conditions that produced different outcomes of three great revolutions in 
France, Russia, and China (Skocpol, 1979). Institutional change therefore must be examined by 
an institutional analysis of the conditions of progress (Popper, 1957: 154). 
Then, we may have to ask the question of what constitutes this conditionality under which 
institutional change occurs. It is important because decision-makers' perceptions and behaviour 
are governed by the best solution within given situations (Sabatier, 1988). First, we need to 
focus on administrative conditions partly because the administrative system is to meet 
value-oriented demands with available means of control and partly because the way in which 
benefits and services are delivered is at the heart of the system of mass surveillance. Second, we 
need to pay attention to legal conditions because (1) welfare legislation provides the basis of the 
introduction of a set of welfare programmes; (2) legislation itself declares the accountability of 
the state; (3) the legislation reflects both the political legislative intention of the system and 
effectiveness of administration as an empirical aspect as well as the changing patterns of social 
expenditure. Therefore it is also important to take account of the timing and contents of a set of 
legislative measures. 
Further, beyond the logic of situation or perhaps as a part of it, an analysis of social movements 
is a necessary component in explaining institutional change. In addition to the collective entities 
such as states, governments, or markets, we should produce an analysis of political situations as 
well as of social movenme nts. We need studies of these social institutions through which ideas 
may spread and captivate individuals, of the v, wav in which new traditions may be created, and of 
the Nvav in which traditions work and break down. The impact of social movements is likely to 
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structure socioeconomic conditions in part }'et the reverse order may also be possible. This 
includes international relations and international pressures and constraints. 
The third component of triangular formation is `contextuality'. Policy changes at a certain time 
and space as a response to the existence of certain conditions. Political actors \v ork with 
constraints and operate through the resources, tactics, or channels available to them. Institutional 
settings can be part of conditions that may affect policy makers' decisions (Scharpf, 11989). Yet. 
at the same time, whether they are consistent or inconsistent in complex situations may only 
become understandable in the context of institutional settings (Ashford, 1992: 18). In other 
words, some variables are part of conditions and part of contexts. International economic 
constraints may condition domestic decision making. But how they condition it may only 
become understandable in the context of international political economy (see Chapter 5). 
Therefore, context is a `conceptual device' to differentiate different rules of the game and 
`methods' to compare these differences across time, space, organisations, and functions 
(Ashford, 1992: 13). 
Contextual statements are stipulations about realities in widely different situations. Given this, 
`critical junctures' become an important variable (Pierson, 1993). In addition to `normal 
periods', `critical junctures' constitute history. Critical junctures are `moments when substantial 
institutional change takes place thereby creating a `branching point' from which historical 
development moves onto a new path' (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 942; see also Collier and Collier, 
1991: 29). For example, Gourevitch (1986) focussed on three periods of economic crisis and 
compared responses from Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States. Therefore, 
critical junctures are the points at which crises occur. Krasner (1984: 240) argues that `new 
structures originate during periods of crisis'. Rapid change during periods of crisis followed by 
long period of consolidation and stasis is patterned as `punctuated equilibrium'. This model of 
change further implies that a `particular structural development reflecting marginal advantages 
at a particular point in time may constrain future evolutionary developments' (Krasner, 
1984: 2433). Crises bring on abrupt institutional change because they present `leaders with an 
opportunity to enact new plans and realise new ideas by embedding them in the institutions they 
establish' (Gorges. 2001: 156). These crises can be `domestic or international', 'class conflicts' 
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and the `evolving complexity of routine social interactions' (Skowronek, 1982: 10). Thelen 
(1999: 399) argues that `for in moments of crisis, the elements that previously held a system 
together come into full relief (see also Gourevitch, 1986). We shall use these points of critical 
junctures in order to identify contextual variables that influence policy change. 
1.5.3 Policy Outputs, Policy Structure, and Policy Implementation 
To a large extent, channels in which policy is formulated and implemented can be described as 
implementation structures, policy networks, policy communities, relational contracts, partisan 
mutual adjustment, coordination, or clans (Scharpf, 1993; Smith, 1993). The idea of these 
concepts was developed to provide a `conceptual perspective from which to examine purposive 
action in those situations where such parts of public and private organizations cooperate in 
performing the different tasks involved in the implementation of a particular programme' 
(italics in original, Hanf and O'Toole, 1992: 175). A series of analyses of this kind tend to focus 
on `policy communities', and `policy sub-system' both in examining the interactions of actors 
involved in policy formulation and in analysing the management of the structures through which 
policy is implemented19 
Nonetheless, while these studies pay a great deal of attention to the process of policy, they pay 
little attention to the actual policy structure and the substance of policy in which policy goals and 
intentions are embodied. O'Toole (1993: 27) argues that policy implementation focuses on the 
`connection between the expression of governmental intention and the achievement of action'. 
Poulantzas and Miliband (1972) also point out that institutional configurations of ideas are best 
seen in the form of state welfare arrangement. Through the institutional process, ideas become 
embodied in institutions. The institutional structure of social policy programmes can also 
encounter negative as well as positive effects (Walker and Wong, 1996: 74). Titmuss (1976) 
argues that the particular infrastructure of social programmes wherein a set of services can be 
19 
For network analysis, see Evans (1998,2000); Hanf and O'Toole (1992); O'Toole (1993), Scharpf 
(1993). For implementation studies in general, see Hill (1993); Parsons (1995): for a series of classical 
arguments on top-down and bottom-up division in particular, see Elmore (1978); H}ern (1982); Hogwood 
and Gunn (1984); Hudson (1989), Lipsky (1971,1980); Pressman and \Vildavsky (1984): Sabatier 
(1986). 
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implemented and developed is seen to be a more challenging task to resolve than the choice 
between universalist and selective services themselves. For this reason, the analysis of policy 
implementation requires a close examination of policy structures in which policy outputs are 
institutionalised. 
The second box in Figure 1.1 illustrates policy outputs in which policies configured in box 1 are 
executed. According to Skocpol (1985: 16), `the implementation of state policies often leads to 
unintended as well as intended consequences, both when states attempt tasks they cannot 
complete and when the means they use produce unforeseen structural changes and sociopolitical 
reactions. Thus, the capacities of states to implement strategies and policies deserve close 
analysis in their own right'. By analysing the content of social programmes and the politics of 
implementing them, we may well be able to identify the relationship between intended and 
unintended consequences of state policies. In doing so, we shall question whether or not 
legally-mandated goals and objectives of the policy initiatives are put into place in the structure 
of social policy. We shall also question whether or not these goals and objectives are met at the 
level of implementation. 
1.5.4 Policy Outcomes and Policy Feedback 
In Figure 1.1, box 3 illustrates policy outcomes where the policy effects on citizens are subject 
to evaluation. Given this evaluation, the effects can become causes of policy change. In other 
words, policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political process. Baldwin (1990: 290) 
argues that `once made, choices in social policy exerted a determining influence on the course 
of events later possible'. This importance of the policy feedback effects is made plain by 
Pierson, arguing that 'policies provide both incentives and resources that may facilitate or 
inhibit the formation or expansion of particular groups' (Pierson, 1993: 599). Its significance is 
also clearly reflected by Skocpol (1992: 58), arguing that `we must make social policies the 
starting points as well as the end points of analysis: As politics creates policies, policies also 
remake politics'. She identifies that there are two major types of policy feedback. First, policies 
transform or expand the 'capacities of the state'. This is because the official efforts have made 
use of 'new or existing administrative arrangements' which in turn chanoc `administrative 
possibilities for official initiatives in the future and affect later prospects for policy 
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implementation'. Second, policies have feedback effects in that new policies affect the social 
identities, goals, and capabilities of groups' (Skocpol, 1992: 58). 
By examining the Swedish labour movement, Rothstein (1992) has also demonstrated that 
unions were given authority over unemployment funds by policy designs. These policy designs 
provided an important driving force to the development of powerful labour confederations. 
Policy feedbacks can be positive if a policy enhances `the kinds of state capacities that can 
promote its future development, and especially if it stimulates groups and political alliances to 
defend the policy's continuation and expansion' (Skocpol, 1992: 59). But at the same time, 
policy feedback effects can be negative. Skocpol (1992: 59) cites the case of Civil War pensions 
in the United States: 
`After initial legislative liberalizations.. 
. the 
Bureau of Pensions became one of the largest and 
most active agencies of the federal government... Yet at the same time, Civil War pensions set in 
motion reactions against future public social provision along similar lines. Because the very 
successes of Civil War pensions were so closely tied to the working of patronage democracy, 
these successes set the stage for negative feedbacks that profoundly affected the future direction 
of U. S. social provision. During the Progressive Era, the precedent of Civil War pensions was 
constantly invoked by many American elites as a reason for opposing or delaying any move 
toward more general old-age pensions. ' 
Through the analysis of policy feedback effects, we are able to analyse how policy outcomes at 
one time point make impacts on shaping the content and scope of consecutive reform efforts at 
another time point. 
In sum, most variables discussed and developed in Figure 1.1 derive from the tradition of 
historical institutionalism. This is because these variables reflect the significance of 
historical-interpretative research on social polices. Through this model, it becomes possible to 
define and explore the policy process while becoming aware of the various interconnections 
between decision making points as authoritative rather than routine decisions by the political 
authorities; conditionality as conditions for action arising from both inside and outside the 
political system; contextuality as contexts in which both decisions and conditions operate; 
polic4y outputs as what the system does; and policy outcomes (or impacts) as consequences 
intended or unintended resulting from political action or inaction. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
By underscoring the priority of contextual dimensions, the role of ideas in shaping social policy 
and the uncertainties that often condition choices for policy makers, this chapter seeks to 
ascertain the `possibility' of social policy. The `possibility' is that through the institutional 
process, images of welfare may become formed into a specific set of policy ideas. These ideas 
may in turn become aggregated, converted into proposals and put into effect. During this 
process, political values of social policy may or may not be brought out in the construction of the 
welfare state. The `possibility' is also that welfare systems are the product of how political ideas 
have passed through the screen of political opportunity and political possibility at a given point 
in time. The translation of ideas in policy tends to have great influence on the contemporary 
formation of state welfare. Dynamics between early intentions of those promoting ideas of 
welfare and the actual behaviour are critical to understanding the development of social policy. 
A great many schools of thought have provided answers to the questions of why welfare states 
emerge and develop yet historical institutionalism has developed particularly useful variables in 
the historical analysis of their development. By reviewing, modifying and rearranging these 
variables, we have developed a systematic model for the analysis of social policy process. We 
shall use this model as a framework for an analysis through the following four empirical 
chapters. In the next chapter, we shall examine how state polices for welfare were configured, 
modified and transformed during the pre-1987 period. By examining prevailing political 
legacies of the Korean nation-state formation, we shall identify why and how state welfare 
programmes were introduced and why some social issues failed to become the subject of policy 
initiatives. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Configuration of Social Policy: Motives, Intent, and Effect 
2.1 Introduction 
In his analysis of the origins of welfare states, Ashford (1986a: 20) argues that the early 
decisions became the precedents for solving later problems. Governmental capabilities, 
administrative organization and vested political interests were taking shape long before 
anyone imagined a welfare state'. Goldstein and Keohane (1993a: 21) further contend that 
`when ideas are powerfully institutionalized, we must both analyze the contemporary 
importance of old rules and socially embedded norms and undertake an archaeology of ideas 
in order to understand how one set of ideas rather than another came to be institutionalized'. 
In this chapter, we take these assertions seriously and address two overarching questions of 
why and how social policies were introduced and modified at a specific point in time rather 
than another, and of why some social issues failed to become the subject of policy initiatives 
while others did not. By providing answers to these questions, the aim of this chapter is to 
suggest that what conditions the initiation, innovation, development and reform of social 
policy initiatives is likely to be impinged upon what constitutes the political and historical 
constraints that may or may not allow Korea's democratic formation to occur. 
Given this, this chapter is organised into seven sections. The first three sections are formed 
on a chronological order, examining two subdivided periods that produced legacies prior to 
the nation state formation (1910-1947) and the foundation of the First to the Third Republic 
of Korea (1948-1961). In the next section, we examine three thematic issues that constituted 
the nature of authorities, followed by exploring the issue of how ideas were embedded in the 
strategy of welfare. By focussing on the role of epistemic communities, we then turn to 
conduct three case studies of the policy-making process from 1961 to 1979. In the final 
section, the point that Korean politics transformed is identified by focussing on the point of 
transition, crisis, and change in rules. 
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2.2 Modernisation or Exploitation?: The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism 
(1910-1945) 
In Korea, the system of state welfare has been levered into being by the values and ideologies 
of political philosophies. Under the feudal system of ancient societies founded either by the 
tradition of Buddhism or Confucian ideas, the principle of profit reciprocity, in which rich 
and poor benefit to varying degree, was one of the major goals of the agriculture-based 
economy of centralised feudalism'. Political ideology of Confucianism stressed the ruler's 
responsibility for the prosperity of society. Ideological beliefs underlying relief strategies 
lying behind Buddhist and Confucian traditions were humanitarianism, benevolence and 
mercy. If the Poor Law tradition of relief strategies in Western Europe was based on the 
principles of character deficiency, poverty under the Confucian tradition of feudal societies 
meant the failure of the sovereign. Therefore, relief-giving was to be via state welfare. To an 
extent, we are not comparing like for like in that the Poor Law tradition in industrial societies 
and Confucianism in pre-modern societies are contextually incompatible. Yet, the principled 
comparison is worthy of attention because a radical systematic change from Japanese 
colonialism has given rise to the ideological distortion of fundamental ideas of welfare in 
modem political philosophies. For this reason, it is fair to conclude that a distinctive 
difference of political philosophy between these two traditions is that a right to welfare 
Centralised feudalism refers to the absolute monarchy represented by the king without decentralisation 
of power. In simple understanding of the term feudalism, the definition inherited from Western 
experiences tends to pay attention to an often disputed relationship between a `lord', paying allegiance 
to a `king' in return for his granting of the former's status. Under the feudal system of the European 
context and even in Japan, it refers to a comprehensive social system which allows decentralisation of 
power including legislative and administrative capacity within a confined territory to landlords. By 
contrast, the pre-modern society of Korea constituted a dichotomous extremism between those who 
occupied the highest status positions and those in the lowest. The middle classes were of no 
significance or even of nonexistence. Both the highest and the lowest status positions were basically 
hereditary. On no account did local landowners have an exclusive degree of discretionary power. 
Although peasants were given the right to till the land, all property rights were eventually occupied by 
the supreme authority. Peasants cultivated the land simply to survive. Therefore cultivation was 
neither a way to accumulate their own properties nor a method to change their social status. The main 
difference between these two traditional political structures is articulated by Weber (1951) 
distinguishing two types of feudalism, one primarily based on fiefs, the other on prebends. Although 
Weber (1951: 37) acknowledges that `despite internal differences, there was a broad, external 
similarity between ancient Chinese and occidental feudalism', with Korea's cultural similarities with 
China, political feudalism was not primarily connected with landlordism in the occidental sense. Thus, 
there was no genuinely feudal period in Korean history contrasted to those cases in Europe in the 
Middle Ages and even Japan where political power was widely diffused among a class of nobles or 
warlords (see Fukuyama, 1996: 132). 
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developed from the objection to the Poor Law principles by way of political conflict, whereas 
welfare rights under Confucianism were fundamentally based on the voluntary and 
humanitarian activities of rulers. 
Comparatively and critically, a careful reconsideration is required for one of the generally 
received ideas that an absolute monarchy controlled the pre-modern society of Korea (The 
Chosun Kingdom, ruled by Yi Dynasty, 1392-1910). From the modern perspectives of state 
theory, the Korean state in the pre-modern society was less strong than it first appears. The 
state bureaucracy was in fact monopolised by a certain privileged class. On the one hand, 
loyal authorities and aristocrats were in conflict to win lands and peasants as fundamental 
resources of wealth. On the other hand, they were to achieve social prestige and dignity under 
the Confucian order of society. For those ruled, constraint and equilibrium between loyal 
authorities and aristocrats remained beneficial since they tended to construct the political 
coalition aiming at public well-being. Originally inaugurated by a military coup d'etat, a 
loyal authority created a new style of non-military rule. From exogenous factors, the 
ideological and charismatic dignity of divine right had to a certain extent been confined even 
within the territory of Chosun for Chinese-centred East Asian imperialism. In short, we 
should remember that state compulsion in pre-modern societies was not as strong as was to 
be the case under the period of Japanese colonialism. 
It was Japanese imperialism that eventually transformed the state into a powerful actor and 
established its systematic structure. At the end of the Chosun Kingdom (1392-1910), Korea 
failed to cope with exogenous pressures from world colonial development and was forcibly 
modernised by Japanese imperialism. As a late comer to modern imperialism, Japan was 
looking for places where its commercial and industrial profit could be secured. After the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Korea became a 
part of Japan's expanding market network in East Asia. At the outset, therefore, Korea was 
not the final destination for the expansion of Japanese colonialism. The colonial function of 
Korea was to provide resources for Japanese industry and to act as a strategic bridge for 
Japanese penetration into China. Consequently, the Japanese colonial state mobilised a 
highly oppressive state apparatus and at the same time created an administrative bureaucratic 
system which was integrated as an independent centralised machinery. Japanese colonial 
rule emphasised military and police forms of control and the exploitation of the peninsula 
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under strong state auspices. According to Cumings (1984b: 486), coercion is favoured wk-hen 
a political force lacks authority and legitimacy, and Japan was no different. The colonial 
governor-generals, posts only available to generals and admirals and personally appointed by 
the Japanese emperor, had absolute authority to control Korean military and civil affairs. The 
colonial governor-generals in Korea were granted extensive powers amongst other chief 
executive officials in the imperial domains of Japan. Hence, the bureaucratic structure in 
Korea was relatively independent of central Japan and was endowed with authoritarian 
wielding executive, legislative and judicial powers virtually without formal restraint (Kim, 
Han-Kyo, 1973: 47). 
Relief-giving strategies under Japanese imperialism provide a typical example of the idea 
that political purposes rather than ideological responses to welfare need can lie at the heart 
of the system in pursuit of loyalty by the use of state welfare. The basic structure of 
relief-giving under Japanese colonial rule was established as an expedient, short-sighted 
emergency treatment. The Japanese Poor Law established in 1929 was not introduced in 
Korea until 1944. The underlying rationale behind its introduction was rather strategic in the 
sense that there was an urgent necessity for conscription and labour requisition for military 
purposes. In short, as we shall see later in this chapter, policy developments embrace the 
legacy of Japanese colonialism. 
Throughout the thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule (1910 - 1945), Japanese 
imperialism had left two notable legacies of modernisation: (1) exploitation and (2) class 
stratification. These legacies are important because they became institutionalised into the 
Korean nation-state formation. To begin with, the usage of the term modernisation requires 
further elaboration. Although Japanese colonial rule had made some innovation in the field 
of transportation, banking and the rapid growth of heavy industry in northern Korea, 
industrialisation efforts were basically to enhance the Japanese domestic economy. The 
precise reason is that economic resources in Korea such as peasant lands and mineral 
resources were utilised by Japanese authorities in the form of systematic exploitation (Duss, 
1984: 163; Sohn, Hak-Kyu, 1989: 11). On no account did the Japanese colonial state attempt 
to transform a Korean agriculture-based economy into an industry-based capitalist economy 
in a genuine sense. It was an act of exploitation. 
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Another legacy is class stratification. One of the first major Japanese projects in Korea was 
the land survey (1910-1919) (Kim, Han-Kyo, 1973: 47). Also, it was a remarkable extension 
of the state's influence. As the most ambitious and important task, the Japanese colonial state 
undertook the land survey chiefly in order to extract revenues from agriculture. This was also 
to speed up the industrialisation of the domestic economy in Japan. The purpose of the 
survey was three-fold. First, it aimed to confirm and register titles. The second objective was 
to assess the value of land for tax purposes by nationalising land. This attempt eventually 
expanded the state assets to a large extent. And third, it aimed to prepare accurate 
topographical maps. In consequence, this step gave rise to a drastic change of class structure 
where vast lands had previously been attached to loyal authorities and aristocrats. 
On the positive side, the land survey established the modem concept of land-ownership 
rights for the first time in Korea which had simply not developed previously. On the negative 
side, however, the survey deprived those who failed to claim their rights, thereby losing their 
economic foundation. This is partly because they were ignorant or suspicious of the new land 
law, and partly because they failed to produce relevant documentary evidence of their land 
ownership even though they had long tilled their land. Therefore, the land which the peasants 
failed to register became the domain of colonial government and was then purchased by 
Japanese public land companies such as the Oriental Development Company. 
The growth of Japanese agricultural possession under colonial state protection promoted the 
economic foundation of Japanese immigrants and dismantled the traditional class structure 
in Korea. On the one hand, Korean peasants who had lost their traditional land rights were 
by and large forced to become the basis of a new industrial working class. On the other hand, 
aristocrats who remained in place where their land ownership had been intact and rather 
strengthened by law became the basis for a new capitalist class. This artificial breakage of 
societal structure had been undertaken in a short period of time which in turn resulted in a 
loss of the standing identity of long lasting cultural heritage. In short, the newly emerged 
working class in Korea was not a product of purely historical and cultural or even 
evolutionary influences, but one of Japanese legacies. 
There were other distinctive characteristics of colonialism's legacy after Korea's industrial 
revolution began during the period 1935 to 1945. In addition to the emergence of a working 
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class, there were the uprooting of peasants from the land. widespread population mobility 
and urbanisation (Cumings, 1984b: 489). Most importantly, however, there is little doubt 
that liberation movements failed to generate a single indigenous leader or leadership 
legitimised by popular support. Further, an assortment of political aspirants existed. Their 
ideas, origins, and ambitions were so diverse that cooperation among them to establish a 
strong, unified, independent Korean state would never have been possible (Cumings, 1984b: 
496). The liberation from the Japanese colonial rule had been in this sense brought about by 
the defeat of Japan in the Second World War. Subsequently, there was no indigenous 
organised authority to step into the breach when Japanese control was removed. The Korean 
peninsula again was occupied by the Soviet Union in the northern part and the United States 
in the southern part. 
In sum, the thirty-five year occupation of Japanese colonial rule in Korea left distinctive 
legacies that became embedded in the contemporary institutional structure. The state became 
a powerful actor; modernisation was introduced but it created the concepts of exploitation 
and class stratification. How these legacies continued to be influential under the military 
government is the subject of the next section. 
2.3 The American Military Government (1945-1948): Social Revolution Failed 
Skocpol (1979) argues that social revolutions have transformed state organisations, class 
structures and dominant ideologies. For example, those successful cases of French, Chinese, 
and Russian revolutions had turned states into centralised, bureaucratic and 
mass-incorporating nation-states with autonomous power. In Korea, however, failed social 
revolutions had also been accompanied by severe conflicts and revolts so that 
anti-revolutionary forces might succeed in reversing progressive tendencies. Social 
revolutionary movements after liberation required that the American military government 
should stabilise society. Inevitably, for this reason, there had to be the emergence of 
something more than turning back to the situation prior to the revolutionary period 
(1945-1948), a more strengthened state, an ideologically self-conceived form of regime 
against that of social revolution. As was the case of the systematic incorporation of those 
ruled such as urban labourers and peasants so as to consolidate the political order after social 
revolutions in France, China, and Russia, similar strategies had been adopted in the form of 
land reform, and the expansion of citizenship rights. 
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In the three years of an American military government, the formation of which was 
announced on 9 September 1945 and finished on 15 August 1948.. social progress in Korea 
was by no means accomplished. Japanese colonial rule was superseded by the American 
military government. In comparison to the relatively fast and stable possession by the Soviet 
Union in the northern part of Korea, the strategic objective in the southern part of Korea was 
to provide the establishment of a non-socialist nation. Since the American military 
government had neither a long-term plan of projects nor military personnel well trained in 
civil administration, the existing bureaucracy and those who had worked for the Japanese 
colonial state were not replaced by a new system. The maintenance of the political machinery 
under Japanese colonial rule had been seriously challenged by Koreans and more 
importantly, the military government had a strong division between right- and left-wing. 
Throughout the period of Japanese imperialism in Korea, social revolution movements had 
been to a certain extent advanced and had been supported by a majority of the population. 
The left-wing political development during this period was also collectively responsible for 
civil society. On the other hand, a dominant class of those who had formerly been 
pro-Japanese politicians and landlords had nowhere to stand with the breakdown of the 
Japanese colonial state apparatus. 
The modem form of the Korean state could have been completely different if there were no 
intervention of the American military occupation because the American military government 
explicitly supported the right-wing party (Korean Democratic Party, KDP). As we shall see 
in Chapter 3, Korean party politics has been dominated by this right-wing conservative 
tradition resulting from this early formation of a single-party system. Since majority 
members of the KDP were pro-Japanese landlords, the left-wing party had been supported by 
a majority of the population. 
This state construction led by the military government created a certain type of political 
legacy. First, the form of the strong state was favoured by the American military government. 
Its structural orientation was obviously based on the properties of a military bureaucracy 
which were unilateral, bureaucratic and disciplinary (Huntington, 1957: 64-65). The 
bureaucratic structure of the Japanese colonial state was modelled by the military 
oovcrnnlent. Second, in order to pursue effective control over Korean society, a coercive 
state apparatus was reintroduced. The police force of Japanese imperialism was activated 
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and the Korean military authorities were created together with even greater centralisation. 
Third, more importantly, due partly to lack of planning, expert personnel, and administrative 
experience of the American military government, those Korean officials who had worked for 
the Japanese colonial state were appointed especially to senior posts. They could have been 
obliterated in the past, if the left-wing movement had taken political power. Under the ne« 
political environment, they created a typical pattern of politicised bureaucracy. 
In the three years of the American military government, relief-giving was passive, and 
dependent upon national and international non-governmental organisations. Compared with 
the active support of the American military government in Japan, there was no sufficient 
relief-giving strategy based on a long-term plan in Korea. In fact, state welfare was virtually 
impossible due to lack of national resources, almost complete dependency on foreign aid, 
and excess expenditure on military. The relief-giving strategy2 during this period of time 
rendered the social protection system largely reliant upon unstructured religion-based charity 
activities. 
In sum, the foundation of the Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948 began on the basis of 
legacies of the American military government and even those of the Japanese colonial state. 
Just as liberation from Japanese colonial rule was not achieved by the independent power of 
Korea, so the Korean nation state was established through the leading role of the American 
military government. 
2.4 The Nation-State Formation to the Foundation of the Third Republic 
(1948-1961) 
By monopolising all coercive means, the First Republic of Korea (1948-1960) under the 
strong and autocratic rule of President Syngman Rhee, was regarded as a coalition of 
conservative elements grafted onto the bureaucratic and police apparatus of the Japanese 
z 
Two administrative ministries (the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the Ministry of Labour) under 
the American military government were amalgamated into the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1948. The 
health administration under the Ministry of Social Affairs was shared by the Ministry of Health, 
established in 1949. Both of which later on were incorporated into the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs (MoHS. AA) in 1955. The continuity of passive relief-giving strategies had, by and large, 
remained Intact. Only specialised welfare benefits were introduced such as the Military Relief Act of 
1950, the Police Relief Act of 1951, and the Civil Servant Pension Act of 1960 for those who were 
privileged in terms of close connection to the state such as military personnel, police and civil ser ants. 
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regime. This authoritarian nature of the new Republic of Korea had been determined by a 
number of characters: (1) a direct consequence of the American military government's 
concern to establish a new political order responsive to US regional interests; (2) the 
coalition effectively excluded any participation by the left; (3) the conditions created by the 
Rhee government (Sohn, Hak-Kyu, 1989: 15). 
Prior to the nation-state formation (1945-1948), there appeared states of political vacuum to 
which a situation of `low accumulation' and `low concentration of coercion' leads to (Tilly 
1992: 19). This political vacuum gave rise to coercive means being widely dispersed amongst 
various political groups. It is clearly evidenced by a number of political conflicts between the 
right and the left in order to formulate the nation state in their own monopolistic way. All the 
left-wing power was removed by the right under Syngman Rhee's leadership. This was 
possible because of an exogenous military and police force supported by the American 
military government, inheriting the bureaucratic machinery created by the Japanese. As the 
first president of the Republic of Korea, with the support of the American military 
government, Syngman Rhee was then able to exclude even those in the KDP. In other words, 
Syngman Rhee removed all the left and right-wing power. For him, party politics should be 
avoided and the state power should be centred upon the president. Tilly (1992: 19) states that: 
`coercion includes all concerted application, threatened or actual, of action that commonly 
causes loss or damage to the persons or possessions of individuals or groups who are aware 
of both the action and the potential damage'. 
According to Tilly, states are produced when the accumulation and concentration of coercive 
means grow together. The state in this context means a distinct organisation that controls the 
chief concentrated means of coercion within well-defined territories, and exercises priority 
in some respects over all other organisations operating within those territories. Similarly, 
Skocpol and Amenta (1986: 131) centrally locate the concept of `coercion' within the 
definition of the state and argue that `states are organizations that extract resources through 
taxation and attempt to extend coercive control and political authority over particular 
territories and the people residing within them'. 
In ideological terms, Syngman Rhee was able to manipulate anti-Communist feelings that 
had evolved from the United States' anti-Communist policy on a Cold War footing as a tool 
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for securing his regime's legitimacy and for intimidating or eliminating his opponents. To 
this end, the National Security Act enacted in 1948 under the First Republic, was used as a 
major device for facilitating control of opposition groups. Under the rule of the American 
military government, this anti-Communism was firmly settled by the KDP-centred 
right-wing tradition against left-wing power. The fear of communist subversion provided 
Rhee's regime with an endless excuse to deploy coercive forces. The proclamation of martial 
law in 1952 was a typical case. With the `hegemonic ideology' of being anti-Communist, 
Rhee's government not only conducted a brutal coercion and suppression policy against 
opponents but also extracted human and material resources from society without national 
consensus. This anti-Communism was a major hegemonic mechanism to suppress 
pro-democracy movements through the 1960s to 1970s (for `hegemony', see Gramsci, 1971, 
Hall, 1984; Schmitter, 1988; Spicker, 1988). 
Together with the creation of the strong state and leadership with the anti-communist 
hegemonic ideology, the First Republic also stimulated land reform in the early 1950s and 
expanded the citizen's rights incorporating those ruled into the political sphere3. The land 
reform had a significant impact on the class structure. The idea of land reform was originally 
based on the partial articulation under the American military government and on the political 
and constitutional promises in the process of the nation state formation. Before the General 
Election on 10 May 1948, the American military government was threatened by the 
possibility of socialist revolution. The probability of reunification had already faded away. 
Society was extremely unstable and mass famine was widespread. In this situation, populist 
support was desperately required by the American military government to operate the 
election itself and to assist the US supported political leadership to win. In 1948, in addition 
to the military government decree on 5 October 1945 which reduced the high rent charged for 
land, all land formerly held by the Oriental Development Company was forced to be 
redistributed to peasants who had rented it. The military government also created the modern 
concept of civil society by expanding political rights introducing adult universal suffrage in 
1947. 
3 
Regardless of the political intention and administered distortion, the First Republic initially espoused 
liberal democracy, provided political freedom to opposition parties and freedom of expression to the 
press. 
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In sum, the land reform of 1950 gave the government a strategic advantage to promote 
political legitimacy on the one hand and weaken the KDP, many of whose members were 
landlords, on the other. It eventually undermined the economic base of the ruling class and 
by redistributing resources to peasants, the revolutionary radicalism of peasants could be 
weakened. Obviously, the land reform was not favoured by the first National Assembly (NA) 
since again the vast majority of the members were landlords. The underlying principle 
behind it was `confiscation with compensation, distribution with a price' which was put into 
effect on 10 March 1950. This principle was subsequently in operation even during the three 
year period of the Korean War (1950-1953). There were two reasons: first because of the 
urgent necessity for military supplies; and second because of the strong appeal of the 
principle of `confiscation without compensation, distribution without a price' proposed by 
the North Korean government. 
After the Korean War, anti-communism became a hegemonic ideology. By the late 1950s, 
the left-wing forces had entirely vanished, so did the partisan guerrillas and the Progressive 
Party. There had been no competitive political leadership against the Rhee government. 
Traditional ruling classes had already lost their economic base. A new capitalist class 
emerging from the land reform had relied heavily on state support. The working class and 
peasants had been turned into pro-government groups. Meanwhile, the military and the 
police became even stronger than ever before throughout the 1950s. 
However, the coercive measures exercised by Rhee's government had resulted in a 
legitimation crisis. The coercive violence which culminated in the police firing on the 
students during the `April 19 Student Revolution of 1960' in which almost 200 
demonstrators were killed, led directly to the regime's collapse. Nonetheless, this 
revolutionary student movement merely terminated corrupted anti-democratic dictatorship, 
and failed to change the nature of the state. Since a set of land reforms 
had created a vacuum 
in the class structure and considerable state autonomy, students 
in high educational 
institutions, in increasing numbers, were the only groups with accumulated power 
in civil 
society (Oh, Byung-Hun, 1975). They were not exclusively connected with 
the working class 
and peasants. Further, just like the socialist movement after 
liberation from Japan had failed 
due to anti-socialist exogenous forces, so the April 
Revolution did not enjoy long lasting 
success because of a military coup d 'etar on 16 
May 1961. 
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On the fall of Syngman Rhee, the Second Republic4 was established on 12 August 1960 and 
experienced perhaps the only experiment with democratic life in Korean history at least 
before the establishment of the Sixth Republic (1988-1993). However, the experiment under 
the Democratic Party failed to achieve social stability and economic progress. It also failed 
to address the problems bequeathed by the old regime which was that a `purge of bureaucrats 
and police [had] undercut the apparatus essential to the maintenance of social order in the 
face of the challenge from the left' (Sohn, Hak-Kyu, 1989: 18). 
On 16 May 1961, a military coup d'etat under the guidance of Major General Park 
Chung-Hee illegally terminated the Second Republic merely nine months after its initiation. 
Huntington (1968: 223) has termed this a `veto coup' whereby a veto was exercised against 
rising leftist groups which the military thought threatened national security and its 
ideological basis, anti-communism. The military was able to exercise this veto for the 
Korean War had stimulated rapid military expansion and enhanced its self-perception as the 
sole agent capable of modernising Korean society (Sohn, Hak-Kyu, 1989: 19). The first and 
the last parliamentary democracy therefore was replaced by an even stronger presidential 
system on the basis of a nationwide referendum on 19 December 1962 after a two-year 
control by military junta (see Appendix 2). The military government of Park Chung-Hee 
from 1961 to 1963 was then transformed into a semi-civilian regime in the period 1963 to 
19795. 
Park Chung-Hee, a former Japanese army officer in Manchuria, was elected as the first 
President of the Third Republic in October 1963 and re-elected three more times in 1967, 
1971 and 1972. His third term in office was allowed by a Constitutional amendment in 1971 
while the indefinite tenure of an individual in the Presidential office was granted by the 
promulgation of extensive Constitutional changes in 1972. A state of martial law was 
4 
The Second Republic was the government of Chang Myon, the Prime Minister (1960-1961). The 
President in this period was Yuri Bo-son. A cabinet system was substituted for the previous 
presidential system which still remains the first and the last of its kind in the history of Korea. 
Cotton (1 Qß)2: 51-') subdivides the entire period of 1961 to 1979 into three periods: (1) military regime 
of 1961 to 1963; (2) quasi-competitive political system of 1963 to 1972, and (3) dictatorial system of 
1972 to 1979. 
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declared on 17 October 1972 which subsequently abolished the representative National 
Assembly for the time being. Wright (1975: 50) nonetheless notes that: 
`[T]he nation has been politically regressive from a democratic political perspective, but has 
accomplished in a short time a solid material and economic base for national progress which 
likely could not have been done on strictly democratic terms'. 
The foundation of the Third Republic of Korea (1961-1979) depended, under the Democratic 
Republican Party, upon the mechanisms put in place by the military government. The 
government under the control of the Park regime was often named as an even stronger state 
in that it conquered the assertive and resistant civilian society by the use of military power. 
and extracted societal resources with the absence of procedural formation of national 
agreement. The President could exercise extremely broad power. A state of emergency or 
martial law could be proclaimed. And all powers of government could be assumed by the 
President without significant restrictions from either the Prime Minister or the State Council 
and the Executive Ministries (Wright, 1975: 51). 
In sum, the failure of revolutionary movements in Korea has shown the similar outcomes of 
successive social revolutions in that the state-led economic growth strategy of the 
post-revolutionary period was based on the nature of an even more strengthened state. A new 
sociopolitical order formulated by the American military government required almost a 
decade to achieve political consolidation and ideological legitimation. The nature of the state 
largely determined by exogenous factors continued to remain and even grow from the 1960s 
under the military government. Again, the economic growth strategy outlined by the Third 
Republic was based on the idea that anti-constitutional seizure of political power could be 
legitimated by economic development. The comparative superiority of the capitalist 
economic system in South Korea was also required by the United States because of a clear 
tension between East and West. How did these previous legacies become institutionalised 
into practice'? Instead of analysing this process on an exclusively chronological order, we 
shall look at three thematic issues: state autonomy; state capacity; and legitimacy deficit in 
order to answer this question. 
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2.5 The Nature of Authorities (1961-1971) 
In Korea, state autonomy6 and state capacity experienced a dramatic increase as the military 
force was manipulated as a major mechanism for the state to control society. Rueshemey-er 
and Evans (1985: 44-47) argue that the growth of state autonomy and state capacity promotes 
the effectiveness of state intervention in economic growth. In consequence, the state is 
placed in an absolute and unbalanced position vis-ä-vis society (Barkey and Parikh. 
1991: 525). However, neither state autonomy nor capacity could be achieved by a single 
military coup d'etat. They had rather been accompanied by the legacies of the past. 
Haggard and Moon (1990) argue that the relatively strong nature of the state wýwithout any 
persistent activity of the working class and peasants strengthened the degree of state 
autonomy in terms of available resources of social groups together with political structure. 
The underlying condition of this was that the proportion of the working class was very low, 
and peasants had become domiciled since the land reform. The rudimentary power of a new 
capitalist class allowed considerable state autonomy. As seen previously, the American 
military government and the right force after liberation from the Japanese colonial rule 
effectively removed the left and the nationalist party. In addition, the downfall of the land 
owning classes by the land reform gave rise to the removal of strong opposition power within 
society. The capitalist and the working classes failed to grow large enough to make an effort 
against state supremacy. This was mainly because of weak capitalist industrialisation, the 
absence of domestic capital, and almost total reliance on foreign aid for the purpose of relief 
and military assistance. Most of all, as a result of the Korean War, the ever stronger 
perceptions of communist threat were recognised as the ideology of `national security'. This 
gave legitimised coercive power with almost unlimited resources to the state elite against any 
political opposition (Choi, Jang-Jip, 1989: 199). 
Whenever a coup d 'etat brings military officers to power, the existing constitution is 
typically scrapped and government based on the exercise of what Lasswell and Kaplan call 
6 
State autonomy may have three types of meanings. First, it refers to 'situations in which state actors 
translate their preferences into authoritative action despite divergent societal preferences'. Second, it 
refers to 'situations in which state action changes divergent societal preference to convergent ones'. 
Third, it refers to 'situations in which there is non-divergence between the preferences of the state and 
the society' (Krasner, 11)84: 231. see also Nordlinger. 1981: Ch. 3- Ch. 5). In this thesis, we adopt the 
combined use of the first and second type of state autonomy, unless indicated otherwise. 
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`naked power' ensues (cited in Riggs, 1993: 199). The military coup d 'etat violated the 
democratic principles based on the legitimising formula of constitution. This democratic 
deficiency engenders a threat of political challenge, and therefore Park was desperate to 
legitimise his violation of the democratic principles. As Offe (1984: 268) points out, `the 
legitimacy of a regime or government depends upon the justifiability of its institutional 
arrangements and political outcomes'. For this reason, the Park government adopted a 
strategy of export-oriented industrialisation which would appropriately be able to harmonise 
state intervention and market mechanisms in order to solidify the political system and obtain 
political legitimacy. This strategy was inevitably shaped by labour-intensive industrialisation 
and export-oriented growth by assembly manufacture, both of which were heavily based on 
cheap labour because of lack of resources and capital (Deyo, 1987a, 1987b; Haggard and 
Cheng, 1987; Koo, 1987). To this end, the effective control of the working class as well as 
of political opposition forces was an essential precondition. By accomplishing successful 
industrialisation, the legitimacy deficit might be resolved. 
A confronting military situation between South and North Korea was effectively 
manipulated to perform coercive state power as evidenced in a series of laws and 
amendments 7. The exercise of this state power was subsequently justified by rapid 
industrialisation which marked average 10 per cent of economic growth from the Third 
through to the Fifth Republic (1963-1988) based on strong authoritarian regimes8 (Appendix 
2; EPB, 1990). This industrialisation within a short period of time has caused a new concept 
of class structure under capitalism. Unlike the case of a market-based economy, 
industrialisation in Korea has been exclusively based on the mechanisms of state 
intervention. In this sense, the state is required to legitimise its activities because state 
intervention has resulted in unequal distribution of wealth (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 
1985: 69). Where and when it fails, there is a possibility for those ruled to organise collective 
political actions. The supremacy of the dominant group might be achieved by force in some 
contexts but in others by its power to persuade the population of its legitimacy (Polanyi, 
7 
For example, the Anti-Communist Law (1961), the Law concerning Assembly and Demonstration 
(1962, amended in 1972), and the Law of Special Measures for the Security of the Nation (1971). 
8 
According to Lee (1990: 5), however, `neither an authoritarian basis nor a democratic basis has been 
firmly rooted in Korean society. It is somewhere in the twilight zone'. 
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1944). In the two years of military junta (1961-1963), Park Chung-Hee had set in force 
revolutionary goals of economic prosperity and those of national security from leftist 
elements. The modernised concept of a rank-based power hierarchy of officers first emerged 
under the military leadership in 1961 (Choi, Sang-Jip, 1987: 313). 
The expansion of state capacity in general and that of the president in particular was 
represented by the creation of two superpower agencies. The first was the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency (KCIA) which aimed to eliminate leftist elements. The second agency 
was the Economic Planning Board (EPB) for the construction of a national economy. These 
two institutions were elaborate and powerful state machines. The KCIA was not accountable 
to the National Assembly for its activity but controlled only by the president (Kwon, 
Huck-Ju, 1999a: 38). The EPB was given full responsibility for planning and coordination 
of economic development as well as budgeting, coordination of foreign aid activities and 
attracting foreign investment. The head of the EPB was the third ranking official in the 
executive branch as vice-premier and his economic decision-making power lies right under 
the aegis of the president (Choi, Jang-Jip, 1987: 319). As we shall see later in this chapter, as 
one of the influential social policy making institutions established in 1971, the Korean 
Development Institute (KDI), was basically designed to develop the national economic 
strategy (mainly the nation's Third, Fourth, and Fifth Five-Year Economic Development 
Plans) under the guidance of the EPB. 
The military government of 1961 to 1963 had shifted towards greater emphasis on economic 
strength and expansion in the general goal orientations of the ruling elite. The rationale 
behind this shift was that economic advancement and development were seen by the ruling 
elite as the fundamental means of improving the polity. With the creation of a multiplicity of 
agencies and the launch of the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966), 
the major emphasis of the bureaucracy shifted from a control and coordination focus to a 
goal-attainment function (Hahn, Bae-Ho, 1975: 309-311). The overarching decision-making 
structure of the military government was highly centralised, heavily concentrated in a 
relatively small and confined terrain. Consequently, the decision excluded the interests of the 
majority of the population both in the process of arriving at a major political 
decision and in 
implementation. The autonomy of the ruling elite was almost absolute in the 
decision-making realm and only the interests of the government were delivered by the KCIA 
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and EPB. The centralisation of power determines the operational mode of the state 
bureaucracy concerned with the effectiveness of delivery of the decisions made at the top. 
For this reason, social policy decision-making was exclusive and confined to top 
decision-makers' interests. As we shall see in the process of social programmes later in this 
chapter, they undermined the welfare-centred policy ideas and modernisation efforts in 
favour of their political purposes such as labour stabilisation and political legitimacy. 
Before the military government transferred power to an elected government, there had been 
a set of policy initiatives that concerned whether the nature of the Supreme Council for 
National Reconstruction (SCNR)9 would change. One of the many broken promises of the 
military government was to return to barracks when the `Revolutionary Pledge' had been 
completed. Concerning this issue, there was a certain internal division between the ruling 
elite of the military government. This division had regard to whether to return to their 
original position or to participate in the political arena. This division might have originated 
from their lack of political legitimacy or from their relatively modernised or Westernised 
character largely obtained by the systematic continuity of military training since 1951 and the 
dispatch training of military personnel to the US. The first option was favoured generally by 
administrative military personnel and the second option was mainly supported by those in a 
line of military command (i. e. the chief members of the military revolution). 
In October 1972, Park Chung-Hee proclaimed the `Yushin' constitution. This revitalising 
reform of regime enabled the presidency of Park to continue for another decade. In fact, this 
constitutional amendment perpetuated by President Park himself gave him the privilege to 
stay in office for life by denying the possibility for the opposition to be in power. Park had 
already amended the constitution to stay in power for a third term in 1969. He increasingly 
favoured the depoliticised patterns of politics which eventually generated one-man 
despotism. He believed that democratic institutions such as political parties were by no 
means effective and efficient; and that they only endangered social and political order. 
Consequently he did not allow the then premier (Chong I1-Gwon, 1964-1970) to exercise any 
significant political role. He even excluded his own party (Democratic Republican Party, 
9 
The SCNR was formed by Park Chung-Hee at the time of the military coup 
d 'etat for the purpose of 
providing supervision to the revolutionary work. 
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DRP) and one of the significant figures of the military coup d 'etat and the creation of the 
KCIA and the DRP (Kim, Chong-Pil). 
The near defeat of the presidential election on 27 April 1971 had proved that dictatorial 
leadership excused by national security and economic development was not supported by the 
electorate. Rather the electorate advocated relatively progressive political programmes 
presented by the opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung under the New Democratic Party 
(NDP). His political programmes were derived from the welfare-oriented revised capitalism 
or mixed economy paying a great deal of attention to equality in distribution and high 
productivity (Sohn, Hak-Kyu, 1989: Ch. 2). Nonetheless, partly because of Park's near defeat, 
in spite of the intervention of the police and the bureaucracy in the elections, and partly 
because there was no systematic opposition from the working class and socialists, the 
`Yushin' constitution was engendered and formed as a semi-fascist regime. 
In sum, during the 1960s there was marked expansion in state autonomy and state capacity. 
The rules of the game were set up by military power. By promoting rapid industrialisation, 
the principle of economic supremacy was settled during this period. A small number of 
political actors made highly strategic choices in order to justify their intrinsic legitimacy 
deficit. These overarching rules of the game were strengthened by the constitutional 
violation. 
Under these institutional rules of the game, the political rhetoric given by the SCNR had 
shifted from resolution of mass poverty in 1961 towards the construction of social welfare 
and the promotion of the living standard based on assistance and insurance in 1962. The 
basic policy directions were furthered in 1963 to enhance the construction of social welfare 
by eliminating the elements of social instability such as poverty, illness, unemployment and 
overpopulation. Also, social justice became one of the policy directions. However, the 
state's commitment to welfare was politically strategic and remained rhetorical. According 
to Choi (1998: 53), almost twenty welfare bills were enacted before Park became President in 
December 1963 compared to only four during the period of 1964 to 1971. Also, many of 
them failed to take effect due to the absence of either an Enforcement Ordinance or detailed 
enforcement regulations. For this reason, it seems fair to conclude that a set of welfare bills 
introduced in the early 1960s reflect the clear intention of the military government to stay in 
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power. In order to identify the social policy implications under these rules, the state's 
strategy of welfare towards the poor is the subject of the next section. 
2.6 The Strategy of Welfare: Raising the Standard or Stigmatising the Vulnerable? 
On 23 December 1972, Park Chung-Hee was re-elected as the president by a new institution 
specified by the `Yushin' constitution, the National Conference for Unification . The 
election was almost unanimous since Park had already been given even stronger 
monopolistic power to dissolve the National Assembly and empowered to appoint one third 
of the National Assembly members. As the military coup d'etat of 1961 was justified by 
himself as an industrial revolution along with national security in Korea, the emergence of 
the Yushin system was justified as a necessary measure to deal with the state of national 
emergency. 
Nonetheless, there was little doubt that the Park government suffered from a lack of political 
legitimacy. Social policies in this line of understanding are often viewed as the best 
mechanism to achieve the goals of legitimacy and to control society. However, the 
introduction of welfare programmes and the expansion of social policy require essential 
financial support from the state. The prevailing economic conditions did not allow those in 
power, particularly President Park, to take risks since their ultimate measure to overcome 
deficiency of democratic rule was heavily reliant upon economic development. At the outset, 
social policy would hamper economic policy and could endanger the role of family and 
self-help. Hence, although a set of social welfare programmes were introduced in the period, 
they were by no means systematic and comprehensive. As Titmuss (1987c: 204) argues, 
`social policy has been seen as an ad hoc appendage to economic growth, the provision of 
benefits, not the formulation of rights'. Social policy, if necessary, had to be subordinate to 
economic policy and should enhance the economic performance of the state. 
A clear example is the Public Livelihood Protection Act which was enacted for the deserving 
poor in 1961. In conceptualising the poor, the English Poor Law provides the first clue to 
understanding the disciplinary configuration of the programme. The English Poor Law of 
1601 classified the poor into a tripartite division: the impotent poor such as the aged and the 
sick who were accommodated in `poor-houses' or `almshouses'; the able-bodied poor such 
as the unemployed in the modem terminology, who were to be provided with work in a 
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`workhouse'; and the persistent idlers who were to be punished in a `house of correction' 
(Fraser, 1984: 33; Pinker, 1971: Ch. 2). The New Poor Law of 1834 in England implicitly 
drew a distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor. The former is 
distinguished from the latter in that the former would work but could not, whereas the latter 
could work but would not. That is, the distinction is drawn between the genuinely 
unemployed and the idler (Fraser, 1984: 32). The important point however is that the second 
category of the poor has always been considered as an undeserving poor. This close 
connection between the unemployed and the undeserving poor is a product of a dominant 
ideology which has been the individualistic explanation of the culture of `blaming victims' 
(Ditch, 1991: 38). 
It is well known that the English Poor Laws were central weapons built up by the state to 
maintain the incentive to work which inevitably mould perceptions of poverty (Novak, 
1988: 31). The classification of the poor and the notion of `less-eligibility' in the new Poor 
Law of 1834 provide the similar philosophy to the principle of poor-relief in Korea. Pierson 
(1991: 104) argues that countries that have exclusively been guided by the strong government 
embrace the mercantilists' view of the state. This mercantilists' view see the state as to `have 
an active role to play in the promotion of national prosperity and a responsibility for the 
labouring poor, as the principal source of this national wealth' (Pierson, 1991: 104). Korea 
seems to be the case for this. 
In a similar vein to public assistance, the Disaster Relief Act (1962) provided the legal basis 
of temporary aid for those damaged by various accidents. The Law of Temporary Measures 
for Self-Support Guidance Activity was enacted in 1968 in the light of supporting living 
costs for those unemployed and poor but able to work. The support was provided in the form 
of offering simple labour activities such as reclamation, embankment, irrigation and the 
readjustment of fields aiming at self-support of the poor. Given this, there is little doubt that 
the underlying theme of these two laws was to combine the concept of `assistance' and 
`labour' thereby promoting the `commodification1° of labour'. 
10 
Commodification can be understood by the definition of `de-commodification'. Esping-Andersen 
(1990: 3 7) defines it as `the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable 
standard of living independently of market participation'. This de-commodification can also be 
understood in conformity with a concept of 'de-proletarianization'. The terms `commodification' and 
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As a central principle or philosophy of Korean capitalist development, the commodification 
of labour was to ignore the rights of social citizenship and was even to strengthen the 
salience of class. This connection between `labour' and `relief was particularly well 
presented in the `keeping benefits low' principle, so that anyone who can work should work. 
This could also be seen as a mode of social control. This social control mode of social policy 
is explored by many scholars" but particularly defined by Offe as `the state's manner of 
effecting the lasting transformation of non-wage-labourers into wage-labourers'. This 
linkage also led the poor to `active proletarianization' through wage-labour by preventing 
them from `escape routes' such as organised forms of plunder and begging (Offe, 
1984: 92-93). In other words, the relief activity was not merely operated with a view to 
stabilisation of livelihood and social security for those who were poor. The authoritarian 
government pursued it towards export-led growth by linking these ideas. The primary 
objective was therefore to mitigate and prevent social instability, and to provide the 
minimum welfare benefit, on the context of state plan for economic growth. 
The labouring poor were seen as the principal source of national wealth. This idea was 
organised by the state to control and repress them as clearly seen in the underlying theme of 
the English Poor Law. Given this, the Public Livelihood Protection Act was composed of 
three important elements to operate the market-based liberal capitalist mechanism. First, it 
focussed on the self-reliance of beneficiaries and constituted the principle of self-support. 
Second, it was based on selectivism. And third, it provided public assistance which required 
that the principle of `less eligibility' be applied to those seeking relief: the support they were 
given should be less than that available through work. As the Poor Law performed to prevent 
the paupers from causing disturbance and to force them to labour in order to accelerate 
capitalist development (Fraser, 1984), on no account was the idea of relief derived from 
positive images of welfare. Esping-Andersen (1990: 24) also argues that: 
`de-commodification' were first used by Polanyi (1944), and subsequently by Offe (1972,1984) and 
Esping-Andersen (1990,1999). 
For example, see Higgins (1978,1980); Piven and Cloward (1971); Squires (1990), Taylor-Gooby 
and Dale (1981); Janowitz (1975,1976). 
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`[T]he poor-relief tradition, and its contemporary means-tested social-assistance offshoot, 
was conspicuously designed for purposes of stratification. By punishing and stigmatising 
recipients, it promotes social dualisms'. 
In sum, the relief-giving strategy in Korea was viewed in many ways as an institutionalised 
apparatus to accelerate capitalist development by the `commodification of labour' being 
provided by the cheap labour of the poor. In other words, the concern of this law was 
primarily with the maintenance of public order and the management of the labour market 
rather than the well-being of the poor (Ginsburg, 1979; Mandel, 1975). 
Despite these criticisms, the coercive and disciplinary nature of poor-relief had to a certain 
extent strategic advantage because it created ideological stigma not to live on welfare. 
Poverty was largely understood in terms of individual rather than structural accounts. Since 
the overall economy was very poor, recording only 87 US dollars per capita GNP in current 
prices and a 2.2 per cent rate of real economic growth in 1962 (BoK, 2000; EPB, 1990: 5; see 
also Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4), the resources available to the Public Assistance Programme 
were extremely limited. Thus, the state accomplished only the minimum relief performance 
for those in dire need. This poor performance of state welfare continued from the Third 
through to the Fifth Republic. This continuity of poor performance of state welfare was 
possible since the living standard of the citizens was very low. In other words, poverty in 
absolute terms was widespread throughout the country. 
Table 2.1 Incidence of Poverty 
Incidence of Poverty Absolute Poverty' Relative Povertyz 
(%) 1965 1970 1976 1980 19883 1965 1970 1976 1980 1988 
Urban Households 54.9 16.2 18.1 10.4 9.3 17.9 7.0 16.0 15.1 10.3 
Rural Households 35.8 27.9 11.7 9.0 9.8 10.0 3.4 9.2 11.2 11.4 
All Households 40.9 23.4 14.8 9.8 9.5 12.1 4.8 12.4 13.3 10.7 
Notes: 1. Absolute poverty line defined as 121,000 won (1981 prices) a month for a five-person household; 2. 
Relative poverty line defined as one-third of average household income; 3. Absolute poverty line and relative 
poverty line defined as 290,000 won at current prices a month for a four-person household, and one-half of 
average household income, respectively. 
Sources: Koh, Il-Dong (1990); Suh, Sang-Mok (1985). 
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As Table 2.1 clearly shows, nearly half of the population was in absolute poverty in 1965 
(Table 2.1; Choo, Hakchung et al., 1996: 89; Suh, Sang-Mok, 1979; Suh, Sang-Mok and 
Yeon, Ha-Cheong, 1986). Under this condition, industrialisation efforts could provide the 
opportunity of employment without any form of welfare provisions. First, it was strongly 
believed that the only way to eliminate poverty was to improve the economic standard for all 
(i. e. the trickle-down effect, see Galbraith, 1992). Second, the authoritarian government 
could lead industrialisation guaranteed by an almost infinite supply of cheap labour. For 
instance, the population in the agricultural sector was 63 per cent of the whole population in 
1963. Most agricultural workers in rural areas were small scale independent farmers 
resulting from the land reforms from the end of 1940s to 1950s. They were the main 
resources that were able to provide the cheap labour force. Without any effective 
mechanisms to relieve societal disorder, the nation experienced rapid economic growth as 
evidenced by the fact that the per capita GNP in 1953 was 67 US dollars but 2,041 US dollars 
by the year of 1983 (NSO, 1998b: 304), Therefore, the Third Republic had policies that were 
consistent with an anti-welfare strategy for the poor and the working class. These policies 
aimed to pursue effective industrialisation on the basis of a low wage economy. The 
government's anti-poverty measure was nothing more than an artificial measure which had 
failed to capture those in great need. In fact, though the poverty threshold had annually been 
readjusted by increasing the individual monthly income, neither benefit levels nor the total 
number of those receiving benefits had changed for the first 10 years since 1965 (Appendix 
6; MoHSA, 1981: 192). 
In sum, the strategy of welfare was largely drawn from the principle of economic growth. But 
we should remember that this strategy was not simply deployed by political intentions alone. 
Socioeconomic conditions were also important factors that allowed decision-makers to 
move on to this end. In general, the strategy of welfare was not primarily concerned with 
raising the standard for all, but by stigmatising the vulnerable able to record rapid economic 
growth. 
Prevailing legacies behind the formation of the nation state are influential in shaping social 
policy in modem state development. The strategy of welfare has been selected in examining 
political values of social policy. These analyses enabled us to explore the ways in which 
ideas have been embedded in the configuration of social policy. Nonetheless, the questions 
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addressed in the introduction of this chapter are yet to be satisfactorily answered. Why and 
how were social policy introduced and modified? And why did some social issues fail to 
become the subject of policy initiatives. In answer to these questions, it is necessary to 
conduct a more specific analysis of welfare programmes by identifying the origins of the 
ideas, the ways in which these ideas filtered through institutional structures, and the reasons 
why a particular set of ideas rather than others were institutionalised. Given this, the policies 
designed by policy experts during the period of 1961 to 1979 are the subject that we now turn 
to 
2.7 The Making of Social Policy (1961-1979): Who Decides What for Whom? 
Under the authoritarian rules of the game, the overarching strategy of social policy making 
relied heavily upon the interests of those in power. Consequently, the role of policy experts 
had been confined within a small circle of the political arena. Although what has appeared in 
practice was very different from what was initially proposed, it is still worthwhile paying 
critical attention to the original ideas and their policy initiatives. This is because comparing 
motives, intent and effect allows us to analyse why some issues have failed or have been 
successfully realised in political arena. This is also because examining ideas allows us to 
explain choices, especially those made under conditions of uncertainty and within margins 
set by material constraints (Hall, 1989a, 1989b, 1993; Jacobsen, 1995; Yee, 1996). These 
conditions of uncertainty are often resolved by the role of an epistemic community. And 
equally, the `influence of an epistemic community "depends on the level of uncertainty" in 
a political realm' (Jacobsen, 1995: 303). This idea-centric approach enables us to connect 
political elites, policy experts, institutions and the public realm. 
Many studies have already confirmed that the role of policy experts has contributed to the 
formation or reform of social policy in different countries (e. g. Desai, 1994; Easterbrook, 
1986; Skocpol, 1992). For Korea, Sohn (1981,1983) and Kwon (1999a) share the view that 
the institutional configuration of a set of welfare programmes at the crossroads between 
political and economic interests had been possible largely because of the significant efforts 
made by policy expert groups with relatively advanced welfare minds (see also Adler and 
Haas, 1992; Le Grand, 1997; Haas, 1992; Jacobsen, 1995). There is little doubt that there 
was limited influence by policy experts in shaping social policy in Korea. Yet, this was not 
because their ideas and roles were insignificant but because these were confined to a given 
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institutional structure. The political infiltration of an epistemic community into governing 
institutions can be an influential force in forming social policy, thereby its contribution 
deserves critical attention. In the first two parts of this section, we shall examine the role of 
two of the most influential think tanks in ideational terms at the early stage of social policy 
making in Korea. Then, we shall analyse how the role of these think tanks become 
marginalised or enhanced through the interaction between ideas, prevailing conditions and 
final decisions in the case of national health insurance. 
2.7.1 The Role of the Committee for Social Security: Idealistic Ideas in Framing 
Social Security 
The overarching structure of social security had initially been constructed by those in the 
Committee for Social Security (CSS). Originally initiated by the government of the Second 
Republic at the National Conference on the General Economic Plan in December 1960 
(Choi, Chon-Song, 1991: 13-14), the creation of the CSS could have contributed to the rather 
progressive, yet somewhat idealistic framework of social welfare programmes in Korea. The 
CSS, as a founding research committee of social welfare programmes, was initially a 
voluntary study group of eight participants, sharing common interests in the possibility of the 
health insurance system which, they believed, could later contribute to the future 
institutionalisation of social welfare programmes (Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 1981: 19,1983: 62). 
One of the study group members (Choi, Chon-Song) proposed the establishment of the CSS 
as a middle range research institute for the introduction of social security in 1960. The study 
group also manifested itself as a social security movement by way of lobbying in order to 
maintain finances. The initiation of the establishment of the CSS in 1960 was postponed 
however due to the military coup d'etat of 1961. Nonetheless, there had been a certain degree 
of continuity towards the idea of establishing the CSS. The idea was reintroduced by the 
chairman of the Health and Social Affairs Committee in the Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction. By Cabinet Decree 469, the CSS finally took its official shape under the 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MoHSA) on 20 March 1962 (Choi, Chon-Song, 
1991: 19-2-5; Sohn, Chun-Kvu, 1981: 34: see also footnote 2 in this chapter). 
l; ntil 28 July 19(2 when the chairman of the SCNR, Park Chung-Hee, requested the cabinet 
to introduce the social security system, the CSS had remained an advisory committee for the 
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MoHSA. The members of the CSS were those who had initially been members of the 
voluntary study group for the introduction of a health insurance system, and those who were 
entrusted and appointed by the Minister of Health and Social Affairs. In short, the CSS was 
a small ideological expert group whose specialised knowledge on social welfare 
programmes had been acquired by their own voluntary commitment. 
Prior to the 1963 presidential election, the CSS became an official government committee. 
The CSS was also asked to design the pilot welfare programmes most suitable to the case of 
Korea amongst many social insurance programmes that would benefit industrial workers and 
include the entire population (Choi, Chon-Song, 1991: 36,42). The underlying principle 
behind its foremost initiation was to design social insurance programmes that should be 
relatively undemanding to implement and that should enhance the development of the 
national economy (Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 1981: 36). Therefore, the four sections of the research 
division (social security, labour, health insurance, and public assistance and social welfare) 
within the CSS initiated three founding pieces of welfare legislation in 1963 in order to 
configure the overarching structure of social policy in Korea. Their progressive mind was 
evidenced by the fact that they had already recognised the necessity of the introduction of 
legal bases on the implementation of social security system even before they were asked to 
design social insurance programmes. These three pieces of legislation are the subject that we 
now turn to. 
Enacted on 5 November 1963 (Law, no. 01437), the founding legal basis of the two tier 
structure of social security was initiated by the CSS. Social security was for the first time 
legally defined as 'a set of benefits from social insurance and non-contributory benefits from 
public assistance' (Article 2) which shares the characteristics of the Beveridgean paradigm 
of social security. Clause 1, Art. 3 of the Act clarified the government's responsibility for 
social security such that the government could allow local authorities and public 
corporations to implement the work in part. In which case, also, the expenses were to be 
defrayed by the National Treasury (Clause 4, Art. 3). Though the CSS became the official 
government committee under the Minister of Health and Social Affairs by the Act (Clause 
1, Art. 4), its ads isorv role remained as it had been (Clause 2, Art. 4). In other words, the CSS 
failed to become an executive committee (where authority is given to make a decision). 
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Compared to the final Act, the original draft proposed by those at the CSS constituted a 
somewhat progressive framework of social security. During the process of consultation at 
the 107`h standing committee of the SCNR, the role of the CSS became reduced to be rather 
passive. For example, the `minister of health and social affairs' rather than the 'government' 
should `consult' with the CSS on the occasion that the social security planning was 
formulated rather than the CSS being allowed to `investigate and deliberate' related matters 
(Clause 2, Art. 4). The `vice-minister' rather than the `minister' became the head of the CSS 
(Clause 2, Art. 5) and the members of the CSS were reduced from `fifteen' to `eleven' 
(Clause I, Art. 5). Further, the originally proposed eleven benefit categories failed to appear 
in the Act (SCNR, 1963; Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 1981: 40-49,1983: 94). All of which clearly 
indicate that the CSS would remain as an advisory committee, not being allowed to be an 
influential committee at the point of decision making. 
This overall backwardness had been to a great extent heavily influenced by the prevailing 
social and economic conditions that might have not given a wide range of choices to the 
SCNR. Once established, a set of welfare legislation may provide potential challenges to 
those in power. This may be in contradiction with the idea that the introduction of welfare 
legislation can be an attractive mechanism in legitimacy gaining. This is precisely why 
underlying ideas, motives, and intentions behind welfare legislation are greatly important 
and this is why principled ideas become metamorphosed through institutional structure. In 
short, the instruments of social policy originated not from those in power but from a small 
group of researchers failing to convey their intended motives. The continuity of limited 
availability of financial resources and greater policy priority to economic progress on the 
basis largely of nominal and pragmatic political reasons did not allow a more ideal shape of 
social security to emerge. 
In contrast, the original draft of industrial accident insurance designed by the Labour Section 
of the CSS became the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act with less severe 
amendments (MoL, 1')97b: 17). Comparatively, industrial accident insurance or workmen's 
compensation insurance is often perceived to be the `least radical break with liberalism' 
where the old idea of liability for individually caused damages lies amongst sickness, old age 
and unelllployment. It however still functions as the `principle of automatic compensation 
for the loss of earnings through work injuries' (Flora and Alber, 1981: 51). 
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The Act introduced compulsory insurance against industrial accidents for workers with 
implementation due on 1 July 1964. Industrial accidents however had not previously been at 
the centre of public debates. During the period of the `April 19 Student Revolution' of 1960 
to the May 16 military coup d'etat of 1961, the overarching agenda for approximately 1,840 
street demonstrations involving the total number of 960,000 ordinary citizens was to resolve 
the problem of unemployment. This subsequently led the then ruling Liberal Party 
(Appendix 2) to make a commitment to implementing unemployment insurance, health 
insurance and other social security programmes as part of their election pledge for the 
general election in 1960 (MoL, 1997b: 14). In other words, while unemployment insurance 
had long been supported by the public, industrial accidents had not been subject to either a 
public or a political discussion (MoL, 1997b: 17-18). 
Industrial accident insurance, having failed to become a social problem, had to a greater 
extent been a product of the state pre-emptive mechanisms underlying social welfare before 
1963 (for social problems, see Manning, 1985a, 1985b). Prior to industrial accident 
insurance of 1964, the Decree of Chosun Mines (1915) had offered miners assistance for 
industrial accidents under the Japanese colonial rule. Industrial accidents compensation from 
1948 to 1953 had been made payable in the form of earnings-related compensation to those 
incapacitated as a result of an injury sustained at particular types of work (MoL, 1997b: 13). 
Their legal bases were three rights of labour declared, yet to be legalised in a written form'2, 
by the Constitution of 17 July 1948 (Art. 17 and Art. 18). Industrial accident compensations 
were subject to a collective agreement between employers and enterprise-specific trade 
unions. For this reason, industrial accident compensations had marginalised those in small 
and medium scale businesses (FKTU, 1979: 391-392; MoL, 1997b: 9). Further, the Labour 
Standard Act, enacted during the Korean War (1950-1953) on 8 May 1953 (Law no. 0280), 
had already established the principle of `employer liability' whereby an individual employer 
is responsible for industrial accidents at work. However, the principle of employer liability 
was impractical in practice. This is because although small and medium scale businesses as 
well as large scale businesses were subject. `employer liability' was conditional upon 
t2 
In other words, the Trade Union Act that allowed three rights of labour was enacted on 8 March 1953 
as a law no. 0280. Three rights of labour ýý'ere unionisation, collective bargaining and collective action. 
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employers' discretionary power that would not compensate more than their financial 
capacity allowed (MoL, 1997b: 18: Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 1981: 54.1983: 100). 
Industrial accident insurance was therefore given a priority over unemployment insurance. 
This was not because there had been exclusive plans or increasing social demands (Sohn, 
Chun-Kyu, 1983: 97). Nor was this because there had been considerations on priority setting 
and service delivery. But this was because the Labour Standard Act of 1953 had already 
provided an overarching framework that could relatively easily be rearranged by turning the 
underlying principle (i. e. employer liability) into compulsory insurance (Choi, Chun-Song, 
1991: 36-37). The First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966) had also 
necessarily been taken into account as an overarching paradigm of economic policy. The 
reasons can be summarised in three ways. First, it was more likely to generate the major shift 
in industrial structure (see Table 3.4 in Chapter 3). Second, it would in turn increase the total 
number of industrial workers out of the entire economically active population. And third, the 
overall rate of industrial accidents might rise as a result (MoL, 1997b: 27; Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 
1981: 35-55). Therefore, both functions of social control and social integration of social 
policy had been embodied in industrial accident insurance. As a function of social control, it 
would be more practical in order to maintain the `reserve army of labour'. As a function of 
social integration, those who would experience industrial accidents might need more 
financial and medical support than those able-bodied unemployed. 
The original scope of the coverage designed by the Labour Section of the CSS had been 
slightly modified from workplaces with more than 100 employees to those with over 500 
workers. Yet, the compulsory principle remained intact as it had initially been proposed. 
During the entire process of legislation, interest groups including trade unions and 
employers' organisations had made no significant interventions (Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 
1983: 107). The key actors that were able to get the Bill through the SCNR were not the 
political elites or academics but mainly those in the CSS, the then Minister of Health and 
Social Affairs, and a member at the Social Affairs Section of the SCNR. They were 
ideologically and philosophically bound up in social welfare (Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 
1983: 79,101). In other words, they were the figures to make an initial contribution to the 
making of social policy by persuading officials working within a highly rigid institutional 
81 
structure (i. e. SCNR) where all judicial and executive functions were carried out (Wright, 
1975: 53). 
The only identifiable pressure group activity appeared when a private insurance company 
endorsed the idea that industrial accident insurance should be run by private insurance 
companies. The idea itself had been around within the MoHSA and other related ministries. 
lt had then become one of the main questions raised by the discussion held at the SCNR 
(MoL, 1997b: 21; SCNR, 1963: 108; Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 1983: 103). Yet, two practical reasons 
had been called into question against the idea of the central fund operating body being a 
private insurance company. A government department (MoHSA) had been favoured over 
private organisations by those who designed the scheme. First, it would be the first social 
security programme ever and would require coordination with industrial accident safety 
measures, the legal basis of which had been given by the Disaster Relief Act of 1962. 
Second, the overall framework of the scheme had already been outlined with the idea of the 
MoHSA being a central operating body, in which the Ministry of Labour (MoL) has taken 
over the task since its establishment in 1981 (MoL, 1990a: 411; see also Chapter 4). Hence, 
the change of a central operating body at the last moment of legislation would lead to a 
prolonged delay of the scheme being given life (MoL, 1997b: 22). In principle terms, in 
addition, more fundamental problems might rise if the scheme was run by a private insurance 
company. The primary reason is that there would be the potential danger of occupational 
schemes' capital accumulation and the investment power wielded by private insurance 
companies (Titmuss, 1962: Ch. 7,1974: Ch. 7,1976: Ch. 15,1987b). 
In sum, as the pre-Beveridgean paradigm of British social security had evolved in piecemeal 
fashion during the first four decades of the 20th century (Berthoud and Brown, 1981: 134), so 
had the social security system in Korea during the early 1960s. By the introduction of 
industrial accident insurance, the impracticality of the existing paradigm became more 
realistic. The Act had brought about the imposition of insurance, the entire cost of which was 
to be financed solely by contributions from employers in conformity with the government 
subsidies on the administrative cost for the first two years of 1964 and 1965. Industrial 
accident compensations were therefore available as of right in return for contributions. in 
addition to the two pieces of welfare legislation, the CSS initiated the health insurance act to 
\V hich we now turn to. 
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As we have seen, the CSS was asked to design social welfare programmes that would benefit 
industrial workers and the entire population. Industrial accident insurance has therefore 
come to life as a social insurance scheme that would benefit industrial workers, while health 
insurance had been considered to be another social insurance programme that would 
encompass the entire population (Choi, Chon-Song, 1991: 36,42). In order for the Health 
Care Section of the CSS to design the draft bill for health insurance, the first health survey, 
with a sample of 500 households, was conducted in Seoul from October to November 1962. 
The research findings pinpointed the necessity of the universal health care programme. 
Those in greatest need of health care had failed to use hospitals due largely to the costs and 
had also required long-term care because of the nature of their sickness (Choi, Chon-Song, 
1991: 60-91; Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 1983: 110-111; for the three ideal-type health programmes, 
see Immergut, 1992a, 1992b). 
Unless being universal and compulsory at least in principle, social insurance can neither be 
redistributive nor risk-pooling (Baldwin, 1990: 47-54; Titmuss, 1976: Ch. 15). Despite a 
certain distributional effect between different risk categories permeated within the principle 
of social insurance, there always exist excluded groups who are inclined to be trapped in a 
marginal area of poverty (Baldwin, 1990). This is particularly the case in so far as the scheme 
is contingent upon contributions determined by the level of income within the confined area 
of industrial sectors. The larger the group, the higher the chances to meet the needs required 
by the funds pooled. The financial viability becomes much higher when affiliation is 
compulsory. That is, voluntary affiliation leads to `adverse selection' (Ron, Abel-Smith, and 
Tamburi, 1990: 3-34). 
The problem is that a universal provision also brings costs (Spicker, 1988: 123). The 
concentration on the lower income groups had not even been brought up in the first draft 
proposal. Only workplaces with over 500 employees were embraced instead. More 
importantly, the original proposal was revised to delete the compulsory principle of 
participation during its reading in the SCNR. The Health Insurance Act, enacted on 16 
December 1963 (Law no. 01623), had eventually therefore failed to apply to those in great 
need. And it had merely allowed the voluntary participation of employees' in workplaces 
with more than 30(0 employees (Clause 1, Art. 8: Choi, Chon-Song. 1991: 112: SCNR, 1963; 
Sohn. Chun-Ky u. 1981: 67.1953: 1 15). 
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A primary decision taken by those in the SCNR against a compulsory and universal approach 
was to a certain extent a logical conclusion. In order to set up the programme, compulsory 
health insurance was more likely to impose a financial burden on both businesses, 
responsible for the half of insurance contributions, and the government, liable for 
administrative costs. The CSS had been given very limited time to construct the bill before 
the military government became transformed to a semi-civilian government. Conditional 
possibilities had also been heavily underestimated. Hence, the Health Insurance Act had 
remained almost intact until compulsory elements became principal parts in August 1977. 
A member of the CSS who had been one of the key experts participating in the policy process 
recollected that: 
`... the legalisation process of health insurance had been one of recklessness... neither had 
socio-economic conditions been throughly taken on board, nor had there been any demands 
from social groups. There had also not been consideration for any highly strategic means to 
achieve social policy objectives' (Choi, Chon-Song, 1991: 109). 
Health insurance had failed to come to life. Only minor enactments and amendments of the 
Enforcement Ordinance were made in 1964 and 1969, with health insurance under the 
voluntary principle being in operation in the experimental form for the time being (see also 
Chapter 4). 
In sum, Kwon (1999a: 52-60) argues that those in the CSS were idealists. Their idealistic 
approach failed to attract those in the top decision-making echelons, especially, the 
president. Kwon's explanation was that the argument of the CSS for social development was 
not attractive to those who `pursued the politics of legitimation through economic 
performance. In other words, the policy paradigms of the experts and the decision makers 
were different' (Kwon, Huck-Ju, 1999a: 60). Notwithstanding, the prevailing ideas and 
policy initiatives throughout the 1960s should not simply be seen as a linear strategic 
manoeuvre against the legitimacy deficit. The initiation of a set of welfare programmes 
might have given it logical pertinence. Their metamorphosis and subsequent implementation 
failure might also have endorsed a quintessential idea that economic growth should not be 
impeded by social policy. Yet, the refusal of welfare policy initiatives did not arise from the 
changes to their underlying ideas but was derived from the rigidity of institutional structure 
that limited the flow of the ideas. In fact, the Minister of Health and Social Affairs as one of 
the key actors in the making of social policy in the 1960s remained in office longer than 
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anyone else since its establishment in 194813. The motives and intent might have been 
predominantly engaged with legitimacy gaining but their effects failed to impart any logical 
validity. Positive welfare that could reflect images of an altruistic and egalitarian quality 
often seen in humanitarian collectivism had to linger around until the institutional rigidity 
became relaxed. In contrast to the CSS, we now move on to another think tank that has been 
pragmatic in the making of social policy in Korea. 
2.7.2 The Role of the Korea Development Institute: Pragmatic Ideas in the Making of 
National Pensions 
In contrast to the emerging ideas of welfare in the 1960s, credit for which should be given to 
those in the CSS, the role of the CSS became increasingly marginalised within the even more 
rigid institutional structure of the 1970s. Historically, there have been nine constitutional 
amendments since 1948, weven of which, however, have been attained either under a state 
of constitutional discontinuance or by coercive measures 14. Two of the well-known 
examples have been the constitutional violation of 1971, followed by the subsequent 
declaration of martial law on 17 October 1972 and that of 1980 under the Fifth Republic. On 
the one hand, the constitutional governance had been severely undermined; on the other 
hand, an economic supremacy doctrine had become more empowered by marked progress in 
the national economy. Since its first initiation of Five-Year Economic Development Plans in 
1962, the average annual rate of economic growth until 1972 was 9.24 per cent. Per capita 
GNP rose from 87 US dollars in 1962 to 319 US dollars in 1972, representing a 366.67 per 
cent increase over the same ten-year period (EPB, 1990: 5). Those involved in economic 
policy had taken credit. The distance between what the state felt could be spent on welfare 
and what was economically feasible had grown. There had been no sign of interrelatedness 
between social policy and economic policy. Social policy had come second to economic 
policy by an even larger margin (see Boulding, 1973; Piachaud, 1989). 
13 
The Minister, Chung, Hee-Sup, remained in office from 15 April 1966 to 21 October 1969 (42 
months), while the average tenure of ministers from August 1948 to May 1999 was only about 15.25 
months. 
14 
Except for the one of 19('0 that changed a presidential system to a cabinet system and the other of 1987 
after the June democratic stns`ggle (see Chapter 3). 
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However, the rate of economic growth in 1972 was the lowest (5.1 per cent) during the 
period of 1963 to 1979, while the average annual rate of economic growth was 9.28 per cent 
in the same period (EPB, 1990: 5). A grounding rationale behind a strategic shift from 
export-led industrialisation based on import-substitution to heavy and chemical industry in 
the 1970s had to a large extent ensued from this macro-economic indicator (see Chapter 5). 
Having been considered since the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan 
(1967-1971), the Korea Development Institute (KIDI) was established in March 1971 under 
this condition. By its establishment, social development, embarking on national investment 
in a social sector, exclusively became part of economic policy earmarked by a change of 
discourse where the existing framework of a Five-Year Economic Development Plan turned 
into a Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan from its fourth activation (1977-1981). 
The political intentions underlying the introduction of welfare legislation during the 1970s 
(see Appendix 1) had been embodied by the KDI, the origin of which came from Park 
himself in order to enhance economic plans for industrialisation. As part of social 
development, the establishment of the KDI in 1971 and its involvement in social policy 
making from 1972 generated the idea that social policy could function not to hamper 
economic development but to reinforce the balanced development of society and economy. 
Contrary to those in the CSS, researchers in the KDI had a relatively pragmatic welfare mind 
designing and setting up social welfare programmes. Those in the KDI were however less 
concerned with the very idea of welfare. They were pragmatic in the sense that social policy 
could be compatible with economic policy by way of designing social welfare programmes 
within the given economic policy paradigm. 
The KDI is a government subsidised think tank and might deserve to take credit as one of the 
most influential research institutes in framing social policy in Korea. The main reason was 
that the KDI managed to change the top decision makers' perception of social policy by 
bringing up the idea of its possible compatibility (Kwon, Huck-Ju, 1999a: 60). However, the 
central role of the KDI has largely remained concerned with economic policy, not social 
policy. The question could arise therefore when considering whether they made a 
contribution to the adequate and sustainable configuration of social policy. A former 
researcher of the KDI points out that: 
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`I do not think that the KDI have made a marked contribution to the field of social policy. 
At that time, the KDI carried out what they were asked as a proxy institute because there was 
no competent research institute for social policy. Their role has always been centred upon 
economic policy. Their temporary substitute role might have had a meaning to the extent that 
the government had them involved in designing social welfare programmes. To a certain 
extent, for example, it might be of help to design a rather generous scheme at an initial stage. 
Yet, it was obvious that financial instability could result from a generous earmarking higher 
benefit rates than their correspondent contribution rates, originally proposed by the KDL On 
no account was the National Pension Programme designed appropriately' (Interview with 
Kwon, Soonwon, 31 July 2000, Seoul). 
The principle of economic supremacy over social policy continued through and is 
particularly well illustrated by the process of national pensions making in which the KDI 
played a key role. In order to understand this process, two circumstantial possibilities of 
conspiracy should be taken on board within the underlying paradigm of motives and intent 
behind national pensions. First, the mobilisation of domestic capital became one of the 
significant tasks to resolve after the shift of grand economic growth strategy that required a 
substantial amount of national resources. Its genuine motives had therefore been called into 
question whether national pensions had been designed to be a means to an accumulation of 
domestic capital (DDN, 26 September 1973; HDN-a, 21 September 1973; NPC, 1998a: 
77-88; Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 1983: 134). Second, the result of the Seventh Presidential Election 
held on 27 April 1971 was not promising enough to give the President confidence for the 
coming ninth general election of 27 February 1973. There might be two sound reasons for 
this. To begin with, he had nearly been defeated by the opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung, 
at the Fifth Election of 15 October 1963 (NEC, 1996b: 10,11). Furthermore, his Democratic 
Republican Party (DRP) only gained 109.89 per cent votes of the leading opposition party at 
the Eighth General Election held on 25 May 1971. It was the narrowest margin since Park's 
first term in office for the DRP had obtained 166.38 and 154.60 per cent votes of the leading 
opposition party at the Sixth and Seventh General Election respectively (NEC, 1992: 142). In 
addition, the Ninth General Election was to be the first political evaluation after the 
constitutional violation which had obviously sent Park on a search for a distinguished 
election strategy. 
Both the CSS under the jurisdiction of the MoHSA and the KDI under the EPB had been 
involved in the design of national pensions. Yet, their official engagement with it began only 
when the joint-departmental working committee was appointed by the then Vice-Prime 
Minister on 31 January 1973. This appointment aimed to prepare a draft legislative package 
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that could become duly effective on 1 January 1974. However, the role of the CSS had 
already been marginalised. Instead, the KDI had been playing a leading role. Its entrance was 
formally requested by the President on 30 November 1972 when the President of the KDI, 
Kim Mahn-Je, met Park Chung-Hee to discuss the potential of national pensions (Park, 
Chong-Kee, 1975: 56,104-105). 
The President publicly proclaimed the possible enactment of a national pension programme 
at the New Year's conference on 12 January 1973 (Choi, Chun-Song, 1991: 131; Lee, 
Hye-Kyung, 1999: 27; Park, Chong-Kee, 1975: 104). It became an Act on 24 December 1973 
(Law no. 02655). The first two tentative drafts produced both by the MoHSA and the KDI 
had shared their contents in general items, yet had shown substantial differences in critical 
elements. First and foremost, the rate of fund accumulation for the first year estimated by the 
KDI was over six times higher than that estimated by the MoHSA. Second, in order for the 
K. )I to fulfil the strategic purpose of national pensions, those in low income and in relatively 
unstable businesses failed to become included, whilst the draft proposed by the MoHSA 
comprised the entire population aged between 20 and 60. Third, in order to divert pension 
funds, the KDI proposed that the contribution should be levied by the National Tax Service 
(NTS, established in 1966). However, the Bureau of Welfare Pensions under the MoHSA 
should be established in order for the fund to be more responsive to welfare needs according 
to the draft made by the MoHSA (Chun, Nam-Jin, 1981: 13-14; NPC, 1998a: 62-72). 
On 7 December 1973, a finalised government bill appeared closer to that of the KDI both in 
the scope of coverage and in the fund operation. The bill had already gone through three 
critical stages of strictly hierarchical decision-making; first at the Economic Ministers' 
Conference (EMC) with all the economic ministers present (the deputy prime minister who 
was also the Minister of the EPB chaired this Conference); second at the Cabinet (State) 
Council with all ministers in attendance; and then third, at the president's desk for signature. 
Throughout this procedure, the president exercised the most significant power of ratification 
(Chung, Chung-Kil, 1989: 269). The subsequent decision taken by the National Assembly on 
1 December 1973 allowed it to go through with no critical correction added (NAO, 1973a, 
1973b, 1973c, 1973d). 
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According to the National Welfare Pension Act (Law no. 02655), the national pension 
programme would be financed solely through the contributions of employers and employees, 
without subsidy from the general revenues of the government (Clause 7, Art. 3; Clause 2, 
Art. 7). The underlying rationale for this was to encourage cooperative responsibilities for 
both groups and to make clear that national pensions were not a state assistance programme. 
In addition, those covered were relatively better-off (Park, Chong-Kee, 1975: 69-70). One of 
the founding members of the KDI who had been involved in the designing of the national 
pension programme demonstrates that: 
'In examining the role of national welfare pension program in income redistribution, we 
have to keep in mind that the redistribution of income between different income groups is 
not the only or even the primary objective of the NWP [National Welfare Pension] program' 
(Park, Chong-Kee, 1975: 90). 
`... the NWP system builds up and maintains reserves and is thus a source of savings. The 
accumulation of substantial reserve funds in excess of current requirements for benefit 
payments would enable Korea to use its NWP system as a means of increasing savings in the 
economy' (Park, Chong-Kee, 1975: 80). 
In sum, the role of the CSS had begun to be marginalised through the process of national 
pensions making. Yet, its existence had remained until its research functions were 
transferred to the Korea Institute for Population and Health (KWH)15 . All in all, the 
presidential decision-making power had once again been substantially superior to research 
experts or government ministries throughout the policy-making process. Though the 
executive power, dominated by career bureaucrats, was highly influential in designing 
state-centred polices, the decisonary power had been exclusively concentrated on the 
president (Chung, Chung-Kil, 1989). In fact, the national pension programme failed to be 
carried into effect. On 22 December 1973, only two days before its implementation, 
President Park suddenly made a decision to postpone it. This was largely because the oil 
crisis of 1973 could have devalued potential accumulated funds. Again, the very idea of 
welfare being beneficial to all failed to come to life. The key point to be remembered here is 
that Presidential power was supreme but even this Presidential power was also conditioned 
by an economic crisis. How did the role of these think tanks change? And what underpinning 
is 
The KIPH was established on 1 July 1981 (Law no. 03417) and renamed as the Korea Institute for 
Health and Social Affairs (KIHSA) on 30 December 1989 (Law no. 04181). 
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conditions emerged in the process of compulsory health insurance making? These are the 
questions that we now turn to answer. 
2.7.3 Making Health Insurance Compulsory: Ideas, Conditions, and Final Decisions 
Since 1963, those in the CSS had made a great effort to put the principle of compulsory 
health insurance into effect within a series of experimental projects (see Chapter 4). 
However, its first amendment on 7 August 1970 (Law no. 02228) did not come to life due to 
the absence of a presidential decree, a legal requirement for any law to be put into effect 
(Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 1983: 137). Lack of financial resources was one of the major reasons that 
had caused its failure, and even the previous failure in 1963. It was the field of national 
defence that most of the national budget was allocated to. Despite the unusual rate of 
economic growth, a bilateral defence burden-sharing agreement with the United States took 
up 6 per cent of GNP which resulted in over 30 per cent of the national budget being spent 
on national defence (Son, Annette Hye Kyung, 1998: 20). 
There had been a number of conditions that might have enabled compulsory health insurance 
to be introduced. First, the financial rigidity had eased off as a five-year health sector loan 
agreement was signed between the government of Korea and the United States Agency for 
International Development in September 1975 (Ron, Abel-Smith, and Tamburi, 1990: 145). 
Second, the post-period of the Joint Communique of 4 July 1972 between South and North 
Korea enabled both to start off the South-North dialogue that had eventually led to a 
comparison between their living conditions. In fact, a universal coverage of health care 
service had already been in operation in North Korea since 1972 and this had been taken full 
advantage of as a political propaganda by the North (Joo, Jaehyun, 1999a: 397). Further, as 
Figure -'. 1 clearly shows, per capita gross national product in North Korea had been slightly 
hither than that of South Korea during the period of 1955 to 1968. For instance, it recorded 
the maximum difference of 57 US dollars in 1965 (see also Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4). Third, 
a substantially higher rate of medical practitioners per person in North Korea legitimised the 
criticism that the accessibility to health services in South Korea was very limited as a result 
of capitalist development (NSO, 1998b: 340). 
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Figure 2.1 Per Capita GNP 1953-1977 (Unit: US dollars) 
Source : NSO (1998b: 304) 
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In South Korea, although the incidence of labour disputes had remained modest, there had 
been a continuity of sporadic opposition movements (MoL, 1981: 370). In this sense, 
compulsory health insurance could generate the idea of solidarity wherein social integration 
could be achieved by `cross-subsidisation from individuals with higher resources to those 
who can contribute less and from those with a lower incidence of illness to those who require 
care more frequently' (Ron, Abel-Smith, and Tamburi, 1990: 3). Further, those of the CSS 
had argued that the idea of social welfare would be able to substantiate the social basis 
behind the concept of `national security' against communism (Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 1983: 142; 
for a hegemonic function of the intellectuals, see Desai, 1994; Gramsci, 1971). 
At the New Year's Press Conference on 15 January 1976, the President made official the 
possibility of health insurance being duly implemented as a core part of social development 
within the Fourth Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan (1977-1981) (HDN-a, 16 
January 1976). The then chief presidential secretary said that President Park had already 
determined to implement a health insurance programme and then appointed an economist, 
Shin Hyun-Hwak, to be a Minister of Health and Social Affairs as a germane (pertinent) 
figure to the task (Kim, Joung-Ryum, 1990: 308-309). Shin Hyun-Hwak has in fact been not 
only the most powerful minister of health and welfare but also the person having been in 
office for the second longest tenure (9 December 1975 - 22 December 1978). The original 
source of the idea evolved from those in the CSS while the overarching policy-making 
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process had been carried out by the executives. By the Minister of Health and Social Affairs 
being entrusted by the President. the MoHSA had been able to take a leading role. 
Nonetheless, the CSS did not take part in this process for two reasons. First, executives at a 
wide range of ministry levels had already been responsible for different aspects of health 
care. Second, a newly established tripartite body of the National Health Council (NHC), the 
National Health Secretariat (NHS), and the Korea Health Development Institute (KHDI) 
began to be in operation at a community level from 1976 (Park, Chong-Kee and Yeon, 
Ha-Cheong, 1981; Ron, Abel-Smith, and Tamburi, 1990: 147). Chaired by the deputy prime 
minister, the NHC was established at the cabinet level in order to co-ordinate the roles of the 
ministries involved. The NHS was set up within the KDI to provide inputs and resources to 
the N1 IC. The KHDI'6 was also created to develop low-cost health delivery schemes and to 
evaluate the project by the NHS (Law no. 02857; Park, Chong-Kee and Yeon, Ha-Cheong 
1981: 157; Ron, Abel-Smith, and Tamburi, 1990: 147). 
Despite this tripartite structure, the Bureau of Welfare Pensions (BoWP) 17 was given the 
responsibility for the preparation of the reform bill (MoHW, 1998b: 527-528). The draft bill 
designed by the BoWP was challenged by the EPB and the Professional Evaluation Unit 
(PEU). These challenges could not be ignored because the EPB was the most powerful 
ministry in the government and the PEU was a group of scholars who had carried out 
evaluations of five-year economic development plans from the mid-1960s to the 1980s 
(Chung, Chung-Kil, 1989: 277; see also Chapter 3). The then Minister of Health and Social 
Affairs said that: 
At that time, I thought that it would be really difficult for the [MoHSA] to pass the proposal 
of the mandatory [health] insurance scheme through a Cabinet Council, for no ministry 
supported the [MoHSA] ... I 
had no option but to ask the President to call a meeting of the 
departments concerned. So a meeting presided over by the President was held at the 
Presidential {Mansion. Every Minister except me opposed it ... Despite these negative 
responses from other departments, President Park finally decided to do it. The [health] 
insurance would not have been achieved without the President's determination and 
16 
Merging with Korea Institute for Family Planning (KIFP) which was established on 1 July 197l(Law 
no. 02270), the KHDI became the KIPH on 1 July 1981 (Law no. 03471). 
17 
The Bo\VP was established on 4 Januar 19,4 (Presidential Decree no. 7015) and later became the 
Bureau of Social Insurance (BoSI) on 12 March 1977 in the MoHSA (Presidential Decree no. 8486; 
M41l-14'x', 
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commitment to it' (Shin, Hyun-Hwak. requoted from Joo, Jaehyun, (1999a: 392) with 
modifications of terminologies in square brackets). 
Because of this Presidential power, the draft bill designed by the BoWP had gone through the 
ministerial conflicts with no serious challenges involved. However, it had not developed far 
beyond its original proposal drafted by the CSS in 1963. First, welfare programmes in the 
1960s and the 1970s were in general modelled on those of other industrialised countries, 
particularly Japan for example (see Choi, Chon-Song, 1991; Joo, Jaehyun, 1999a: 393; 
Sohn, Chun-Kyu, 1983). Second, prevailing political considerations behind its initiation had 
not allowed it to take the time required for development. The empirical lessons largely 
learned from the experience of a series of experimental projects (1965-1977) had by and 
large been ignored in guiding the directions of health insurance (Choi, Chon-Song, 
1991: 114-129). 
In making health insurance compulsory, interest group politics had first appeared to be 
influential. For example, the Korean Medical Association (KMA), a doctors' association, 
had their voice heard during its process (Sohn, Chun-Kyu 1981: 86-98,1983: 128-150; see 
also Ham, 1992). Yet, unlike the cases of France, Sweden, and Switzerland'8, institutional 
rules did not allow any organised interests or the National Assembly to exercise veto points, 
thereby bypassing most the potential resistance. The president's determination and his 
subsequent actions were the key determinant within a distinct logic of decision making that 
set up the agenda and made health insurance compulsory (see also Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). 
In sum, throughout this section have we examined the micro-politics of individual pieces of 
legislation in the making of social policy under the authoritarian rules of the game. This has 
endorsed the argument that institutional rules, predominantly determined by the rules of 
politics, had presided over incentives, opportunities and constraints. Given this institutional 
p, lradigrn, neither the intellectuals or think-tanks, nor the executives, the legislature, or 
organised interests played a significant role in decision making. As a result of this 
institutional rigidity, what determines the choices available is not the rightness or wrongness 
is 
Immer gut (1992a, 1992b) argues that the parliamentary arena in France, a pattern of executive 
dominance in Sweden and the referendum in Switzerland are either a significant veto point or a critical 
decision point in the politics of health. 
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of the ideas but the politics of the rules (institutions) that condition the utility of power. 
However, as we shall see in the next section. political democratisation emerging in the late 
1980s has changed the prevailing rules of the game and thereby subsequently relaxed 
institutional rigidity. The conditions that allow the ideas to be disseminated made it possible 
to articulate social demands. The topicality of the public concerns becomes an increasingly 
important variable. 
2.8 Moving Towards Democracy? : Transition, Crisis, and the Rules of the Game 
Institutional dynamism had only been allowed to be operationalised within the confined 
extent to which the interest of top decision makers and policy agendas were considered to 
coincide. The democratic rules of decision making had consistently been undermined in 
parallel with constitutional violations. Legitimacy deficit of the polity continued through the 
Fifth Republic (1981-1987) largely due to its military nature. The sovereignty of Park 
Chung-Hee, terminated by his assassination on 26 October 1979, was taken over by that of 
Chun Doo-Hwan, another military General who gained power by the second military coup 
d 'etat of 12 December 1979 in the modem history of Korea. The eight-month presidency of 
Choi Kyu-Ha19 was replaced by President Chun, elected on 27 August 1980 as the eleventh 
President under the `Yushin' constitution and on 25 February 1981 as the twelfth under the 
new Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1981-1988). 
Internationally somewhat less well known than the democratisation movement on 
Tiananmen Square in China on 4 June 1989, the `Kwangju uprising', a harbinger of 
democratic class struggle in the late 1980s, began from 18 May 1980 for approximately ten 
days in a southern part of Korea. As a response from the state, though declared by President 
Choi, the expansion of martial law to a nationwide level was a decision of the military 
authorities who had in fact exercised superior power to the President. Militarists' despotism 
not only blocked the role of the National Assembly but also subdued the `Kwangju uprising' 
by li rcc (Kim, Chem -Lim, 1988). Evolving from this, the nature of the Fifth Republic 
(1981-1988) was also military driven authoritarian despotism in the guise of liberal 
democracy. For example, the Twelfth Presidential Election was held at the electoral 
19 
He was the tenth President from 6 December 1979 to16 August 1980. He was previously a Prime 
N ini`ter who became the President according to the 'i'ushin' constitution. 
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conference of the electoral college. However, it was somewhat different from the previous 
method exercised since the Eighth Presidential Election on 23 December 1972 (NEC, 1996b: 
14). Whereas members of a delegation at the National Conference for Unification were not 
allowed to be assigned to any political parties, those at the electoral college were. Yet, in 
practice, the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) constituted almost 70 per cent of those in 
the electoral college that obviously led to Chun's landslide victory, gaining 90.23 per cent of 
votes cast (NEC, 1996b: 11). 
This anti-democratic rule of the game had been maintained by Chun's declaration on 13 
April 1987 of his decision to suspend debate on constitutional reform and to attempt to pass 
it on to the next presidential candidate of the DJP, Rho Tae-Woo, on 10 June 1987 (Han, 
Sung-Joo, 1988: 53-54). The democratisation movement had already been betokened by the 
Twelfth National Assembly Election in February 1985. At this election, the one-month old 
New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP) not only gained nearly 83 per cent votes of the DJP 
but also obtained 40.2 per cent votes cast in five major cities, while the DJP managed to gain 
only 28.4 per cent in the same areas (NEC, 1992: 142; Seong, Kyung-Ryung 1996: 240; see 
also Appendix 2). Both opposition parties and ordinary demonstrators including university 
students, religious figures, journalists and intellectuals, formed a National Coalition for 
Democratic Constitution (NCDC) on 27 May 1987. This formation aimed to spearhead 
demonstrations for constitutional reform (Lee, Manwoo, 1990: 37). A previously latent and 
controlled labour movement also became salient as Figure 2.2 clearly illustrates, measured 
not just by the level of unionisation (see Korpi, 1983: 39), but better by the number of strikes, 
the number of working days lost, or even by the number of those involved in strikes (see also 
Appendix 3). 
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Figure 2.2 Labour Disputes (1963-1999) 
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Working class mobilisation has strategic advantages compared to collective actions led by 
other social groups in that measures such as strikes and lock-outs, demonstrations and 
boycott can paralyse capitalist development. Valenzuela (1989: 447) clearly argues that: 
`The labour movement generally has a greater capacity for extensive and effective 
mobilisation at critical moments than other social groups.. . the 
labour movement can disrupt 
the economy directly through work stoppages. Its wage demands are also an important 
element in the longer-term macroeconomic context, and it can seek to redefine the 
conditions of employment and the character of labor-management relations. Labor's 
demands cannot be lightly ignored. ' 
Nonetheless, emerging working class movements did not place on the political agenda a 
great many social policy issues. Trade unions failed to take the leading part in pro-democracy 
movements. This was partly because they had failed to be an innermost part of the NCDC 
and partly because their class mobilisation in the early 1980s had already been subject to 
even harsher control than in the previous decade (MoL, 1987: 398,1991: 428). There had also 
been friction between those well-organised and those not that caused divisions inside the 
working class (see Esping-Andersen, 1990: 24). For example, the rate of unionisation, 
measured by union membership divided by total number of employees, was only 19.20 per 
cent from 1979 to 1989 (EPB, 1990: 26). In essence, pro-democracy movements in the 1980s 
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were not led by the working class but by thousands of students and urban White collar 
middle-class citizens. 
In addition, in contradiction to Valenzuela's assertion, the crisis of accumulation20 was not 
critically severe in a macroeconomic sense. According to Offe (1984: 83), accumulation 
crisis requires legitimatised political regulation to function. Yet, there had been no serious 
economic damage involved. This was because most of the large disturbances took place in 
large enterprises that could manage the increase of wages and other benefits for workers 
without being critically challenged by their competitors. Primary concerns of workers were 
confined to the areas of wages, benefits and working conditions. As Figure 2.3 shows, 
nominal wages increased greatly over time while weekly average working hours and 
monthly average working days in all industries remained almost unchanged. More 
importantly, no particular sign of broader political activities was evidenced. Han 
(1990: 10-11) argues that this absence of political activity made them lose the connection 
with other social groups. Consequently, an eight-point proposal, where a constitutional 
reform that allowed direct presidential elections was promised and declared by Rho 
Tae-Woo on 29 June 1987, effectively ended the `spring of discontent' with no remarks on 
any labour or social policy related issues (Han, Sung-Joo, 1988: 54; Seong, Kyung-Ryung, 
1996: 245). 
20 
The crisis of accumulation is one of the four crises identified by O'Donnell in his case study of the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian state of Argentina from 1966 to 1973. The other three are the crisis of 
go\ ernnment, the crisis of regime. and the crisis of social domination (O'Donnell, 1988: 24-27). 
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Figure 2.3 Wonting Conditions (1976-2000) 
2000 
1500 
1000 
500 
0- . -........... -.......... -........... - . -......... -...... -...... ý,.. ý. 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Nominal wages (in Thousand Won)* 
-- Weekly average working hours (all industries) 
Monthly average working days (alI industries) 
Notes: * data from 1976 to 1979 include all industries, the rest includes only non-agricultural industries. 
Sources: K! ] (1999); NSO (1998a: 189,190,192,1999c, 2000c: 204,206,2001). 
Ginsburg (1979: 14) argues that the British welfare state is a response to the presence of the 
working class but the working class has exerted very little control over the shape of welfare 
and administration. Similarly, the working class power in Korea did not make a considerable 
contribution to a government's capitulation. However, their presence itself was meaningful 
and influential because it eventually led to the opening and diversification of policy making 
channels (see Chapter 3 especially for the making of employment insurance). Also, in 
historical terms, the working class finally regained their power21. The continuity of labour 
disputes after Rho's declaration also changed the perceptions of the working class. The 
working class had previously been considered as nothing more than a manipulative means of 
industrialisation. By bringing together the middle class, the public outrage of the time 
enabled workers to unionise and to be more militant. 
Further valuable insights can be achieved by Hirschman's (1970) famous triad of exit, voice 
and loyalty in the analysis of a theory of reaction in systems which individuals belong to or 
depend on. In the system of markets, he argues, there are two kinds of power or sanction that 
21 
The historical continuity was lost by the de-legalisation of branches under the National Council of 
Korean Labour Unions (NCKLU), while the General League of Korean Trade Unions (GLKTU) was 
generated by the American military government in 1947 (FKTU, 1979: 266; see also Chapter 3). 
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consumers have over organisations to make them respond to what they want. As the most 
powerful sanction, consumers can promote their capacity by taking their consumption 
elsewhere so that a firm is providing what they want more efficiently. The other is that users 
have their `voice' by way of election or campaigning though this `shorthand term for 
political modes of expression' might be conditional upon influence and bargaining power or 
perhaps be poorly distributed among users (Bulmer and Rees, 1996: 271). Therefore, the 
central point of his argument lies where consumers or users in public services utilise their 
voice more effectively through democratic institutions. In so doing, it is critical to introduce 
an element of `exit', `the ultimate form of rejection' (Ringen, 1987a: 51). The working class 
movement continued after Rho's declaration. This enabled workers to employ their voice 
and exit options by the use of their mobilised and militant capacity that had previously been 
subject to extreme suppression. Military governments forced coercive measures in order for 
workers to remain silent and loyal. 
Since June 1987, therefore, a gradual shift has occurred from authoritarian military rules to 
pluralistic diversification of liberalism (Ahn, Byung-joon, 1990: 15). A distinction can be 
made between these two. The former confines popular citizens' participation and 
competition in the policy-making process, whereas the latter allows them on the basis of the 
consent of citizens through a certain constitutional process, to achieve civil, political and 
social rights (Marshall, 1950,1963). Democratisation is located somewhere in between 
although a borderline cannot clearly be drawn. When societies are reaching some form of 
turning point with profound implications for future developments, the concept of crisis 
appears critical (Talyor-Gooby and Dale, 1981: 241). Habermas (1976: 2) introduces a 
social-scientific concept of crisis that can be differentiated from a systems-theoretic concept 
of crisis. The latter types of crises are seen as `persistent disturbance of system integration' 
(italics in original). While his objection against this concept resulting from its scientific 
usefulness lies in the form that `crises in social systems are not produced through accidental 
changes in the environment but through structurally inherent system-imperatives that are 
incompatible and cannot be hierarchically integrated'. His classification of four possible 
crisis tendencies is based on economic, political, and socio-cultural systems. Each crisis can 
arise at different points when the existing political system is delegitimised (Habermas, 1976: 
45). First, an economic crisis emerges if the output of the economic system is inadequate. 
second, a rationality crisis takes place if the political system fails to adhere to political and 
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administrative decisions. Third, when the political changes need to be legitimated but a 
method of persuasion is inappropriate, a legitimation crisis occurs. Finally, a motivation 
crisis appears if the relatively coherent progress between traditional value and belief system 
appears to be retarded. 
The third crisis has been utilised as a central variable in a political legitimation thesis 
whereby a set of welfare programmes were introduced to obtain political legitimacy (see 
Kwon, Huck-Ju, 1999a). From the neo-Marxist perspectives, welfare states develop in order 
to incorporate the working class into the existing political system (Harbermas, 1976). They 
originate from the need to compensate for the contradictory function that results from the 
continuous capital accumulation (O'Connor, 1973; Offe, 1984). Thus, working class power 
can be effectively rooted out. An archetypal case can be found in Bismarck's social insurance 
legislation in the 1880s (see Rimlinger, 1971: 111). Yet, there are two identifiable 
differences in the Korean case. First, neither the working class were threatening nor was 
there socialist or left-wing movement in Korea. Second, whereas Bismarck's political 
strategy was a pre-emptive strike against the working class and the socialists, in Korea there 
had been no imminent political challenge until 1987. In short, the strategy of welfare was 
geared to politically expedient requirements. In other words, political actors acted from 
expediency not from principle. The ideas underpinning welfare for all became 
metamorphosed to a politically useful and economically profitable direction. 
2.9 Conclusion 
A vast array of policy transfer literature confirms that political actors are likely to search for 
policies they can borrow, if they are uncertain about the cause of problems, the effects of 
previous decisions or the future. These conditions of uncertainty often lead them to seek for 
advice from networks of knowledge-based experts (i. e. epistemic communities). By reducing 
uncertainty, the direction of policy is thereby influenced by a network of ideas. 
In Korea, these epistemic communities were created by key political actors. By providing 
information and (new) ideas or proposing specific policies, their role became influential in 
the political process. However, the political process was largely determined by political 
rigidity and the state-oriented type of social provision towards economic-growth supremacy. 
Motivated by vested political interests, systems of welfare were configured, yet with little 
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articulation of the idea that requires the state's response to those in great need in society. In 
consequence, the ideas behind welfare provisions were inevitably constrained within the 
confined circle of economic capacity and political expediency. Given this formation, original 
ideas shaped by those in an epistemic community could only be institutionalised when vested 
political interests and these ideas coincided. In other words, those searching for advice 
preferred to turn to those whose overall political values were consistent with their own. 
Epistemic communities in Korea lacked the political authority to impose binding decisions. 
All that has been said through a set of case studies relates to this limitation that epistemic 
communities were exposed to. Confined by power politics that was supreme in shaping 
social policy, original ideas were metamorphosed to the ways in which they were to maintain 
the prerequisite conditions for economic growth under Park's government. In order to utilise 
these conditions, civil order was to be maintained and marginal labour was to be regulated. 
For this reason, political intentions and motives to introduce social programmes were not in 
favour of risk-pooling effects of social insurance but of political instrumentality of social 
policy. This overall process of the configuration of social policy in Korea, we argue, was 
greatly influenced by political and historical constraints inherited from the past which in turn 
condition the initiation, innovation, development and reform of social policy initiatives. 
How this process changed during the period of democratisation is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Politics of Possibility in Transitional Politics 
3.1 Introduction 
Democracy, Lipset (1983: 28) argues, may be defined as a `political system which supplies 
regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social 
mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major 
decisions by choosing among contenders for political office'. For any given democracy to 
be stable, he argues further (1983: 65), it is necessary to maintain not only economic 
development but also the effectiveness and the legitimacy of its political system. Policies, 
within this context, may serve symbolic purposes. Edelman (1971), for example, draws 
attention to the way in which policies may fulfil more of an effective function in giving the 
impression that government is taking action than in tackling social problems, therefore in 
maintaining political support. Building on this argument, Hill (1997: 22) argues that `policies 
may be intended to improve social conditions, but examining whether this is the case should 
be part of the object of enquiry rather than an assumption of research'. Given this, this 
chapter suggests that an exploration of the dynamics of policy development and the 
conditions under which policy change occurs is a prerequisite to explanation of political 
intentions that underpin social policy development. 
This chapter can be read separately but more desirably in comparison to Chapter 2 in which 
we explored the distinctive political and historical constraints that framed the conditions that 
influenced the configuration of social policy in Korea before 1987. This chapter is organised 
into four sections. The first section examines the nature of political parties in Korea and their 
influence on shaping social policy. The second section explores a growing interest 
articulated by different types of interest groups and their influence on making social 
problems a transformed political agenda. In the third section, the ways in which these 
political parties and interest groups made an impact on shaping social policy are investigated 
through four case studies. As a comprehensive research strategy, the case study method is 
helpful when contextual conditions are required to be covered (Yin, 1994: 13). In the final 
section, the lessons from the case studies are drawn together to develop the argument of this 
chapter. 
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3.2 The Role of Political Parties in Social Policy 
Political parties are institutions and their major function is to provide a `platform for the 
expression not only of group or class economic and social interests but of group values and 
prejudices' (Lipset, 1969: 305). In other words, political parties tend to represent group 
values and even prejudices which function to build images and characters of parties. The 
relationship between party politics and social policy in the development of Western welfare 
states has been a perennially topical issue in both political and academic debate. For 
example, in shaping social policy, there has been a wide variation to explain political 
activities of the religious political party such as the Christian Democrats of various European 
nations (Lipset, 1969; van Kersbergen, 1995). Equally, many efforts have been made to 
generalise about the relationship of given statuses and roles of behaviour to political 
demeanour between the historic left and right categories. Hibbs' (1977) comparative study 
of twelve European and two North American nations proclaims that political party 
constellation influences macro-economic outcomes. Also, Wilensky (1981) focussed on the 
relationship between left and Catholic party dominance' and their influence on social policy 
development in a corporatist political economy. 
Despite the huge literature available in Western academia on the subject, little attempt has 
been made to place party politics at the centre of analysis in explaining the development of 
social policy in Korea. This ignorance may result from the fact that Korean party politics was 
almost entirely confined within a small circle of conservative terrain. On the one hand, the 
authoritarian structure of the polity had created constant political illegitimacy of the ruling 
party. On the other hand, there had virtually been no possibility for the opposition party to 
take power. The emergence of progressive parties or revolutionary parties was initially 
constrained by an anti-communist ideology following the Korean War. Furthermore, almost 
all efforts to create the two-party system had been subject to harsh control as clearly seen in 
the case of political violence and a rigged election in 1958 and Yushin declaration in 1971. 
;\ relatively predominant one-party monopoly had therefore generated an unbalanced 
structure of society between regions, classes, and different sectors of industries which 
basically opened up the question of distributional issues as political contention. However, 
Party dommance is defined as a 'large amount of party power continuously exercised over a 
substantial period of time' (\Vilenskv, 1981: 35 1). 
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the social construction of social problems tends to be given life by interest aggregation 
through political parties. When political parties fail to play their key roles, publicly 
acknowledged interests or problems look to another way to receive political attention. As we 
shall see in the next section, this incapability that Korean political parties have long suffered 
in part resulted in the emergence of citizens' movements in the early 1990s. For this reason, 
it is important to examine why Korean political parties have failed to play a key role in 
shaping social policy and how these reasons have become relieved in the later formation of 
social policy. 
According to Huntington (1965), the strength of political organisations and procedures are 
contingent upon their scope of support and their level of institutionalisation. By defining 
`institutionalisation' as the `process by which organizations and procedures acquire value 
and stability' (Huntington, 1965: 394), he argues that political development is determined by 
the level of institutionalisation. Political development, in other words, can be defined and 
measured by four criteria: (1) adaptability; (2) complexity; (3) autonomy; and (4) coherence 
of its organisations and procedures. From these criteria, Huntington (1965) made it clear that 
the more adaptable, more complicated, more autonomous and integrative, and the more 
unified and coherent an organisation or procedure is, the more highly institutionalised it is. 
Given this, on no account did political parties in Korea experience a high level of 
development. Korean political parties have been relatively short-lived, perhaps because of 
their high rigidity to the environmental challenge and maybe because of their relatively 
heavy dependence upon political power or the political age of political leaders. 
Consequently, a significant characteristic of political parties was a lack of multifunctional 
subunits and almost no articulation of autonomy under a highly systematised authoritarian 
regime. Factional conflicts within opposition parties have also been one of the well-known 
properties which obviously attenuated the coherence of political parties. A low level of 
political development, at least in the functions of political parties, has therefore represented 
the obvious consequences of a low level of trust towards party politics. 
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To be more specific, party failure2 could be explained by a combined failure of the four 
categories defined by Huntington (1965). In other words, the less adaptable, more rigid, and 
less complicated the organisation or procedure is, the lower its level of institutionalisation. In 
less developed political systems, political organisations are highly vulnerable to outside 
influences. The greater the disunity of the organisation, the less its institutionalisation. 
Huntington (1965: 401) clearly points out that a `political party, for instance, which expresses 
the interests of only one group in society - whether labor, business, or farmers - is less 
autonomous than one which articulates and aggregates the interests of several social groups'. 
Above all, however, the importance in association with social policy making is that the 
failure of the institutional party system has influenced the failure of the legitimate 
consolidation of welfare ideology. 
To an extent, until 1998 the Korean party system was dominated by the one-party system for 
two reasons. First, even if there had been several opposition parties in existence, constant 
continuity for the rules of the game on the basis of the anti-democratic strategy effectively 
paralysed the capacity of the opposition parties. Second, it was not until 1998 that the 
political complexion of the governing party changed for the first time since the establishment 
of the national constitution in 1948. During the interim period (1979-1981), having 
prohibited the political activities of a number of politicians, the new military authorities 
created the ruling party (DJP) and two other opposition parties (DKP and KNP). This 
look-alike mulitiparty system was however nothing more than political ostentation and this 
one party system had continued even after the democratisation movement in the late 1980s. 
In 1987, the 13`" presidential election was the first in thirty years that successfully followed 
the democratic principles of constitutional procedure. This could have been the first 
democratic turnover of political power if two major opposition candidates, Kim Young-Sam 
and Kim Dae-Jung, had agreed to put forward a single united-candidate. The following 
general election in April 1988 launched the new paradigm of a four-party system. That is, 
although the governing party still remained the biggest party, it failed to occupy the majority 
of seats in the National Assembly. However, after two years, an amalgamation of the 
Party failure can be conceptualised as the failure of political activity where political parties in the role 
of' political actors of political society, are supposed to intermediate the state and civil society (see 
Lawson and v1erkl. 
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Democratic Justice Party (DJP), the Party for Reunification and Democracy (PRD) and the 
New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) created the gigantic governing party, the 
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). As a result, this amalgamation brought about the 
conventional composition of party systems. 
By repeating this one party tradition, at least in the sense of a narrow continuum of 
ideological spectrum condensed into a conservative right wing tradition advocating liberal 
democracy and capitalism, political parties in Korea failed to generate ideologically bound, 
competent ideas and policies. This tradition might have originated from the constant 
continuity of conservative legacies of both ruling parties and opposition parties 3. The 
conservative tradition of opposition parties even became one of the political legacies of 
current opposition parties. Ideological rigidity and lack of substance embodied in political 
parties have failed to show a distinctiveness of their policy propositions in response to 
socioeconomic interests. Consequently, the political conflict between the governing party 
and the opposition party has been less likely to be occupied in the area of social welfare, and 
rather more likely to be on the issues of regime support (Lijphart, 1984: 137-138). 
In short, Korean political parties have suffered from a deficiency of ideologies and policies. 
Then, what are the key factors that have determined the properties of Korean political 
parties'. ' There are three significant factors that have affected the degree of ideological 
intensity, and the extent to which the democratic rules of the game are accepted by all 
important actors in the polity. First, democratic rights for all were not institutionalised by 
political actors. Consequently, prior to the emergence of a mass working class, opposition 
hoiitics were less legitimate, but ironically more moderate (perhaps because of illegitimacy 
of opposition politics themselves). Radical industrialisation left the potential for class 
conflicts, but there was no development of relevant parties that could have made these 
potential class conflicts reflective. In other words, Korean political parties have been 
marginalised in the sense that they failed to consist of more than a single, narrow interest in 
soc iety and so to some extent to aggregate interests. Since authoritarian regimes only 
i 
Ruling parties from the Liberal Democratic Party (1951) through the Democratic Republican Party 
(1963) to the Democratic Justice Party (1981). Opposition parties from the Korean Democratic Party 
(1949) through the Democratic Party (1955), the New Democratic Party (1967) to the New Korean 
Democratic Party (1985) and the Party for Reunification and Democracy (1985) (see Appendix 2). 
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permitted the working class to be in existence as a source of economic mobilisation, their 
strong prohibition policy against workers' political mobilisation eventually weakened the 
overall class capacity of the potential revolutionary class. As seen in Chapter 2, democratic 
social movements in the late 1980s were centrally mobilised by both the middle classes and 
university students, not by the working class. 
Second, lines of party support have been contingent upon regional variations and personal 
charismatic leadership rather than reflecting aspects of stratification or those of cultural 
difference. In other words, on no account did Korean political parties organise on class or 
religious lines. Table 3.1 compares four consecutive general elections from 1988 to 2000. It 
clearly illustrates that there has been no particular sign of progress to have mitigated the 
regional segregation in political terms. For example, on the 16th National Assembly Election, 
the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) gained 91.64 per cent of the votes available in 
Jeolla-do where the party leader and President, Kim Dae-Jung's home town is located 
(Gwangju, where the `Kwangju' uprising took place). By contrast, the Grand National Party 
(GNP) which obtained even more votes than the ruling party gained only 5.15 per cent in the 
same region. In addition to the historical hostility between these two parties where one is 
based on Jeolla-do and the other on Gyoungsang-do, regional strongholds have remained 
intact. In short, this may suggest that localism has a greater impact on elections than political 
party manifestos in Korea. 
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Table 3.1 Regional Strongholds and Proportion of the Vote (as %) obtained by each party 
in 
the National Assembly of 1988 (13`h), 1992(14 th), 1996(15 th ), and 2000 (16th) 
Regional Strongholds National 
Level 
Gyonggi i Chungch. 2 Jeolla3 S. G4 N. G5 Gang-won. Jeju-do (% of seats) 
The 13th National Assembly Election of 1988 
DJ P 30.35 34.65 22.81 36.13 49.90 43.63 36.02 33.96(41.81) 
RDP 23.66 15.33 0.92 45.69 26.02 21.61 27.09 23.83(19.73) 
PPD 22.32 3.02 69.07 1.49 0.81 3.99 5.96 19.26(23.41) 
ND '6 16.68 42.06 1.61 8.56 14.88 20.21 3.39 15.59(11.70) 
The 14 `h National Assembly Election of 1992 
DLP 35.50 40.11 24.42 48.62 48.20 38.83 34.10 38.49(49.83) 
DP 34.81 22.58 62.07 13.85 8.75 11.71 19.89 29.17(32.44) 
RNP 19.38 19.06 4.73 15.49 22.01 31.90 0.0 17.37(10.37) 
The 15`h National Assembly Election of 1996 
NKP 35.44 27.84 17.61 51.01 30.48 36.14 37.26 34.52(46.49) 
NC7 31.68 8.39 71.58 5.26 1.48 6.68 29.44 25.30(26.42) 
ULD 14.39 47.01 0.68 5.08 27.05 23.63 1.16 16.17(16.72) 
The 16th National Assembly Election of 2000 
GNP 42.70 24.92 5.15 65.43 62.31 41.97 46.69 38.96(48.72) 
MD5 44.23 32.25 91.64 15.43 14.34 39.67 52.17 35.87(42.12) 
ULD 8.87 37.36 2.71 2.92 13.62 11.08 0.68 9.84( 6.23) 
Notes: Calculation formula: the number of votes obtained by each party in a region = the entire number of votes 
cast by those eligible to vote in the same region (excluding invalid votes but including blank ballots) x 100. 
I. Gyonggi includes Seoul and Incheon; 2. Chungcheong includes Daejeon (South Chungcheong); 3. Jeolla 
includes Gwangju (Kwangju) (South Cholla); 4. South Gyoungsang region includes Busan; 5. North 
Gyoungsang region includes Daegu; 6. NDRP; 7. NCNP; 8. MDP; the total sum of each region does not add up 
to 100 per cent because not all the political parties are taken on board in this table. 
The 13'h National Assembly Election of 26 April 1988 - DJP: Democratic Justice Party, Party Leader (PL): Rho 
Tae Woo from Daegu, North Gyoungsang; RDP: Reunification and Democratic Party, PL: Kim Young Sam 
from Busan, South Gyoungsang; PPD: Party for Peace and Democracy, PL: Kim Dae Jung from Gwangju, 
(South) Jeolla; NDRP: New Democratic Republican Party, PL: Kim Jong Pil from Chungchong. 
The 14'h National Assembly Election of 24 March 1992 - DLP: Democratic Liberal Party, PL: Kim Young Sam; 
DP: Democratic Party, PL: Kim Dae Jung; RNP: Reunification National Party. 
The 1 ý`h National Assembly Election of 11 April 1996 - NKP: New Korean Party, PL: Kim Young Sam; NCNP; 
National Congress for New Politics, PL: Kim Dae Jung; ULD: United Liberal Democrats, PL: Kim Chong Pil. 
The 16''' National Assembly Election of 13 April 2000 - GNP: Grand National Party, PL: Lee Hoi-Chang; MDP: 
Millennium Democratic Party, PL: Kim Dae Jung: ULD: United Liberal Democrats, PL: Kim Chong Pil. 
o of seats in the National Assembly is calculated as, total number of seats in National Assembly (299) = number 
ot'seats obtained by each party; in the case of the 16`h election, total number of seats in National Assembly was 
271; sources: Reconstructed Table, data adopted from NEC (1988: 92-94,1992: 110-111,138-139,143, 
1996a: 140-141,16 3-165.2000: 270-271,301). 
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Third, the role of executive bodies, especially that of the governments, had taken precedence 
over the National Assembly until at least the late 1980s. This was a major reason why there 
had been a lack of policy propositions and policy experts in political parties. Figure 3.1 gives 
an overall picture of the role of the National Assembly as a legislative body. Its capacity has 
been relatively weak compared to the government in part through the properties of 
long-lasting authoritarian regimes (see also Kim, Chong-Lim, 1988). The National 
Assembly played a relatively strong role before the authoritarian rules were clearly 
envisaged. Yet, the National Assembly remained titular when the authoritarian regime was 
further strengthened by constitutional violation during the 1970s. The executive power, for 
example, reached its apex at the 10`h National Assembly (1979-1980; see Appendix 5). In 
addition, as Table 3.2 clearly shows, the law-making process undergone by the executive is 
much more complex than that of the National Assembly due to its despotic potential. 
Nonetheless, as Figure 3.1 has shown, the number of legislative bills initiated by the 
executive has been substantially higher than those by the National Assembly (Figure 3.1; 
Table 3.2; Appendix 5). From the period of the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, however, the 
National Assembly returned to play a central role especially at the time that the opposition 
parties managed to occupy more seats than the ruling party for the first time. Given this, one 
might conclude that the role of the National Assembly was more activated as the political 
regime changed. Yet, after the gigantic governing party was formed in 1990, the executive 
power again superseded the National Assembly under the first civilian government at the 14th 
National Assembly (1992-1996). 
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Table 3.2 The Process of Law Makin 
Bills submitted by the Government* Bills submitted by the National 
Assembly 
I. Drafting of a legislative bill by the competent 1. Initiatives by members of the National 
ministry Assembly 
2. Consultation with other ministries concerned 2. Deliberation by the National 
and public notice concerning legislation for 20 Assembly Standing Committee 
days 3. The Legislation and Judiciary 
3. Review by the MoLeg 
4. Deliberation by the State Council A 
5. Approval by the President 
6. Submission to the National Assembly B 
7. Decision by the National Assembly 
8. Transfer to the Government (MoLeg) 
9. Promulgation 
Committee 
4. A Plenary Session of the National 
Assembly (Decision made) 
5. Transfer to the MoLeg 
6. Approval by the President 
7. Promulgation by the President 
Notes: * Presidential Decrees do not undergo stages 6 through 8; Ordinances of the Prime Minister/Ministerial 
Ordinances do not undergo stages 4 through 8; A. by vice-ministers; B. through the Health and Welfare 
Committee, the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, A Plenary Session of the National Assembly. 
Sources: MoLeg (2000); Noh, Yun-Hong (An Assistant Secretary to the President for Health and Welfare in the 
Office of the President, interviewed on 10 August 2000, Seoul). 
Figure 3.1 Results of Legislative Bills in the NA of 1948 - 2000 
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It was the period of democratisation that enhanced the roles of the National Assembly, 
political parties and interest groups. As the state became more democratised, the entire 
procedure of policy initiative formation to decision making became longer, more complex 
and more dynamic. Policy initiatives concerning social welfare also became located at the 
centre of contention. One empirical study comparing the legislative procedure between the 
Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Republics concludes that the more democratised the state becomes, 
the longer the period between policy initiative suggestion and presidential declaration (Huh, 
Man-Hyung, 1995). Democratisation also strengthens the activities of participants and 
brings about the functional strength of the National Assembly. For example, Lee (1995) and 
Song (1992) argue that the National Assembly in the late 1980s played an active role in 
raising the welfare budget. Their activity regarding social security began to be more critical 
than the government's. The government was more concerned with regulatory policy areas at 
a national level such as health and sanitation, and medical treatment between hospitals and 
pharmacies. The National Assembly paid a great deal of attention to the area of social 
welfare services for those suffering social exclusion such as the elderly, disabled and 
women. 
In sum, as long as party politics is concerned, political values of social policy is culturally 
bound because culture constitutes people's behaviour in everyday life which engenders the 
structural context for political culture. Political culture therefore tends to pattern political 
behaviour based on norms and values inherent in a given society. In a similar vein, political 
or social movements in the context of norms and values that shape political life tend to be 
given life when a prevalent power in a society and the coalitional behaviour of parties fail to 
satisfy the expectations of the public (van Kersbergen, 1995). The ways in which this 
socially constructed citizens movement can be more influential than a highly bureaucratic 
hierarchy within an authoritarian regime are the subject of the next section. 
3.3 The Politics of Participation: Interest Group Politics and Social Policy 
The idea of interest (pressure) groups was first developed in the United States where the 
pluralist democratic tradition allows competitive interest articulation with relative autonomy 
between various types of interest groups in society. According to the early pluralist 
perspectives, the public policy decision-making process cannot be ruled or controlled by a 
particular group. This is because power is assumed to be widely and equally distributed 
among competing groups. For them, the role of the state is limited to the scope that mediates 
the interest conflicts. Consequently, the state should stand neutral, and function as a passive 
rather than active mediator (Dahl, 1956,1961). By emphasising liberal market principles of 
interest articulation, these early pluralists developed optimistic explanations of interest 
group politics and argued that the United States provides the best case scenario (Dahl, 1982). 
In practice, however, there are three colossal possibilities at present. First, power 
discrepancy between gigantic and small interest groups makes equally competitive interest 
articulation impossible. Second, a certain group can monopolise the interest representation 
or hold power of a decision-making process through interest alliance with the government 
and the political lobbies. Third, the over-competitive interest articulation and interest 
conflicts may make societal complications worse and may engender political 
ungovernability as a result of political and economic instability (Pross, 1986: 132-134; 
Schmitter, 1981: 285-324). 
In short, interest groups are different from political parties. While political parties are 
exclusively concerned with the acquisition and exercise of power, interest groups tend to 
remain distant from the issues of political power. In other words, interest groups seek to 
influence those who wield power since they are not directly involved in political games. 
However, there remains the possibility that the activities of interest groups may become 
subject to political harness. Duverger (1972: 101-104) points out that the discussion of 
interest group activities can be restricted to organisations that engage exclusively or 
primarily in the exercise of political pressure. Given this, interest group activities can have 
a major impact on the politics of social policy. Huntington (1965: 388), for example, argues 
that `modernization means mass mobilization; mass mobilization means increased political 
participation; and increased participation is the key element of political development. 
Participation distinguishes modern politics from traditional politics'. By examining the 
development of trade unionism followed by an analysis of citizens' participation in 
transitional politics, these two political aspects of political participation is the subject that 
we no\\* turn to. 
3.3.1 The Development of Trade Unionism 
Labourist theory, power resources theory or the social interpretation of the welfare state 
explain that the level of welfare state development is to be measured by the strength of 
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corporatist arrangements of welfare. The corporatist arrangement of welfare can be achieved 
either by political parties, especially by social democratic parties, or the working class 
movement (Korpi, 1983; see Baldwin, 1989: 471). Compared to pluralist accounts of interest 
group politics, the corporatist account of interest representation places the state at the centre 
as an independent variable which contains an active function in the policy decision-making 
process. Yet, the structural characteristics of state-associational relations take one form or 
the other depending largely upon whether the institutional framework is evolved from below 
and by associations themselves (societal or liberal corporatism) or imposed from above and 
by the state (state corporatism). In addition to this, Schmitter (1974) finds that there is a clear 
difference between these two types of corporatism. The tripartite arrangements in societal 
corporatism tend to remain horizontally coordinated, allow autonomy of interest groups, 
provide possible bottom-up interest penetration and appear in the post-liberal advanced 
capitalist organised democratic welfare state. By contrast, state corporatism tends to 
emphasise subordination of territorial subunits to central bureaucratic power, a weak single 
party monopolisation, and appears to be in the authoritarian, delayed capitalist societies. 
Interest group activity in Korea has been subject to harsh control while it has been virtually 
impossible for interest penetration through a bottom-up mechanism to take place. For this 
reason, the applicability of state corporatism in comparison with pluralism is of higher 
validity. However, there are significant drawbacks for three reasons. First, there has been no 
significant evidence that organised labour interests have been incorporated into the state 
policy decision-making process through strategically systematised mechanisms. Lee (1988) 
argues that it is more reasonable to say that interest aggregation took the shape of extremely 
incremental fashion. 
Second, one of the important assertions that Korean interest group politics can be explained 
by state corporatism is to the effect that corporatism considers the state to take control over 
trade unions. Nonetheless, the rate of unionisation under the umbrella of the Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) has continuously been no higher than twenty per cent (see 
Appendix 3). This means that even if the FKTU has been politically manipulated by the state, 
a majority) of workers were beyond control. Further, the legitimacy of leaders in the FKTU 
was challenged, as evidenced by the constant expansion of democratic trade union movements 
against both the coercivýe structure of the state and official structure of trade unions. 
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Third, state corporatism fails to account for the latest development of trade unionism partly 
because democratisation movements of 1987 have attenuated the disciplinary control of the 
state over trade unions. To an extent, one might argue that the establishment of the Tripartite 
Commission on 15 January 1998 was an attempt to broker the societal corporatist approach. 
Originally proposed by President Kim Dae-Jung, it was initially designed to encourage a 
tripartite consultation mechanism to overcome the economic crisis. However, a criticism 
against this assertion can be raised because the underlying rationale for its establishment was 
aiming for situational confrontation measurements against the economic crisis. For this 
reason, the Tripartite Commission cannot purely be understood as the strategic changes 
towards societal corporatist arrangements between interest groups. As there has been an 
absence of political representative parties in favour of the working classes in Korea, trade 
unions like many other interest groups were subject to governmentalisation. 
According to Choi (1989: 28-29), the labour movement in Korea had progressed through 
three main phases prior to 1961. First, under Japanese rule, the labour movement developed 
as an integral part of the anti-colonial independence movement. Second, after liberation, a 
militant, left-wing union leadership emerged and took over the whole union movement. 
Third, this left-wing leadership was completely eliminated by the state authorities under the 
American military government. The radical unionism articulated by the National Council of 
Korean Labour Unions (NCKLU) was demolished by the American military government 
from 1946 to 1947. Consequently, unions became aligned with the ruling political party in 
the Syngman Rhee regime. In short, labour unions in the 1950s were an `auxiliary 
organization of the ruling party, used in its pure form as a political instrument to buttress 
Rhee's rule, and totally lacking any meaningful rank and file organizational base' (Choi, 
Jang-Jip, 1989: 29). 
The official union structure, the General League of Korean Trade Unions, under the 
Synngman Rhee's regime, was challenged by a dissident minority groups, the National 
Council of Trade Unions (NCTU) for three reasons. First, the GLKTU had its 
pro-government attitudes evidenced by their activities for Syngman Rhee's re-run for the 
presidential election. Second, the GLKTU was initially designed to demobilise the activity 
of radical, left-wing trade unions. Third, the internal structure of the GLKTU was highly 
factious, ruht-ýý ins oriented, subordinate to those in the governing party (FKTU, 
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1979: 265-266). The properties of the NCTU were inherited from the NCKLU. Supported by 
the constitutional change for a parliamentary cabinet system in 1960, the power of the NCTU 
was even strengthened in association with the then most well-organised, radical and 
politically oriented union, the Teachers' League. However, the institutional framework for 
labour unions was eventually shaped by the executive bodies of the military government. On 
30 August 1961, the military government established the FKTU while those previously in the 
NCTU failed to become part of it. This exclusionary attempt remained powerful in 
controlling labour unions until the nation's second largest umbrella trade union was 
established in] 995. 
This early exclusionary attempt gives us a first clue why Korean labour unions fail to exert 
their power in shaping social policy. As we have seen, working class power in the 1960s was 
weakened by the government by establishing the FKTU. Yet there are many other indications 
to show why labour unions in Korea have been modest. Structurally, the relatively small 
proportion of industrial workers in general and the small number of unionised workers in 
particular (see Appendix 12) were not only vulnerable to political manipulation but also too 
weak to aggregate their own interests as Figure 3.2 shows. 
Figure 3.2 The Change of Industrial Structure (1957-1999) 
( Unit: Percent; Source: Appendix 12) 
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On 27 December 1971, President Park Chung-Hee promulgated the Special Decree for 
National Security based on the Law concerning Special Measures for Safeguarding National 
Security. This Decree constrained the rights of collective bargaining and collective action 
which had been bestowed by the constitution. The Decree also allowed President Park to 
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mobilise the entire populace for the purpose of national security and to control wages and 
prices for economic needs. This excessive power over society actually made the status of the 
working class worse than during the 1960s. In fact, industrial relations in the 1960s had not 
been significantly controlled by the state apparatus such as the KCIA partly because of the 
genuinely underdeveloped structure of the labour market (Figure 3.2). 
During the period of 1980 to 1986, the strength of the working class was not remarkably 
different evidenced in part by the fact that the driving force of the democratic protest in June 
1987 was neither organised by the FKTU nor opposition political parties. In fact, no single 
candidate in favour of the working class or union movement had been elected at a national 
level even after democratic union movements and a series of political events4. For example, 
the result of the 14`h National Assembly election shows that the Democratic People's Party, 
established by the force of people's movement, achieved only 1.5 per cent of total votes 
(NEC, 1992: 111). 
During the period of 1989 to 1994, the number of union members had decreased to 265,000 
and so had the number of trade unions to 836. The rate of unionisation also had decreased 
from the top rate, 19.8 in 1989, through 16.4 in 1992 to 14.5 per cent in 1994. In other words, 
the renaissance of unionism came late but its stagnation came early. Further, the economic 
crisis from the late 1990s entangled with sporadic and incremental rather than systematic 
unionism has weakened already immature strength of the working class (Figure 2.2 in 
Chapter 2; Appendix 3). 
Democratisation influenced the overall strategic shift of the authoritarian regime. As long as 
trade unionism is concerned, a creditable result of democratisation was the inauguration of 
the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). As the nation's second largest umbrella 
trade union, the KCTU was established on 11 November 1995. Its establishment means that 
Korean trade unionism has since been constructed into a two-tiered system centred around 
both the rather moderate FKTU and the militant KCTU. The nature of the KCTU is 
somewhat different from that of the FKTU. Whereas the FKTU originated from the political 
necessities of the government which obviously reduced the union's legitimacy, the origins of 
4 
For example, the presidential election in 1987, the National Assembly election in 1988, two local 
elections in March and June 1991, and the 14th National Assembly election on 24 March 1992. 
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the KCTU did not suffer in this way. However, the then Trade Union Act (Clause 5, Art. 3) 
did not allow the KCTL to be legalised despite their continuous applications; this was 
mainly because of the election of dismissed workers as union officials. In 1995, the KCTU 
adopted a social reform programme to argue that labour standard rights had to be achieved 
by revising labour law and that social security systems had to be expanded. Again, however, 
its activity remained illegal until the KCTU finally gained legal status on 23 November 1999. 
Their entire activities for four years had been outlawed, thereby being subject to a coercive 
measure. Nonetheless, two conditions made its legalisation possible. First, the subsidiary 
also became legal in July 1999. Second, there had been international pressures to recognise 
the KCTU as a legal organisation, especially from the International Labour Organisation 
(Korea Herald, 24 November 1999). In short, legacies created by the establishment of the 
FKTU are finally broken down by the legalisation of the KCTU. 
All in all, the historical expansion of trade unionism in Korea has been almost exclusively 
oriented towards pro-democracy, anti-authoritarian movements. Their influence on social 
policy has been moderate largely because the introduction of social policy was perceived 
from a Bonapartist perspective. Instead of making a direct impact on shaping social policy, 
trade unions have influenced the growth of the average wage for workers and reduced the 
wage gap and wage inequality between industries. By testing either union relative wage 
effect or wage rate standardisation, many empirical studies have shown that Korean trade 
unions have not only made little impact on widening the wage gap between unionised and 
non-unionised workers, but also had a relatively sound and responsible effect on the national 
economy5. It is yet to be known whether union wage equalisation effect resulted from an 
unusually high rate of labour movements in the late 1980s or from Korean trade unions' 
unique function of equal wage distribution. But the view that Korean trade unions led a wage 
increase, thereby worsened the international competitiveness requires re-thinking. 
Despite the trade unions' contribution, it is important to acknowledge that the working class' 
po\vcr is only one of a broader logic of social interest behind the welfare state and its 
development. Baldwin (1989: 477), for example, argues that `workers were often that group 
For example, s« Kim. Hwang-Joe and Sung. Baik-Nam (1990): Kim, Jang-Ho (1991); Lee, 
. 
loom-Woo and Nam, Sang-Sup (19Q4); Sony,,. Ho-Keun (1989): Uh, Soo-Bong and Lee, Tae-Hun 
(1992). 
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most concerned with social policy, but they hay only one. Nor. in a broader e not been the 
comparative analysis, have their interests been more than a single, however important, 
among many competing factors. Workers' concerns have been determined and consequently 
altered by historical circumstances. In the evolution of the welfare state there has been no one 
uniform and consistent objectively solidaristic class. ' In this critical juncture where dramatic 
changes in Korean politics occurred, there remains other organisations' efforts on the 
development of social policy. This is the subject that we now turn to. 
3.3.2 The Development of Social Movement: Egalitarian Struggle? 
As many scholars have identified, the most essential characteristics that differentiate 
democracy from other forms of government are public competition and participation in the 
political process (Dahl, 1971; Lijphart, 1984; Lipset, 1983). Dahl (1971: 129) also made clear 
that the greater the public desire for democracy, the greater the chances for establishing and 
maintaining a democracy. Shin and McDonough (1999: 12-13) find that support for 
democratisation in Korea increased as the regime or government changed. For example, 
public responses to a strong desire for democratic change increased from 43 per cent under 
the authoritarian Chun regime (1980-1988) through 54 per cent under the first democratic 
government of Rho (1988-1993) to 81 per cent under the second democratic and first civilian 
government of Kim (1993-1998). This increasing public support for democratic change was 
initiated by democratisation protests in June 1987 which should be seen as a landmark not 
only because they made it possible to develop public participation in the political process but 
also because they provided a promising start for further democratisation. 
Democratisation protests in June 1987 resulted in two contradictory outcomes of 
pro-democracy movements. On the one hand, it was successful because Rho's declaration on 
29 June 1987 was perceived to be the government's concession forced by the public, 
constituting a somewhat autonomous, institutional, and political foundation of the social 
movement. On the other hand, it failed because it did not achieve a critical turnover of 
government hut only generated a change of governmental strategy declared by Rho 
Tae-\Voo. In this sense, social movements, particularly citizens' movements deployed and 
developed following popular movements in the late 1980s. were not deemed to be an 
expansion of the notions of previous movements. The citizens' movement has been manifest 
\w ithin the anti- or nosy- popular ¢mmovement manifesto. 
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Citizens' movements can be differentiated from popular movements. The popular movement 
attempts to have its own leaders placed in power. But the citizens' movement argues that 
radical, revolutionary and militant class struggle as well as ideological extremism have 
engendered the isolation of social movements. Instead, it claims to develop the activities 
without setting up an antagonistic attitude towards those in power which consequently 
enables them to be relatively free from coercive and disciplinary control by the state 
apparatus. Of course, it was the previous militant class struggle that allowed the latest social 
movements to put themselves in a non-antagonistic orientation of social movements. A 
strategic shift of expression from ideologically rigid anti -authori tari an pro-democracy 
movements to the ideologically diversified reform-based approach has strengthened the 
citizens' voice in the making of social policy. The idea of welfare that had remained only at 
a rudimentary level began to be critical as a means of linking strategy between democratic 
society and social justice. 
New social movements developed in Korea are somewhat different from those in Western 
societies. Offe (1985) argues that new social movements in western societies emerged on the 
basis of advancing new forms of social relations and cultural meanings and identities deemed 
absent from the welfare state's agenda. These movements originated from conventional 
methods of political organisation and expression, and experimentation, thereby attempting to 
institutionalise untransformed diverse issues into class-based popular movements, especially 
labour movements. By contrast, social movements in Korea tend to focus on previously 
ignored problems based on multi- and entire-class based issues resulting largely from a 
previous situational exigency. In addition, while many individual social movement 
organisations may operate in a relatively independent way, sometimes causing confusion and 
conflict within the iimo\vement itself, social movements in Korea have shared many social 
issues as clearly seen in the formation of a gigantic organisation including over sixty civil 
groups in order to reform public assistance in the late 1990s. In short, while those in western 
societies aim to build up a new radical structure, new social movements in Korea try to 
change it within the existing social paradigm. 
Compared to a political rhetoric appearing in a set of presidential speeches6 socially 
6 
For example. the embodiment of Welfare-culture society' (Park. Chung-Hee, 19" 1); `expansion of 
social security s\ stems' and '\ý elfare system to promote interests and welfare for workers' (Park, 
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constructed ideas of welfare started to emerge with the support of a set of new social 
movements. There are two important Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
in terms of 
their objectives towards social reform. The first organisation is the Citizens Coalition 
for 
Economic Justice (CCEJ) established in July 1989. It aims to `contribute to the making of 
social foundation in order to build a democratic welfare state by way of peaceful citizens' 
movements to construct economic justice in our society' (CCEJ regulation Article 2). The 
second organisation is the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) 
established in September 1994. It aims at `constructing a participatory democratic society 
which truly secures freedom and justice, as well as human rights and welfare by way of 
monitoring authority power, proposing detailed policies and counter-proposals, and practical 
activities volunteered by the citizens' (General Rules, Article 2). These two organisations 
were initially established by intellectuals including university teachers, lawyers, previous 
popular movement activists, and religious figures. These intellectuals were looking for 
alternative methods that could allow them to stand outside both class-based rigidity and 
ideological extremism but also to incorporate comprehensive class identities shared by a 
necessity of social reform through moderate rationing. The point is made clear by a chairman 
of the Joint Policy Board for the National Basic Livelihood Security Act within the PSPD who 
has been actively involved in the process of the public assistance reform bill. He said that: 
`In fact, many of those who had been involved in the pro-democracy movement in the 1970s 
and the 1980s are those who have been playing a leading role in the citizens' movement in 
Korea. The core intention remains the same. Yet, during the process of completing 
institutional and procedural democracy since the Kim Young-Sam government, there has 
been a division between those who became involved in citizens' movements and those who 
remained in popular (labour) movements. Those in the former group are somewhat different 
from those in existing pro-democracy movements in the sense that gradual changes on the 
basis of rationalising and democratising an every day life of individual citizens are more 
favoured than the across-the-board and fundamentally class-oriented social reform that had 
often been accompanied by illegal methods of struggles. For example, the involvement of 
citizens groups in a small sum shareholder movement, the National Basic Livelihood Security 
Scheme, health insurance and the separation of medical and pharmaceutical practices do not 
constitute any class-based attributes. All the pressure group activities are attempted through 
a legal way of achieving a goal as a basic means to an end ... 
however, all of this has been 
possible under the institution of democracy. It could have not been possible under the 
authoritarian regime of the past' (Interview with Moon, Jin-Young, 11 July 2000, Seoul). 
Chung-Hee, 1972); 'time to accomplish welfare society' (Park, Chung-Hee, 1978); `constructing a 
(democratic) Welfare State', `building a welfare society', `establishing a social justice society', 
'promoting working conditions, reducing wage gaps' (Chun, Doo-Hwan, 1980) and `elimination of 
poverty' (Chun, Doo-Hwan, 1981). 
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In a negative sense, new social movements to have emerged in Korea tend to underestimate 
the nature of capitalist society in that the fundamental foundation of these 
have been 
constructed in class-based society. Yet, their non-class based identities have been able to put 
the middle class at the centre of organisational activities and bring the abstract, 
but rather 
modernistic idea of the citizen into their systematic activities. Through these systematic 
activities, citizens' organisations began to participate in the political process which has 
addressed the possible emergence of social solidarity. Social welfare in this sense has been 
believed to be the key means to an end. Trade unions and citizens' organisations have been 
solidified in the areas of economy, politics and social welfare (Moon, Jin-Young, 2002). The 
CCEJ and the FKTU worked together to achieve a fair election in 1991 and to pursue the 
making of social justice and economic reforms in 1993. The CCEJ also supported the 
consortium to resolve labour disputes of the Seoul Underground Corporation, one of the 
biggest trade unions in 1992. The introduction of unemployment insurance and national 
health insurance reform were argued for by both the CCEJ and the FKTU in 1993. From the 
late 1990s, most issues concerning state welfare polices such as the national pension reform, 
unification of national health insurance, and the reform of social welfare related legislation 
have been closely monitored by the public. 
Conceptualised as citizens' movements in the field of social welfare attempting to reform 
state welfare policies, social welfare movements have been led by social welfare experts and 
university students majoring in social welfare or social work. However, these social welfare 
movements had previously made no serious challenges to the assumptions of the prevailing 
political paradigm. To an extent, the `social welfare budget securing movement' in 1992 was 
considered to be a turning point for welfare workers to promote their political manoeuvre 
because it had drawn government compromise to a certain degree. Nonetheless, there have 
been problems of continuity for them in seeking to effectively solidify their interests with 
other groups, and e%-en to aggregate their internal cohesive power. In this sense, the PSPD 
has , ought to expand the social welfare movement to overcome its structural problems. As 
a citi/ens' organisation. the PSPD has been deeply involved with welfare issues. This has 
been the case especially from 5 December- 1994 when the Social Welfare Committee under 
the PSPD started to get in olved with the `national minimum securing movement'. This 
movement has subsequently been able to draw attention from both the general public and 
those in power. 
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As part of the `national minimum securing movement', the Social Welfare Committee under 
the PSPD initiated a judicial lawsuit against the Minister of Health and Social Affairs for the 
abuse of his authority. This also concerned the loss of the national pension fund as well as the 
regulation which allowed the accumulation fund of health insurance to be lent by the then 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. By pursuing this `national minimum securing 
movement', the PSPD aimed to assure the government's responsibility for the national 
minimum, to require its legislative necessity, to achieve its comprehensiveness and 
universality, and to proclaim the importance of public and democratic participation to the 
political process. In the absence of any significant independent involvement of professional 
groups including the Korean Medical Association (KMA), the intellectual involvement in 
the political process occurred within citizens' movements. 
There is little doubt that previous democratic labour movements have enabled this public 
participation to grow. However, the essence that citizens organisations have been more 
actively and effectively involved in the political process is their unique format distinct from 
most other organisations. The key organisation that may be a case in point is the PSPD. 
Critical actors working in the PSPD are divided into three major groups. First, human rights' 
activists including human rights' solicitors and critical jurists have made an effort to 
transform the victim-centred human rights movement to the more comprehensive social 
reform movement. Second, radical social scientists have played an intellectual role in 
guiding the overall orientation of the PSPD towards progressive rather than conservative 
citizens' movements by producing policy alternatives. The idea of participatory democracy 
evolves from this group of social science experts. They argue for the importance of 
progressive practice in the field of citizens' movements and the revolutionary approach to 
reformative issues. Third, previously working as student movement activists involved with 
labour movements, social movement activists realise that as labour movements have become 
independent, they need to be incorporated with other social reform movements. They believe 
that this may help to expand the overall scope of social movements. These three groups have 
worked together as founders of the PSPD which eventually unites each groups' interests 
together and makes their activities more productive. These three groups also represent the 
organisation's initial identity that enables them to be legally-bound by using laws as a 
legislative means of their activities; to be policy-based by proposing alternative and feasible 
counter-policies; and to be progressive by being aware of the fact that early citizens' 
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movements were distant from pro-labour movements. 
In short, the citizens' movement in the 1990s has enabled social problems 
to be taken more 
comprehensively by legally granted methods of procedure. 
It incorporated previously 
marginalised issues of welfare into social movements and resulted 
in solidarity between 
several organisations. Compared to the political process that had 
largely been determinated 
by power politics during the initial stages of social policy initiatives from the 
1960s to the 
early I 980s, the political process became more reflective to the parliamentary electoral 
system and to citizens' organisations. Geared by democratisation protests in 
1987, policy 
decision-making became the subject of a form of collective resolution on society's behalf. 
Thereby the welfare state develops reflecting its unique characters of institutional 
universalism. This epochal change made it possible for social issues to transform from the 
questions of whether we can achieve the distribution of political power to the questions of 
whether we can accomplish changes of attitudes, information and interpretations of social 
reality (sec Banting, 1979, Heclo, 1974). 
In surm, the period that democratisation protests occurred was a critical juncture. Social 
protests changed the view that predominant authoritarian decision rules were essential to 
achieve societal stability and to maintain economic growth. The strength of participatory 
democracy can be an influential force in shaping social policy. Labour movements in the late 
1980s produced distinct legacies not in their own right but by enabling subsequent social 
movements to emerge. Also, the legacies produced by these social protests are not likely to 
crystallise `immediately after the critical juncture, but rather is shaped through a series of 
intervening steps' (Collier and Collier, 1991: 31). There is little doubt that it was a path 
dependent pattern of change in that outcomes during an important transition establish 
distinct trajectories within \v'hich one thing follows another. This path dependent pattern is 
otttn constructed by initial conditions. For this reason, it still remains critical to see the ways 
in which the e f'fect of the critical junctures is intertwined with other processes of change. 
3.4 the Making of Social Police in Transitional Politics (1980-1995): 
Deckion-Making Points, Conditions, and Contexts 
Whilc \ýeltare instninmentality under authoritarian hegemony was not only apolitical in 
appearance but also anti-democratic in essence. welfare issues became subject to a wide 
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range of political and public debate at the time of democratic social protests. 
As social 
changes have progressed, public participation to the political process grew to 
be crucial in 
differentiating issues of social problems as a sociologically simplified and dichotomous 
analysis shows. In defining social problems, as Haines (1979) and Manning 
(1985b) argue, 
it is important to distinguish whether social problems involve a diversity of interest groups 
and perspectives or whether they consist of what seems to be a basic consensus7. That 
is, 
social problems cannot be constructed by objective conditions alone. They require value 
judgements as a necessary component. Thus, the social construction of social problems 
should be seen by analysing the idea's implications which have been extended to their 
fullest. Given this, the question is whether these conceptual activities take place when 
political debate surrounding certain issues of social problems has been publicly open, 
allowing for the existence of ongoing public controversy, or closed where only a superficial 
level of public access is available. How these contradictory meanings of social problems 
were entailed in the political process is the subject of this section. By examining four cases 
of the social policy legislation in the late 1980s, we expect to provide answers to how and 
why social policy institutions changed in transitional politics, and how and why ideas 
underpinning these institutions were modified during this process. 
3.4.1 The National Pension Act: Institutional Persistence and Minor Changes 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, President Park postponed the introduction of the National 
Welfare Pension Programme in the early 1970s. On 31 December 1986, the National Pension 
Act was suddenly introduced and implemented from 1 January 1988. For over a decade in 
between, however, there had been no serious social demand to establish a national pension 
programme. The demographic structure of society had still not been severe enough to claim 
national pensions. Instead, major social issues had concentrated on constitutional reform, 
democratisation and reforms of labour relations. Given this, the National Pension Act of 
1986 was criticised as a political instrument to achieve vote-gaining purposes prior to the 
presidential election in 1987 and the general election in 1988 and to mobilise domestic 
capital that had been required due to the international pressures to open the national economy. 
7 
For example, the controversy of abortion seems to belong to the first category because the issues 
always involve competing groups of claimants. But the problem of child-abuse does not seem to allow too much controversy because this condition is likely to be characterised as a social problem (see Haines, 1979). 
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To be more precise, it was President Chun who initiated the idea and 
its timing. The 
responsible ministry (MoHSA) had not even been prepared for the 
detailed proposals for 
national pensions at the time that he announced their launch. Not surprisingly, the activities 
of the EPB took the higher stance over the MoHSA. Perhaps having learned 
from past 
experiences, where there were controversies surrounding the EPB, by the time that the 
KDI 
proposed the National Welfare Pension Act inter-ministerial policy coordination took place 
this time. Yet, the final Bill of new national pensions was almost identical to the EPB's 
proposal. Put differently, compared to the contrary views on social policy between the CSS 
and the KDI in the 1970s, the EPB's superiority over the MoHSA remained unchanged in the 
1980s. The EPB's superiority over the MoHSA in this political process meant not only that 
economic supremacy took priority over social protection but also that the economic 
perspectives could divert the function of national pensions away from welfare perspectives. 
This welfare state developmental ism remained a crucial part of authoritarian legacies in 
Korea. 
Further evidence that shows this developmental state paradigm can be found from conflicts 
between these two competing ministries (Kim, Sang-Kyun, 1987; Oh, Chung-Soo, 1987). 
The first conflict concerned who should be the chairman of the National Pension Fund 
Operation Committee. While the Prime Minister was favoured by the MoHSA, the EPB 
argued for its Minister. In principle, the National Pension Council Committee and a Council 
for the National Pension Corporation were responsible for a set of administrative activities 
(i. e. operating the national pension programme including decision-making on contribution 
and benefit levels) and it was the MoHSA that monitored these institutions. However, in 
practice, the way in which the national pension fund was operated was decided by the 
National Pension Fund Operation Committee. For this reason, the final decision that 
appointed the Minister of the EPB to be a chairman of this Committee was an essential part 
of state developmentalism. 
The second conflict emerged concerning the use of the National Pension Fund which should 
be either reserved through real capital investment8 (MoHSA) or diverted through financial 
8 
As the first meaning of investment, real capital investment is generally taken to mean in economic theory the actual production of real capital goods such as the construction of a new motorway or the erection of new factory buildings. 
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investment such as the purchase of stock exchange securities (EPB). The 
EPB's proposal 
was finally adopted but in practice both tactics were used by the government. 
Through the 
first tactic, the government borrowed capital from the Fund with 3 or 4 per cent 
lower 
interest rates than those in the financial market to invest it in government projects such as 
constructing high-speed railways and airports. By 1996, the government had borrowed more 
than half of the Fund, which could have obtained a higher investment return if it was invested 
in the money market. In fact, through the second tactic, the government invested the Fund 
directly in the money market. For example, however, 16.5 per cent of the Fund invested in 
the stock market had recorded 47.88 per cent losses by September 1997 (Kwon, Huck-3u, 
1999b: 27-28). Kwon (1999b: 32) argues that this financial crisis of national pensions 
occurred mainly due to inadequate policy design, for all that its financial management has 
been inefficient. This inadequacy in policy design, he argues further, originated from the 
legacy of `developmental ism embedded in the Korean welfare state'. 
The third conflict evolved around more fundamental issues about national pensions' 
redistributive functions. The MoSHA proposed that the mean wage of all participants in the 
National Pension Programme over their working life should be determined by the last three 
years of their income. But the EPB argued that it should be calculated by the entire period of 
contribution. This basically resulted in the reduction of the final monthly pension level 
because workers' working life-cycle tends to show that the wage level increases as they reach 
their retirement age. For example, Jacobs (1998: 126) clearly points out that the last wage 
prior to retirement is typically higher than average lifetime earnings which basically yields 
a lower replacement rate. Furthermore, as Table 3.3 clearly illustrates, `A' tended to 
influence the overall impact on income redistribution because the variable `A' was a built-in 
mechanism of' vertical redistribution. Yet, the replacement rate was about 40 per cent which 
\w as much less than 60 per cent of the minimum recommended level by the ILO. In other 
\ ords, the pensions from the National Pension Programme were less than half of their wages 
during the last month at work. In short, even if the National Pension Programme might look 
redistributive on the surface, in practice, the majority of those on low wages were unlikely to 
belieft from it. 
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Table 3.3 The National Pension Programmes Pension Formula 
Basic pension = 2.4 x (A+B) x (1+0.05 x N) 
" A: mean wage of all participants in the programme a year before their pensions start. 
" B: average wage over individual workers' working life in the programme. 
" N: number of years of contribution - 20 
" 2.4: when mean wage of participants reaches middle value (median) on the basis of 
the minimum period of participation in the programme (20 years = 240 months), 40 
per cent of monthly wage is earned. In other words, when A=B, a participant who 
has been in the programme for 20 years will earn about 40 per cent of his final 
income as a basic pension. 
" 0.05: when the number of year of contribution exceeds 20 years, annual 5 per cent 
increase is added. 
Notes: final monthly pension however is calculated as accumulation of basic pension and supplementary 
pension which includes spouse (6,000 won per annum); maximum 2 children aged under 18 or disabled 
above 2°d category (36,000 won per person); and parents including partners' aged over 60 or disabled above 
2nd category (36,000 won per person). 
In addition to these three sets of conflicts between the two competing ministries, there also 
were conflicting activities between two pressure groups during the legislation process. The 
issue was concerning whether retirement grants (pensions) should remain intact. Retirement 
grants had been solely paid by employers. On the one hand, the retirement grants were 
understood by the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) to be in part a terminal bonus 
and in part deferred pay, with little relevance to age or to the circumstances in which the 
c i»ploy rent ends. Therefore, the FKTU argued that retirement grants and national pensions 
should be separately recognised. On the other hand, the Korea Employers' Federation (KEF) 
considered retirement grants as in part social security provision and in part a reward for 
meritorious services. Their opposing positions failed to come to terms and almost all 
decisions were made by the government. In consequence, the legally defined rate of 
retirement grants was to be transferred to national pensions contributions from 1993. This 
decision was to avoid potential overburden imposed on employers and at the same time to 
expect the system of retirement grants to be developed into the form of an occupational 
pension (NPC, 1198a: 128). 
Despite all these conflicts, the National Pension Act of 1986 was almost identical to its 
predecessor with only two minor changes. The first change was to establish the National 
Pension Corporation with a special status on 18 September 1987 under the jurisdiction of the 
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MoHSA. The second change was to reinforce a compulsory principle covering workplaces 
with over 10 workers rather than 30. However, in practice, this principle of compulsory 
participation was undermined by the maintenance of the lump-sum payment because if one 
failed to return it after being given, the compulsory principle would no longer be valid. This 
subsequently indicated the loss of entitlement that required a minimum 20-year period of 
contribution. The lump-sum payment was furthermore paid not on the basis of 
earnings-related formula, but of equalised rate of interest added to contribution rates paid by 
employers and employees, thereby nullifying the function of redistribution. Despite this, the 
rationale behind its maintenance was a high turnover rate in the labour market and the scope 
of the scheme that only covered those in the workplaces (NPC, 1998a: 127-128). 
In sum, the National Pension Act of 1986 did not progress much further from its predecessor, 
the National Welfare Pension Act of 1973. In fact, there is little doubt that the two pension 
programmes are almost identical except for the two minor changes identified. The economic 
ministry had still taken a superior role over the competent ministry in framing national 
pensions. Given the supreme role played by the EBP, there had been no substantial 
contribution made by the National Assembly or political parties in making national pensions, 
thereby causing little controversy around the basic framework concerning benefit level and 
contributory rate. 
3.4.2 The Minimum Wage Act: Responding to Social Demands or Pursuing Political 
Interests? 
In 1986, on the same day that national pensions were materialised into legislation, the 
minimum wage became an Act. In comparison to a set of ministerial conflicts found in the 
process of national pensions, however, the policy process leading to the introduction of 
minimum wage was more dynamic and more sensitive to contemporary social conditions. 
There is little doubt that the growth of the national economy in the 1970s was outstanding, 
recording 9.36 average GDP growth rate, which was higher than any other decadal period 
(NSO, 2000e; see Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5). However, as income disparities presented in 
Table 3.4 show, the income distribution ratio between the top 20 per cent and the bottom 40 
per cent decile groups had not made significant progress. Social inequality and relative 
deprivation became increasingly significant social problems as a result (Table 3.4; see also 
Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). 
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Table 3.4 The Trend of Income Distribution 
1965 1970 1976 1978 1980 1982 1985 1986 1988 1990 
(1) 41.8 41.6 45.3 46.7 45.4 43.8 42.7 41.3 42.2 40.4 
(2) 19.3 19.6 19.9 15.5 16.1 18.8 18.9 19.7 19.7 20.5 
(3) 0.34 0.33 0.39 0.4 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.323 
(4) 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.33 0.35 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.507 
Notes: (1) The percentage of income by the top 20% income decile; (2) The percentage of income by the bottom 
40% income decile; (3) Gini Coefficient; (4) Deciles Distribution Ratio = (2) = (1). 
Source: EPB (1990: 56). 
Given these social conditions, trade unions such as the FKTU had been lobbying for the 
resolution of income disparity problems from the 1970s. Yet, employers' organisations, 
including the KEF, argued that it was too soon to introduce a minimum wage because wage 
increases must principally be based on the scope of productivity. Despite these 
socioeconomic conditions, therefore, no proposals concerning minimum wages were made 
in the Fourth (1977-1981) and Fifth Five-Year (1982-1986) Economic Development Plans. 
Oh (1987: 99) identified reasons for this, arguing that the then Prime Minister and the 
Minister of the EPB had blocked them, thereby preventing popular debate (Oh, Eul-Im, 
1987). In fact, the then Prime Minister, Shin, Hyun-Hwak, said that it was `too early to 
introduce minimum wage in Korea' (HDN-a, 19 June 1980). In short, not until structural 
problems became seriously challenged, largely through increasing pressures from both 
indigenous and exogenous factors, were minimum wages subject to a political and public 
debate. Indigenously, there were increasing rates of labour disputes and the growing 
realisation of the press. Exogenously, the ILO requested to publicise whether the minimum 
wage system existed at all. The United States also questioned the structure of the low-wage 
labour market in Korea leading to trade issue policies (MoL, 1986: 120). 
Given this context, as one of the employers' organisations, the Korea Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (KCCI), and the Ministry of Labour (MoL), surveyed industries' attitudes 
towards minimum wages in 1982 and 1983. They subsequently concluded that most 
industries had replied positively to their introduction (KCCI, 1983: 98). Encouraged by this 
result, the MoL argued for their introduction and assumed that minimum wages could help 
the national economy to grow steadily by preventing an increase in labour disputes (see 
Chapter 2). The MoL asked the affiliated Economic Institute of Seoul National University to 
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conduct research which could be referenced in order to create the new scheme. However, 
responses from power elites had not been very positive and this included the response of the 
president himself. The MoL's attempt to materialise a minimum wage in legislation was 
partially based on President Chun's Inaugural Address where he confirmed the `Construction 
of a Welfare State' (Chun, Doo-Hwan, 1980). Yet, it was not until 1986 that the prospects for 
a national minimum wage finally began to be considered positively by political elites. The 
reason for this change is not entirely clear but perhaps this had resulted from aforementioned 
international pressures, domestic structural and electoral necessities. In fact, for example, the 
number of strikes and lock-outs increased dramatically during this particular period of time 
(see Figure 2.2. in Chapter 2; Appendix 3). 
In 1986, the government formed a mediation committee for the Sixth Five-Year 
Socio-Economic Development Plan (1987-1991). The creation of this committee was a 
landmark that involved officials from both the MoL and the EPB, representatives from trade 
unions and employers' organisations and academic intellectuals to discuss the adoption plan 
for minimum wages on 28 January 1986 (Chung, Byoung-Suk and Kim, Hun-Soo, 
1988: 109-110; Joo, Jaehyun, 1999a: 400). Subsequently, in August 1986, the Fifth 
Republic's welfare policies were summarised and published by the EPB, MoHSA, and MoL 
(1986). This report included a plan for the implementation of national pensions, universal 
expansion of health insurance, and the introduction of a minimum wage. This was also 
remarkable in that the economic ministries at last became a supporter of the minimum wage 
programme. 
President Chun finally announced the adoption of minimum wages in August 1986 
(Presidential Secretariat, 1987: 164 requoted from Joo, Jaehyun, 1999a: 400). The 
President's declaration enabled executives to precipitate their activities. On 3 September 
1986, the MoL proposed its own draft and passed it on to the ruling party, the Democratic 
Justice Party (DJP). Political parties also began to participate more actively in this political 
process. Since one of the opposition parties, the Korean National Party (KNP) initiated a 
minimum wage bill on 11 March 1986, the main opposition party, the New Democratic Party 
(NDP), also submitted its own scheme on 23 October 1986, followed by the ruling party on 
20 November 1986 (NAO, 1986b: 20). The FKTU was not an exception in this process by 
presenting a petition proposal to the National Assembly. Of which, Oh (1987: 100) points out 
that the KNP's bill was originally modelled on the Japanese system. The DJP's bill was 
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passed on by the MMoL and included many parts of the KNP's. The FKTU's petition proposal 
was excluded in the process of deliberation on the grounds that its content was already 
reflected by political parties' bills. At the National Assembly Standing Committee for Health 
and Social Affairs, each bill submitted was discussed and then unified from three political 
party bills into a single bill (NAO, 1986a: 13). During its legislation process, the NDP took 
part neither in the deliberation process nor in the General Meeting of the National Assembly. 
Instead, the NDP focussed on the constitutional issues and vetoed the National Assembly 
activity. Consequently, the minimum wage bill became an Act in the absence of the main 
opposition party with no critical discussion (NAO, 1986b: 20-21). 
In sum, compared to the process of national pensions legislation, minimum wages were 
introduced as part of a response to sociopolitical unrest and social demands (see Figure 2.2; 
Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2). In its legalisation process, although the MoL designed the draft, the 
ruling party took all the credit by taking it as the form of an assemblymen-initiative bill. For 
the ruling party, minimum wages were politically important for the thirteenth National 
Assembly election in 1988. In forming a draft bill for minimum wages there was strategic 
cooperation the MoL and the DJP. This strategic cooperation was possible because the MoL 
had long been trying to win the economic ministries over to its side while the ruling party had 
to deal with the upcoming election. In short, their strategic concerns coincided. Nonetheless, 
this does not mean that the state elites' perceptions on worker-friendly policy initiatives 
changed dramatically. Nor did workers' perceptions on the nature of regime because of the 
absence of a progressive revision of labour laws that could have developed the workers' 
bargaining power. Joo (1999a: 402) interprets this process as the state elites' political 
interests taking over the importance of their policy ideas. Socioeconomic conditions, 
political illegitimacy, and the state elites' political responses were the context within which 
the minimum wage bill finally materialised into legislation. Leaving aside its effectiveness, 
its legislation was possible because policy ideas and political interests coincided at a 
historically significant juncture. 
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3.4.3 The Financial Integration of National Health Insurance9: 
Presidential Veto 
Power 
Since its universalisation, the National Health Insurance 
Programme in Korea has been 
subject to constant controversy surrounding the issue of administrative management 
which 
cannot be separated from issues of cost containment and 
financial stabilisation. The 
programme had been managed by the health insurance societies, which were 
non-profit 
quasi-governmental organisations established in either the workplace 
for wage earners or 
residence area for the self-employed. In 1997, on the one 
hand, the National Federation of 
Health Insurance Societies managed 92 health insurance societies in rural areas and 
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health insurance societies in urban areas. On the other hand, the Health Insurance 
Corporation administered a health insurance corporation for the government employees and 
private school teachers throughout the country, and 150 employees' health societies 
for 
industrial employees (MoHW, 1998b: 407). In 1999, the health insurance programme was 
being enforced by 142 insurance associations serving company employees and 161 branch 
offices of the National Health Insurance Corporation for other citizens14 
This two-tiered financing and administrative structure has since July 2000 been unified into 
the National Health Insurance Corporation (Korea Herald, 20 April 2000; MoHW, 2000b: 
62). Its controversial debate however dates back to 1989 after the first controversy of 1983 
failed to pave the way for integration. On 9 March 1989, the National Assembly passed the 
9 
The National Health Insurance Act in Korea has been amended about seventeen times between the 
amendment in December 1999 and its first enactment on 16 December 1963. Before its actual 
implementation from 1 July 1977, the second Amendment on 22 December 1976 enabled it to be 
compulsory, covering workplaces with 500 workers or more. The coverage had been extended to 
workplaces with 16 or more by 1982 and to workplaces with 5 or more by 1988. Following the 
inclusion of Oriental medicine into the system from February 1987, the seventh Amendment Act on 
4 December 1987 expanded its coverage by including siblings aged under 20 and daughters and 
sons-in-laws of the insured's (Son, Annette Hye Kyung, 1998: 23). From 1 January 1988, the 
government introduced a regional health care system for the self-employed in rural areas. From 1 July 
1989, as the health care system started to cover the self-employed in urban areas, the National Health 
Insurance Programme (NHIP) has begun to cover virtually the entire population in association with 
the Health Assistance Programme established in 1977. 
10 
As one of President Kim Dae-Jung's policy reform projects, the National Health Insurance 
Corporation (NHIC) was established on 1 October 1998. The NHIC incorporates 227 regional 
insurance societies for general citizens including the self-employed with the now-defunct Health 
Insurance Corporation, which had worked for government officials and private school employees 
(Korea Herald, 5 August 1999). 
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national health insurance bill that integrated the two-tiered structure of 
the health system. 
This bill was considered under the unique situation where opposition parties managed 
to 
occupy more seats than the ruling party for the first time in Korean political 
history. For 
example, at the thirteenth National Assembly election on 26 April 
1988, the ruling DJP 
gained 125 out of total 299 seats, while the Party for Peace and Democracy 
(PPD), the 
Reunification and Democracy Party (RDP), and the New Democratic Republican 
Party 
(NDRP) gained 70,59, and 35 seats, respectively (Kim, Hong-Nack, 1989: 487). 
Under this political situation, there were two contradictory schools of thought in conflict 
concerning the overarching structure of national health insurance. On the one hand, 
academics specialised in social security argued that the integrated system could work better 
at promoting equality of access to health care in four ways: (1) contributing social equality 
of insurance contribution; (2) reducing the poverty gap and contributing national solidarity; 
(3) stabilising health finance and protecting reverse distribution; and (4) promoting effective 
management of the system. On the other hand, those who argued for the two-tiered system 
maintained the idea that health insurance was aiming at health security rather than income 
redistribution. Also, as many scholars have argued (e. g. Corden, 1999b; Williams, 1999), it 
was hardly feasible to measure the actual income and assets of the self-employed. This 
diliiculty, they argued, might generate the possibility of reverse distribution. According to 
them, the two-tiered system would work better with liberal-democracy, local government 
and the capitalist economy. 
In fact, the essential part of the discussion determining the merger of health insurance was to 
raise the question of how to maintain its financial stabilisation after the full coverage of the 
entire population. This was because although government subsidy made up to 36 per cent of 
insurance funds to alleviate the burden imposed on the self-employed in rural and urban 
areas, the major source of finance was contributions paid by the insured. For industrial 
workers, contributions were paid equally by employers and employees. The government paid 
a half oi'the contributions for its own employees and 20 per cent for private school teachers. 
The government also subsidised self-employed health insurance societies for the society's 
administrative cost from general revenue. In addition, there was a third party payment system 
in operation. Health services for the beneficiaries were provided by the medical practitioner 
or medical facilities not owned by the insurer and those health service providers were 
reimbursed by the insurer on the basis of tee-for-service (Lee, Du-Ho et al., 1992: 317-359). 
I) 
Under this financial complexity, the existing two-tiered system could not solve 
five practical 
problems. First, structural unbalance between different health societies 
inevitably caused 
financial difficulties because the contribution level was determined by health societies to 
which the insured belong according to their region of work. This subsequently engendered a 
financial gap between financially stable and unstable societies. Second, financially unstable 
societies faced difficulties expanding insurance benefits and medical services. In general, 
health societies for industrial employees or government employees were financially more 
stable than those who belonged to regional health societies because the former's 
contributions could be directly deducted from their salaries. For this reason, the benefit level 
for those who belonged to regional health societies tended to be downwards equalised. Third, 
the two-tiered system differentiated by employment status raised the problem of fairness. 
Son (1998: 23-24) points out that this was because the monthly insurance contribution for 
members of the employee group to the health insurance societies was determined by their 
monthly wage depending on the decisions made by the health societies they belong to. By 
contrast, the monthly insurance contribution rate for the self-employed, farmers or employed 
in the informal sectors was determined by the regional grading system based on their income 
level, property and family size. Fourth, there were also losses of `economies of scale' in both 
administration and finance. On no account were financially unstable small size health 
societies effective in their spending on management and operation. Finally, the two-tiered 
system was unlikely to manage and operate national health insurance efficiently. For 
example, if the insured moved from one health society to another, it was possible that the 
management of qualification could overlap. This may result largely from lack of a joined-up 
approach including, information of contribution and deferred payment records. 
All these practical problems provided a rationale for the idea that all health insurance funds 
should be integrated. Thus, the idea was supported by a majority including the ruling party, 
major opposition parties, regional interest groups, and the Korean Medical Association 
(KNIA). Only the N9oHSA and the NDRP did not support the argument (NAO, 1989b, 
1989c, 1989d). During the process of its legislation, the government played no significant 
role. Fven the ruling party participated in the main stream along the line of opposition 
parties. I low this exceptional political process was possible remains arguable. For some, this 
exceptional process was possible because man' of those who supported the merger were 
ills mbers of the Health and Social Affairs Committee in the National Assembly, or even in 
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the ruling DJP. For others, this was possible because 
National Assemblymen had to listen to 
local voices. In other words, there was a certain amount of restriction 
for National 
Assemblymen having to listen to their regional supporters because the 
13th National 
Assembly Election was based on the `small-constituency' system 
(a small-member 
constituency system). However, a more reasonable account may 
be that leaders of the ruling 
party had anticipated a presidential veto. In fact, the DJP, the government and a 
Cabinet 
council suggested that the president should exercise it, while three opposition parties 
suggested not to. On 24 March 1989, fifteen days later the National Assembly passed 
the bill, 
President Rho actually exercised his veto on it. The reason for his final decision was 
officially known as there being illegal components, difficulties with enforcing the 
bill in 
practice and possible imposition of an increasing burden on salaried employees 
(Lee, 
Kyeong-Kee, 1991: 199). As seen in Table 3.2, all the Bills submitted by the National 
Assembly require approval by the President. With the President's veto power exercised at the 
last moment, the Bill for national health insurance integration failed to become an Act. 
In sum, as Lee (1991: 199-200) argues, the policy outcome of this political process can be 
read as a strategic means to maintaining political power, minimising the government's 
financial imposition and to protecting those with vested-interests. To integrate the financial 
system for national health insurance might discern the problems of the existing taxation 
system that levied contributions based on incomes and assets, thereby causing public tax 
resistance. To make a one-tier financial system would undoubtedly produce the 
across-the-board state intervention to overall health issues, thereby resulting in more 
financial imposition. To integrate existing health societies might also result in the loss of 
existing bureaucratic patterns that had substantiated political power. For maintaining 
political and economic interests, it could be argued, a presidential veto was exercised. In 
short, prevailing policy ideas failed to materialise into policy initiatives for another decade. 
3.4.4 The Employment Insurance Act: State Protection for Contingencies or 
Structural Adjustment as Necessity? 
I'. nacted on 27 December 1993, the Employment Insurance Act provided a legal basis for the 
Ftnplovmelnt Insurance Programme that was launched on 1 July 1995. Its introduction was 
alreauly `t gested from the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan in the 1960s, yet 
t ulcd to be `given life mainly due to the principal economic orientation known as `economic 
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growth first, distribution later' (see Chapter 2). However, prior to 
the Fourteenth General and 
Presidential Election in which both ruling and opposition parties promised 
its introduction 
as one of their election pledges, unemployment had not returned to 
the subject of much 
political or public debate. Not even in the late 1970s was 
it the case, as Figure 3.3 clearly 
illustrates, for its introduction could impose too much burden on companies, and the overall 
structure of industry was yet to be mature (MoL, 2000a: 16). 
Figure 3.3 Unemployment Rate 1970 -1994 (Labour Force Sample Survey, 
%) 
Sources: EPB (1990a: 17); NSO (1998a: 128) 
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This prolonged ignorance might have originated from the fact that the system of retirement 
grants had played a role as an unemployment benefit. As seen in the policy-making process 
of national pensions, this system of retirement grants was and still is one of the unique 
systems found in Korea. However, most accumulated funds drawn from retirement grants 
have been operated within individual firms, thereby being relatively unsafe against financial 
impact such as bankruptcy. For individual firms, retirement grants were considered as 
overburdened personnel expenses (MoL, 1993: 145). Furthermore, according to the Labour 
\Vhite Paper (MoL, 1993: 145), almost 80 per cent of those who were unemployed relied on 
informal support such as their family rather than their own savings. Therefore, there had been 
an increasing demand for the state's commitment to the minimum livelihood security against 
¢ay-oft' and downsizing. Given this, various interest groups" had demanded and showed 
For example. Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), The Korean Traders Association (KTA), 
the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), the Korea International Trade Association 
(KITTTA) and even the Korea Employers' Federation (KEF). 
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expressions of interest in its introduction especially 
from 1989. In April 1991, for example, 
the KCCI and the KITA proposed that employment insurance provide support 
for industrial 
restructuring. In April 1993. representatives of the FKTU and the 
KEF came to terms with an 
item that proposed the earlier implementation of employment insurance to the government. 
For employees, this was a compensatory measure in return for a stoppage of strikes. 
Labour 
disputes for wage increase would occur otherwise as a self-support measure against 
employment instability (MoL, 1995: 173,2000a: 19). 
: \t a similar time or even before increasing social 
demands were visualised, a number of 
think tanks produced a series of reports. In February 1991, the KDI produced a tentative plan 
for employment insurance which would become part of the Seventh Five-Year 
Socio-Economic Development Plan (1992-1997). Established in May 1988 as a 
go% crnment-sponsored think tank under the jurisdiction of the MoL, the Korea Labour 
Institute (KLI) also participated in producing reports for employment insurance with the EPB 
(I-: PI3 and MoL, 1991: 22-23; Yoo, Kil-Sang, 1999). Initially, the government entrusted the 
welfare ministry's think tank, the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHSA) with 
the project. )'ct, none of the researchers in the KIHSA was on board at the sub-committee for 
employment insurance under the Committee for Social Security Planning (CSSP). On 5 
February 1991, those in the CSSP suggested that the KLI should take over the project. On the 
following day, the KLI became the research institute responsible for designing employment 
insurance (MoL, 2000a: 17-18). On 27 March, researchers in the KLI won the 
policy-practitioners for the Seventh Five-Year Socio- Economic Development Plan over to 
its introduction by arguing that unlike unemployment insurance, employment insurance 
should be able to promote an active labour market policy. This was a landmark moment that 
made economic policy practitioners change their views on employment insurance from 
social de\ elopment to human development. As a result, the decision to introduce employment 
insurance \\ as finally taken at the Economic Ministers' Conference on 23 August 1991. This 
ýý as oft icinl l% the final decision that enabled employment insurance to become part of the 
"cventh Five-Year tioocio-f-. conomic Development Plan (MoL, 2000a: 19). 
On IN' May 1992 the employment insurance research team was established within the KLI in 
order to conduct s\ stematic research. On 30 July 1992. the MoL announced the possibility 
Of employment insurance being legislated upon and a set of hearings took place. Related 
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interest groups and Executive bodies made efforts to coordinate the 
Bill. In general, the 
FKTU and the MoL made similar proposals and so did the KCCI, the 
KEF, and the EPB. The 
most sensitive areas such as the administrative structure and the scope of coverage were 
however entrusted to Presidential decree in the final government Bill. 
Also, the level of 
contribution was decided on the side of the Economic ministries even 
if the MoL was 
responsible for it. Thus, the overall influence of the Economic ministries was stronger than 
that of the Labour ministries. Yet, the FKTU made their voice heard at least in part in the 
final Bill since the final Bill did not allow a certain amount of retirement grants (pensions) to 
be diverted to insurance contributions (Park, Dong-Meong, 1994). 
On 28 October 1993, however, only the government Bill was sent to the National Assembly, 
while political parties were deeply engaged with issues concerning constitutional reform. For 
this reason, the Bill did not progress much further from the MoL's bill throughout the 
deliberation process. The government and the ruling party made a great attempt to simply 
pass the Bill through persuading those in opposition parties who did not actively participate 
in revising the Bill. The role of the state in financing the programme remained passive, and 
most regulations concerning administration, contribution, and coverage were determined by 
those proposed by the Economic ministries. 
Policy ideas for employment insurance had been raised by various channels from the 
beginning. Yet, there is little doubt that the critical concern for its introduction was not to 
establish the welfare programme that could enhance the living standard of workers but to 
stabilise the national economy. In December 1993, for example, the MoL announced a `new 
human-power policy' which was modelled on the Japanese type of organisation 
development12 (Uh, Soo-Bong, 1993: 43-44). To structure a competitive labour market, 
employment insurance was part of overall structural adjustment policy in industry rather than 
part of social security policy. Its principal objective was therefore to resolve the difficulties 
underlying dramatic changes of overall economy. According to a series of the Labour White 
12 
Japan has developed the labour market condition in response to the prevailing drawbacks that resulted largely from the repeated process of simple labour as a mass-production mechanism. These 
weaknesses were disincentives for workers, a high rate of inferior goods and an inflexibility of changing demands. As a post-Fordist arrangement, the new method developed in Japan aimed to strengthen the functional flexibility of labour, flexibility of wages, and flexibility of labour supply. As a result, a competitive internal labour market structure could be achieved. 
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Papers (MoL, 1993: 145,1994: 179,1995: 172,1996: 245), it becomes clear that employment 
insurance aimed to be preventive rather than curative, requiring active support 
for the labour 
market beyond the activity of providing unemployment benefits, thereby what was 
conventionally known as unemployment insurance was being replaced 
by employment 
insurance (see also Chapter 2). What was important was not to decide what the programme 
ought to be, but to ensure that it should be in operation in response to an election pledge. 
As 
we shall see in Chapter 4, the Employment Insurance Programme was not adequately 
designed to achieve a preventative objective. 
In sum, it was the government that initiated employment insurance in order to adjust the 
industrial structure and promote the supply and demand of labour. The underlying rationale 
of the legislation also originated from the urgent necessity of structural adjustment of 
industry in order to strengthen national competitiveness. This adjustment however 
consequently required active state intervention especially in its finances which largely 
remained unresolved. All that has been discussed through the four pieces of welfare 
legislation reflects the `politics of possibility' in the period of democratic transformation to 
which now we turn. 
3.5 The Politics of Possibility: The Overall Lessons from the Case Studies 
For most advanced capitalist states, it was the period from the mid-1930s to the late 1940s 
that the principles of sound finances transformed to those of the Keynesian welfare state. In 
part, the period of the 1980s has also been one of the policy transformations in which most 
Western democratic nations experienced some degree of challenge to the policy orthodoxies 
elaborated during the Keynesian welfare consensus. Castles (1990: 491) argues that: 
`[T]he most massive policy transformations occur when existing long-term policy strategies 
become the subject of political challenge with a view to new fundamental decision premises 
replacing the old. It is under these circumstance that we may meaningfully discern a 
watershed in public policy development, with established policy orthodoxy under attack and 
alternative policy agendas vying to take its place. ' 
In Korea, it was the period from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s that transformed the policy 
orthodoxies elaborated during the military authoritarian rules to more dynamic directions. 
However, we argue that it was not democratisation per se that became a determining factor 
in shaping social policy but its implication that required political actors to follow principles 
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institutionalised in the form of rules and norms. Under these conditions in which principled 
reasons are required for proposed courses of action. 
ideas become important. From the case 
studies, it was clear that social policies were unlikely to take their 
institutional shape unless 
social demands became the point at issue in a political spectrum. In other words, not until 
these social challenges became actualised as a transformed policy agenda were social 
policies formed into institutional shape. For this reason, social policies better reflect social 
demands under the democratic rules than under the authoritarian rules where social policies 
are likely to be introduced for politically purposive reasons. That social policies can be an 
effective means of obtaining political support leads to an idea that political actors are likely 
to consider their political effects, thereby social policies are introduced prior to upcoming 
elections. This can often be the case under the authoritarian and democratic rules alike, yet 
more so under the democratic rules because vote-gaining at the election appears more 
important in obtaining power. 
I having passed at the 131 S` General Meeting of the National Assembly on 17 December 1986, 
both national pensions and minimum wages were materialised into legislation on 31 
December 1986. Prior to the presidential and general election of 1987 and 1988 respectively, 
these two pieces of legislation shared the timing that fulfilled the objective of vote-gaining. 
For the government, however, it was capital mobilisation that underpinned the introduction 
of national pensions whereas it was economic necessity that required an active response to 
emerging social demands of minimum wages. To be more specific, it was the President who 
took the policy initiative in introducing national pensions while it was party dynamics that 
made the first move towards minimum wages. In a strict sense, not until the President 
announced their initiation was their enactment within the bounds of possibility. Yet, 
President ('hun did not direct minimum wages whereas national pensions were under his 
instructions. A further difference was that it took only 55 minutes within 7 days of 
deliberation for a standing committee to pass national pensions. A standing committee spent 
only 127 minutes to pass minimum wages, yet the entire deliberation process lasted 173 days 
(NAO, 1986a. 1986b, 1986c, 1986d). During this process, a national pension bill passed as 
dratted. but a minimum wage bill passed as redrafted by a standing committee. In short, these 
detailed differences show that national pensions reproduced an authoritarian political 
process while minimum wages were an example of social challenge becoming a transformed 
agenda during the period of regime complications. In other words, social policies even under 
140 
the same context (i. e. time-frame) can differ to the change of conditions that 
influence the 
political process. 
Conditions under which the financial integration of national health insurance of 
1989 took 
place were favourable in economic and political terms for democratic consolidation. 
The 
national economy, for example, underwent average 11.5 per cent GDP growth rate 
for the 
past three years (BoK, 2000). In comparison to the conventional format of party politics 
where the authoritarian regime 'actively and carefully cultivate limited oppositions behind 
the scene, in order to maximize the legitimating rule of the legislature' (Kim, Chong-Lim, 
1988: 9), the opposition parties took more seats than the ruling party for the first time in the 
history of Korean legislature. In societal terms, not until as late as 1988 were social demands 
made for social insurance, while they had dominantly evolved around issues on labour 
welfare. In other words, it was from early 1988 to mid-1989 that social demands underwent 
a dramatic change from labour-related issues to more general welfare issues for the entire 
population. This dynamic of social change was further evidenced by the fact that it took 646 
minutes within almost three months for a standing committee to pass the bill as redrafted by 
the committee (NAO, 1988,1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1989d). Despite these favourable 
conditions for a democratic political process, the exercise of presidential veto power 
eventually sent the bill back to the National Assembly. Not only did this decision lead the 
opposition parties and other social organisations to demand that President Rho should 
withdraw his veto but also it pushed him and his DJP to an impasse. Meanwhile, the event 
that the priest and a university student from a progressive camp visited North Korea gave 
political leaders an opportunity to manufacture political demands for national security, 
thereby creating conditions for their own action. By the creating of this temporary crisis, they 
imposed their own definitions of problems and diverted the public's attention from national 
hcalth insurance. Further to this reproduced conservative recurrence, it was the creation of 
the gigantic governing party on 22 January 1990 that finally set President Rho free from the 
pressure. In short, by presidential veto power emergent democratic elements returned to a 
conventional format of the old style rule. 
In tact, this return of conventional rule may explain why the National Assembly played a 
relatively small role compared to the government at the 14th National Assembly from 1992 to 
1996 (see Figure ý. I: Appendix 5). In contrast to the favourable conditions for the financial 
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integration of national health insurance in the late 1980s, GDP growth rate fell down from 
9.1 per cent in 1991 to 5.1 per cent in 1992 (BoK, 2000) and unemployment rate increased 
from 2.4 per cent in 1992 to 2.8 per cent in 1993 (NSO, 1998a: 128; see also Figure 3.3). 
Given this, as part of structural necessity, employment insurance reflected a `new 
human-power policy' which was announced by the MoL in December 1993 (Uh, Soo-Bong, 
1993: 43-44). Modelled on the Japanese type of organisation development, this new policy 
challenged weaknesses that largely resulted from the repeated process of simple labour as a 
mass-production mechanism. By strengthening flexibility of wages and labour supply, a new 
human-power policy shared the idea with a post-Fordist arrangement in order to suggest 
solutions to disincentives of workers, a high rate of inferior goods and an inflexibility of 
changing demands. In other words, employment insurance was part of overall structural 
adjustment policy in industry rather than part of social security policy itself. It was 
introduced not to enhance the redistribution of welfare but to resolve the difficulties 
underlying dramatic changes of overall economy such as the emergence of a dual-economy 
and instability between labour demand and supply. 
Nonetheless, it should not be underestimated that not all emergent democratic elements 
returned back to the old style rule. On 18 December 1992, the 140' Presidential Election 
made it possible for the first civilian government in thirty-two years to be in office. Under the 
authoritarian rule, interest groups were only able to expose their interests only after certain 
issues were transformed as a policy agenda. For employment insurance, interest-articulation 
was made even before the government framed the policy agenda. The role of President Kim 
remained indirect and passive, though economic ministries still played a superior role over 
the responsible ministry. In short, the return of the old style rules was a partial step-back, not 
a complete retreat. They were not allowed to be back in shape by ignoring what had been 
undergone during the period of democratisation. 
In sum, the greater the institutional changes attempted, the greater are their unintended and 
largely unexpected repercussions, forcing upon those in power the expedient of piecemeal 
improvisation. A democratic transformation from the mid- 1980s to the early 1990s made it 
possible for the existing authoritarian regime to change. This possibility of changeability in 
a critical juncture became substantially meaningful. For some, the arrival of democracy 
signalled that systems could be reformed. For others, the old style rules of the game were no 
longer allowed to return. Policy change at a one time point influences what comes next. 
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Change occurred because the essential components that maintained the old rules had already 
been rearranged by different sets of challenge. For this reason, the `politics of possibility' is 
a mirror image of the possibility of changeability. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Judged by the similar criteria that were originally set out by Dahl in his seminal work 
Polyarchy (1971) and then simplified by the Freedom House Survey Team, it is since 1988 
that Korea has been judged to be democratic (Lijphart, 1999: 54). In a broader time span, it 
was from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s that the existing `rules of the game' were 
transformed to a new order. Policy change during this period, we have argued, was largely 
seen as a reaction to changes in demand mobilisation, interest articulation and political 
perceptions to them. Far from being fixed and stable, these changes were frequently sporadic 
in appearance, fluctuating in intensity, ambivalent in composition, and therefore logically 
inconsistent in pattern and structure. This inconsistency however was mediated by ideas 
about what was good for society. The important role played by such ideas has also been 
argued by a number of scholars in the context of the United States (e. g. Heymann, 1988; 
Kelman, 1988; Moore, 1988; Orren, 1988). Reich (1988: 124), for example, summarises the 
core argument developed by these scholars that `citizens are motivated to act according to 
ideas about what is good for society; that such ideas determine how public problems are 
defined and understood; that government depends on such ideas for mobilizing public action'. 
Under the authoritarian rule in Korea, such ideas were aggregated by networks of 
knowledge-based community, yet their roles were equally confined within a small terrain 
which constrained their diffusion and transformation to be a policy agenda. Under the period 
of political transition, by contrast, epistemic communities played a less important role. 
Rather, it was previously inactive social movements that shaped such ideas and propelled 
them forward. Through this new source of participation in the political process, the 
prevailing view that social policies require conditions of economic growth was revised by 
the view that conditions of economic growth are not always in parallel with each other. For 
social policy development, in other words, economic growth is certainly a prerequisite but 
not necessarily a fulfilling condition. Social policies require conditions of economic growth 
but without the stability of any given political democracy, social policies are likely to remain 
a secondary policy task. 
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Much that has been said seems to acknowledge that policies may serve purposes other than 
those to improve social conditions. Further to this, all that has been said so far relates to one 
of the key processes of political systems (i. e. inputs) and to the diffusion process of policy 
ideas (Box I in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). A more direct focus on the policy context (content) 
rather than the process would provide a richer empirical insight into the ways in which 
policies are structured in society and the ways in which underlying goals and objectives of 
those policies are institutionalised. By taking a case study approach, social programmes that 
constitute major pillars of social protection in Korea will be analysed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Politics of Implementation 
4.1 Introduction 
In a closed society policy makers can control almost all that happens in the policy 
environment. As the society becomes free and open, however, changes in the policy 
environment are no longer subject only to what happens inside government. The interaction 
between what happens inside government and what happens in the external environment 
may force changes in a programme that in turn condition further choice. Not only because 
this interaction is often unknown but also because the future is greatly influenced by the past, 
persisting with what was good enough before may become a cause of dissatisfaction. This 
dissatisfaction is often the result of a disequilibrium between political goals set out for a 
certain set of programmes at one point in time and their subsequent achievements at another 
point in time. The assumption that present obstacles remain in place is thereby misleading. 
For this reason, the ways in which political goals are implemented in the structure of social 
policy are an important empirical enquiry. Given this, the purpose of this chapter is to 
suggest that the politics of implementing social programmes in general and social policy 
reforms in particular is greatly influenced by what happened in the settlement of social 
problems in the past. 
This chapter is organised into four sections. The first section examines the political process 
that reformed public assistance. The second section analyses the structure of old public 
assistance which was replaced by a new system through reform. These two sections on 
restructuring public assistance as part of a social safety net identify a number of decaying 
elements and demonstrate the ways in which they were transformed to a new order. By 
focussing on the structural problems that four major social insurance programme have 
encountered and the ways in which those problems have been approached, the third section 
explores the principled ideas and political underpinnings behind the structure of social 
policy. The concluding section of this chapter analyses the political discourse that underpins 
social policy reforms in response to the economic crisis and presents the overall lessons that 
can be drawn from the third section. 
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4.2 The Social Safety Net: The Reform of Public (Social) Assistance 
For the most industrialised economies, whether to provide a sufficient social safety net under 
the conditions of economic retardation has always been highly contentious. This contention, 
Atkinson (1991) argues, evolves from the nature of the social safety net that owes its creation 
to the notion of a national minimum but conflicts with aggregate economic objectives. For 
this reason, it is logically expected that countries with high priority to economic policy over 
other policy areas are less likely to develop a social safety net. Confined to the design 
standards that each country achieved, the social security system in Korea was ranked as 130`h 
out of 172 countries in 1995 (Dixon, 2000). Given the immaturity of this social safety net, 
the financial crisis in the economy since November 1997 widened a gap between what was 
socially desirable and what was economically feasible. As Figure 4.1 shows, for example, the 
unemployment rate in the first quarter of 1999 reached almost 9 per cent. Further, it was only 
from 1995 to 1996 that per capita GNP grew beyond the point of 10,000 US dollars until 
1999. Per capital GNP fell from 10,543 US dollars in 1996 to 6,823 US dollars in 1998 
(BoK, 2000). 
Figure 4.1 Unemployment Rate (ILO standard) (%) 
Source: NSO (2000b: 222) 
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Despite this financial crisis in the Korean economy, this period is often seen as an important 
turning point that influenced the reform of the social safety net. As part of the International 
Monetary Fund's request and increasing demand from civic groups to set up an adequate 
social safety net, the National Basic Livelihood Security Act (NBLSA) was enacted on 12 
August 1999 and began to be implemented from 1 October 2000. Since March 1998, the 
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) had played an active role in 
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reforming the existing Public Livelihood Protection Act. Subsequently, for the first time in 
Korean social welfare academia, 209 academics in the field of social welfare made a joint 
statement on `building up the social safety net' on 12 May 1998. Almost 45 civic groups 
including the PSPD, CCEJ, KCTU and FKTU were involved in petitioning this enactment. 
The joint cooperative body of both civic and labour groups claimed that: 
`The government's welfare programmes have proven ineffective in protecting the 
unemployed, handicapped and elderly. .. an increasing number of underprivileged citizens 
are not benefiting from such programmes following the nation's economic crisis' (Korea 
Herald, 5 March 1999). 
The possibility of strong anti-government protest remained likely unless the government 
accepted these demands. To an extent, national consensus was possible because the 
economic crisis exacerbated not only the major economic indicators but also class 
disparities. Table 4.1 shows income disparities between different income decile groups in 
urban wage workers' households from 1990 to 1999. The last two rows show that the lowest 
income decile group had taken a smaller proportion of income compared than the top income 
decile group, thereby the ratio between them became much higher than that before the 
pre-economic crisis period. 
Table 4.1 Income Distribution by Income Decile for Urban Wage Workers' Households, 
1990-1999 (%) 
I s` (I) 2 °d (II) 3rd (III) 4 `h (IV) 5 `h (V) Ratio (V = i) 
1990 8.3 13.3 17.1 22.5 38.8 4.67 
1991 8.5 13.5 17.3 22.7 38.0 4.47 
1992 8.5 13.6 17.5 22.8 37.6 4.42 
1993 8.6 13.6 17.5 22.9 37.4 4.35 
1994 8.5 13.4 17.5 22.9 37.7 4.44 
1995 8.5 13.5 17.5 23.0 37.5 4.41 
1996 8.2 13.2 17.5 23.1 38.0 4.63 
1997 8.3 13.6 17.7 23.2 37.2 4.48 
1998 7.4 12.8 17.1 22.9 39.8 5.38 
1999 7.3 12.6 17.0 22.8 40.3 5. >2 
Sources: Reconstructed Table from NSO (1998a: 156.2000c. 168). 
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Perhaps responding to this growing income disparity, public opinion changed greatly from 
1997 to 1998. For example, the percentage of those who supported the view that 'individuals 
should be responsible for their own welfare' in 1997 (20 May to 3 June) was 51 per cent of 
a total 1,117 nationwide representative. In 1998 (13 to 22 October), it dropped greatly to only 
17 per cent of a total 1,010 adults. On the other hand, the percentage of those who chose the 
statement `the state should be responsible for everyone's economic security' was 49 per cent 
in 1997 while it increased dramatically to 83 per cent in 1998 (Shin and Rose, 1997: 28, 
1998: 35). 
Under these socioeconomic conditions, the proposed Act was centred upon the need to 
reform the existing categorisation of benefit recipients and the determination of eligibility'. 
The legislative petition was made by civic groups through Kim, Hong-Shin (Grand National 
Party) an assemblyman who introduced the Bill on 29 June 1998. In August 1998, on the 
basis of petitioning by civic groups and the draft bill designed by the ruling party committee 
for the basic livelihood security, the legislation judging committee of the ruling party 
(National Congress for New Politics) confirmed the National Basic Livelihood Security Bill 
as party policy and put forward legislation to this end. On 21 June 1998, there was the 
President's positive announcement of the enactment of the Act. This speech was the final 
decision made by the top-decision maker: the President. Yet, the National Assembly was not 
running on a regular basis because of confronting positions taken by ruling and opposition 
parties concerning the issues of political audit and the attempt to absorb opposition party 
members. For this reason, the Bill had remained outside the National Assembly. By the time 
those issues were through, the Bill was finally submitted to the National Assembly on 15 
October 1998, sent to the Standing Committee for Health and Welfare on 17 October, and 
forwarded to the Petition Committee for Legislation Inspection on 25 November 1998 (Kim, 
Hong-Shin, 1999: 22-23). 
During this political process there were two sets of conflicts, the first of which occurred 
between those who wished to design the Act in different ways, while the second set of which 
concerned budgetary issues. First, the MoL maintained the negative position and argued that 
Benefit recipients had been based on earning ability, and the determination of eligibility had been 
based on demographic criteria. In other words, those between the ages of 18 and 65 are assumed to he 
able to work unless mentally or phvsicall\ disabled. 
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strengthening the social safety net should be promoted by making investment on 
employment maintenance such as promoting public workfare. However, the MoL did not 
achieve sufficient public support. This was because of the dramatic increase in the number 
of the unemployed and limited applications of temporary employment policies to 
marginalised classes. In contrast, the MoHW had agreed with the general principle of the 
extension of public assistance but raised administrative difficulties within the Act. The 
expansion of the Public Assistance Programme would require an expansion of the 
professional workforce prior to its implementation. This was largely because the programme 
had been carried out by a relatively small number of trained welfare officers since 1987. 
Figure 4.2 Number of Welfare Officials and Clients 
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on the regulation. For example, 3,000 places were available each year for welfare workers from 1996 to 1998 
but only 2,935 in 1996,2,929 in 1997,2,887 in 1998 were actually on the job, and the fixed number of workers 
was 4,200 and 4,800 but the actual number was 4,095 and 4,496 in 1999 and in 2000 respectively; the number 
of recipients under public assistance does not include those under the temporary livelihood protection. 
Sources: Reconstructed from MoHW (1998b: 299,310,311,1999b: 201,263,2000a: 199,2000b: 110, 
154-155,2001b). 
As Figure 4.2 shows, the gap between the number of welfare workers and public assistance 
recipients became narrower over time. Yet, the gap still remained substantial. When it comes 
to the actual number of welfare workers rather than the number according to the regulation, 
the gap becomes bigger. This is also the case when the temporary livelihood protection 
recipients are included. Without an increase of their numbers, the programme was less likely 
to he effective. A single official worker, for example, took the responsibility for an average 
of 165 households in 1995. And almost 33 per cent of administrative units where they were 
required to be present was in operation with unqualified workers (MoHW, 1998b: 310-311). 
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Further to this, these professional welfare officials in the administration unit had officially 
been confined to particular types of positions which were unlikely to carry promotional 
prospects. On the scale of one (highest) to nine (lowest) in the ladder of an office-bearer, they 
could not rise above point seven. This obviously resulted in a lack of motivational incentives. 
The second set of conflicts derived from the Office of Budget which opposed the 
introduction of the Act mainly because of underlying difficulties in financing the new 
scheme. The budget for unemployment and the existing social safety net had already 
increased. Once the Act was enacted, there would be increased risk of additional demand on 
an already overloaded social welfare budget. For this reason, as far as the Office of Budget 
was concerned, the existing Livelihood Protection Act should be maintained. Yet, those who 
supported its introduction argued that difficulties of financing could be resolved in two ways: 
first, by improving the leaky bucket effect of management (Atkinson, 1991); and by 
adjusting the emergency measures of the economic crisis in the form of public workfare 
programmes and training programmes for the unemployed (Kim, Hong-Shin, 1999: 23). 
This National Basic Livelihood Security Act was composed of several progressive and 
groundbreaking elements. Because of these elements, it would be possible to declare: first, 
the separation from previously imitated Japanese systems; and second, the introduction of 
welfare as a right (Kim, Yeon-Myung, 1998,1999). Compared to the previous 
stigma-attached relief provision, benefits are provided as social rights under the new Act. 
Also, terminologies used in the new Act differ from those in the previous Act. The term 
`protection' has changed to `security' for example. Housing benefit has been introduced and 
the welfare workers' position in the administration unit has been absorbed into the 
mainstream ladder of public services. This means that they now have prospects for 
promotion. In addition, the increase in the number has also been promised up to the level of 
7,200 nationwide (MoHW, 2000b: 152). An administrative official in the Livelihood 
Protection Division of the Ministry of Health and Welfare who has participated in the design 
of the temporary livelihood protection scheme said that: 
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`The long lasting concern with this consistent demand for them to be located in the 
mainstream classification was possible because the issue has been taken into consideration 
with the support of the grand reform. It could have not been possible otherwise as the past 
experience for more than 10 years shows' (Interview with Lee, Hyung-Hun on 12 June 
2000, York, England)2. 
The new Act requires the government to specify and announce the ways in which the 
minimum living cost is determined. To this end, the Central Committee for Livelihood 
Security in the Ministry of Health and Welfare is now given a role to play in consulting and 
making this decision which will later be confirmed and announced by the Minister of Health 
and Welfare. Further, the Act dismissed the existing categorisation of benefit recipients that 
had been based on earning ability. Integrating beneficiaries into the same categories means 
that all of those receiving public assistance are entitled to livelihood (income) support. This 
had previously been paid only to those unable to work. In other words, livelihood support 
used to be unavailable to households including at least one person aged between 18 and 64. 
Those aged between 18 and 64 had automatically been considered to be able to work. In this 
tradition, it did not matter if the household's incomes were less than the minimum cost of 
living (MoHW, 2000b: 154). By the abolition of this demographic criterion that the person 
was deemed capable of working, however, they are now eligible for payments equivalent to 
the difference between their real income and the minimum cost of living3. In short, the 
overarching social demands of the time were reflected by this reform that was a step forward 
in institutionalising the principle of universality within public assistance. 
2 
At the outset, he said further, this integration had been opposed by the Ministry of Government 
Administration and Home Affairs (MoGAHA) for two reasons. First, there was an equity reason 
because they had entered this employment through an exceptional route. Second, there had been 
emerging trends of `the small but effective government' before the economic crisis. Thus, integrating 
welfare officials in the administration unit to a mainstream ladder would be a self-contradictory course 
of action for the government. In other words, the integration would inevitably result in an increase in 
the total number of officials in local authorities (governments). Hence, the integration would be likely 
to raise equity issues between those who become integrated and those not. But also would this raise 
difficulties for the overall management of all office bearers. To an extent, these problems are a result 
of the overall administrative structure. The work of welfare officials has been instructed by the 
MoHW, while the management of those personnel has been under the MoGAHA (Lee, Hyung-Hun, 
An Administrative Official in the MoHW. Interviewed on 12 June 2000, York, England). 
3 
In fact, this has been another critical point that the Ministry of Planning and Budget presented. The 
reason was simple. Integration could reduce work incentives for those able to work. It could also 
generate an excessive demand from the general public. And once the level of welfares was set up at 
a high level, it is less likely to be feasible to bring it down. 
l:, l 
In sum, originated and initiated by civic groups, the original motives of the Act were neither 
in response to legitimacy-deficit nor to capital accumulation. By integrating the beneficiaries 
categorisation, the Act responded to the criticism that the existing programme was no longer 
able to play a role as a social safety net in dealing with the newly emerging group of those in 
poverty: the unemployed. A senior member (Park, Soon-Chul) of the Committee for Social 
Welfare in the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy argued that `by reforming the 
existing Public Livelihood Protection Act, the Bill aims to promote the state's active concern 
towards the issue of poverty. Public assistance has been in operation on the basis of residual 
welfare only for those in low income' (HDN-b, 15 January 1999; interview also undertaken 
on 8 September 2000, Seoul). 
Despite all these positive elements, there appeared a number of features that were sensitive 
to political pressures. The media expressed a great deal of doubt about its initial intention by 
criticising the timing of its announcement. In fact, the government announced a set of 
welfare programmes4 right ahead of the general election on 13 April 2000. This controversy 
was substantiated by the fact that none of the government's policy proposals dealt with 
appropriate explanations on methods of financing and of implementation. For example, the 
MoHW announced that the National Basic Livelihood Security Programme would be 
launched from 1 October 2000. Fifteen days later, the MoPB presented the budget reduction 
for livelihood protection of 2000. The rationale behind it was based on the assumption that 
the national economy would grow in general and the number of beneficiaries under the 
temporary livelihood protection scheme would decrease by half. That is, those under the 
temporary livelihood protection scheme (760,000 in 1999) out of the total number of those 
under public assistance (1,919,000 as 4.2 per cent of total population) would be reduced by 
half (380,000). Therefore, the total 1,539,000 would be selected under the new programme 
(HDN-b, 2 September 1999; see also Table 4.2). 
4 
For example, the expansion of the unemployment benefit up to one year and a doubling of the number 
of beneficiaries. the government's promise to hold itself responsible for the loan guarantee for a great 
man\- households in the agricultural and fishery sectors; and the National Basic Livelihood Security 
Programme right after the Presidential Address on 15 August 1999. 
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Table 4.2 Social Security and Social Welfare Budget, 1980-2000 
(Unit: hundred million won, current prices, per cent) 
ABCD B-A C-A D=A 
1980 64,670 1,730 - - 2.7 - - 
1985 125,320 3,970 1,480 - 3.2 1.2 - 
1986 138,010 4,560 1,740 - 3.3 1.3 - 
1987 160,600 5,800 2,340 - 3.6 1.5 - 
1988 184,290 8,200 3,130 - 4.4 1.7 - 
1989 220,470 11,430 3,800 - 5.2 1.7 - 
1990 274,560 14,870 3,860 11,520 5.4 1.4 4.20 
1991 313,800 19,960 4,380 14,630 6.4 1.4 4.66 
1992 335,020 24,190 4,630 15,460 7.2 1.4 4.65 
1993 380,500 24,150 4,880 16,550 6.3 1.3 4.35 
1994 432,500 26,140 5,390 17,720 6.0 1.2 4.10 
1995 518,810 29,250 5,740 19,840 5.6 1.1 3.82 
1996 588,228 35,279 7,130 23,710 6.1 1.2 2.94 
1997 675,786 42,071 9,268 28,510 6.2 1.4 4.22 
1998 755,829 45,761 11,210 31,130 6.1 1.5 4.12 
1999 836,851 61,051 19,427 41,610 7.3 2.3 4.97 
2000 887,363 80,737 24,090 53,100 9.1 2.7 5.98 
Notes: (A) Government Budget (general account); (B) Social Security; (C) Public Assistance; (D) Social 
Welfare Budget allocated to the Ministry of Health and Welfare; (B. A) Social Security as % of Government 
Budget; (C=A) Public Assistance as % of Government Budget; (D=A) Social Welfare Budget allocated to the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare as % of Government Budget. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table, data adopted and calculated from MoHW (1998a: 362-365,1999b: 364-367, 
2000a: 362-363); MoPB (1999). 
As Table 4.2 illustrates, public assistance as a percentage of the government budget 
increased not as dramatically as it should have from 1999 to 2000. Compared to a great leap 
forward in social security as percentage of government budget, public assistance increased 
by an even smaller margin than the previous year. A somewhat dramatic increase in the 
public assistance budget from 1998 to 2000 resulted in part from the necessity in financing 
a newly introduced temporary livelihood protection scheme. Not a serious budgetary concern 
was made in 1999 for the preparation of implementing the NBLSP. In fact, the MoPB (1999) 
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produced the Inquiry Report for Budget 2000. It shows that the actual government budget for 
the new scheme in 2000 was reduced by 9 per cent than first agreed and planned. Compared 
to the amount of budget required by the MoHW (2,263,177,000 won), the actual budget 
announced by the MoPB was only 1,767,690,000 won. 
Overall, although those in need are to benefit from the programme regardless of their age or 
ability to work, benefits are conditional upon the activities for those who continue to seek or 
train for jobs. In late 1998, there was a certain degree of hesitation for the National Assembly 
to pass the bill into act at the request of the Kim Dae-Jung Administration. This was largely 
because of the budgetary concerns. As there is little doubt that public assistance reform is an 
attempt to reflect the government's policy orientation of `productive welfare', the workfare 
principle is deeply embodied in it (see Chapter 5). In other words, productive welfare owes 
its core meaning to avoiding `welfare dependency'. This has long been one of the 
predominant values of Korean social policy development. For this reason, whether the 
programme functions as an effective social safety net remains yet to be seen. The chairman 
of the Joint Policy Board for the National Basic Livelihood Security Act within the People's 
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, who has been actively involved in the process of the 
public assistance reform bill, has expressed his worries that. 
`[The most difficult problem when the Act comes into effect] is how to construct the 
infrastructure for those able to work. How many benefit recipients will fall under the 
conditions of job seeking activities clearly remains of great significance' (Interview with 
Moon, Jin-Young, 11 July 2000, Seoul). 
This public assistance reform should be seen as an attempt to break the traditional 
less-eligibility rule and to solidify the foundation of the middle class. Indeed, the idea of 
reforming the social safety net originated from the inconsistent foundation of the middle 
class which may have generated the significant gap in terms of polarisation in society (see 
Baldwin, 1990; Gould, 1982). On 21 June 1998, when the decision on its enactment was 
finalised by the President, he stressed the centrality of the middle class in the rebuilding of 
the nation (Kim, Dae-Jung, 1998). It was repeated three days after its enactment, when 
President Kim Dae-Jung gave a speech to the public, saying that: 
`The great majority of the people will join the middle class. To nurture the middle class and 
enhance the living standards of the masses, I will actively seek to implement productive social 
welfare policies built around the principle of human development' (President Kim, Dae-Jung 
(1999b), Presidential Address on the 54`h Annie ersary of . National Liberation, 15 August 1999). 
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In sum, there were a great many actors involved in the process including the president's 
decision, the IMF's policy packages, interest groups' and citizens' groups' active 
involvement, and the roles of the executives and the National Assembly. Shin (2000c) has 
argued that social security reforms during the financial crisis resulted from domestic 
institutional changes rather than exogenous influences. It was domestic institutional changes 
that constrained the policy options of the government. Yet these institutional changes should 
be seen as a consequence of a breakthrough in coordination impact between 
decision-makers, growing social demands, and the point of crisis. The ideas about what is 
good for society have been reproduced as a result of the increasingly positive coordination 
between the state and other agencies (see Giddens. 1998: 128). The ways in which such ideas 
are institutionalised into each social programme is the subject to which now we turn. 
4.3 Public (Social) Assistance: Old Legacies and their Continuity 
First enacted in 1961, the Public Livelihood Protection Act provided a legal basis of the 
Public Livelihood Protection Programme. Under this public assistance programme, those on 
low-income have been given means-tested benefits since 1965. This programme, however, is 
now a defunct programme being replaced by the National Basic Livelihood Security 
Programme (NBLSP) from 1 October 2000. Nonetheless, old legacies and the underlying 
principles of public assistance have been carried over into the new scheme despite the 
progressive elements within the ne«w scheme identified earlier. And its critical position as 
one of the central pillars of social security remains unchanged. This section critically 
examines the thirty-five year old public assistance programme that had played a role as a last 
resort for those in need. 
Under the old public assistance programme, the recipients were awarded benefits by a strict 
eligibility rule and the level of benefit was decided annually when financial standing and 
average income were taken into account. The eligibility criteria were based on the two-tiered 
standard: (1) the per capita income of a family: and (2) the value of household property. This 
two-tired standard had been on the basis of the minimum cost of living being defined as `the 
minimum expense required to maintain a person's health and cultural life announced by the 
Minister of Health and Welfare' (Public Livelihood Protection Act, Clause 5, Art. 2, 
amended on 22 August 1997). In accordance with the change in consumer prices, this 
minimum cost of living has been calculated annually and is also interchangeably used with 
the poverty line. 
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According to the Public Livelihood Protection Act (especially, Article 3), those who had no 
one under obligation to support them were eligible for benefits'. Based on the criteria, four 
different categories of benefit recipients used to apply to the programme according to earning 
ability. This earning ability principle basically determined the types of benefit, the level of 
assistance, and the degree of living standard. The first category (domiciliary protection) 
consisted of those who lived in their own homes but resided there under the aforementioned 
criteria. The second category (institutional protection) comprised those who were under 
protection of public (social welfare) residential institutions because of old age, mental 
disability, or homelessness. A clear distinction was made between these two categories and 
the third. Those in the first and second categories had no earning ability, while those who had 
earning ability (i. e. those who were able to work) but lived in poverty belong to the third 
category (self-reliance protection). The fourth category (health assistance) was legally 
derived from the Medical Protection Act but its implementation was under the provision of 
the Public Assistance Programme. Health assistance covered those who needed health care 
but could not afford to pay health insurance contributions, and were thereby excluded from 
the National Health Insurance Programme. 
This fourth category (Health Assistance Scheme) was also divided into two subcategories. 
Class I applied to those under domiciliary protection and institutional protection6. Class II 
included those under self-reliance protection (Appendix 6). In 1998, for those under Class I, 
services were provided free of charge at the point of delivery. In comparison, those under 
Class II should pay 1,500 won per out-patient treatment in primary medical institutions and 
20 per cent of total cost when hospitalisation (in-patients treatment) was required. If the 
individual's allotment exceeded 10,000 won, the government would lend the rest. This could 
be redeemed on an instalment basis between the first and the third year with no interest. The 
In case there had been anyone under obligation to support potential beneficiaries but their earning 
ability was too limited to maintain them, potential beneficiaries became eligible for benefits. These 
criteria specifically included those over 65 with no earning ability, due largely to the infirmity of old 
age: those under 18; expectant mothers; those unable to work because of disease or mental and/or 
physical disability; and those in need who were qualified to receive assistance under the Public 
livelihood Protection Act. 
For example. persons in nursing facilities; the victims of disasters whose income and the value of 
housel old property were below a threshold according to the Victim Salvation Act; persons of national 
merit; those considered to be cultural assets; defectors from North Korea; and those infected with 
\ cn real disease. 
156 
White Paper of Health and Welfare clarifies that this strategy aimed to avoid `welfare 
dependency' and to promote the individual's will to support himself (MoHW, 1998b: 
444-445)'. 
As Figure 4.3 and Appendix 6 show, the percentage of those on public assistance (excluding 
those under health assistance) was 5.4 per cent of total population in 1981 but increased 
dramatically to 8.7 per cent by 1982. The reason for this was the integration of the third 
category under health assistance into public assistance. Figure 4.3 illustrates that there was 
no increase in the number of those on the Public Livelihood Protection Programme while 
there was a notable increase in the number of those on the Health Assistance Scheme after 
the economic crisis. This is precisely because the figure does not include those on the 
temporary livelihood protection scheme. If included, the figure goes up to 3.72 per cent 
which is much higher than 2.71 per cent (see Appendix 6). 
Figure 4.3 Percentage of benefit recipients under the PAP to total population 
Sources: MoHSA (1960,1964,1968,1990); MoHW (1996,1999b, 2000a, 2000b) 
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This temporary livelihood protection had been in operation between April 1998 and 
September 2000. It was created as an emergency measure to assist those who were no longer 
able to maintain their living standard due largely to a job loss, a loss of their means of living, 
7 
The Health Assistance Scheme was reformed on 24 May 2001 and its implementation was embarked 
upon 1 October 2001. The reform was made by the Medical Benefit Act (Law no. 6474). But it still 
maintained a two-tiered structure with those unable to work (aged between 18 and 60) belonging to 
Class I. The rest of those tinder the National Basic Livelihood Security Act belong to Class II (the 
Medical Benefit Act, Art. 3 and Art. 13). 
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or a dramatic reduction of income as a result of the economic crisis of November 1997. The 
temporary livelihood protection was divided into two subcategories: livelihood protection 
(Class I), and self-reliance protection (Class I1). This categorisation comprises rather 
different properties from the previous one. Further, its underlying principles have been 
absorbed into the NBLSP since 1 October 2000. First, the concept of breadwinner is not 
taken into account when eligibility is considered, whilst the existence of the breadwinner 
who is able to work makes applicants unlikely to be eligible for benefit. That is, if a 
breadwinner does not live in the same residence, potential beneficiaries are considered not to 
be supported by those who are obliged to maintain their living standard. Second, even in the 
case of home owners, if their house is only used for residence and they have suffered a loss 
of income in order to maintain their living, they are eligible to the scheme (MoHW, 1999c). 
In short, as an emergency measure, the temporary livelihood protection scheme was due to 
be ended when the NBLSP started to take full effect. Welfare professionals have however 
become worried that the possibilities of disturbance from those due to be removed from the 
scheme are more likely since they would lose this additional source of income (A Welfare 
Official in the Smallest Unit of Local Administration. Interviewed on 17 September 2000, 
Seoul). 
In addition to this structure of public assistance, the Public Assistance Programme 
encompasses important features of human development strategy. In other words, both 
education and job-training mechanisms are embodied in it. First, educational support has 
been in operation since 1979. It first provided the school fees of children in secondary 
schools (middle schools) for families on public assistance. Then, the coverage expanded to 
children from families under the first and second categories as well as those under the third 
category living in a subdivision (-myeon) of a county (-gun) or smaller areas up to the first 
year of the vocational high school level in 1987. Before 1997, educational support covered 
all children from families under public assistance studying in secondary schools and 
vocational high schools. From 1997, educational support began to cover the school fees of 
children under public assistance in secondary schools, vocational high schools, and high 
schools for higher education (MoHW, 2000b: 156-158). 
Second, those who join the job training: programmes are entitled to training payments, family 
allowances, and transportation payment. Under the guidance of the MoL since 1993, those 
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registered at public job training centres and those who live in their halls of residence are 
entitled to food support during the training period. Training preparation grants and 
employment preparation grants are also provided for the pre- and post- training period. 
Employment Support Allowance as a one-off cash benefit is also available to those recei ing 
training; or who have found a job related to the training within 6 months after training, and 
have worked on the job over 3 months; or who have become certified as at least a 
second-level technician (MoL, 1997a). Table 4.3 summarises the types of benefits provided 
by public assistance in 1999. 
Table 4.3 Types of Benefits provided by the Public Assistance Programme, 1999 
Types of Benefits No. of persons (thousands) 
1'` category (domiciliary) 
funeral payment 
Livelihood (income) support, 
medical support, self-support 
aid (vocational training, 
self-reliance grants, and 
self-reliance aid centre), 
educational support for 
children, maternity payment, 
°d category (institutional) Same as the 1 category 
3rd category (self-reliance) Educational support for 
children, medical support, 
self-support aid 
4th category (health Medical support (depending 
assistance) on Class, types of benefits 
could be either identical to the 
Ist and 2'd categories or to the 
3rd category) 
331 
78 
766 
Class I: 596 
Class II: 798 
5`h category (temporary Livelihood (income) support. Is` subcategory (livelihood 
livelihood protection) educational support for protection under temporary 
children, medical support, livelihood protection): 190 
self-support aid 2°d subcategory (self-reliance 
under temporary livelihood 
protection): 380 
Note: Data on the number of persons under the 4`h category are based on 1998 figures. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table from Mot IW'F' (1998b, 1999a); Park. Chanvoung and Kim, Meesook 
(1 )1)ý: (, 5_7G). 
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As Table 4.4 elucidates, the job training programme subsequently experienced a steady 
increase in the number of participants until 1993. However both the employment rate and the 
number of participants began to decrease. This was mainly because public job training 
programmes organised by a number of different ministries became integrated into the 
jurisdiction of the MoL after 1993 (Presidential Decree no. 13823). The integration resulted 
from increasing criticisms that the programme had been managed in an irregular manner 
which had resulted in ineffectiveness of both budget operation and individual programmes 
themselves (MoHW, 2000b: 159). 
Table 4.4 Number of Participants in Job Training programmes, 1981-1996 
Number starting 
course 
Number completing 
course 
Number subsequently 
employed (%) 
1981 3,466 2,918 2,591 (88) 
1982 4,626 4,145 3,372 (86) 
1983 5,011 4,413 3,800 (86) 
1984 5,095 4,583 3,715 (81) 
1985 5,675 4,881 3,828 (78) 
1986 6,492 5,583 4,236 (76) 
1987 9,034 6,346 5,163 (81) 
1988 10,413 9,849 8,113 (82) 
1989 16,628 12,672 9,730 (77) 
1990 16,362 15,813 11,389 (72) 
1991 14,794 11,231 7,436 (66) 
1992 19,530 12,327 5,901 (48) 
1993 22,401 15,331 7,961 (52) 
1994 9,089 6,251 3,171 (51) 
1995 4,871 3,391 1,709 (50) 
1996 3,500 2,224 1,182(53) 
Note: Employment rate = number in employment = the number of those completing the course. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table, data adopted and calculated from NIoHSA (1990: 192); MoHW (1998b: 302 
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In principle terms, this overarching structure of public assistance itself appears to encompass 
all of those in poverty. However, further to the low level of government budget both as a 
proportion of social security spending and of total government expenditure in general (see 
Table 4.2), there have been serious administrative difficulties in implementing the 
programme. For example, there are two stages to the application process: (1) the potential 
recipients have to apply proactively; and then (2) their claim is officially verified. The 
eligibility of those who make a claim is initially ratified by the officials in the smallest unit 
of local administration. Alternatively, however, potential recipients can be reached by 
welfare professionals in the smallest unit of local administration in cooperation with those in 
community centres. This out-reach service sometimes brings in community members to 
identify potential recipients in their neighbourhood. In other words, informal contacts in the 
process of new recipients' selection at the local level are officially recognised as an 
important procedure. Partly because of this, there exists constant friction between those who 
have to reject the application and those who wish to pass it through. 
This two-stage process is designed to prevent two types of errors in the claiming process. On 
the one hand, the first type of error may occur: `errors of harshness' (i. e. false negatives or 
Type I errors, Goodin, 1985a: 141-142; Rossi and Freeman, 1985: 196). This is where those 
eligible are not awarded benefits. There maybe many reasons for this type of error. It occurs 
perhaps because of the problem of `incomplete take-up' or because of an incorrect rejection 
of the application, or because of `administrative error' or of an `inability of the applicant to 
provide the necessary documentation' (Atkinson, 1991: 16). On the other hand, when the 
administrative process fails to identify the application of those not eligible, `errors of 
generosity' occurs. This is where those not eligible are awarded benefits (i. e. false positives 
or Type II errors, Goodin, 1985a: 141-142; Atkinson, 1991: 16). Informal contact at the local 
level, a welfare official in the smallest unit of local administration clearly points out, 
sometimes enables those not eligible to be awarded benefits through their personal ties with 
those in high ranking posts in the local administration unit (Interviewed on 17 September 
2000, Seoul). 
As Atkinson (1991: 16-17) argues, these two types of errors are more likely to reduce both the 
efficiency and effectiveness in the administration of the safety net. Nonetheless, there has 
been no substantial research carried out on the take-up or the non-take-up rate of social 
security bent: tits in Korea, compared to Britain where it has been relatively well researched 
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(van Oorschot, 1991,1995: van Oorschot and Schell, 1991). Nor have there been substantial 
studies on the actual situation of benefit fraud in Korea. Perhaps only reference to the level 
of benefit fraud is available from the KDI survey (Koh, I1-Dong, 1990: 332). which identifies 
that the percentage of those not entitled, yet receiving public assistance benefits in 1989 Evas 
almost 50. Compared to the 80 per cent Income Support take-up rate in 1991 in Britain 
(Eardley et al., 1996b: 408), it is difficult to expect that the public assistance take-up rate 
would be higher than the case of Britain. Perhaps the only available source to this end is the 
Analysis of Livelihood Protection Recipients that the MoHW (1991-1998) has annually 
published. This analysis includes both the actual number of recipients and the allocated 
number of those who might be entitled to protection. By comparing the number of those 
actually receiving benefits and that being allocated, Table 4.5 shows the case-load measure 
of take-up which compares `the number of benefit recipients, averaged over the year, with 
the number who would be receiving if everybody took up their entitlement' (Corden, 1999a: 
136). 
Table 4.5 The Number of Livelihood Protection Recipients, 1991-1998 
Allocated number (A) Actual number receiving benefits (B) Ratio 
1st 2nd 3rd 1ST 2nd 3 rd (B-- A)' 
338,168 81,556 1,826,421 330,909 75,082 1,709,678 94.19 
1991 (180,284) (475,892) (178,055) (447,985) (95.41) 
1992 338,168 83,279 1,755,000 319,902 77,835 1,489,811 86.73 
(183,232) (475,578) (176,572) (409,250) (88.92) 
1993 338,168 82,875 1,580,000 304,622 77,843 1,319,746 85.07 
(183,232) (428,020) (173,737) (385,767) (91.53) 
1994 320,414 81,448 1,501,000 287,676 76,344 1,117,287 77.85 
(179,647) (406,619) (170,557) (353,860) (89.45) 
1995 307,401 77,671 1,369,832 287,439 77,671 953,242 75.12 
(180,708) (420,275) (175,678) (319,426) (82.38) 
1996 295,767 76,001 1,134,242 285,185 76,001 798,020 76.97 
(183,447) (338,292) (179,484) (285,140) (89.05) 
1997 296,988 76,769 1,039,908 290,762 76,343 680,757 74.11 
(188,623) (299,782) (186,627) (257,364) (90.91) 
1998 300,902 76,205 798,020 295.939 71,740 610,929 83.27 
(194,880) (' 11,382) (193,669) (241,557) (83.27) 
Note: 1. The ratio of total number of beneficiaries (case-load take-up), i. e. the number of beneficiaries in the i 
2+ 3d categories. figures in parentheses refer to the number of households. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table, data adopted and calculated from %loIl\V (1991-1998). 
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Despite this relatively high case-load take-up rate, the number of livelihood protection 
recipients was allocated based on the annual budget announced even before the actual survey 
of potential recipients being carried out until public assistance was reformed. For example, 
the annual budget for public assistance 1996 was announced on 4 September 1995. The 
announcement was even before the livelihood survey was undertaken by welfare officials 
which usually takes place throughout September every year. Obviously, therefore, regardless 
of the actual survey of the number of those in need, the number of beneficiaries cannot 
exceed the allocated number of those under the scheme. Two possible interpretations could 
be made. First, because of the substantial gap between two sets of figures, the government 
may have left enough space for the possibility of the potential increase of real number of 
beneficiaries. Second, the number of poor can be manipulated by the government by 
adjusting the total allocated number of beneficiaries. 
Given all this, two potential tasks have to be resolved based on both effectiveness and 
efficiency terms under the new scheme (see Eardley et al., 1996a: Ch. 4; Corden, 1999a). To 
begin with, possible benefit fraud might have to become a central concern in its 
implementation for two reasons. First, the scope of means-testing has widened up to those 
who have initial responsibilities for primary beneficiaries. Second, a systemic infrastructure 
for encouraging take-up by those who are entitled to benefits has not yet been fully 
established. A welfare official commented that there have been a number of cases where 
some had transferred their assets to those who were not considered to be responsible for their 
living standard. This should be traced and prohibit them from benefiting from the system. 
But this was very difficult to pinpoint (A Welfare Official in the Smallest Unit of Local 
Administration. Interviewed on 17 September 2000, Seoul). 
Furthermore, a speculation can possibly be made by drawing on the four provisional 
anti-benefit fraud strategies. First, the government may decide to reduce the overall level of 
benefit as low as possible. Second, heavy punishment might be introduced such as the case 
of Switzerland, based upon retrospective means-testing strategies. Third, the possibility of 
benefit fraud could simply be ignored based on collective assumptions evidenced in 
Denmark. Finally, a benefit fraud squad could be established to disclose fraudulent claims 
such . as the case of Britain (sec Ditch et al., 1997). 
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In sum, Veit-Wilson (1999: 80) argues that the realm of political ideologies may explain the 
underlying rationale for the setting of priorities. In other words, the view that interprets social 
policy as subordinate to economic policy generates the belief that social assistance should 
not exceed its minimum function of subsistence. The concept of adequacy is highly 
vulnerable to a political consideration of feasibility and cost. For this reason, the official 
poverty line, set up by the government, is more likely to be based on political decisions rather 
than scientific measures of the minimum incomes (Veit-Wilson, 1998: 8,1999: 82; for further 
detailed discussion, see Chapter 5). In principle terms, those who fall below the public 
assistance scale are officially designated as poor. The public assistance scale was determined 
by the Central Committee for Livelihood Protection under the livelihood protection division 
within the MoHW (Public Livelihood Protection Act, Clause2, Art. 5). Perhaps as an 
equivalent to the `Income Support level' in Britain, it provides only the `state's poverty 
standard'. In Korea, however, there had been no published data on how it was measured. 
Given this, one of the major disadvantages remains the lack of `public discussion of what 
implies in terms of contemporary patterns of expenditure and styles of living' (Wedderburn, 
1974: 4). By expanding the boundaries of those in poverty (i. e. broadening the concept of 
poverty), universality within public assistance can be achieved. The ways in which this 
principle of universality is institutionalised within social insurance are the subject of the next 
section. 
4.4 Social Insurance: Universality and Solidarity 
There is a critical distinction between Bismarckian and Beveridgean models of social 
insurance. In the Bismarckian insurance scheme, benefit entitlement and benefit levels are 
closely linked to individual contributions. In the Beveridgean insurance scheme, subsistence 
benefits are available to all in return for flat-rate benefits on a `pay-as-you-go' basis from the 
start (Alcock, 1999: 55). A more conceptually bound explanation has been given by Baldwin 
(1994) that the Beveridgean conception of social insurance formulates an ideology of 
collectivist social insurance. The potentially solidaristic impulse behind this is given life 
with the universalisation of risk-sharing and the equalisation of risk-pooling. On the other 
hand, the expansion of the risk pool from being limited to particular classes to embracing all 
citizens is relatively marginalised in Bonapartist ambitions pursued by Bismarck with his 
welfare legislation. the achievement of which had been only partially solidaristic (Baldwin, 
19')4: 41- 45). In Korea, social insurance programmes have been modelled in part on the kind 
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of insurance protection developed in Germany in order to provide security against a set of 
contingencies such as industrial injuries (industrial accident insurance. 1964), disease 
(national health insurance, 1977), old age (national pension insurance, 1988) and job loss 
(employment insurance, 1995). 
4.4.1 Protecting Workers? : The Industrial Accident Insurance Programme 
Industrial accident insurance was one of the earliest social insurance programmes introduced 
in most OECD countries during the period of the birth of the welfare state (1880-1914). 
Introduced in 1871, Germany takes a position as an innovator of the programme (Pierson, 
1991: 107-109). Industrial accident insurance was not only the first compulsory welfare 
programme introduced in Korea but also the only insurance programme financed solely by 
contributions from employers (see Chapter 2). The programme is administered by the 
semi-public carrier to which all employers subject to the programme should pay 
contributions, and which in turn pays the benefits when due (Park, Chong-Kee, 1975: 36). 
Until the Labour Standard Act was enacted in 1953, compensation for industrial accidents 
had been resolved either by the civil law as an illegal activity if the employers had been 
responsible for the accident or by a collective agreement based on the individual unit of 
workplaces. Although the Labour Standard Act introduced the principle of an employer's 
liability, its effectiveness had been almost negligible. Neither was compulsory nor 
administrative power strong enough to provide industrial accident compensation. Industrial 
accident insurance was introduced into legislation on 5 November 1963 and brought the 
employer's liability to life in the form of a compulsory insurance guaranteed by the state (see 
Chapter 2). The programme at the beginning only covered workplaces with 500 employees 
and more, but the coverage has gradually expanded, while the rate of industrial accidents has 
gradually decreased (Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4 Coverage of the IAIP and Industrial Accident Rate (1964-1999) 
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of employed persons j(5) --(I)) x 100; ** number of victims divided by number of workers covered by the 
Industrial Accident Programme { (7)-(5))x 100; *** number of workers covered by the Programme divided by 
total number of employees. 
Sources: Appendix 7; NSO (1998b: 98,2000c: 182). 
Since 1992, industrial accident insurance has been compulsory for almost all types of 
businesses and entire workplaces8. The coverage rate of industrial accident insurance in 1997 
was 39.03 per cent. This means that the Industrial Insurance Accident Programme covered 
less than 40 per cent of total employed persons. However, the coverage rate goes up to 62.28 
per cent in the same year if the rate is calculated by the number of workers covered by the 
programme divided by the total number of employees instead of the total employed persons. 
The former method has been widely accepted as the standard measure of industrial insurance 
coverage. However, as the Labour White Paper (MoL, 1999a) clarifies, industrial accident 
insurance in Korea has operated by `accidents due to occupational cases' which refer to `a 
series of activities where labourers work under labour relations built up by the labour 
contract'. For this reasons, the latter method may also make sense to a certain extent. The 
distinction between `employees' and `employed persons' is determined by the period of 
S 
Except workplaces with less than 5 employees; construction work which amounts to less than 
40,000,000 won; and seasonal industries with less than 1,350 annual employees. Since July 2000 
those in workplaces with more than one person have been covered by industrial accident insurance. 
These exceptional cases have been made according to the rate of accident, scale of industry and place 
of work and remain outside the principle of compulsory participation. However, if industrial accidents 
occur under the circumstances where participation is compulsorily required, and is not, the employers 
will he given penalties to pay 50 per cent of the insurance benefit (MoL, 1999a). 
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employment contract. Thus, `employees' includes both those employed more than 1 year 
(ordinary) and those more than 1 month but less than 1 year (temporary). On the other hand. 
`employed persons' includes those employed less than 1 month and workers paid on daily 
basis without any permanent (fixed) establishments in addition to the category of 
`employees' (NSO, 1998a: 582). Obviously, the total number of `employed persons' always 
exceeds the total number of `employees' (see Appendix 7). 
The Industrial Accident Insurance Programme provides two types of benefits classified 
broadly into cash benefits and medical care benefits. Medical care benefits are provided in 
kind such as medical treatment at a designated medical institution (3,144 in 1998 
nationwide, MoL, 1999a). Cash benefits are also provided for those in temporary sickness 
and in disability. For those who require either medical care or hospitalisation full medical 
costs are provided until complete recovery unless the injury or illness is diagnosed to be 
treated within 3 days wherein employers provide industrial compensation under the Labour 
Standard Act. In addition to the medical costs, an employer provides cash benefits for the 
suspension of work equal to 60 per cent of the average wages during the period of medical 
treatment (Labour Standard Act, Article 82). 
If the industrial accident causes a permanent disability of a worker after having been given 
all available medical treatment, either a lump-sum or an annuity payment for industrial 
accident compensation is provided according to the severity of disability. The severity scales 
the most severe disability as class 1 to the least severe disability as class 14. That is, a person 
with disability resulting from industrial accidents can benefit from either the maximum 
lump-suºn payment equal to 1,474 days' wage to the minimum 55 days' wage, or the 
maximum annuity payment equal to 329 days' average wage to the minimum 138 days' 
average wage. If the annuitant dies without having been fully paid by the sum of annuity (i. e. 
in case one has failed to reach the amount of the lump-sum payment that he or she could have 
been paid if he or she had chose to be paid that way), the balance is paid to the survivors of 
the annuitant in the form of lump-sum payment (MoL, 1999a). The types of benefits and 
their payrnents are summarised in Table 4.6. 
167 
Table 4.6 Industrial Accident Compensation by Benefit Categories (unit: per cent) 
BC' 1964 1973 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
MCB2 40.9 47.0 38.36 44.3 32.2 24.6 25.3 25.5 26.2 28.1 
SLB3 20.6 15.1 17.67 18.5 28.9 31.6 21.2 30.8 27.5 26.5 
DB4 1.6 17.7 29.80 24.7 23.4 26.1 25.7 27.1 30.0 27.0 
SB5 33.7 18.5 12.97 11.1 12.9 14.2 13.2 12.8 11.6 12.4 
F B6 3.2 1.6 1.16 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 
SB 7-0.1 0.04 0.4 1.4 2.3 2.4 2.6 3.6 4.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: 1. Benefit Category; 2. Medical Care Benefits, 3. Sick Leave Benefits; 4. Disability Benefits; 5. Survivor 
Benefits; 6. Funeral Benefits; 7. Special Benefits; Survivors refer to the spouse of the deceased (only in marital 
relations), offspring, grandchildren, parents, grandparents, or siblings. Survivor benefits arc only available to 
those under the support of the worker when s/he died, such as, wife, husband who is aged over 60 or disabled 
(severity level 3 or above), parents, grandparents, those aged under 18 or disabled offspring, and those aged 
under 18 or aged over 60, siblings; funeral benefits are paid to the person who is in charge of the funeral in the 
form of cash equal to 120 days' average wage (MoL, 1999a). 
Sources: Reconstructed Table, data adopted and calculated from Park, Chong-Kee (1975: 36); NSO (1998a: 
316); MoL (1999b); MoL (2000b). 
In sum, there is little doubt that industrial accident insurance has provided an important 
safety net against industrial accidents. The expansion of the coverage and increasing 
generosity of benefit may imply that industrial accident insurance has come to read as such 
that industrial accidents in prescribed contingencies should be compensated without any 
question being raised as to `whether the injury was attributable to fault on the part of 
employer, the employees, or any third party' (ILO, 1984: 44). Yet, `in terms of protection of 
workers', Kwon (1999a: 83) argues, `industrial accident compensation is only a second-best 
solution. The most important form of protection is prevention, and for this reason the 
effectiveness of any industrial accident insurance programme must be considered in tandem 
with efforts to prevent accidents'. In Korea, As Table 4.6 clearly shows, disability benefits 
have taken a relatively high proportion which in turn may imply that the programme has been 
curative but failed to be preventive. 
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4.4.2 Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Equity: The National Health Insurance 
Programme 
In Korea, the origins of national health insurance date back to the Health Insurance Act on 
16 December 1963. Until its actual institutional initiation geared by the Second Health 
Insurance Amendment Act on 22 December 1976, however, only experimental programmes 
were in operation on the basis of voluntary participation. The number of experimental health 
insurance projects increased from one company covering 340 insured people in 1965 to 12 
workplaces insuring 63,455 people in 1977. This voluntary principle is typically seen in 
private insurance which tends to rely on an actuarial basis, while social insurance 
contributions are determined by the level of income. In efficiency terms, therefore, private 
insurance may not be of any help in improving horizontal efficiency (i. e. in assisting all of 
the target group) in favour of vertical efficiency (i. e. in assisting only the target group). 
However, as Atkinson and Hills (1991) argue, this vertical efficiency could not be enhanced 
even by social insurance unless all types of different risk categories participated in the 
project. This was one of the many lessons drawn from the experimental projects (Choi, 
Chun-Song, 1991: 109-129). In short, the application of voluntary principle to social 
insurance may result in a negative-sum game. 
The voluntary principle applied to the experimental projects became more problematic 
because all the participants in the projects were in high-risk categories. They were likely to 
gain more than the low-risk categories partly because their demands for medical services 
were more likely to be higher than those of the low-risk categories. At the same time, the 
contributions from the high-risk categories remained low because of an across-the-board low 
level of income. The occurrence of such `adverse selection' caused significant 
implementation difficulties. In order to solve this problem, there should be an increase in 
tither the level of contributions from those unable to afford the high level of premiums or 
state intervention, providing subsidies. 
All that has been said subsequently led to an amendment of the Act in 1970. The amendment 
way designed to implement the compulsory principle within a specific category of 
population. The Health Insurance Unit of the CSS targeted civil servants and military 
personnel for another set of experimental projects on the basis of the compulsory principle. 
The rationale behind this decision had drawn upon the fact that they had been relatively solid 
169 
for two reasons. First, once they were instructed by the government, other external factors 
such as accidents of private insurance were less likely to affect their behaviour towards social 
insurance. Second, they already had experience from the existing pension programmes for 
civil servants and military personnel. However, these projects caused severe conflicts 
between ministries such that the then Ministry of Government Administration, Ministry of 
National Defence, and Ministry of Health and Social Affairs failed to come to terms with 
jurisdiction and supervision of civil servants and military personnel (Choi, Chun-Song, 
1991: 118-119). 
Despite all the lessons drawn from the experimental period of health insurance (1963-1976), 
national health insurance in Korea was formed by expediency, not by principle. Largely 
learned from the first set of experimental projects, the second amendment of the Act 
combined compulsory and voluntary principles. It maintained the compulsory principle for 
employees and their dependents in large-scale industries with 500 employees and more. But 
at the same time, there remained the voluntary participation from the community and 
workplaces outside the compulsory participation. Thus, the implementation of the Act from 
1 July 1977 was the de facto initiation of national health insurance. This initiation was 
extremely segmented on the basis of eligibility determined by occupational and regional 
categories. From the second set of projects, the programme's operation was set to be based 
on the principle of autonomous management whereby different categories of the insured 
were managed by financially independent health insurance societies. Those employed in 
industrial sectors were categorised as Class I and the rest as Class II. This was again 
subdivided into regional health insurance for regional members and occupational health 
insurance for self-employed9. Only those under Class I were legally bound to be in the 
category of compulsory participation. In short, the risk-pooling function of health insurance 
\vvas undermined by its separate management between different risk categories by three 
health societies. 
In December 1977, the Health Insurance Act for government employees and private school 
teachers was put into legislation. Subsequently, they became compulsory members of the 
9 
The usage of Class I and 11 was abolished by the Sixth Amendment of the Health Insurance Act on 31 
December 1984 which instead used business and regional health insurance. 
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programme after 1 January 1979. A series of pilot projects were initiated in three geographic 
areas from 1 July 1981 and in three additional areas in July 1982. These projects were to 
evaluate the possibilities of compulsory participation involving those under Class II. These 
projects raised a key issue regarding the financing of health insurance which required a 
revision of the original government plan. State intervention only in the administrative cost in 
the form of the government subsidy appeared to be not as effective as it had been expected to 
be since those under Class II were not in favour of paying the full cost of contributions. 
Accordingly, a governmental decision was made to subsidise 50 per cent of the total cost 
including the premiums for those under Class II (Kwon, Soonwon, 1993b: 255-256). 
The programme's coverage had gradually expanded covering workplaces with 5 employees 
and more in 1988. By 1987 almost 69 per cent of total population was covered either under 
health insurance or under health assistance (NHIC, 1990). The rest of the population 
consisted of the self-employed in rural areas and those under regional health insurance for 
regional members. These two groups finally became compulsory members of health 
insurance from 1 January 1988. From 1 July 1989 the self-employed in urban areas became 
part of it. By this expansion, as Figure 4.5 shows, the coverage rate of national health 
insurance began to be virtually 100 per cent of the total population from 1989 (see Appendix 
8). 
Figure 4.5 Coverage of Health Care (1977-1999) 
Unit: per cent 
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Coverage of health care* 
--- Coverage of health insurance 
Coverage of health assistance 
Notes and sources: calculated from Appendix 8; * total coverage of both health insurance and health assistance 
out of the entire population; it should be noted that although the total coverage rate of health insurance and 
assistance had reached 100 per cent by 1989, the actual figures do not exactly match the number of entire 
population because the number of those under health insurance has been estimated on the basis of double 
qualification (KN11C, 1990: 33; Nli1C, 1999: 36,37, NSO, 1999b). 
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In other words, the National Health Insurance Programme has begun to be universal in scope 
since 1989. Yet, it is not free at the point of service delivery except for those under Class I 
category of health assistance. Health insurance only lasts until a patient requires no more 
medical treatment'°. The imposition of the partial payment for medical services to the 
insured was intended to discourage unnecessary utilisation of medical treatment and to 
maintain the financial stability in health insurance. However, whether the programme could 
conform to a social insurance model remained contentious largely because the rate of the 
insured's responsibility for cost sharing was set too high in 1977. For this reason, as Table 
4.7 shows, there has been gradual adjustment in the cost-sharing (co-payment) mechanism 
of the insured. 
Table 4.7 Changes in the Cost-Sharing System, 1977-1997 (%) 
Type 1977 1979 1980 1986 1992 onwards 
50 (50) 65 % (65 %) when Consultation fee + (total fee 
C total medical - consultation fee) x 55=100 
d expenses excee s 
50 (50) 10,000 won; Consultation fee+(total 
D otherwise a flat fee-consultation fee) x 40 
A 40 (50) 30 (30) co-payment is =100 
applied: 2,600 won 30 % of the total fee when 
30 (30) for a visit to a clinic total fee exceeds 12,000won; 
E and 3,000 won for a otherwise 3,200 won as a flat 
visit to a teaching rate fee in 1997 hospital 
B F 30 (40) 20 (20) 20 (20) 20(20) 20 (20) 
Notes: Figures indicate the coinsurance rate, imposed on the insured; A. Outpatient care; B. Hospitalisation 
(Inpatient care); C. General Hospital; D. Hospital; E. Clinics and health centres; F. General Hospital, hospital, 
clinics and health centres. Figures in parenthesis indicate co-insurance rates for dependents. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table from MoHW (1998b: 408); Kwon, Soonwon (1993b: 267). 
Table 4.8 demonstrates a segmented and equally complex structure of national health 
insurance. This complexity, on the one hand, originated from the idea that specific groupings 
(i. e. based on the similar nature of the insured; e. g. types of income, easiness of income-test, 
10 
The length of the health insurance coverage had been only 6 months until 1995,240 days in 1996.270 
days in 1907,330 days in 1999 and 365 days in 2000 (MoL and MoHW, 1999). 
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etc. ) would improve equality issues about contributions and benefits. Thus, individual health 
societies were in separate and different operation (MoHW, 2000b: 440). This segmentation, 
on the other hand, was a partial product of incremental development of health care in Korea 
which had contained an overarching structure of a provider-friendly mechanism. A former 
research officer of the KDI argues that this arrangement of health insurance was by no means 
robust since possible disparities would obviously exist even within the same health insurance 
societies (Interview with Kwon, Soonwon, 31 July 2000). In addition to the lack of overall 
health insurance infrastructure, the administrative expediency to reduce administrative costs 
had been given prior attention to the principles of income redistribution inherent in social 
insurance. In short, inequality had even been precipitated especially on the health care 
system. 
Table 4.8 The Structure of the National Health Insurance Programme in 1997 
Classification Type Premiums; Finance; Methods (1) 
Health Each health society makes autonomous 145 
Insurance for decisions to the extent of 2-8 % of standard 
Industrial monthly wage (earning-related fixed rate 
Employees system); both employers and employees 
N contribute 50 % each; payroll taxes 
H Wage 
I Earners Health 3.8 % of standard monthly wage (3.0% for I 
Insurance for military personnel) (a flat sum system based on 
Government grades); the government and government 
Employees and employees pay 50% of contributions each; 
Private School private school teachers (50%), school board 
Teachers (30%), government (20%); payroll taxes 
Non- Regional Those in rural areas pay 54 % of total 92R 
Wage Health contribution; those in urban areas pay 66 % of u 
Earners Insurance total contribution, the rest of which is 
35 
subsidised by the government 
National Class I Free of charge at the point of service delivery 
Health G't 
Assistance Class 11 1,500 won in the case of outpatient primary 
medical treatment; when hospitalisation is 
required, individuals pay 20 % out of the total 
costs. 
Notes: (1) Number of health societies; R. Rural; U. Urban; * Health Assistance Scheme under public assistance. 
Source: Reconstructed Table from ` ioHW1' (I998b). 
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In order not only to maintain the equal distribution of health resources and to improve 
regional disparities in health care services and facilities but also to reduce the overall health 
care costs, clinics, health centres, and (general) hospitals are designed to compete for patients 
in association with the enforced use of the referral system since 1 July 1989. In other words, 
health care systems in Korea provide consumer choice (MoHW, 1998b, 2000d). However, in 
reality, the insured patients have tended to prefer large scale health institutions such as 
general hospitals since national health insurance's inception in 1977. For example, large 
scale health institutions were preferred by 60.95 per cent of medical professionals and 62.95 
per cent of the insured and the general public. Shin (1978: 142) explains that this was due to 
the relative supremacy of medical facilities and medical professionals. Given this, the 
country was divided into three subdivisions: (1) 138 medium-sized health care regions; (2) 
8 large health care regions; and (3) one nationwide health care region" l (MoHW, 1998b: 
434-435). In the regional health system, all patients should be referred by clinics and health 
centres if medical treatment from a general hospital is necessarily required. If this rule of 
health care delivery is not followed, health insurance stops being applied except for certain 
medical subjects and emergency patients. 
Yet, this proposed solution for regional disparities has generated unexpected externalities. 
The referral system has built up the medical delivery system by clustering health regions, 
thereby contributing to an equal development in different regions. But the actual outcome 
has not been as successful as it could have been because middle class patients or even those 
poor in urban areas tend to use the outpatient services of a hospital for primary care. Only 
those who are poor in rural areas remain as users of primary medical treatment. In other 
words, they are the only users who have followed the enforced mechanism of the referral 
system. 
In addition, consumers could choose either regular medical care provided by general 
practitioners or special care by patient-designated specialists requested by name at an 
The first division provided primary medical treatment. Initially, there were 140 medium-sized health 
care regions in 1989 but current regions were set up according to the changes in administrative 
boundaries in 1994 5. The second division provided secondary medical treatment. The third division 
provided special, 'tertiary medical treatment including 39 university hospitals and large general 
hospitals on I July 1995 and 42 in 1997. 
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additional cost. The initial purpose of this two-tiered service charges system in hospital care 
has been to provide financial leverage to hospitals under the compulsory health insurance 
system. In principle terms, this was to hold costs as low as possible. In fact, however, this has 
been considered to be another concessionary measure taken by the then Ministry of Health 
and Social Affairs in favour of hospitals. In most cases, as Kwon (1993b, 274-276) has 
argued, information on the specialists available to consumers is extremely limited. 
Much that has been discussed relates to the underlying difficulties implementing health 
insurance which in turn led to a set of reforms. In October 1998, the integration took place 
between a health society for government employees and private school teachers, and regional 
health societies for the urban self-employed and residents in rural areas. In January 1999, the 
integration of the two-tiered financing and administrative operation was finally materialised 
into legislation. Since 1 July 2000, therefore, national health insurance has come into effect 
on the basis of employment status. At the same time, the system of delineating pharmacy - 
and doctor - prescribed drugs was also scheduled to come into effect (for detailed discussion, 
see Chapter 5). As Immergut (1992a, 1992b) clearly points out from the cases of European 
countries, these health insurance reforms in Korea also involved self-interested groups' 
activities. The idea of integrating health societies had been opposed by the health insurance 
societies at workplaces arguing that it should remain to maintain their own organisational 
and financial systems. There is little doubt that this opposition undermined the tenets of the 
legislation enacted for this integration but it was also reasonable to claim that the difficulties 
underlying financial instability of the regional societies should not be resolved at the expense 
of others. In other words, the merger was likely to bring the relatively unstable financial 
status of regional health societies into financially stable health insurance societies at 
workplaces. 
Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 show that the rate of expenditure to revenue had substantially 
increased during the economic crisis for government employees and private school teachers, 
as well as industrial workers. From 1998, however, the financial balance for government 
employees and private school teachers began to be recovered. Nonetheless, it should be read 
with a caution that this financial recovery was made by a marked increase in contribution 
rate, representing 88.07 per cent of total revenues in 1999, which had only been 54.43 per 
cent in 1995 (NIoHNN', 2000a, 2000b). 
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Figure 4.6 Rate of Expenditure to Revenue by Year (per cent) 
Expenditure/Revenue; Sources: Mo'HW (2000a); NFMI (1990: 124,1999: 98) 
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Figure 4.7 provides a clearer illustration that the accumulated legal reserve for each category 
under health insurance has not been in a state of equilibrium. One might read from Figure 4.7 
that regional health insurance funds have been more sustainable than those for government 
employees and private school teachers. However, there have been government subsidies for 
industrial workers only for the first eight years ever since national health insurance began to 
take effect, while regional members have benefited from government subsidies for almost 
two decades. For this reason, if the ratio of government subsidies to both categories is taken 
into account, the financial instability in regional health insurance becomes much worse. This 
argument is clearly evidenced by Figure 4.8 which shows the percentage of government 
subsidies to total revenues in each category. Figure 4.9 clearly demonstrates that all these 
difficulties maintaining sustainable health insurance finance have been approached by 
increasing the rate of contributions. In turn, this approach has generated socioeconomic 
disruptions especially from those who have been rather explicitly exposed in financial terms. 
176 
Figure 4.7 Financial Sustainability of National Health insurance (million won) 
Sources: NFMI (1990,1999,1991-1999); NHIC (2000); SoNA (2001) 
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Figure 4.8 Percentage of Government Subsidies to Total Revenues 
Unit: per cent ; Sources: MoHW (2000a); NFMI (1990,1991,1999) 
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Figure 4.9 The Change of Average Annual Contribution Rate 
Unit: per cent; Source: MoHW (2000b: 445) 
4 
3.8 
3.6 
3.4 3.4 
3.29 
3.2 
3f- 
1984 
3.75 
3.57 
3.51 
3.43 
3.29 
3.19 
3.13 3.13 
3.09 3.06 3.05 3.04 3.03 
3.27 
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
The average contribution (premium) rate 
All that has been said seems to acknowledge that there is a certain degree of validity in the 
opposing argument to the system integration. One of the crucial reasons that the regional 
health societies are financially unstable results from the fact that the premiums paid by the 
self-employed are collected on the basis of their incomes. As is well known, this method of 
collection has not been reliable. Therefore, this argument goes further that the integration 
should be postponed at least until improvement was made in the method of detecting the 
self-employed's incomes. Since 1 July 2000, the integration nevertheless has encompassed 
both health societies under the National Health Insurance Corporation. But the financial 
systems of both groups were due to be run separately until January 2002 (Korea Herald, 20 
April 2000). 
In sum, the development of national health insurance in Korea has often been seen as the 
`most striking example' by achieving universal health insurance coverage within about 12 
years (van Ginneken, 1999: 57). It represents the model that services are provided contingent 
upon contributions rather than citizenship rights as is the case under the national health 
service system: if contributions are not collected for more than two months, health insurance 
is no longer valid. Those under health assistance are more likely to experience stigma 
attached to health services. As was the case in most industrialised countries where 
interactions between those directly involved in their own concerns and interests tend to be 
explicitly exposed in shaping health care systems, national health insurance in Korea was 
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also greatly influenced by self-interested groups' activities, However, it ww as political and 
administrative expediency that undermined the effectiveness and efficiency principle. This 
expediency in turn has led to an ad hoc development of national health insurance. This 
incremental nature of health insurance development was in part a response to consistent 
struggles between effectiveness, efficiency and equity issues. In the end, there has been no 
winner, but a lack of coordination between contrasting principles endangered increasing 
instability of the programme. This has in turn imposed a substantial amount of financial 
burden upon the public. 
4.4.3 Inadequate Design or Operational Failure? : The 'National Pension Programme 
Public pension in Korea is a social insurance system in which the pension benefits are 
financed by means of contributions (premiums) imposed equally on the insured persons and 
employers. When the self-employed are included, one third of state subsidies are provided. 
This public pension scheme has consisted of two pillars. Pensions for civil servants (1960) 
constitute the public pension for particular occupational groups (e. g. military personnel in 
1963, and private school teachers in 1975). A national pension covers the rest of the 
population (1988). Implemented from January 1988, a national pension has been one of the 
most controversial welfare programmes in its financing and management. In addition to the 
introduction of minimum wages and the expansion of national health insurance, its 
introduction was one of the big three national welfare policies announced by the then 
President Chun Doo-Hwan on 11 August 1986 (see Chapter 3). The first attempt to introduce 
a national pension in 1973 was proposed by the EPB and its affiliated research institute, the 
KDI. Their intentions were largely drawn from the existing political and economic 
motivations (see Chapter 2). 
Learning from past experience, there had been concerns expressed between the MoHSA and 
the KDI that national pensions should not be recognised as a political instrument to mobilise 
domestic capital (NPC, 1998a: 119). Nonetheless, the deposit on account of national treasury 
for public services and utilities had remained a compulsory requirement for the fund's 
operation. In this situation, there had been enormous risks that the funds would not be 
operated to fulfil this promise. The Director of the Welfare Policy Division in the MoHW 
made plain: 
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`When the national pension programme was designed by the KDI in the late 1980s, the 
major concern was in the accumulated fund of the pension system. The method of its finance 
was based on the funded scheme. Although the funds were expected to be exhausted in the 
2030s, it had been ignored. Since most Western countries began their pension systems based 
upon a funded scheme, moving towards a pay-as-you-go scheme, shifting the method of 
funding had not been a serious problem in a later stage of the programme management. For 
the first year following the implementation of the programme (1988), almost 5,000 billion 
won was expected to be accumulated. The then Fiscal Investment and Financing Special 
Account Act, engaged by the then EPB, allowed the public funds to be driven by the 
government ministries such as the Ministry of Construction and Transportation which used 
lower interest rates than the private investment market... since the abolition of this Act, the 
funds reserved for use by government departments deliver no less than market interest rates. 
The discretionary operation of the funds is no longer allowed perhaps because of the 
increasing public concerns over the funds' (Interview with Lee, Young-Chan, the Director 
of the Welfare Policy Division, Social Welfare Bureau, the MoHW, 24 July 2000, Seoul) 12. 
In principle, the main purpose of pensions is to `prevent poverty in old age and (at least 
partly) to protect the living standards to which pensioners have become accustomed' (Barr, 
1987: 205). The primary group for pensions should therefore be applied to those in great need 
rather than those who are financially stable or those favoured by administrative convenience. 
By expanding its coverage, one might argue that a national pension in Korea may have 
fulfilled this main purpose to an extent. Beginning with a coverage of workplaces with over 
10 employees amongst those of working age of 18 to 60 in 1998, those in workplaces with 
over 5 employees were part of it by January 1992. In July 1995, those in rural areas became 
members of the programme. Since April 1999, virtually all the population have become 
integrated into the system 13 
12 
He continues to point out that it was the president of the KDI, Kim, Man-Jae, who was the key figure 
in the attempt to introduce national pensions in the early 1970s. In 1986 when he became the Minister 
of the EPB, he again made a major contribution to implement the pension system together with the 
head secretary to the president for economy. However, his contribution was influential not simply 
because of his character, but also because of his position. Political decisions were drawn from 
economic capacity and this had remained highly influential compared to what had actually been 
required by the society (NPC, 1998a: 68,111; Lee, Young-Chan, the Director of the Welfare Policy 
Division, Social Welfare Bureau in the MoHW. Interviewed on 24 July 2000, Seoul). 
13 
This includes the self-employed in urban areas, those in workplaces with less than 5 employees, 
temporary and daily workers, and part-time employees. From July 2002, those in workplaces with 
more than 1 employee can be a member of the programme in workplaces category. Those aged below 
27 with no income will be excluded from the programme in regions (CDN, 19 August 2000). 
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As Table 4.9 shows, the rate of pension coverage to the economically active population was 
only 25.6 per cent when it first took off in 1988. In 1999, however, it reached 49.7 per cent 
of the economically active population. This increase was indeed a remarkable expansion but 
at the same time this fast expansion towards the self-employed in rural areas had stimulated 
the radical reform of the programme. In consequence, the new pension formula was 
introduced according to the National Pension Reform Act of 1998 which is shown in Table 
4.10. 
Table 4.9 The Coverage of the National Pension Programme (1988-1999) 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1988 4,432,695 4,431,039 58,583 - 1,370 286 25.6 
1989 4,520,948 4,515,680 62,952 - 4,036 1,232 25.1 
1990 4,651,678 4,640,335 72,511 - 8,274 3,069 25.1 
1991 4,768,536 4,747,605 80,987 - 14,921 6,010 25.0 
1992 5,021,159 4,977,441 120,374 - 32,238 11,480 25.8 
1993 5,159,868 5,108,871 129,703 - 40,452 10,545 26.1 
1994 5,444,818 5,382,729 144,910 - 48,332 13,757 26.8 
1995 7,257,394 5,541,966 152,463 1,650,958 48,710 15,760 34.9 
1996 7,425,700 5,677,631 164,205 1,681,915 50,514 15,640 35.0 
1997 7,356,931 5,600,947 172,759 1,606,542 47,208 102,234 34.1 
1998 6,580,265 4,849,926 160,027 1,583,201 29,024 118,114 30.7 
1999 10,749,322 5,238,149 186,106 5,390,735 32,868 168,570 49.7 
Notes: (1) the total number of participants in the NPP; (2) the total number of participants in workplaces; (3) the 
total number of workplaces in the NPP; (4) number of participants in regions, those aged 18-60 who are not 
members of (2) including the self-employed; (5) number of voluntary participants, those who are not the 
members ot'(2) or (4) such as students or soldiers aged 18-23, or spouse of participants but without income; (6) 
continuously voluntary participants, those aged 60 or more but whose period of contributions is less than 20 
years can stay in the NPP until the ape of 65; (7) percentage of the economically active population. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table from MoHW (1999b, 2000a): NPC (1999,2000a); NSO (2000c: 180). 
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Table 4.10 The National Pension Programme's Pension Formula II 
Basic pension (1) 2.4 x (A + 0.75B) x (1 + 0.05 x N) 
Applied to those who had been insured from 1988 to 1998 
Basic pension (2) 1.8 x (A + B) x (1 + 0.05 x N) 
Applied to those who have been insured from 1999 
According to the 1998 National Pension Reform Act basic pension (1) and (2) are added 
to generate the following formula; 
Basic pension = {2.4 (A + 0.75B) x P1=P + 1.8 (A + B) x P2 = P} x (1 +0.05 N =12) 
" A: mean monthly wage of all participants in the pension programme a year before 
their pensions begin (equalised amount; regardless of the individual participant's 
income, the total amount of the previous year's (31 December) standard monthly 
income of all participants both in workplaces and regions is divided by the total 
number of participants. For example, 1,272,595 won is applied to A until March 
2000). 
" B: the average amount of Standard Monthly Income during the period of insurance 
(earnings-related amount; the standard monthly income of those insured during the 
period of contributions is converted to the present value of the previous year that 
pensions start by means of the annually determined re-valuation rate. Then, the 
re-valuated aggregate amount standard monthly income is divided by the year of 
insurance. The re-valuation rate is to be announced by the MoHW on the basis of the 
annual rate of change on all participants' average standard monthly income during 
the period of insurance). 
" 1.8: means the constant which determines the level of benefit on the basis of 40 
years' (480 months) participation in the programme. When A=B, a participant who 
has been in the programme for 40 years will earn about 60 per cent of his final 
income as a basic pension. 
"P1: the number of months that a person has been in the programme before Jan. 1 
1999. 
" P2: the number of months that a person has been in the programme after Jan. 1 1999. 
" P: the total number of months that a person has been in the programme. 
" N: number of years of contribution -20 
As briefly seen in Chapter 3 (Table 3.3), its design contains powerful re-distributional 
elements between intra-generational groups (vertical redistribution) for two reasons. First, a 
mean monthly wage of all participants a year before their pensions start provides lower 
pensions to higher income groups, and higher pensions to lower income groups. In other 
words, `A' represents an income-proportional component, earnings-related average monthly 
remuneration for the year preceding the year of pension payment. For example, if a person's 
income is one fourth of A and his contribution has been for 20 years, he would be able to 
receive 95 per cent of his life-time income. But if a person's income is either equal to A or 
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double, he would only be able to receive 35 per cent or 25 per cent of his life-time income 
respectively. Second, due to 'B' which is an equal distribution component, flat-rate average 
standard monthly remuneration during the aggregate insured term of the insured person, an 
average monthly wage over an individual workers' working life in the programme is 
designed to secure the real value of pensions by re-valuating it with the present value of the 
previous year before pensions are provided. This real value of pensions after pensions are 
provided by adjusting A and B through a sliding-scale system and its adjustment is based 
upon the national consumer price index (CPI). 
Despite all these functions, the current system has played an inter-generational distributive 
role in practice because the funds are yet to mature and the first full old-age pension benefit 
is yet to be provided. But there has been increasing need of those who have come to 
pensionable ages. For this reason, it might be said that a national pension scheme has an 
element of pay-as-you-go14. In principle, pension schemes can be thought of as being on a 
continuum with pure funded schemes with defined contribution at one end (e. g. Singapore, 
see ILO, 1984: 6), and pure pay-as-you-go with (means-tested) defined benefits, at the other. 
However, in reality, the actual formation of pension schemes varies. Its variation depends 
upon their operational objectives. In other words, it differs to whether pension schemes aim 
to alleviate poverty and to achieve redistribution, or to encourage savings and to promote 
income smoothing (Evans and Falkingham, 1997: 5). 
Whichever of these objectives is taken, the initial formation that set out the low level of 
contributions and the high level of pensions questions the survival of national pensions. The 
contribution rate was initially scheduled to start with 3 per cent for the first five years and to 
increase 3 per cent in every five years. Ironically, however, even those who designed the 
system at first argued that it should have started with 9 per cent from the beginning (Min, 
Jae-Sung et al., 1986). They certainly knew that the contribution rate was too low in order for 
14 
Park (1997: 67-68) argues that the method of national pensions finance is rather close to the 
incomplete (or partially) funded scheme because the overall scale of the funds has not fully 
accumulated the present value of all pension liabilities. Even in this situation, the first generation 
should still be integrated, at least in equity terms, into the system even before the funds are fully 
accumulated. For this reason, the current pension system maintains the structure that its financial 
burden has been imposed upon the future generation by increasing the rate of contributions but 
lowering the level of benefits. At the other end, national pensions benefit systems contain both 
features of the defined benefit and defined contribution scheme. This is because levels of 
contributions and levels of pensions are defined on a formula basis. 
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the finance of the system to be sustainable. But priority was given to lessening the negative 
impact on the national economy. This low contribution rate set out at the beginning is an 
important cause of maintaining sustainable finance because, as Table 4.11 shows, national 
pensions finance has entirely been based upon contributions and the interest receipts from 
the funds. The government subsidies remain very low only in the area of the operational and 
administration costs of the National Pension Corporation (NPC). The method of finance has 
therefore remained as the funded scheme which refers to the payment of pensions from the 
funds accumulated through the contributions paid and the interest earned from their 
investment' (Evason, 1999: 114). According to either the KDI's or the NPC's projection, it 
would become necessary at some point in time to move to the pay-as-you-go scheme which 
finances pensions from direct transfers of income between generations rather than 
accumulated funds. In other words, the KDI's original estimation anticipated the exhaustion 
of the funds in 2041 (Min, Jae-Sung et al., 1986: 336), while the NPC's estimation shows that 
the funds will be exhausted in 2033 (NPC, 1998a: 371). 
Table 4.11 The Composition of the National Pension Fund (1988-1999) (Unit: million won) 
Year Total Contributions Operational profit 
from the fund 
Transferre 
d money 
Surplus on 
closing 
accounts 
1988 528,221 506,931 20,110 335 845 
1989 1,240,234 1,134,816 99,975 335 5,108 
1990 2,259,513 1,968,821 284,838 335 5,519 
1991 3,539,043 2,953,623 579,101 335 5,519 
1992 5,201,885 4,177,042 1,018,524 335 5,984 
1993 8,424,628 6,816,394 1,601,915 335 5,984 
1994 12,766,147 10,142,169 2,617,659 335 5,984 
1995 18,159,651 14,108,481 4,044,851 335 5,984 
1996 25,028,387 19,052,037 5,970,031 335 5,984 
1997 33,190,569 24,727,764 8,454,352 335 8,118 
1998 44,851,859 32.568,480 12,274,926 335 8,118 
1999 58,361.462 41,95-1,385 16,397,093 0 9,649 
Sources; Reconstructed Table from \ PC (1990,1998b, 1999). 
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A national pension, like national health insurance. has developed in an incremental fashion. 
At each stage of its coverage expansion, different rates of contribution have been applied 
(see Appendix 9; Appendix 10). For example, the contribution rate for those in rural areas 
since 1995 has been applied differently. It started with 3 per cent for the first five y ears (July 
1995- June 2000), and it was scheduled to increase by 3 per cent in every five years until the 
rate reached 9 per cent from July 2005. As has been well discussed elsewhere (see Boden and 
Corden, 1994; Corden, 1999b; Eardley and Corden, 1996; Williams, 1999). this coverage 
expansion towards those in rural areas (including those whose means of living relates to 
agriculture or fisheries in urban areas) brought about two important problems. First, the 
actual income of the self-employed can only be collected by their reported income. The most 
reported income tended to be lower than the actual income. Thus, this could result in the 
reverse redistribution from those who have reported their actual income and salaried 
employees whose contributions come from their pay-roll to those who have falsely reported 
their income. Second, the falsely downward-reported income inevitably makes contributions 
low which in turn provides the lower amount of pensions. In short, the earnings-test for the 
self-employed appears to be one of the most serious problems but hard to resolve in virtually 
all social security systems such as public assistance and national health insurance. 
In order to solve the existing problems and to make an effective design to integrate the 
self-employed in urban areas, a planning mission for national pension reform came into 
operation from May to December 1997. Coordinated by the government, the final Bill for the 
National Pension Reform Act was submitted to the National Assembly in April 1998. 
However, the ruling party and the opposition party failed to come to terms. Meanwhile, the 
review of the Bill was considered by a Standing Committee for Health and Welfare under the 
National Assembly until the opposition party submitted their own Bill. In December 1998, 
the National Pension Reform Bill was finally passed by the National Assembly and this 
enabled the Reform Act to be implemented from April 1999. Appendix 9 summarises an 
overview of principles since the original design of the National Welfare Pension Programme 
in 1973. 
This 1998 National Pension Reform Act has generated several important changes. First, the 
universality of social insurance has been completed by inte`rating those self-employed in 
urban areas into the public scheme. Second, the level of benefit has been reduced from 70 to 
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60 per cent on the basis of 40 years contribution. The eligibility begins from the age of 65 
through a phase in adjustment which enables the funds to be sustainable. The contribution 
rate has also been readjusted for national pensions finance to be sustainable. This 
readjustment generates a major shift from the mixed features of defined benefit and defined 
contribution schemes to the paternalistic nature of defined benefit schemes. Third, as a 
response to financial difficulties, the committee for the national pension funds operation has 
been democratised. The total membership of the committee has expanded from 15 to 21. 
placing a great emphasis on increasing the number of representatives from participant 
groups. The chairman of the committee has also changed from the Minister of Finance and 
Economy to the Minister of Health and Welfare, the competent ministry responsible for 
national pensions. Finally, as whether maintaining national pensions finance is sustainable 
can easily be conditional upon socioeconomic changes such as the interest rate, wage 
increase rate, consumer price rate, unemployment rate, fertility rate, and the number of 
pensioners. The reform has introduced the re-computation system which is designed to 
enable the operation of the National Pension Fund (NPF) to be more flexible by way of 
regular check-ups. 
Despite all these changes, whether to solidify national pensions remains largely unclear. 
Compared to the relative ignorance on the ways in which the NPF should be operated at the 
initial stage of the late 1980s (Kwon, Huck-Ju, 1998b: 109), the accountability of the NPF 
was one of the most critical issues that in turn became subject to political debate in 1998. 
Clear answers to whether the current pension system would be sustainable must be given to 
those who have expected their returns. To this end, it is `the deposit on account of national 
treasury for public services and utilities' that has been put at the centre of the debate on 
whether its use can be legitimatised. As Table 4.12 shows, almost 70 per cent of the NPF had 
been borrowed with the interest rate of savings account plus 1 per cent. In other words, it is 
highly unlikely to expect high returns from more than half of the total fund. Table 4.12 also 
demonstrates that the rate of investment in projects for the welfare of those insured and 
pensioners has always been very low and has even become lower in the late 1990s. It further 
shows that while percentage of payment of benefits and other expenditure to the total amount 
of the NPF has gradually increased, the rate of investment in banking section out of the NPF 
has gradually decreased. 
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Table 4.12 The Operation of the National Pension Fund (1988-1999) 
(Unit: * in million won; per cent) 
Year Total * (1) (2) (3) (4) (5 *) (6) 
1988 527,920 54.6 - 45.4 100.0 301 0.06 
1989 1,233,258 50.9 - 49.1 100.0 6,976 0.56 
1990 2,198,692 46.3 - 53.7 100.0 60,821 2.69 
1991 3,327,514 45.6 3.6 50.8 100.0 211,529 5.98 
1992 4,750,348 44.8 5.1 50.1 100.0 451,537 8.68 
1993 7,611,761 40.5 5.1 54.4 100.0 812,867 9.84 
1994 11,355,724 57.7 4.2 38.1 100.0 1,410,423 11.05 
1995 15,955,373 65.4 3.9 30.6 100.0 2,204,278 12.14 
1996 21,670,945 67.7 3.2 29.1 100.0 3,357,442 13.14 
1997 28,282,412 67.4 2.9 29.7 100.0 4,908,157 14.79 
1998 37,464,653 71.5 3.9 24.6 100.0 7,387,206 16.47 
1999 46,992,280 67.8 2.1 30.1 100.0 11,369,182 19.48 
Notes: The total amount does not include payment of benefits and other expenditure (5) in this table. If they are 
included, the figure goes slightly higher which can be found in Table 4.11; (1) = deposit on account of national 
treasury for public services and utilities = total x 100; (2) investment in projects for the welfare of insured 
persons and pensioners = total x 100; (3) investment in banking section = total x 100; (4) Total = (1) + (2) + (3); 
(5) payment of benefits and other expenditure; (6) percentage of payment of benefits and other expenditure to 
the total amount of the NPF found in Table 4.11; 1998 and 1999 data are the figures of 31 S` December; figures 
are accumulated. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table, data adopted and calculated from NPC (1996,1998b, 1999,2000a, 2000b). 
The investment of the NPF in banking section from 1988 to 1999 is separately tabled in 
Table 4.13. A number of shadowed places show that almost every section, except 
government bonds, had undergone a severe financial loss. Deposit trust, beneficiary's 
securities, stock and short-term funds are charted in Figure 4.10 on a quarterly basis from 
October 1998 to July 2000. Though not shown in Figure 4.10, government and corporate 
bonds had undergone a gradual increase over time (NPC, 2000b) while deposit trust and 
beneficiary's securities had decreased in their accumulated amount. In short, the 
profit-making from the investment of the NPF was hardly impressive enough to prove that 
those who expect their returns would receive them in due course. 
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Table 4.13 The Investment of the National Pension Fund in Banking Section (1988-1999) 
(Unit: in billion won) 
Year Gov't 
bond 
Corp. 
bond 
Deposit 
Trust 
Beneficiary' 
s Securities 
Stock Short-term 
funds 
Total 
1988 399 192 1,153 477 - 178 2,399 
1989 1,074 1,079 2,854 848 - 199 6,054 
1990 2,666 2,627 3,974 2,231 - 311 11,809 
1991 3,986 4,762 5,059 2,955 20 115 16,897 
1992 4,702 5,685 9,125 4,192 121 - 23,825 
1993 8,694 8,398 12,156 5,977 5,247 945 41,417 
1994 11,336 7,057 11,430 3,430 6,683 3,273 43,209 
1995 14,642 5,686 13,751 2,236 8,080 4,502 48,897 
1996 18,468 8,100 18,148 6,809 10,618 869 63,012 
1997 26,429 10,119 21,926 13,171 11,551 924 84,120 
1998 44,481 3,793 14,583 9,261 10,789 9,403 92,310 
1999 58,980 31,226 6,931 14,885 13,722 11,743 141,450* 
Notes: * The figure includes the investment in CP (Commercial Paper), the total 3,963 billion won which is not 
found in the table; figures are accumulated; 1998 and 1999 data are based on 31" of December each year. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table, data adopted and calculated from NPC (1996,1998b, 2000a, 2000b). 
Figure 4.10 The Investment in Banking Section 
Unit: in billion won; Source: NPC (2000b) 
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In sum, from the start a national pension expressed a political intent in its very formulation 
and design. The high level of benefit and low contribution rates initially built into national 
pensions were to fulfil the political goals that national pensions were meant to serve. In other 
words, an immediate short-term measure was given priority over long-term impacts and 
consequences that national pensions were likely to bring about. In operational terms, national 
pensions have undergone severe financial instability to which no clear solution has yet been 
given. In order to make national pension funds sustainable, lowering the rate of pensions for 
the future generation may result in public distrust which seems highly unlikely to be restored 
by a single reform. More national pension reforms would inevitably come but their impact 
on this public distrust is yet to be seen. 
4.4.4 Employability and Welfare Dependency: The Employment Insurance 
Programme 
The maintenance of employment has always been an important argument in forming welfare 
systems in Korea. Under the institutional setting that prioritises an economic growth strategy 
in particular, emerging employment instability no longer provides government considerable 
authority. For instance, the newly emerging concept of the working poor has attenuated the 
division of the deserving and undeserving poor. In addition, both indigenous and exogenous 
disruptions have influenced society and these disruptions could no longer be neglected. 
Under these circumstances, the introduction of employment insurance of 1995 was an 
institutional completion that finalised four major state welfare programmes on the basis of 
compulsory participation. However, fundamental ideas underpinning this completion do not 
necessarily express marked changes in policy orientation. From the start, employment 
insurance was designed to promote the prevention of unemployment rather than addressing 
cash benefits. As discussed in Chapter 3, social policy discourse for employment insurance 
to be preventative was brought in by changing its title from what is conventionally called 
unemployment insurance. The criticality of stable economic growth and the efficient labour 
market operation remained unmodified. Employment insurance, thereby, offers no sign of 
solid credibility that the main stream policy orientation had changed towards a 
labour-friendly policy. Maintaining incentives remains to be given high priority by those 
planning administrative mechanisms for the relief of unemployment15. 
15 
The principle of incentive maintenance has also been prevailing elsewhere. Lipson (quoted in Creed`, 
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In principle, earnings of those who work are subject to a contribution assessment based upon 
their liability. For this reason. whether or not social insurance programmes are able to collect 
the insurance premium (contribution) is likely to determine administrative effectiveness. 
This administrative effectiveness is a rather simple yet precise reason why none of the social 
insurance programmes in Korea began with the full coverage of the entire population. For 
instance, small businesses have always been the last to be integrated due to the 
administrative difficulties implied. 
Perhaps because of the financial crisis in 1997, which changed the initial plan of the 
expansion, employment insurance has grown faster than any other social insurance 
programme. Table 4.14 summarises how employment insurance has expanded its coverage 
over time since its initiation 16 . Despite this exceptionally 
fast expansion, the MoL's 
measures on the actual coverage of employment insurance confirmed that the ratio of the 
number of those eligible to that of those actually insured was only 69.8 per cent (MoL, July 
1999). Moreover, as the final row of Table 4.15 shows, the percentage of those under 
employment insurance out of all types of waged workers (excluding family workers and the 
self-employed) in 1999 was less than 50 per cent. The second last row of Table 4.15 also 
illustrates that if the total number of the employed is considered, the coverage of 
employment insurance becomes much lower. These figures imply that a number of those 
ruled out are substantially high perhaps because of their wage threshold or instability of 
employment under the regulations of voluntary participation, or because of possible defaults 
of the administrative mechanism for take-up by those eligible for employment insurance. 
1981: 3) argues that what is most important in designing employment insurance is to constrain the 
possibilities of `adverse reactions upon the economic system'. For example, Britain has been credited 
as the first country to introduce compulsion in its unemployment insurance. However, Hill (1990: 134) 
argues that the Social Security Act of 1989 enables unemployment benefit not to be paid where 
individuals fail to conduct an active search for jobs. Incentive maintenance has been a prolonged 
concern in British social security systems. 
16 
In February 1998, the Tripartite Commission (the presidential advisory board represented by the 
government, political parties, management and trade unions) came to terms with integrating all size of 
businesses from 1 July 1999. But as the Korean economy and the labour market situation became 
much worse than expected, the expansion plan was rescheduled to come into effect from 1 October 
199'8, (Yoo, Kil-Sang. 1999: 16). There are groups that still have not been part of this integration. 
Those en aged in temporary or part-time labour market have been excluded due to a great deal of 
administrative difficulties in collecting information on their wages. Furthermore, those aged 65 and 
more, and those aged 0(0 and more but seeking a job are also excluded and so are those employed by 
both national and local governments and those employed in private schools. 
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Table 4.14 Trends of Compulsory Participation in the Employment Insurance Programme 
Coverage 
A1 Jul. 1995 1 Jul. 1997 1 Jan. 1998 -1 Mar. 1998 -1 Jul. 1998 -1 Oct. 
-1 Jan. - 31 28 Feb. 1998 30 Jun. 1998 30 Sept. 1998 
1996 Dec. 1997 1998 onwards 
B 30+ 30+ 10+ 5+ 5+ 1+ 
C 70 + 70+ 50+ 50+ 5+ 1+ 
D 40 billion 44 billion 34 billion 34 billion 3.4 billion 3.4 billion 
won or won or won or more won or more won or more won or 
more more more 
Notes: A. unemployment benefits; B. employment stabilisation scheme; C. employability development scheme; 
D. the total amount of construction costs in construction industry (applying to A, B and Q. 
Source: MoL (2000a: 89). 
Table 4.15 The Coverage of the Employment Insurance Programme 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of Establishments 38,953 43,723 47,427 400,000 601,394 
No. of Participants(a) 4,204,258 4,330,885 4,280,430 5,267,658 6,054,479 
Total No. of the 20,432 20,817 21,106 19,994 20,281 
Employed'(b) 
Self-Employed I(c) 5,694 5,811 5,981 5,776 5,841 
Family Workers' (d) 1,955 1,941 1,899 2,028 1,918 
Regular Employees' (e) 10,974 11,261 11,333 10,455 10,233 
Daily Workers' (f) 1,809 1,804 1,892 1,735 2,289 
(a) = (b) x 100 20.58 20.80 20.28 26.35 29.85 
(a) + {(e) + (f) }x 100 32.89 33.15 32.37 43.21 48.35 
Note: 1. In thousand persons, classified by type of employment. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table from MoL (2000a: 93,2000b: 236); BoK (July 2000: 140-141). 
The Employment Stabilisation Scheme (ESS), the Employability Development Scheme 
(EDS) and unemployment benefits are the three pillars that constitute employment 
insurance, financial resources of which are also drawn from these pillars. First, the ESS is 
designed not only to provide economic incentives to employers who have been actively 
involved in employing marginally displaced workers. But, the ESS also provides 
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information and job opportunities to potential employees. Second, the EDS is mainly 
engaged with on-the-job-training (OJT), vocational training for new entrants and increasing 
capacity of those who require to be re-employed. Third, unemployment benefits provide 
basic benefits and incentive benefits such as the early re-employment allowance. Given this 
structure, as Table 4.16 shows, both employers and employees had paid 0.3 per cent of 
insurance premiums for unemployment benefits until December 1998. But this rate was 
readjusted to 0.5 per cent largely due to a growing number of the unemployed since January 
1999 (see Figure 4.1). For the ESS and the EDS, employers are responsible for their full 
payment. 
Table 4.16 The Insurance Contribution Rates by Industry (In per cent out of total payroll) 
1995-1998 1999 onwards 
employees employers employees employers 
Unemployment benefits 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 
ESS N/A 0.2 N/A 0.3 
businesses with s 150 workers N/A 0.1 N/A 0.1 
E 
D businesses with z 150 workers N/A 0.3 N/A 0.3 
S more than 150 to less than 1,000 N/A 0.5 N/A 0.5 
more than 1,000 employees N/A 0.05 N/A 0.7 
Sources: MoL (1999a); Yoo, Kit-Sang (1999: 85). 
As part of a social safety net, employment insurance shares the nature of benefits available 
from the reformed public assistance programme. In both cases, preventive measures take 
priority over curative measures mostly by promoting active labour market policy. For this 
reason, employment insurance in Korea has been almost exclusively engaged with a number 
of built-in mechanisms to attenuate the culture of dependency. Political discourse of 
\vorkfarc has been placed at the centre such that social welfare should not undermine 
individual activities in economic terms. Not only are unemployed persons required to get 
registered at the public employment office but also they are obliged to report their 
job-seeking activity on a regular basis. Ineligibility for benefits applies to the case in which 
unemployment occurs due to individuals' own fault, or to personal reasons that cannot be 
validated by the head of the public employment office. 
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To be eligible for unemployment benefits, one should not only provide a minimum 12 
months contribution record within the previous 18 months of employment but also be 
insured for minimum 60 to maximum 210 days 17. Further to this, a waiting period scheme 
provides another strict eligibility rule such that unemployment benefits are not paid to those 
who are eligible for the first 14 days after they become unemployed. The rationale behind 
this waiting period is to confirm the eligibility of beneficiaries and to assess the amount of 
benefits. Yet the average duration of unemployment benefit payments was only 74.6 days 
during the period of 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998 according to the Korea Labour Institute's 
estimation (KLI, Autumn 1998: 73,79). Compared to the average duration of the 
re-employment being 96.1 days, this low figure indicates that those unemployed had no 
choice but to live without any income whatsoever for almost 20 days. Hence benefit 
payments extension has been formed into the benefit system as implicit assistance to them. 
The issues at stake in employment insurance that appears to go beyond all sets of built-in 
mechanisms to discourage welfare dependency in fact concern the unrealistic replacement 
rate. The replacement rate is regulated at 50 per cent but its real value has been much lower 
than 50 per cent because of different formulae applied to the contributions and benefits. In 
other words, the contributions are calculated by the total amount of wage including all types 
of fringe benefits in cash and additional allowances provided from the businesses. By contrast, 
the benefits are measured based only on basic wage excluding all amount of allowances and 
fringe benefits in cash. In fact, the average benefits were 1,942,770 won being provided for 
74.6 days during the period of 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998. Therefore, a person with unemployment 
benefits had been given monthly average benefits of approximately 880,245 won compared 
to the average income of 1,744,200 won having been paid at work. This clearly indicates that 
a replacement rate was only 44.79 per cent (KLI, Autumn 1998: 73,75; the unemployment 
benefits replacement rate = unemployment benefits per day . daily average wage). 
From the start, unemployment benefits were not given any significant emphasis in the overall 
design of employment insurance. Instead, the purposes of employment insurance were to 
build up a solid emplo\ment infrastructure and to fill in the marginal gaps where those who 
According to the Amendment Act of Employment Insurance on 31 December 1999, unemployment 
benefits require a minimum 1, -', 0 days contribution record and one should be insured for minimum 90 
to maximum 240 days to be eligible for benefits. 
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need employment security were ruled out due to the stringent nature of the system. All the 
amendments made since its first enactment in 1993 to these ends (e. g. the Amendment Act 
of Employment Insurance on 22 Dec. 1994; 30 Dec. 1996; 28 Aug. 1997; 20 Feb. 1998; 17 
Sept. 1998; 31 Dec. 1999). Notwithstanding, employment infrastructure in Korea is 
relatively underdeveloped. As Table 4.17 shows, one person employed in the employment 
stabilisation office was in charge of 8,060 persons out of the entire economically active 
population in Korea, while the figures go down to 4,438 in Japan, 1,946 in the United States, 
867 in the United Kingdom and 338 in Germany. 
Table 4.17 Comparison of Employment Stabilisation Office (ESO) 
Germany UK US Japan Korea 
Economically active population' (a) 29,5902 28,6202 136,2972 67,8702 21,6343 
Number of ESO 841 1,159 2,528 619 119 
Number of personnel in ESO (b) 87,570 33,000 70,050 15,290 2,684 
(a) -- (b) 338 867 1,946 4,438 8,060 
Notes: 1. In thousands; 2.1997 data; 3.1999 data; the rest of the figure is based on 1998 data. 
Source: MoL (February 1999). 
Despite this overall stress on employment stability and employability, there has been a 
growing demand for employment benefits. For example, Figure 4.11 demonstrates each 
sub-scheme's financial balance (i. e. premiums - payments). Through this analysis, it 
becomes clear that the amount that has been paid both to unemployment benefits and the 
employability development scheme was much more that the amount that has been collected. 
This financial loss that employment insurance has undergone requires further reforms to 
push the figures up. There are two possible options that may keep the balance sustainable. 
The first option is to increase the premium rate for unemployment benefits. This means that 
those under employment insurance should pay more contributions in addition to the three 
other social insurance programmes. The other option requires the government to provide 
extra resources in order to stabilise the system. If employment insurance is to be seen as an 
emergency measure against the economic crisis, then the second option is unlikely to take 
effect because this view parallels with the idea that the public spending would harm the 
national economy. If the view that takes employment as the completion of a social safety net, 
the government is still capable of spending more on it. Neither the excessive public spending 
nor welfare dependency caused the economic crisis. 
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Figure 4.11 The Trends of Employment Insurance (Unit: in million won) 
Sources : KLI (Autumn 1999); MoL (December 1999) 
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In sum, that employment insurance would be the concern of anyone who may lose a job at 
any time and that measures against economic recession are to require better social 
infrastructure came with huge surprise as the economic crisis paved the way for more 
uncertainties. As a response to this economic crisis, employment insurance has grown faster 
than any other social programmes while at the same time its financial soundness has been 
questioned equally fast. The prospects for the answers to this question however may come in 
a different way froh what has been the case in the past because the economic crisis has 
marked another critical juncture for social policy reform to move forward. The ways in 
which social policy discourse has changed during this historically significant period is the 
subject of the next section. 
4.5 Conclusion: The Politics of Implementation 
Much that has been said so far relates to whether legally-mandated goals and objectives of 
the policy initiatives are put into place in the structure of social policy. The politics of 
implementing such initiatives, according to Pressman and Wildavsky (1984: xxiii), may be 
viewed as `a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to 
achieving them'. Jenkins (1978: 203) also argues that `a study of implementation is a study 
of change: how change occurs, possibly how it may be induced. It is also a study of the 
micro-structure of political life; how organizations outside and inside the political system 
conduct their affairs and interact with one another; what motivates them to act in the way 
they do, and what might motivate them to act differently'. Given this, the remainder of this 
chapter discusses how the expression of governmental intention is linked with policies that 
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may or may not fulfil their goals and objectives in the institutional contexts in which they are 
implemented' 8 
In contextual terms, the period of the working class movement and the subsequent 
democratic transition were the two major expansionary phases that substantial changes in the 
state commitment to welfare occurred. However, even through these phases the president's 
decisions about the orientation of government policy remained intact as the most important, 
deterministic and influential in the political process. The ways in which to theorise welfare 
within the extent to which economic growth strategies are prioritised has begun since the 
idea of `constructing welfare society' became part of political discourse under the Fifth 
Republic (1981-1988). But this remained largely as a symbolic action, a specified formation 
of which was not visualised by any intellectual course of action. It was the Seventh Republic 
(1993-1998) that made this discourse turn to a pragmatic principle by adding on `productive' 
to `welfare'. Announced first by the then President himself in 1995, in other words, 
`productive welfarism' became a principle that led to develop a new welfare paradigm. 
`Productive functions of welfare', `productive welfare policies' and `productive social 
security systems' were the vocabularies used by the Planning Team for National Welfare in 
order to come to this end (KIHSA, 1995). Yet its materialisation was very limited in policy 
terms due to the ambiguity that productive welfarism brought about. 
In structuring a new welfare paradigm, it was the Eighth Republic (1998- present) that made 
productive welfarism finally materialise into one of the governing principles. On the 44th 
National Memorial Day of 6 June 1999, President Kim Dae-Jung (1999a) said that `the 
11 
For this reason, this section does not discuss the mainstream analysis of implementation that is to be 
seen as critical part of the policy making process (Hill, 1993: 213). A whole series of classical 
arguments found in implementation studies deal with top-down and bottom-up division which 
distinguishes the first (top-down) and second wave (bottom-up) studies of implementation (e. g. 
Elmore, 1978; Hjern. 1982; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Hudson, 1989; Lipsky, 1971,1980; Pressman 
and \V'ildavsky, 1984; Sabatier. 1986). Sabatier (1986), for example, identifies that where there is a 
dominant piece of legislation structuring the situation, the top-down approach appears to be 
comparatively advantageous. In contrast, the bottom-up approach becomes methodologically more 
effective in situations where a somewhat large numbers of actors become involved. As a definitional 
issue, this distinction may draw upon a dichotomy between the structural and behavioural centrality 
(Parsons. 1$5) and between a state-centred and society-centred approach (see Skocpol, 1985; 
Shicker, 2000). In short, top-down approaches tend to be state dominated whereas bottom-up 
approaches are society centred. 
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people's government have been developing the trinity that parallels democracy, the market 
economy and productive welfare.. . 
in order not only to break through the economic crisis that 
has been the worst national crisis since the Korean War... but to achieve the second national 
foundation'. In turn, a number of intellectual courses of action were taken by individual 
government ministries and their affiliated think tanks (e. g. the KLI and the KIHSA) as well 
as academia in order to clarify the meaning of productive welfare. To an extent the term has 
largely been interpreted in their own discretionary ways because of the lack of clarity made 
by the President himself. But it has converged upon the point that could solve unprecedented 
market failure that raised questions surrounding unemployment, growing income disparities 
and dismantling the middle class. The Policy Planning Advisory Committee for the President 
began to theorise its meaning. Yet it was the Quality of Life Promotion Committee under the 
Presidential Secretariat that completed a series of reports, where `productive welfarism' is 
defined as: 
`A government administrative doctrine that guarantees the basic standard of life in order for 
all citizens to maintain basic human dignity and self-confidence, promoting the quality of 
life, as well as pursuing social development by way not only of enhancing opportunities of 
active and independent participation in socioeconomic activities, but also of reconsidering 
equality of distribution' (The Quality of Life Promotion Committee, 1999 requoted from 
Park, Neung-Hu, 2000: 38). 
At a similar time, however, the Ministry of Labour defined it as `welfare that enables people 
to work'. The emphasis was given to the linkage of welfare systems and labour policies as its 
core (MoL, 1999 cited from Park, Neung-Hu, 2000: 38). The uniqueness of its meaning was 
also addressed by the Ministry of Health and Welfare identifying the difference between the 
European notion of the third way and its Korean style creation: 
`The third way [in European welfare states] suggests that the balance between social 
welfare and market functions should be taken on board as a solution to the ineffectiveness 
of state intervention which has failed to reduce the number of those on welfare. By contrast, 
the concept of 'productive welfare' is based on the assumption that the scale of welfare 
(provisions) will expand. Yet at the same time, it seeks the ways in which the function and 
the order of the market are guaranteed at a maximum level... productive welfare is the most 
active welfare policy and is composed of three pillars; first, primary distribution through 
market to enhance economically active participation; second, redistribution by the state to 
guarantee the quality of life: and third, social investment for rehabilitation to secure rights to 
work in the overlapping areas of the state and market' (MoHW, 2000b: 13-14). 
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Does this productive welfarism differ from previous doctrine that subordinates social policy 
to economic policy? The answers to this question can be drawn from the analysis that 
examined the context in which a set of social policy reform has been implemented. Public 
assistance reform, for example, places a particular emphasis on job-seeking activities when 
benefit eligibility is considered; employment insurance is centrally structured by the 
principle of employability and employment stability though there has been a growing 
demand for unemployment benefits. In other words, employment insurance was designed to 
provide active labour market policy. Contradictorily however its main function has come 
close to income maintenance because a growing demand for unemployment benefits requires 
response. A lack of grand strategy often leads to an incorrect diagnosis of social problem 
which often results in social segmentation. 
For national pensions, it was its unstable financial status that has long been subject to 
criticisms. Although the economic crisis brought in an emerging consensus of social 
integrity, national pensions were blocked by the refusal of citizens to participate in reform 
largely due to inadequate infrastructure that may not correctly scrutinise the income of the 
self-employed. Universal collectivity as the social basis of national pensions was devalued 
by this refusal. But the origins of this distrust date back to political reasoning that 
underpinned the inadequate design of national pensions which in turn caused financial 
instability. This unstable financial status also applies to national health insurance which 
brought about severe conflict between different health insurance societies. Evolved in an 
incremental fashion, a number of separate health funds were set up at each stage of national 
health expansion and managed separately. At each stage of its development, a government 
gave concessions to those who were deemed to be opposed to its plans. The idea of 
integrating health funds was implemented in this context which resulted in another social 
segmentation. In short, social policy reforms lacked a grand strategy which could have been 
guided by a correct diagnosis of social problems. 
Social policy reforms in this era may well be understood as an emergency measure against 
the economic crisis or immature materialisation of a Korean style third way. The idea that 
centres around productive welfarism is to prevent welfare dependency by emphasising tiwrk 
ethics. But it should be remembered that market failure did not result from welfare 
overloading but from indigenous contradictions of capitalist development. In other words. 
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there was no sign of welfare overloading that may have undermined the work ethic in Korea. 
In order not to experience the `welfare disease' that most Western societies have undergone, 
productive welfarism aims to solve the double edged problems inherent in social policy; 
being productive in economic terms while providing rights to welfare in social policy terms. 
The question is to adjust this pair of scales to new conditions while maintaining the right 
balanced. 
Social programmes in Korea have developed on the basis of principled beliefs which 
underlie social policies elsewhere. But also they were structured by the process of 
lesson-drawing that is about the `diffusion of what was once an innovation elsewhere' (Rose, 
1993: 25). Inspired by the experiences that many other Western societies have gone through, 
particular attention has been paid to almost all social programmes not to suffer any negative 
consequences that Western societies have already undergone. But whichever types of 
drawing a lesson is taken, it requires contextual adjustment. The conditions under which 
different sets of norms and rules develop constrain choice that may or may not be utilised by 
policy makers and policy administrators. The favourable conditions under which systems of 
welfare were arranged in the past may become obstacles at present. The intent that decision 
makers have in mind may be rightly placed in the structure of social policy but may also 
require considerable modification as the context in which they are implemented changes. 
All that has been discussed in this chapter relates to social policy outputs that result from the 
interaction between political contexts, conditions and decision-making points (Box 2 in 
Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). These social policy outputs in turn reshape the conditions under 
which choices are utilised. The conditions that force those in decision-making points to 
rationalise their decisions resulted in the emergence of `productive welfarism'. Social policy 
reforms have been guided by this newly introduced political discourse. The creation of 
productive welfarism is the result of political acceptance such that economic growth equally 
requires a settlement of social problems and that the economic crisis verified how vulnerable 
the existing social safety net was. Restructuring this safety net was preconditioned not only 
to rebuild the economy but also to rationalise the decision. The period of the late 1990s 
became another critical juncture. 
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The analysis of policy formulation and implementation leads us to investigate the ways in 
which social policies affect citizens. These policy effects on citizens can become causes of 
further policy change. As Daniel Moynihan's (1969: 193) phrase over aspects of the `War on 
Poverty' in the United States identifies, `the role of social science in government lies not in 
the formulation of social policy but in the measurement of its results' (italics in original). By 
evaluating the overall effectiveness and efficiency of state welfare, the next chapter v ill 
identify distinctive ideas institutionalised in the Korean welfare state. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Conditions of Possibility 
5.1 Introduction 
George and Wilding (1984: 185) point out that `the claims that social policy undermines 
economic growth have always come to the forefront of public debate when the economy is in 
difficulties'. But at the same time there is little doubt that `social services have always been 
provided in ways in which the needs of the economy, or rather the needs of private capital, 
are taken into account as far as possible'. Proponents of the de-industrialisation thesis, the 
state subsidy theory of strikes or welfare dependency theorists tend to interpret the 
relationship between social policy and economic development as negative by emphasising 
the effects of social policy on undermining economic growth. There is no doubt that the 
provision of social policy would not work without increased economic growth, but as 
George and Wilding (1984: Ch. 4) argue, the main reason for increased economic growth is 
to raise the level of people's living standards. Given this, the purpose of this chapter is to 
suggest that economic growth has a necessary and important role to play in social policies, 
but the risk of overemphasis on it can only be kept in check if it is applied within a broad and 
recognisable infrastructure of social welfare. The conditions under which social policy 
develops are not necessarily contingent upon economic growth but more on the political 
processes that reshape these conditions. 
This chapter is organised into five sections. The first section examines the conditions under 
which the national economy has developed. By underscoring the government's strategy on 
economic development, we identify historically distinctive developmental patterns. The 
second section examines the government's restructuring strategies in response to the 
economic crisis that has influenced many aspects of social policy in Korea to a great extent. 
By bringing the issues of poverty and redistribution, the third and the fourth section evaluate 
the outcomes of social policy by examining the politics of poverty and the redistributive 
politics of the welfare state. In the final section, we explore a recent debate on health care 
systems and identify the complexity involved in the process in order to find the 
contemporary position of social policy in Korea. 
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5.2 The Conditions of Competitive Advantage: Dynamism in the World Economy 
According to the World Development Report of 1987 (`World Bank, 1987: Ch. 5), the East 
Asian NICs were seen as a model to be emulated by other developing countries. Their 
outward-oriented economic development strategies proved to be more effective than the 
inward-oriented development strategies of their Latin American counterparts. To the 
developmental case of Korea, for example, the OECD Economic Surveys (OECD, 
1994: 17-18) point out that a central economic development strategy was guided by an 
outward policy orientation from 1961 to 1973 (see Appendix 11). Song (1997: 88) argues that 
growth, industry and outward-oriented strategy is the only correct development strategy, not 
only for Korea, but also for any other developing country that wants to sustain economic 
growth over a long period of time'. For President Park, it was economic growth that all 
national efforts were to be directed to and that must be achieved at any cost. In order to 
achieve economic growth, `exports first' was officially documented in the Second Five-Year 
Economic Development Plan (1967-1971) and became President Park's favourite maxim 
that national building could be completed through it' (Song, Byung-Nak, 1997: 92). 
To this end, however, a high risk-taking strategy was required because the first oil crisis of 
1973 caused a world wide recession that in turn made it impossible for the military 
government to fulfil the initial promise of economic growth. Conditionality given by the 
For this export-oriented policy, the currency was devalued by 50 per cent; a sliding-peg mechanism 
of adjustment was introduced in order to prevent a real appreciation of the Korean currency (i. e. won )l 
a newly introduced single rate exchange system replaced the complicated multiple exchange rate 
system (i. e. a dual exchange system - the official rate and the `curb market' exchange rate) (OECD, 
1994,1995). Given the international order of the Bretton Woods System* where fixed rates of 
exchange were in operation, devaluing the currency may help a country with a fundamental 
disequilibrium in its balance of payments. It would be able to stimulate its export and to discourage 
imports, thereby restoring equilibrium to its balance of payments. A number of currency devaluations 
controlled by the state had enabled the preservation of international competitiveness. But the floating 
cxchangc rate s ,, tem** was 
introduced in 1973 in the international economy. In 1980, the exchange 
rate system was changed to one of managed floating, with the daily exchange rate movements being 
limited relative to the market average rate of the previous day in Korea (OECD, 1994: 32): *The 
Bretton 11'oo4b; System was in operation from 1944 to 1971. The system subsequently established both 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF; established in 1945, South Korea became a member on 26 
August 1955) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD; established in 
194(x, also known as the World Bank, South Korea participated in the IBRD in 1955): **The floating 
exchange rate . v. i, stein 
is also called freely fluctuating exchange rates. It might be argued that it ww as 
introduced in 1973 or even in 1978, depending upon the choice of landmark. In other words, it differs 
depending on whether the Smithsonian Agreements of December 1971 or the Kingston , %, stem of 
January 197h was seen to be the end of the Bretton Woods vstem. 
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international economic downturn had constrained the optional scenarios available to the 
government. In other words, whether a decision should be radical or conservative would be 
strictly contingent upon how far the recession would persist. The continuity of the recession 
would favour the decision of ever more cautious investment which would not result in the 
fulfilment of the promise. On the other hand, an aggressive investment would be favoured if 
the world economy was in short-term recession. If the decision turned out to be mistaken (i. e. 
an aggressive investment was chosen in the case of long-term recession) the consequence 
would bring about a major domestic economic crisis as a result. 
The decision was made to take risks because on no account could the government fulfil the 
promise otherwise. Korea appeared to be the major purchaser of industrial commodities, 
having managed to increase its production capacity at bargain prices. Meanwhile, there were 
no other countries engaged in such aggressive capital investment in the world market. As the 
world economy stabilised after 1974, the international demand for goods also became highly 
necessitated in turn. The high risk-taking strategy brought in substantial growth in exports. 
The average growth rate in exports in the 1970s was 39.2 per cent compared to 15.8 per cent 
in the 1980s and 8.3 per cent in the 1990s (Appendix 11). The promise was fulfilled as the 
total amount in exports reached ten billion US dollars in 1977, even a year before its target 
year (Cho, Dong-Sung, 1992: 52-53). In short, as Figure 5.1 shows, a growth rate in exports, 
imports and L/C arrivals was higher than ever in 1973 which involved a high risk-taking 
strategy, exercising a monopsony power. 
Figure 5.1 Growth Rate of Exports, Imports and L/C arrivals (1966-1999) 
Unit: Per cent; Source: Appendix 11 
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The government made an important change in a grand economic strategy towards targeting 
heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s. This strategic shift subsequently changed the 
overall composition of manufacture towards more labour-intensive products. Nonetheless. 
there was little change in a previously underpinning doctrine of state interventionism in the 
market economy but a certain level of persistence in a state-led and export-oriented 
economic development on the basis of a credit-based financial system through strict control 
of the banking system (OECD, 1996: 2-3). In other words, those involved in exports were not 
only given a series of state benefits such as tax exemptions, direct subsidies, and other 
incentives, but also provided guaranteed financial help without taking a serious account of 
potential incapacity such as the possession of a high debt to equity ratio. This in turn 
constrained their optional choices within the banking system out of the entire financial 
institutions. For this reason, it is misleading to argue that this might have provided a 
variation of fiscal welfare in Titmussian terms (see Titmuss, 1958: Ch. 2). This concessionary 
measure was targeted to those in relatively better positions in financial terms, thereby 
undermining the principle of equity. 
Change from a general export-led growth strategy to a selective targeting strategy that 
favoured heavy and chemical industries was a political and economic decision within a grand 
framework of economic development. Industries were not distinguished within the 
overarching export-promotion policy. Only large businesses were targeted and given a 
general trade license. Large scale and risky investments were believed to be the only way to 
overcome the chronic trade deficits. This strategy enabled an effective response to the 
exogenous pressures such as the oil crisis of 1973. Furthermore, there had been increasing 
competition in light manufactures mainly challenged from other developing countries with 
lower costs (OECD, 1994: 18). On the other hand, Clifford (1994: 102) and Kim and Hong 
(2000: 76) argue that a dramatic shift towards heavy industries was part of an active response 
to the imposition of textile quotas by the US and their reduced military presence in Korea, 
and to the building-up of the defence industry. China's re-entry into the international 
community in the early 1970s was another cause that made strategic shifts more credible in 
terms of a long-term threat to labour-intensive industries and domestic defence concerns2 
In comparative terms. Taiwan pursued economic developmental strategies where small and 
medium-sized enterprises were closely integrated into international business networks. In Taiwan, a 
large scale-based industrialisation, above all heavy industries in particular, was maintained, despite 
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(Gereffi, 1989: 518). In short, it was the Park Chung-Hee government (1963-1979) that 
constructed the overarching structure of economic development that initiated the policy of 
`manufacturing first, and financing later'. 
By the early 1980s, according to Castells (1998: 251), Korea was one of the world's most 
indebted economies. It was under this financial and fiscal difficulties that financial 
liberalisation began and conservative fiscal and monetary policies were brought in. As a 
result, the inflation rate in the wholesale price index was substantially lowered. During the 
period of two oil crises in 1973 and 1979, for example, it was slightly lower than 42.1 per 
cent in 1974 and was 38.9 per cent in 1980, but reduced to 4.7 per cent in 1982 and 0.2 per 
cent in 1983 (Rhee, Sungsup, 1988: 230). Therefore, as Figure 5.2 illustrates, although there 
was a negative growth rate of GDP in 1980, it was the attainment of price stabilisation that 
deserves credit as one of the most important economic achievements of the 1980s. 
Figure 5.2 GrovAh Rate of GDP and Consumer Price (%) 
Sources: NSO (2000e, 2000f) 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5. 
r' 01 
- .. 
S 
f_i. 
-. 
... 
- 
.. 
\/ 
-5 
-10 
1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 
Growth rate of constiner price 
........... Growth rate of GDP 
1992 1995 1998 
the oil crisis of 1973 and its consequent world inflation. In order to keep the oil bill down, Taiwan kept 
its currency fixed, curbed other imports, and deflated the local economy. By contrast, Korea devalued 
its currency and absorbed the oil price increases. In consequence, foreign currency holdings were 
exhausted and more money was required to be borrowed abroad (Clifford, 1994: 109). Economic 
concerns became even more important than the 1960s and social policy remained substantially inferior 
to economic growth. 
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During the period of the early 1960s to the late 1970s, a strong emphasis on economic growth 
made any other social and political concerns meaningless. But in the 1980s, economic 
growth was less favoured than economic stabilisation by the Chun government. The Chun 
government exercised a monopoly power over financial institutions in order to maintain 
economic stability. And this monopoly power allowed the state to allocate monetary 
resources directly to manufacturing industries. In 1981 and 1982, commercial banks were 
privatised3. But not until the authority to appoint all bank presidents that resided in the 
government was abolished in 1993 had the government's monopoly power been seriously 
damaged (OECD, 1994: 89). In other words, the power to decide to whom to lend had 
belonged to the government, not the banks. For this reason, the banks had not been allowed 
to have full managerial autonomy (Kim, Ilpyong J and Hong, Uk Heon, 2000: 70; OECD, 
1994: 98,1996: 43). 
In the President's Inaugural Address under the Martial Law on 1 September 1980, the 11 `n 
President Chun (1980) pinpointed the significance of liberal democracy and principles of 
free-market competition as the base of the reform, while maintaining the prolonged 
assumption that economic development is a basic premise of social welfare. For market 
competition, he argues, financial liberalisation would be pursued in the form of financial 
market deregulation such as deregulating interest rates4. But the strategic emphasis on 
capital-intensive industries was subject to increasing criticisms partly due to their slow 
growth of total factor productivity and partly due to excess demand and over-investment in 
certain favoured sectors. Following the emergence of the heavy and chemical industry drive, 
high-technology related products began to be given serious consideration by relaxing the 
regulations governing inward direct investment and technology imports in the late 1980s 
(OECD, 1994: 20,44; Kim, Ilpyong J. and Hong, Uk Heon, 2000: 70). 
3 
Commercial banks were once privatised in 1957. They had been nationalised since 1961 which was 
a year before the EPB launched the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966). There 
had been six other five-year economic development plans until the Kim Young-Sam government 
disbanded the EPB and introduced a new five-year economic development plan in 1994. 
4 
Yet it was March 1994 that policy loans that had been designated to certain activities as priorities for 
commercial bank lending were abolished. These policy loans used to be provided by the Bank of 
Korea at 5 per cent, far below the market rate of between 12 and 15 per cent (OECD, 1996: 44-45). 
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Given this trend, technologically lead industries began to be eligible for preferential 
treatment in tariff imposition instead of the industry-specific approach. As opposed to the 
functional approach, Rhee (1988) argues, this industry-specific approach implies that 
officially designated industries are given strategic advantages regardless of their Research 
and Development (R&D) activities. As Figure 5.3 shows, and as both Castells (1992: 40-55) 
and Amsden (1990) argue Korea's acquisition of technology in the new international 
economy was the key to its economic success. 
Figure 5.3 Ratio of R&D Expenditures to GDP (%) 
3.5 
3 
25 
2 
1.5 
1 
0.5 
0 
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 
South KKorea* 
........... EU 15 Countries* 
--- Japan 
"" fý ý- f" "" 
......... 
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
--- United Kingdom** 
f United States 
Notes: * R&D (Research and Development) expenditures of social science and humanities were not covered; 
*defence was also not covered before 1976; * 1999 data is provisional; ** all sectors included. 
Sources: Eurostat Yearbook (2000: 308); Laafia (March 2001: 5); NSO (1998a: 247,337,2000c: 351). 
On this technological acquisition, however, Smith (1997) argues that while the economic 
miracle of South Korea had been achieved by low wages but a relatively well-educated 
labour force, its `technological dependence' remains. In other words, Korea's strategic 
transformation has failed to be developed beyond the strategies of `reverse engineering' 
wherein foreign technology is assimilated through imitation with limited progress on new 
product innovation. Smith (1997: 746) further points out that in order to avoid dependence on 
foreign-based transnational capital, the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) was very 
limited in Korea. In fact, Evans (1987a: 207) argues that either transnational corporations or 
a significant role of foreign direct investment had been virtually absent from the scene until 
as late as the 1960s because the geopolitical risks made both Taiwan and Korea very 
unattractive investment sites. 
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Not only did economic development have been an explicit role in the building or rebuilding: 
of national identity but it may also provide the independent capacity to break away from a 
dependency situation (Castells, 1992: 57; Johnson. 1987: 140). Since the late 1980s the 
overarching economic development strategies began to be influenced by the nature of global 
economic restructuring. Responding to this, for example, a productive capacity of 
multinational corporations (i. e. foreign direct investment) in Korea began to grow greatly 
from 1987 and maintain an average 43.08 per cent annual growth rate from 1987 to 1998 
(Figure 5.4; Appendix 13). 
Figure 5.4 Growth of FDI (1977-1998) 
Unit: thousand US $; Source: Appendix 13 
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To the developmental case of the Korean economy, Friedman and Friedman (1980: 57) argue 
that its economic growth strategy was highly selective in certain preferential industries and 
relied on private markets, thereby state intervention in markets was of less significant 
importance. Johnson (1987: 141) also argues that the high-growth economy was created by 
`market-conforming' methods of intervention in the economy. For the neoclassical 
economists, in other words, it was incentive measures of `market sustaining' rather than 
`market repressing' that resulted in economic growth in Korea (Lim, Youngil, 1981: 4-8 
requoted from Johnson, 1987: 141). 
While these neoclassical economic accounts provide us little explanation about the ways in 
which external forces change conditions under which a national economy operates, 
dependency theories have given rise to the valuable linkage between strategy-directed 
interpretation and conditions of economic changes in the international economic 
environment. To the contemporary potential for further development of the economies of the 
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NICs, dependency theorist or dependency theory revisionists view that peripheral countries 
are vulnerable to the effects of economic and political decisions made in the metropole (i. e. 
core). Evans (1987a, 1987b), for example, argues that this vulnerability in turn stimulates the 
increasing centrality of state intervention in order to avoid the negative consequences of 
dependence. In comparison, world systems or market systems theorists emphasise the 
significance of exogenous variables in the international political and economic structures. 
Cummings (1984a) and Gereffi (1989), for instance, employ the concept of semiperipheral 
countries as an intermediate stratum that promotes the three-tiered world economy. They 
argue that semiperipheral countries' downward move can be resisted by their capability but 
their upward mobility from the semiperiphery to the core, not from the periphery to the 
semiperiphery, in the world system is highly unlikely (Wallerstein, 1974 quoted in Gereffi, 
1989: 508). 
Economic changes necessitate dramatic and rapid shifts in economic structure and external 
economic relations (Deyo, 1987a: 16). It is the competitive vulnerability of a guided 
(centrally managed, state-oriented) economy that has brought about the idea of a global 
economy within a social and political context of Korea. The domestic financial system is a 
key variable in a guided economy. However, its international competitive power has been 
undermined by the increasing openness of the boundaries, thereby generating a turning point. 
For many (e. g. Castells, 2001; Soros, 2001; Volcker, 2001), this structure of the financial 
system has been a critical weakness in the economy and a key determinant of the financial 
crisis in East Asia. 
In sum, much that has been discussed acknowledges the importance of conditionality within 
which epochal changes occur and operate. The `new international division of labour' thesis 
accounts for the rapid rise of newly developing industries from the international relocation 
of low-skilled manufacturing to cheap wage areas in the Third World. The `production 
flexibility' thesis or the `post-Fordist production' thesis on the other hand explains that the 
knowledge-intensive `high-technology' industries have attracted particular attention within 
rapidly shifting conditions in international markets. Nonetheless, the key argument 
underlying the relationship between international and domestic conditions lies in the 
, significance of the 
domestic pattern of economic, social and political organisation (Gereffi, 
1989: 5-16). These different accounts have commonly been criticised when the significance 
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of the contextual specificity comes into consideration. Gereffi (1989) argues that this 
contextual specificity allows distinctive developmental patterns to emerge within particular 
historical and social situations. Thus, the given conditions and optional choices are likely to 
operate and even to be manipulated by the government within a strategic capacity. The ways 
in which domestic politics is restructured in response to changes in international 
competitiveness are the subject of the next section. 
5.3 Restructuring Politics in an Age of Globalisation 
Pierson (2001a: 12) argues that societal changes are more than likely to be governed by the 
powerful force of path dependency. Esping-Andersen (2000: 64-66) further points out that 
breaks in the `time series' are virtually unidentifiable, thereby only epochal changes are 
witnessed. This view that social and economic policies develop in a path dependent way is 
shared by many scholars in conjunction with globalisation (e. g. Giaimo, 2001; Myles and 
Pierson, 2001; Pierson, 1993,2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b; Shin, Dong-Myeon, 2000b; 
Wood, 2001). It is globalisation that has made socioeconomic and political variables 
embedded in the spheres of society, state, and market become increasingly intertwined. 
Furthermore, there is little doubt that paths of economic development have important 
implications for the overarching paradigm of social policy. Ö Riain (2000: 191) argues that 
these paths are determined by mechanisms which reconcile tensions between market, state, 
and society. These tensions are at the same time inherent dilemmas in a capitalist economy. 
While social policy is one of the mechanisms that could reconcile these tensions, multiple 
determinants from different spheres may also shape the structure of social policy. 
Globalisation provides the conditions under which society, state and market become 
intermingled in a complex way. This is an epochal, dynamic and path-dependent process 
which requires an historical analysis of the politics of social policy. For these reasons, this 
section analyses the ways in which globalisation has impacted on domestic politics and 
argues that restructuring domestic politics in an era of globalisation makes a difference in the 
effect of social policy. 
5.3.1 Productivity, Globalisation and Social Welfare 
Globalisation parallels with an increasing capital flow at international and transnational 
levels. In economic terms, it is primarily preoccupied with the openness of the market 
economy (Caste lls. 1997; IMF, 2000). Globalisation can be defined as `a situation where 
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distinct national economies cease to exist in that they are subsumed and rearticulated into the 
system by international processes and transactions', while internationalisation may refer to 
an `extension of the national' in `international economic activity' (Mishra, 1999: 4). 
Although these definitions are seen as ideal types in the sense that they are not `necessarily 
mutually exclusive', Mishra (1999: 4) points out that `what we have today is more akin to 
greater internationalization than globalization'. For this reason, globalisation may remain 
possible as a further development. 
In the origins of globalisation, Garrett and Lange (1991) argue that the market becomes 
beyond control of the nation state power which in turn no longer validates a Keynesian 
notion of state intervention in the market. The Keynesian welfare state is the typical form of 
the Fordist state. The key Fordist distinctiveness that features a phase of capital 
accumulation is transformed by globalisation to post-Fordist welfare arrangements of what 
Jessop (1993,1994) calls the `Schumpeterian workfare state'. In other words, this 
Schumpeterian workfare state prioritises a productivist notion of international 
competitiveness over redistributive welfare rights. In Harvey's (1989: 141-142) terms, 
globalisation also reflects the idea of increasing reliance on the demands of `flexibility' as 
opposed to `rigidity' of the inherent contradictions of capitalism. Pierson (1994a: 99) also 
points out that these demands resulted from the politico-economic crisis of Fordism which 
manifested itself in the historically unprecedented form of stagflation. In Britain, this 
transformation changed an existing social policy framework to a more productivist and 
disciplinary one. Glennerster (1995: 160), for example, notes that Conservatives and even 
Labour in the mid-1970s re-conceptualised social policy to prioritise economic growth over 
social spending. Many have argued that this re-conceptualised social policy has since been 
deeply embodied in the British welfare state (e. g. Barr and Coulter, 1991: 24; Dean and 
Taylor-Gooby, 1992: 55; Jessop, 1994: 24). 
This epochal transformation may also evolve from the insistence that state welfare has been 
provided by deeply and inevitably flawed instruments of large bureaucratic organisations. 
Wilding (1997: 717-724) argues that state welfare has equally been ineffective, inefficient 
and unresponsive, thereby causing a consumerist social policy to emerge. However, the 
causes that may have brought about the retrenchment of welfare in Britain were irrelevant to 
the case of Korea. As Cho (1992), Kwon (1997,1998b, 1999a) and Shin (2000a. 2000b, 
III 
2000c) argue, the state in Korea has never been a major provider of welfare. 
Nonetheless, the 
outcomes and effects in which globalisation has impacted on the economy appear to 
be in a 
similar direction. 
As Kwon (1993b, 1999) argues, the strategies of state building in Korea have been almost 
exclusively guided by a tight regulation in most areas of government policies. Prioritising 
economic growth over social policies was part of its growth strategies. However, this view 
that a tight regulation was a key cause of market failure in 1997 was challenged by many 
political economists. As Chang (1998), Chang, Park and Yoo (1998) and Wade (1998a, 
1998b) argue, for example, it was under-regulation rather than over-regulation that caused 
the crisis which should also be considered as a financial crisis, not an economic crisis. For 
them, the first civilian government since 1963 initiated this under-regulation of financial 
system. In fact, President Kim (1993) made clear in the 14th President Inaugural Address on 
25 February 1993 that by `reinventing new Korea', an overly close relationship between 
businesses and government bureaucrats must be liberalised and reformed. In other words, 
this negative connection between an economy and politics, also known as `cronyism', `crony 
capitalism', `Oriental despotism', `Asiatic absolutism' or `alliance capitalism' in the 
literature (e. g. Chang, Palma and Whittaker, 1998: 649; Wade, 1998a: 1540), was the result 
that the Korean developmental state produced. 
To this end and to modernise the national economy within the ever more competitive 
international economy, previously known as the five-year economic development plan since 
1962 became the new five-year economic development plan (July 1993-July 1997). Given 
this framework, the central task for the promotion of welfare was to develop a Koreanised 
social welfare model. Growth and distribution were to be given equal weight while 
guaranteeing a minimum living standard for all as well as promoting the quality of life. 
Social policy was interpreted as a mechanism which could link human development and 
labour motivation with social investment. This linkage was based on the premise that social 
welfare would be able to contribute to the overall growth potentiality. At the World Summit 
for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995, President Kim said that: 
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`The Republic of Korea is now pursuing a policy of... globalization, with the domestic aim 
of developing our nation into a truly advanced society... based on this policy direction, we 
will give special consideration to the support of relatively neglected areas of social 
development which have been so far overshadowed by the pursuit of economic growth' 
(Kim, Young-Sam, 1995). 
Working in collaboration with economic growth and social development became a 
fashionable idea. However, the idea of productive welfare was restrained to be abstract in 
practice. Welfare for all was deemed to be a concomitant of a society dominated by policies 
of competitive austerity. In conceptual terms, the idea of productivity constrains itself within 
the limited variations of time and space especially when it is engaged with the idea of welfare 
and when particularities rather than regularities come into ever more serious consideration 
(Baldwin, 1992; Castells, 1996,1997,1998,2000; Esping-Andersen, 2000). 
Esping-Andersen (2000: 64) also argues that productivity has long been treated as if it was a 
static concept. Its fundamental meaning and content were routinely invoked, `un-reflected, 
taken-for-granted luggage' which was rather weak to be a harbinger of radical reformative 
actions. 
In fact, the then Minister of Health and Welfare emphasised a two-stage developmental 
strategy that enabled Korea to achieve both economic and social development. Through 
social insurance and public assistance, he argues, Korea was ranked by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) as one of the most improved countries in the human 
development index. For example, life expectancy at birth increased from 62 years in 1966 to 
72 years in 1991. The rate of absolute poverty had dropped sharply from 41 per cent to 4 per 
cent in 1995 (Suh, Sang-Mok, 1995). He made plain: 
`The first stage, from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, emphasized the `trickle-down' 
process in which economic growth benefits spilt over to the poor. Successful labor-intensive 
industrialization created jobs for the poor and helped many unemployed and underemployed 
to escape poverty ... 
[I]n the second stage, which started in the late 1970s and has continued 
to the present, social development policies were put into place to assist those who had fallen 
behind in receiving the benefits of our economic success. Thus various programs were 
carried out to improve social security through the social insurance system and public 
assistance programs' (Suh, Sang-Mok, 1995). 
`... policies should be developed gradually in steps, since economic growth and social 
development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. For example, if social 
development policies \N-ere pursued alone, it would be too much of a burden on the potential 
growth of a nation's cconomv' (Suh, Sang-Mok, 1995). 
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Working in collaboration with economic growth and social development may fulfil the 
argument that a level of social development should correspond to an appropriate level of 
economic development in order to pursue a globally applicable social standard (see Mishra, 
1998: 496). But, because of the practical policy orientation towards economic supremacy this 
strategy would be less likely to remain reformative. As Park (1995: 99) argues, this 
collaboration is likely to mean that the possible apex of development is confined within 
limits which the national wealth may reach. 
In sum, Hutton (2001: 4) argues that `globalisation is so powerful an idea because of the 
sense of there being no escape'. His general view that globalisation influences society seems 
somewhat pessimistic or middle range while Giddens (2001: 10) regards it rather 
optimistically as `more resonant with positive possibilities'. These contrasting viewpoints 
may well also be resonant with the distinction between `productive welfarism' and what 
Schumpeter (1954: 83) calls `creative destruction'. He describes `creative destruction' as 
destructive capitalism while maintaining the position that capitalism is a creative process 
with possible improvement (see also Schumpeter, 1947). Productive welfarism, on the other 
hand, may be a key element of constructive capitalism. As Giddens (2001: 10) points out, the 
constructive qualities of capitalism involve systems of power. Therefore, these systems of 
power are also an important variable in shaping productive welfarism. For this reason, 
globalisation may lead social policy to a particular direction that requires restructuring of 
institutions. The ways in which institutions were restructured and productive welfarism was 
constructed in a new order are the subject of the next two sections. 
5.3.2 Restructuring Institutions 
lt was its long-standing reformist activists and supporters that eventually enabled the 
opposition party to be in power for the first time in Korean political history. Since its 
inception in February 1998, therefore, the Kim Dae-Jung government has been burdened 
with promulgating the promise of democratic consolidation to these groups. The Kim 
government and his National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) were initially a coalition 
`zo\'ernment with the United Liberal Democrats (ULD) under the party leadership of Kim 
Jong-Pil. Having possessed a rather conservative party platform, Kim Jong-Pil's political 
status no longer remains to be minuscule. As a premier, he could also exercise his influence 
in one of the most important institutions of core executive decision-making: the 
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vice-ministers' meeting. In addition, his party was given power of a final 'casting vote' 
(Jung, Yong-Duck, 1999: 13). The reformative actions could not be straightforward for these 
reasons. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the two most influential institutions where important decisions 
were configured were the Economic Planning Board (1961-1994) and the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency (1961- 1998). Almost all socioeconomic issues were under the control 
of these two super-power institutions. They were invincible political institutions subject to 
authoritarian governments. The EPB was the most effective and comprehensive central 
agency placed under a deputy premier. Johnson (1987: 154) and Jung (1999: 18) point out that 
its establishment was a strategic power concentration within all responsible governmental 
economic powers in order to defuse the crisis that had resulted from the end of foreign aid by 
the United States. The EPB not only absorbed all economic powers that had previously been 
dispersed to the Ministry of Reconstruction, the Bureau of the Budget under the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) and the Bureau of Statistics under the Ministry of Home Affairs. But also it 
integrated the budget preparation power of all administrative agencies and the supervisory 
power of their budget implementation. The creation of the KCIA was, on the other hand, 
more closely related to the political empowerment of state apparatus as an independent 
political organisations. 
Financial liberalisation or deregulation since the early 1980s had been rather modest and 
slow both in terms of speed and order (Park, Won-Am, 1996). It was the Kim Young-Sam 
government (1993-1998) that accelerated the liberalisation process both in financial markets 
and institutional structure. Not only did infrastructure pressures require a response but also 
there were external demands for financial market liberalisation from the application for 
membership of the OECD in 1993 (Chang, Park and Yoo, 1998). The government initiated 
the administrative rationalisation process (i. e. downsizing) and institutional adjustment for 
the `poorly constructed 100-day Plan for the New Economy' (Chang, Park and Yoo, 
S 
The KCIA was established by decree of June 10 1961. The key figures of the Korean politics were 
director generals of this institution. For example, Kim, Jong-Pil from 1961 to 1963, Kim, Jae-kyu, the 
assassin of President Park, from 1976-1979, and Chun, Doo-Hwan in 1980. The KCI was then 
renamed as the Agency for National Security Planning in 1981 and again as the National Intelligence 
tie twice in 1999. 
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1998: 739). As part of it, the EPB was merged with the Ministry of Finance in December 
1994 which in turn created the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoFE). By this merger, 
both functions of economic policymaking and implementation that used to belong to the 
EPB and to the MoF have begun to reside in the MoFE. 
The creation of this super-ministry was criticised because the financial crisis was a resonance 
of the strategic failure in the MoFE and because functional and structural balance between 
planning and implementation had no way to be monitored. In 1998, therefore, the Kim 
Dae-Jung government reformed the role of the MoFE by establishing the Committee for 
Planning and Budget. By merging it with the Bureau of Budget, the Committee for Planning 
and Budget became the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MoPB) on 24 March 1999. The 
rationale behind the establishment of the MoPB was highly strategic both in economic and 
political terms. The coherent, coordinative and even centralised function that used to reside 
in the EPB was resurrected in expectation of the cost effective management of budgeting. 
More importantly, while it is the Premier that is to appoint the deputy premiership of the 
MoFE the appointment of the Minister of Planning and Budget is to be decided by the 
President. By bringing back in the power of budget reform, budget-related functions, and 
both public and administrative sector reform that resides in the MoPB, the MoFE was 
downgraded and became simply one of the government's ministries. In short, this strategic 
manoeuver has eventually enabled both the President and the state to exercise their power in 
spite of the politically limited capacity. 
Much that has been said relates to what happens inside government without being 
interrupted by much external force. However, institutions like the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC) established on 1 April 1998 were the result of the agreement empowered 
by the IMF in order to oversee and facilitate all restructuring, thereby building a sound and 
strong financial infrastructure for the national economy. The FSC had since been the 
integrated financial supervisor as a de facto single financial regulator. In other words, the 
FSC had undertaken the overall design of the restructuring programme in financing. This 
important function however has been taken over by the Committee of the Public Fund 
Management under the MoFE. Although the financial institutions are still subject to the 
supervision of a single supervisory body: the Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) and the 
Fair Trade Commission (FTC) has maintained its power to control overly large businesses 
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(DDN, 28 January 2001), the overall role of both the FSC and its executive arm, the FSS was 
downgraded. The MoFE has taken over the functions of designing the restructuring of 
financial institutions and conglomerates. 
In sum, the corporate, financial and public sectors and labour affairs were the four major 
areas that the government targeted for restructuring the economy. The Kim Dae-Jung 
government has restructured institutions to the directions in which those ends could be met. 
It was domestic politics that was given attention in restructuring the economy in an era of 
globalisation in order to achieve institutional power concentration. In other words, much of 
these reforms relates to reshaping domestic politics given the framework of three governing 
principles (i. e. liberal democracy, market economy and productive welfarism), of which 
productive welfarism provides the ideological basis of social policy reforms6. How have 
these social policy reforms been guided by productive welfarism? What is the meaning of 
productive welfarism? And what are the social policy implications? These are the questions 
that we now turn to answer. 
5.3.3 Productive Welfarism 
Largely drawn from Marxist ideas and subsequently developed by Giddens (1984), Bhaskar 
(1998: 19) argues that `historical things are structured and differentiated (more or less 
unique) ensembles of tendencies, liabilities and powers; and historical events are their 
transformations'. Principally known as a structure and agency (i. e. social institutions and a 
human agency) debate or a determinism and choice conflict in the area of public policy, 
political choices are more likely to be exercised by ideological preferences. Their practical 
manipulation is conditioned upon the capacity of the social infrastructure or `human 
possibilities' according to Piven (1995: 114). In other words, both political choices and 
ideological preferences should be given permission to be translated into practice within 
which the conditions are allowed (Cameron, 1978: 1257; Castles, 1981: 123). 
il 
For example, the Ministry of Education was renamed to the Ministry of Education and Human 
Resources Development (MoEHRD), the Minister of which became one of the two deputy premier 
together with the Minister of Finance and Economy. The former Presidential Commission on 
Women's Affairs became upgraded to the Ministry of Gender Equality (\IoGE). This %IoGE hits 
since taken over gender issues from the MoL and the MoHW. The MoL also passed much of their 
man-power policy to the MoEHRD. For the MoL, in other words, all the functions surrounding the 
issues of human development and gender have been taken away (CDN, 28 January 2(X)1: DD\, 2 
January 001 Korea herald, 30 January 2)01). 
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In addition to the institutional power concentration, the affirmation of both liberal 
democracy and market economy became the socioeconomic and political bases of the 
Korean welfare state construction where productive welfarism is given central attention. As 
Bismarckian social insurance was used as a nation-building strategy in Germany, social 
policy in Korea became more explicitly an expression of nation-building, so that the welfare 
state became a political project of nation-building to a large extent. Productivist social policy 
has become an official dogma in Korea. According to Holliday (2000), East Asian welfare 
states are a fourth welfare regime that features productivist welfare capitalism within which 
social policy is subordinated to economic policy. But according to the assistant secretary to 
the President for health and welfare in the office of the President, the core meaning of 
productive welfarism lies within the paradigm of the `complementary relationship between 
the development of the national economy and systems of welfare rather than a contradiction 
between the two' (Interview with Noh, Yun-Hong, 10 August 2000, Seoul). He clarifies that 
the politicisation of welfare ideology has gone through a very radical process. Initiated by the 
President himself, welfare ideology has become the grand framework of the governing 
philosophy. 
`Productive welfare should not be seen as another political manoeuvre which has simply 
been worded differently from what it used to be named in order to justify residual 
welfare... conventional usage of the concept of productivity may have referred to an opposite 
concept of active welfare policies or of the positive welfare state in which residual welfare 
is deemed to be desirable especially when it comes to a combination of the concept of 
welfare and of effectiveness or of productivity. It is evidenced by the expansion of welfare 
programmes followed by national agendaisation under the current government. It however 
no longer remains merely a slogan... Welfare is important yet it seems to have been 
somewhat consumption-oriented, wasteful and unhelpful to enhance work-incentives. For 
example, when the amount of pocket money for a child is decided, the parents should take 
account of how it would be spent and how much might be appropriate. This might help him 
not only to develop his economic awareness, but also to become relatively better-off. 
Besides, it may not impose a heavy burden on the household economy. On the other hand, 
if the pocket money is given unplanned - especially when the money is too much, the 
situation becomes worse - and if the money is not spent on where it is supposed to be, it may 
spoil the child; it may impose a heavy burden on family finance; and it may fail to develop 
economic awareness. The former case can be named as productive and the latter is 
consumption-oriented' (Interview with Noh, Yun-Hong, 10 August 2000, Seoul). 
The circumstantial conditions under which welfare became realised and prioritised were the 
process of democratic politicisation. The political mind of those in power, especially that of 
the President, turned to take welfare positively to the economy. The financial crisis that 
brought in the IMF intervention has also been critical in the ideological nation-building 
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process. The society with the immature social safety net has proven to be very vulnerable to 
competitive international openness. All these factors enabled welfare policies to become a 
national agenda without strong opposition. An Assistant Secretary to the President for Health 
and Welfare in the Office of the President made plain: 
`The decision made by the President had been the key determinant of the introduction of 
welfare programmes. Especially under the authoritarian political structure, the expansion of 
welfare programmes within the economic growth priority circle had been determined by 
what the President had had in his mind about welfare. The introduction of the Health 
Insurance Programme (1977) and that of the National Pension Programme (1988) were the 
key examples... Even under the democratic rule, however, the political mind of the President 
still remains very crucial... Under the current political leadership, whose thoughts on welfare 
have been ever more profound than anyone else, welfare policies have been comparatively 
prioritised even under the IMF intervention. Also, the need to develop the social safety net 
has come to a national consensus. Political decisions have been made under these socially 
necessitated conditions in order to protect the vulnerable. In this sense, circumstantial 
conditions behind the radical progress may have similarities with what occurred during the 
period of the labour movement in the late 1980s' (Interview with Noh, Yun-Hong, 10 
August 2000, Seoul). 
Given this ideological framework, productive welfarism has delivered important social 
policy bearing. Inconsistent policy measures have been criticised by both the public and 
those in power. This criticism results mainly from the lack of a mechanism inside the 
government that allows for effective coordination of a series of policies made by different 
agencies (Korea Herald, 30 January 2001). The Minister of Finance and Economy has now 
been given the authority to coordinate various economic agencies in the policy-making 
process. His authority is exercised without being politically influenced by the populist 
considerations of those in power, thereby guaranteeing the post is politically independent. 
The overarching functions of the MoFE have thus become increasingly similar to those of the 
EPB but still substantially less than those of the EPB because it is the MoPB that holds the 
budgeting power. 
Productive welfarism also enabled human resources development to become the central 
concern of education policy. The creation of the MoEHRD had been envisioned by the 
President since his inauguration but had been postponed because of his pre-election promise 
to maintain a small government. In fact, while there was a slight decrease in the number of 
government employees in 1982 and 1995, the number became substantially reduced in 1998. 
This negative growth in the number of government employees was maintained in 1999 (see 
Appendix 14). 
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Reforms in education are to achieve long-term solutions to the social polarisation of wealth 
in which productive welfare is to provide social and ideological bases. Educational 
enthusiasm has long been of one of the unique characteristics of Korean society as evidenced 
by a high rate of continuity at higher level education. For example, while a middle school and 
high school advance rate reached nearly 100 per cent from the early 1990s, the higher 
education advance rate has equally increased greatly and recorded 68.0 per cent in 2000 (see 
Appendix 15). This educational enthusiasm may have resulted from prolonged tradition of 
Confucian ethics where those who achieve the highest possible scholarly activities are 
privileged to become higher ranking officials in a societal hierarchy. This may also have 
derived from the positive co-relation between educational attainment and wage levels. In 
fact, the income gap between those who have attained higher education and those who have 
not has been narrowed over time since the late 1980s but still remains substantially high. 
Wage differentials between males and females also remain substantially unequal. For 
females, the higher their education level becomes, the closer to the wage levels of their male 
counterparts. In other words, educational attainment on a higher level seems to provide the 
only solution for the female labour force to become more equal to their male counterparts 
(see Appendix 17). 
Those who believed that school education was either `very' or `moderately' effective in 
knowledge and skill attainment reduced from 52.2 per cent in 1993 to 45.3 per cent in 1996 
while those who viewed that school education was either `very' or `moderately' ineffective in 
knowledge and skill attainment increased from 9.8 per cent in 1993 to 11.5 per cent in 1996. 
For character building purposes, 39.4 per cent of respondents answered that school education 
was either `very' or `moderately' effective in 1993 but this percentage dropped to 31.4 per 
cent in 1996. In comparison, those who believed that school education was either `very' or 
`moderately' ineffective in character building purposes rose from 17.2 per cent in 1993 to 
22.1 per cent in 1996 (NSO, 2000c: 264-265). Government policies on education were seen 
by the public as policies without any degree of consistency. For example, the Minister of 
Education was already replaced six times by the 29th of January 2001 within 3 years (CDN, 
29 January 2001). 
In sum, under the guidance of productive welfarism, government institutions have been 
restructured and education policy has been given particular attention. However, it remains 
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largely unclear whether a set of policy reforms would result in a solid social basis for further 
reforms. By restructuring institutions and reforming social policy, the government is seeking 
to reassure the fears and doubts of the public. The Vice-Minister of Health and Welfare for 
example said that `the government aims to elevate the nation to a world leading welfare state 
by the year 2010 by eliminating poverty, fostering the middle class and improving the 
welfare for the lower class ... 2000 
is the year in which we will lay the groundwork for such 
a welfare state' (Lee, Jong-Yun, quoted from the interview held with the Korea Herald, 25 
February 2000). For this reason, it remains as an important empirical enquiry to examine the 
ways in which ideational change towards productive welfarism has made a difference in 
public opinion and attitudes at the crossroads. 
5.3.4 Discussion: Changes in Public Opinion and Public Attitudes 
Gunn (1989: 262) views public opinion as a `political relation of citizen and government in 
more general social processes'. Taylor-Gooby (1985: 22-23) further points out that `opinion 
surveys provide an account of the general structure of political ideas that is difficult to obtain 
from any other source. Provided the evidence is interpreted with care it may help in assessing 
issues about the contribution of changes in public ideas to public policy'. By establishing the 
context within which policy debates are conducted, Moore (1988: 75) argues, ideas become 
influential and create a `reason for someone to take action by setting out the public value or 
necessity of the act and by giving the action a social meaning that is accessible to both the 
person who takes the action and others who are its audience or object. In this way ideas both 
motivate and direct action'. For this reason, the sorts of ideas that matter reflect values and 
attitudes of the public. 
Shin and Rose (1998: 3-4) argue that for Kim Dae-Jung who has democratic credentials 
because of his decades-long fight against undemocratic rule, an economy in trouble, 
uncertainty about how long its recovery may take, and who would be winners and losers were 
important political questions to be answered. By comparing the level of trust in 1996 and 
1997, levels of trust in the majority of people increased from 60 to 70 per cent but at the same 
time, interestingly, levels of trust in most institutions (e. g. courts, police, military, civil 
servants, political parties and National Assembly) decreased on average 16.7 per cent. 
Munro (1998: 48) argues that the changes in levels of institutional trust from 1996 reflect the 
damage caused by the implication of the government in corruption. This high level of 
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corruption was however substantially reduced by 1998 when the Kim Dae-Jung government 
came in power. According to the 1998 New Korea Barometer Survey (Shin and Rose, 
1998: 23), 69 per cent of the public described the level of political corruption of the Kim 
Dae-Jung government as either `low' or `very low' while 85 per cent of the public answered 
that the level of political corruption of the Kim Young-Sam government was either `high' or 
`very high'. 
Despite this result, public attitudes over democratisation were undermined by the financial 
crisis. In 1997,69 per cent of a total 1,117 nationwide representative sample agreed most 
with `democracy is preferable to any other kind of government' while only 20 per cent said 
that `under certain situations, a dictatorship is preferable' (Shin and Rose. 1997: 21). 
According to the 1999 New Korea Barometer Survey (Shin and Rose, 2000: 24) undertaken 
by Gallup Korea between 3 and 15 November 1999, however, 53 per cent out of a total 1,007 
nationwide representative sample chose the statement that `democracy is always preferable 
to any other kind of government', while 31 per cent answered that `under certain situations, 
a dictatorship is preferable'. The remaining 16 per cent answered `it does not matter whether 
we have a democratic government or nondemocratic government'. From the same survey, 45 
per cent of the public answered that a rule by a dictator like Park Chung-Hee is the best way 
to sort out the economic problems while 50 per cent said that a democratically elected 
president is better. 
These changes may have been forced by external forces that provided a multi-billion dollar 
loan in return for substantial restructuring of major business conglomerates and banks, 
partners with politicians in past economic growth (Shin and Rose, 1998: 3). But while the 
combination of domestic and external factors was responsible for the outbreak of the crisis 
(Chang, Ha-3oon, 1998), Hayo and Shin (2002: 21) conclude that Koreans tend to weigh 
`domestic measures much more heavily than international ones' as the particular strategies 
for economic recovery. In fact, a large majority of the Korean adult population (78 per cent) 
mentioned the cosy relationship between government and the business conglomerates that 
contributed most to the economic problems in Korea. Democratic regime replacing military 
rule was the factor that contributed least to the outbreak of the crisis (Hayo and Shin, 2002: 7; 
Shin and Rose, 1998). 
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Table 5.1 Public Opinion and Public Attitudes over the Two National Goals (per cent) 
Nov. 1993 May 1997 Oct. 1998 Nov. 1999 
Economic development 49 54 65 50 
Democratisation 26 9 8 14 
Equally important 25 37 26 36 
Don't Know 0 0 1 0 
Note: Respondents were asked to choose one from the following question: Between the two national goals of 
democratisation and economic development, which do you think is more important? 
Sources: (Shin, Doh Chull, 1999: 253; Shin and Rose, 1997: 22,1998: 35,2000: 26). 
Table 5.1 shows how people's attitudes and value orientations in prioritising democratisation 
as a national development goal in relation to economic development have changed. In 1993, 
49 per cent of a total 1,198 nationwide representative sample were in favour of economic 
development over democratic reform while 26 per cent chose democratisation over 
economic development. Before the financial crisis in 1997,54 per cent answered that 
economic development was more important while only 9 per cent answered vice versa and 
37 per cent answered that both were equally important. To this outstanding change, Shin 
(1999: 252) argues that economic development outweighs democratic development by an 
overwhelming margin which implies that `a majority of the Korean people would withdraw 
their support for democratic reforms whenever they saw those reforms interfering with 
economic development'. The financial crisis made this propensity more explicit. During the 
financial crisis, for example, 65 per cent of the public prioritised economic development 
over democratisation, while only 8 per cent answered democratisation was more important. 
However, after the financial crisis in 1999,50 per cent favoured economic development over 
democratisation and 14 per cent answered vice versa. 36 per cent replied that both were 
equally important. It is therefore interesting to note that the percentage of those who support 
economic development actually decreased after the financial crisis. For this, one might argue 
that the public might have seen the national economy back in shape. But in fact, the mean 
value that the public evaluated for the situation before and after the crisis was not restored by 
changing from 5.7 to 4.7 on a scale of 1 to 10 (10 represents the country as the best possible 
place to live) (Shin and Rose, 2000: 41). 
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Further to this, as discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2). the ways in which ordinary citizens 
view the state's responsibility for individual welfare changed greatly along with the financial 
crisis (Shin and Rose, 1997: 28,1998: 35). This change in value orientations of the public was 
in fact one of the driving forces that enabled the old public assistance system to be reformed. 
However, while public attitudes over the state's responsibility for individual's security 
greatly increased, there was little change in public opinion towards egalitarian values. In 
1997,32 per cent of the respondent answered that incomes should be more equal while 68 
per cent said that individual achievement should determine pay (Shin and Rose, 
1997: 27-28). In 1998,33 per cent responded that `incomes should be made more equal so 
there are no big differences in the standard of living' while 66 per cent said that `individual 
achievement should determine pay; more successful people should be paid more' (Shin and 
Rose, 1998: 35). In other words, it remained largely unchanged for Koreans to favour reward 
for merit rather than equity in determining pay. Given this, the point that should be clarified 
from the analysis of public opinion is that as Taylor-Gooby (1985: 22) points out, public 
attitudes and their structures may be of considerable instability over time. As public opinion 
towards economic development shows (Table 5.1), figures representing people's attitudes 
over the state's responsibility or egalitarian values might have undergone a certain degree of 
instability over time. Since not all the questions have been asked in a consistent manner, it is 
hard to analyse how public attitudes have changed over a longer period of time. Nonetheless, 
it is still fair to conclude that the financial crisis in 1997 brought about a great deal of changes 
in ideas, policies and institutions. 
In sum, the three governing philosophies articulated by the Kim Dae-Jung government might 
have been correctly addressed in balancing the development of economy, democracy and 
welfare. Of all it is productive welfarism that leads this balance to be more sustainable by 
giving due weight to `productivity' and `welfare rights'. To this end, the ideas in shaping 
social policy have been playing a mediating role. All in all, the argument such that 
restructuring domestic politics at the crossroads makes a difference in the effect of social 
policy should be seen by the context within which ideas might produce material effects that 
may act as constraints on policy; and by the conditions under which ideas establish the 
assumptions, justifications. purposes, and means of public action. By evaluating the politics 
of poverty under the conditions of uncertainty that the economic crisis has brought in, the 
outcomes of -ocial policy are the subject of the next two sections. 
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5.4 The Politics of Poverty: How Does Politics Matter in Protecting the Vulnerable? 
Limited resources in society have always been the greatest obstacle to achieving social 
justice (Goodin, 1985a: 1). Though the welfare state might not be a perfect instrument for 
achieving social justice and social equality, its primary goal still remains to relieve the 
distress of those who are more vulnerable than others (Goodin, 1985c, 1988: Ch. 1 and Ch. 3). 
Therefore, the welfare state is the political and principal mechanism which distributes these 
limited social resources, often already dispersed in the market, to those who need them most 
(Goodin, 1985b: 145; Ringen, 1987a). Because the value premise of social policy lies in the 
increasing assumption of collective responsibility, social policy provides the underlying 
principles behind the operation of the welfare state which is thought of as being explicitly 
redistributive (Titmuss, 1958: 42-43,1987a: 208). The greatest complexity and uncertainty 
of the emergence of the welfare state lie where and when systems of welfare fail to protect 
those who are deemed to be vulnerable. Although not all the social welfare programmes were 
designed to protect the vulnerable, Bradshaw (1999: 12) argues that poverty is still the best 
symptom of the failure of the welfare state as an outcome measure of welfare state effort. For 
this reason, the issues of poverty and equality have always been centred around the debate in 
the welfare state and social policy. 
It has legally been required to measure Minimum Living Standards (MLS)7 every five years 
in accordance with the previous Public Livelihood Protection Act (Clause 3, Art. 5) and the 
current National Basic Livelihood Security Act (Clause 3, Art. 6). In addition, another legal 
requirement has been given to the state to make a public announcement on the basis of the 
Basic Act for Social Security enacted in 1995 (Clause 2, Art. 10). The Minister of Health and 
Welfare has been in charge of making a decision on a level of the minimum cost of living and 
to publicise it by 1 December every year according to the reformed Public Livelihood 
Protection Act in 1997. 
7 
Minimum Living Standards are defined as `a minimum cost of living required for citizens to maintain 
sound and civilised lives' (Public Livelihood Protection Act, Clause 5, Art. 2: National Basic 
Livelihood Security Act, Clause 6, Art. 2). Minimum Living Standards are used as a basis of the 
benefit scale levels in Korea. In Britain, however, Minimum Living Standards and Minimum Income 
Standards seem to he identically used partly because (Governmental) Minimum Income Standards are 
defined as the `, standards governments use for assessing the adequacy of their income maintenance 
policies' (Veit-Wilson, 1999: 81) and partly because their vulnerability towards political 
considerations in which scientific criticality sometimes fails to be given full attention. 
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The think tank of the MoHW, the KIHSA, has conducted research on MLS three times since 
1989. The latest results in 1999 however were procedurally different from the previous 
research results both in 1989 and in 1994 in that they were publicly announced by the 
Minister of Health and Welfare. A public announcement is now required after the research 
results have been seen by the Central Committee for Livelihood Protection. This change 
might have evolved from increasing interests that citizens' groups have manifested and from 
growing income disparities and poverty since the financial crisis. Kim (2000: 6) argues that 
the significance of MLS may have been increasingly realised by this financial crisis. 
The ways in which poverty is measured have always been one of the most controversial 
issues within the study of social policy because, as many have argued8, its theoretically 
diverse arguments have been highly contentious and because its policy implications tend to 
contain multiple dimensions. Gordon and Spicker (1999: 105) and Kwon (1998: 35) argue 
that Minimum Living Standards are sometimes the poverty threshold to be applied to a 
criterion of the adequacy of the minimum wage or social security provisions such as the 
public assistance programme and the benefit level of social insurance. Nonetheless, MLS 
should not be confused with poverty lines because `Minimum Income Standards' are based 
on `political consideration of acceptability' (Gordon and Spicker, 1999: 105). Their primary 
`political reflection', Veit-Wilson (1999: 83) further argues, is likely to constitute 
`government's values, ideology and electoral considerations'. By contrast, poverty lines are 
meant to be based on scientific measures which in turn require MLS to be measured by a 
scientific and transparent method. Further to this, because the concept of poverty itself is 
highly controversial, how it should be measured is equally problematic. Poverty may be 
variously defined over time to the extent which the objectives, methods, and even a value 
judgement of those who actually measure it. In other words, political and economic 
(budgetary) decisions are often incorporated with whether the operational concept of poverty 
should be based on the notion of MLS (relative) or that of minimum subsistence (absolute). 
8 
For example, see Atkinson (1993); Bradshaw (1996); Bradshaw, Mitchell and Morgan (1987); 
Donnison (1988); Douglas (1976); Ellison and Thompson (1994); George (1980); Glennerster 
(2000); Kwon, Soonwon (1993a): McLachlan (1983); Miller and Roby (1970): Novak (1996a); 
Novak (1995,1996b); Piachaud (1987,1993): Ringen (1985,1987a, 1987b, 1988); Sen (1983,1985 ): 
Townsend (1979,1983,1985,1987,1993); Veit-Wilson (1987); Walker (1987); Watts (1969); 
Wright (1995). 
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In Korea, there has been no generally accepted definition of poverty or poverty standard. The 
benefit scale poverty line has customarily been accepted as an official poverty line. Yet only 
five officially conducted studies are available while there have been a number of individual 
studies separately carried out using different methods. The CSS was the first official institute 
to undertake research on MLS in 1974. After its second research in 1979, three more official 
studies were carried out by the KIHSA in 1989,1994, and 1999. Table 5.2 summarises these 
studies that employed different methods. 
When converted into 2000 prices, their final results on MLS (i. e. poverty threshold or 
poverty standard) are in great diversity. A comparison however should be made with extreme 
caution because converted results do not necessarily reflect the living standard of the time 
being concerned. As clearly demonstrated in Table 5.2, risks are likely to become even 
higher as the gap between the point in time in comparison becomes wider. For this reason, 
substantial variations between different results may not be as significant as they first appear. 
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the critical gap still clearly exists and the differences are 
substantial. For example, funded by the Korea Development Institute (KDI), Suh's study 
(1979) measured the poverty threshold as 240,560 won. But the result was 3,654,317 won 
measured by the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), almost 7 times higher than 
Suh's result. In interpretative terms, this substantial difference might have resulted from 
different methods used, different point in time considered, and different regions concerned. 
However even when these issues are resolved, the FKTU's result is still substantially higher 
than the KIHSA's. 
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Table 5.2 Minimum Living Standards in Urban Households (households of five) (Unit: won 
Organisation/ Researcher (1) (2) Method Minimum living standards 
Current price 20002 
CSS 1973 1974 Engels 21,739 (whole country) 225,751 
Suh, Sang-Mok 1973 1979 Engels 23,165 (urban) 240,560 
CSS 1978 1978 Engels 168,240 (metropolitan) 771,365 
126,290 (urban) 566,160 
Yoon, Suk-Bum 1980 1980 Leyden 145,105 (urban) 436,393 
Chang, Hyeon-Jun 1984 1986 Rowntree 327,724(urban) 717,450 
Lee, Joong-Hee 1985 1986 Leyden 214,000 (urban) 457,764 
Bai, Moo-Ki et al. 1987 1987 Rowntree 623,811(urban) 1,259,021 
KIHSA 1988 1989 Rowntree 348,597 (urban) 656,659 
369,939 (metropolitan) 696,862 
Lee, Joung-Woo et al. 1989 1990 Leyden 432,000 (urban) 769,619 
Park, Tae-Kyu 1989 1991 Leyden 555,172 (Seoul) 989,053 
Ann, Byung-Kun 1991 1991 Rowntree 720,550 (Taeku) 1,082,161 
Cha, Heung-Bong et al. 1993 1994 Rowntree 746,627 (Chuncheon) 1,006,828 
KIHSA 1994 1994 Rowntree 763,817 (urban) 969,736 
817,401 (metropolitan) 1,037,766 
FKTU 1994 1994 Rowntree 2,077,619 (urban) 2,637,729 
KLI 1998 1998 Orshansky 1,590,067 (urban) 1,640,010 
FKTU 1999 1999 Rowntree 3,573,110 (urban) 3,654,317 
KCTU' 1999 1999 Rowntree 2,775,661(urban) 2,838,744 
KIHSA 1999 1999 Rowntree 1,024,843(urban) 1,048,135 
1,088,838 (metropolitan) 1,113,584 
CCLP3 2000 2000 Rowntree 1,055,588 (urban) 1,055,588 
1,121,503 (metropolitan) 1,121,503 
Notes: (1) Survey year, (2) Year of publication; 1. Households of four; 2. Constant prices based on the year 
2000,2000 prices are calculated separately by using CPI (1995=100 %); a conversion formula: CPI for 2000 
divided by each year's CPI, then multiplied by each year's MSL. For example, CPI in 2000 and in 1999 was 
121.5 and 118.8 respectively, when CPI in 1995 was considered to be 100 per cent. Therefore, 121.5 =118.8 
x l, 024,843 = 1,04$, 135.3. Estimated results applying 3 per cent anticipated consumer price increase in 
November 1999: metropolitan cities refer to six major cities including Seoul; urban areas refer to medium and 
small size cities. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table. data adopted and calculated from Kim, Mi-Gon (2000: 9,15-16); Lee, 
Jcung-Woo (1998: 1-14)-, NSO (1999a, 2001). 
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There are four significant problems that might have caused this significant difference 
between the estimates produced by the FKTU and other organisations. First, according to the 
National Statistical Office (NSO, 2000a, 2000c: 162), the average income of urban wage 
earners' households was only 2,224,743 won at current price in 1999. In other words, the 
FKTU's result was rather unrealistic. Second, the FKTU's estimates have been used as a 
rationale for wage increases during the wage negotiations which may have undermined their 
neutral position. Third, by limiting its estimation to urban areas, regional differences were 
ignored. Finally, the estimates were based on those who worked at highly labour intensive 
sectors, thereby bringing about the issues of generalisation (Park and Kim, 1998: 25). 
The results published by the KIHSA have been used as an official reference to determine the 
level of public assistance benefit scale. The minimum cost of living of one person per month 
in a two-person household rather than a one-person household in small and medium size 
cities set the standard for this state poverty line. The underlying political rationale might 
have been that the average number in poor households had been 1.72 persons during the 
period of 1991 to 1998 (MoHW, 1991-1998). However, because there had been no 
consistent measures on the minimum cost of living (i. e. MLS), it is very difficult to design 
a longitudinal frame that enables us to estimate the difference between the official poverty 
line and the scientific measure of MLS over time. For this reason, Figure 5.5 has been 
reconstructed by using a number of sources and adjusting the figures to Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) for relevant years. 
Figure 5.5 and Table 5.3 show that the minimum cost of living based on one-person per 
month in a two-person household almost has corresponded with the benefit scale poverty line 
since 1994. Further to this, the minimum cost of living based on the one-person household 
from 1993 to 2001 has been substantially higher than the benefit scale poverty line. This is 
a logical result because in principle the minimum cost of living (i. e. MLS) for one person per 
month in a more than one-person household is supposed to be lower than that in a one-person 
household. For this reason, if the minimum cost of living is measured on the basis of 
one-person per month in a four-person household, it is logically expected for MLS to be 
lower than the benefit scale poverty line. But in fact, the minimum cost of living for one 
person per month in a four-person household was higher than the benefit scale poverty line 
from 1980 to 1992 (Figure 5.5). 
229 
Figure 5.5 Benefit Scale Poverty Line and Monthly MLS 
(Unit: won, current prices) 
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Table 5.3 MLS and IES under the National Basic Livelihood Security Act 
Size of household 123 45 6 
2000 
MLS 324,011 536,614 738,076 928,398 1,055,588 1,191,134 
IES' 320,000 540,000 740,000 930,000 1,060,000 1,200,000 
2001 
MLS 333,731 552,712 760,218 956,250 1,087,256 1,226,868 
IES1 330,000 550,000 760,000 960,000 1,090,000 1,230,000 
Notes for Figure 5.5 and Table 5.3: 1. Income Estimated Standard as a poverty threshold under public 
assistance. 
* Data from 1980 to 1992 are based on one person per month in a four-person household. Data for 1993 and 
1995 to 1997 are calculated from MLS of medium-small cities (206,141 won) produced by the KIHSA in 1994 
(MIS for a one-person household), using CPI for relevant years. Data for 1998 are calculated from MLS of 
medium-small cities (314,574) produced by the KIHSA in 1999 (MLS for a one-person household), using CPI. 
Data for 2000 are calculated from the same source using the anticipated consumer price increase of 3 per cent. 
Data for 2001 are from the public notification made by the MoHW on 1 Dec. 2000. 
** Average monthly income per person. Data from 1991 to 1998 are based on the ls` category of the public 
assistant programme where those who belonged to this category were considered to be the poorest of the poor. 
Since 1999, all categories have been incorporated into a single standard. 
*** Data are calculated from 1994 and 1999 results provided by the KIHSA, using CPI. 
**** January to August in 1994. Beginning that year, the minimum wage was revised in September. The figure 
for 1995, for example, was in effect from September 1994 to August 1995. Until August 1999, the minimum 
wage applied to firms with 10 or more regular employees. Since September 1999, it has applied to those with 
five or more regular employees. 
Sources for Figure 5.10 and Table 5.3: JDN (25 September 2000); Kim, Mi-Gon (2000: 15-16); MoHW (May 
2000: 19,2000c); MoHSA/MoHW (various years from 1980 to 2000) Health and Welfare White Paper, Seoul: 
Mo11SA/MoHW: OECD (1996: 102,2000: 187); Park, Chanyong and Kim Meesook (1998: 22-32); Yuri, 
Suk-Bung (1994: 109). 
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The figures for the benefit scale poverty line from 1980 to 1986 were determined by the 
standard used in metropolitan cities. If the benefit scale poverty line of medium and small 
cities and of rural areas had been applied, the difference between the minimum cost of living 
for one person per month in a four-person household and the benefit scale poverty line would 
have become more pronounced because the poverty line of medium-small cities and rural 
areas are likely to be lower than that of metropolitan cities. For instance, the poverty line for 
those who lived in the metropolitan cities in 1986 was 123.5 per cent of those in rural areas. 
In fact, the fact that different regional standards were incorporated in 1987 made 
medium-small cities set the standard for the benefit scale poverty line from 1987 to 1990. As 
a result, the average difference between the minimum cost of living and the benefit scale 
poverty line became almost doubled. 
Both income and assets were the two other criteria in determining the benefit scale poverty 
line of public assistance, yet different concepts were applied to each. The household was 
used as a unit of analysis in measuring the monthly income of household while the family 
was considered as a unit of analysis for the measurement of assets. As a result, as the family 
size increases from a one-person household to two, three, and four, the poverty standard 
accordingly arises two, three, and four times. However, the standard level of assets does not 
change at all as the family size changes (for the discussion of `equivalence scale analysis', 
see Whiteford, 1985; Whiteford and Kennedy, 1995: Appendix1 and Appendix 4). In other 
words, a one-person household or a four-person household was considered to be the same as 
far as the means-test of assets was concerned. This two-tiered measurement of poverty was 
the consequence of administrative expediency. The principle of `economies of scale' was 
ignored since the bigger the household becomes, the more benefits they can get. That is, one 
or two-person households were relatively worse-off in comparison to four or five-person 
households, which of course undermined the principle of equality. 
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Table 5.4 MLS estimated by the KIHSA and the Public Assistance Benefit Threshold, 
(Unit: won, current prices) 
Year Metropolitan Small and Rural Public assistance (B)--. (A) CPI 
cities medium size areas benefit level3 (B) 0) 
cities (A) 
19882 315,076 296,885 268,223 176,000 59.28 7.1 
1989 337,446 317,964 287,267 184,000 57.87 5.7 
1990 356,680 336,088 303,641 192,000 57.13 8.5 
1991 386,998 364,655 329,451 220,000 60.33 9.1 
1992 422,989 398,568 360,090 320,000 80.29 6.3 
1993 449,637 423,678 382,776 520,000 122.73 4.8 
19942 7115766 665,107 576,414 640,000 96.23 6.2 
(471,220) (444,015) (401,149) (144.14) 
1995 755,895 706,344 612,152 760,000 107.60 4.5 
1996 789,910 738,129 639,699 800,000 108.38 4.9 
1997 828,616 774,297 671,044 840,000 108.49 4.5 
1998 865,904 809,140 701,241 880,000 108.76 7.5 
1999,957,641 901,357 775,885 920,000 102.07 0.8 
(930,847) (869,826) (754,478) (105.77) 
2000 965,302 908,568 782,092 930,000 102.36 - 
Notes: 1. A four-person household in standard; 2. Year of estimation by the KIHSA; 3. The benefit scale poverty 
line had not been subdivided into the different size of family until 1996. Data for 1988-1990 are based on the 
small and medium size cities. Data for 1991-1998 are based on the poverty line for those who belong to the first 
category of the public assistance programme (i. e. the poorest of the poor). Since 1999, all categories under 
public assistance have become incorporated into a single category. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table, data adopted and calculated from MoHW (various years) Health and Wc1/are 
Whitt, P : ppcr, Seoui: MoHW; Jung, Won-Oh (1998: 254); Kim, Mi-Gon (2000: 15); NSO (1999a). 
The benefit scale poverty line and the minimum cost of living for a person in a four-person 
household are separately analysed in Table 5.4. In determining the state poverty threshold for 
a person in a four-person household, the monthly income per person regardless of the family 
site had been used as a unit of analysis. In other words, the additional members of household 
were calculated by multiplying the base income (i. e. minimum income per person in a 
one-person household) by the number of household. Yet `economies of scale' ha% e begun to 
be applied to the formula since the reformed public assistance programme began to take 
effect in 2000. For example, the minimum cost of living per person in a one-person 
household was 320.000 \\-on but its amount for a four-person household was not 1,280,000 
(120,000 4) but 930,000 \\, on. 
1 
Figures in parentheses refer to the results calculated from the previous year's minimum cost 
of living by using Consumer Price Index (CPI). These results both in 1994 and 1999 were 
substantially different from the KIHSA's results because first, the overall living standard 
may have changed over time which enabled the minimum cost of living to increase along 
with the changes of social demands. Second, there might have been methodological 
differences that would reflect the level of social demands at a different point in time. Third, 
where even the same methods (Rowntree) were used, what constitutes the market basket is 
more likely to differ dependent upon the cultural and living standards. Therefore, the 
long-standing theoretical disputes on the measurement of poverty still remains unresolved 
which in turn proves that the concept of poverty is maintained to be politico-dynamic and 
ideological. 
From 1966 to 1979, urban and rural areas were differentiated when measuring income and 
assets. By adding metropolitan cities, this two-tier division became three-tiered in 1980. 
However, this regional differentiation was abolished in 1987. Not until 1999 when public 
assistance was reformed therefore did an incorporated standard that disregarded regional 
variations have been applied to the measurement of income and assets. For the abolition of 
the regional differentiation, Kim (1997: 63) argues that in policy terms, it was to control the 
population transference from rural to urban areas. But in fact, the composition of population 
in metropolitan areas (especially Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeong-gi) increased from 35.5 per 
cent in 1980 through 42.8 per cent in 1990 to 45.2 per cent in 1995 (NSO, 1998a: 98-99). 
First, those who live in rural areas tend to be more vulnerable to poverty. In 1996, for 
example, a proportion of those who benefited under public assistance in metropolitan cities 
was 29.5 per cent but it was 23.3 per cent in medium-small size cities and 47.2 per cent in 
rural areas (Kim, Mi-Gon, 1997: 64). Second, since medium and small size cities were 
considered to set the standard when incomes and assets are measured, those with a relatively 
lower cost of living in rural areas may be entitled to benefits. By contrast, those in urban 
areas where costs of living are higher may not be able to fulfil the entitlement requirement. 
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Figure 5.6 illustrates an increasing surplus gap (monthly income -monthly living expenses) 
between urban and rural (farm) areas over time. This gap may have motivated those in rural 
areas, especially those who are relatively young, to transfer to urban areas. By moving to 
urban areas, they could return home with extra money or they could send the surplus of their 
earnings to those who remain to live in rural areas, such as their elderly parents. 
Figure 5.6 Surplus Gap of Income and Expenses between Rural and Urban Areas 
(Unit: won, current prices) 
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Notes: formula =* average monthly income of urban wage earners' households - average consumption 
expenditure of urban wage earners' households; ** average monthly income of rural (farm) households - 
monthly living expenses of rural (farm) households. 
Sources: NSO (1998a: 144,149,152,2000c: 154,159,162). 
As many commentators have argued, a policy definition of the poverty line can be an 
effective political harness when the national economy turns out to be vulnerable and when 
social stability is desperately required (e. g. Sen, 1981; Veit-Wilson, 1999). A case in point 
can be given by way of comparison between those who fell below the state poverty line 
before and after the financial crisis. The percentage of population under public assistance 
(excluding health assistance) was 3.07 in 1997 and 2.53 per cent in 1998. In 1999, it was 2.51 
per cent but if the temporary livelihood protection is included, it changes to 3.72 per cent (see 
Appendix 6). In short, there seems to be little change in the rate of poverty along with the 
financial crisis. However, Yoo (2000: 24-25) argues that if the minimum cost of living (i. e. 
MLS) of 1999 measured by the KIHSA is applied to the same period, the rate of poverty 
increases greatly up to almost 10.3 per cent of the urban wage workers' households. Table 
5.5 shows the variations of poverty rates based on a minimum cost of living both in 1995 and 
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1999. The results might not be directly compatible with the poverty rate of the entire 
population because the scope of the analysis is only confined within the urban (wage 
workers') households. Nonetheless, since those in rural areas tend to be poorer than those in 
urban areas, it still gives us a rough idea of the proclivity for poverty that seems very 
different from the rate of poverty based on the state benefit poverty threshold. 
Table 5.5 The Rate of Poverty from 1997 to 1999 (Unit: per cent) 
The Rate of 
Poverty 
1997 
Average 1/4 
1998 
2/4 3/4 4/4 1.4 
1999 
2/4 3/4 
MLS of 1995' 3.0 6.8 6.4 7.1 7.5 6.2 6.9 6.8 5.5 
MIS of 19991 4.2 9.1 8.4 9.2 10.3 8.5 9.6 9.0 7.4 
MLS of 19952 9.5 17.4 16.6 18.4 22.0 12.7 13.9 14.1 14.1 
MI_S of 19992 13.7 23.2 22.1 24.2 29.0 17.7 19.4 19.3 19.5 
GDP3 5.0 -6.7 -4.6 -8.0 -8.1 -5.9 5.4 10.8 12.8 
Original Income4 6.3 -6.7 -2.8 -5.3 -14.4 -3.8 -0.5 0.4 8.5 
Con. Exp. 5 4.2 -10.7 -8.8 -13.2 -16.8 -4.0 8.9 13.4 17.9 
Notes: 1. Based on household income of urban wage workers' households; 2. Based on household expenditure 
of urban households; MIS stands for Minimum Living Standards; 3. GDP growth rate change over 
corresponding period of previous year based on constant prices of 1995; 4. Original Income (earnings from 
employment, occupational pension and income from capital) of salary and wage earners' households. 
Percentage change over corresponding period of previous year; 5. Consumption Expenditure of salary and wage 
earners' households. Percentage change over corresponding period of previous year. 
Sources: Yoo, Kyung-Jun (2000: 24-27); NSO (2000d, November 2000). 
From Table 5.5, it is possible to draw three significant interpretations. First, the overall 
poverty rate worsened as the national economy became unstable. Second, even when the 
GDP growth rate stabilised, the poverty rate based on household expenditure did not make 
any progress whilst the rate of poverty based on household income began to fall. Third, the 
poverty rate based on household expenditure had been much higher than that on household 
income. This leaves the question of which of the four should be considered to be a valid 
standard. The minimum cost of living based on 1995 is rather obsolete partly because 
socioeconomic conditions after the financial crisis have made marked changes and partly 
because the current public assistance programme has been in operation on the basis of the 
1999 standard. Further, it has long been of concern that whether household expenditure or 
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income should be the best indirect measure of `command over resources'. There has been a 
supporting rationale that the expenditure of the poor is likely to be higher than their income. 
Yet, as Bradshaw (1999: 19) argues, the causes of expenditure being higher than income 
should be read as lack of savings or under-reporting of income rather than excessive 
borrowing or debt: the result might be exaggerated otherwise. All in all, compared with the 
poverty rate of benefit scale levels, the actual situation of the incidence of poverty before and 
after the crisis has been much worse than it first appears. The difference can even be much 
clearer if the self-employed and non-wage workers are taken on board. 
The causes of the increase in poverty were also analysed using the method developed by the 
World Bank, comparing the third quarter of 1997 to that of 1999. According to Yoo 
(2000: 29-30), the rise in poverty mainly resulted both from economic factors (e. g. income, 
economic growth rate, etc., 43.8 per cent) and from the deterioration of distribution (49.8 per 
cent). The remaining 6.4 per cent went to other factors. This result brings us to a very 
important policy implication that economic growth policy alone can no longer be the best 
remedy in reducing poverty. The financial crisis of November 1997 has brought about the 
attenuation of income distribution in Korea. And this polarisation has become the major 
obstacle to building up the notion of solidarity under the newly introduced welfare ideology 
of productive welfarism. For this reason, the discussion should move beyond the 
measurement of poverty that takes account of modernised debate on the polarisation of 
wealth. 
In sum, the relief of poverty is not the only objective of social policy. Nor is poverty the only 
standard that measures the effectiveness of social policy. Nevertheless, the ways in which 
poverty is measured can become a technical and arcane smokescreen to the essence of the 
politics of poverty. The official poverty line in Korea has been based on a `policy definition' 
of poverty. For this reason, as Sen (1981: 19-21) argues, policy as a `function of political 
organisation' is likely to be influenced by the nature of government, the sources of its power, 
and the forces exerted by other organisations. Therefore, although policy recommendations 
are considered to be more adequate, the barriers to implementing them often lead to the 
question of what can be done rather than what ought to be done. In theory,, welfare systems 
in Korea do not allow anyone to fall below the level of a minimum standard of living (i. e. 
residual or marginal model of welfare). if not a normal or average standard of living (i. e. 
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universal or institutional model of welfare). In practice, the poverty standard set by the 
government used to be too low to maintain even a minimum standard of living. However, the 
ways in which poverty is measured has become much more transparent and realistic. The 
introduction of minimum wage in 1988 was partly an important contributor to this end and 
the reform of public assistance in 1999 was a landmark that made this possible. Those below 
the official poverty line now have rights to benefit from public assistance regardless of their 
ability to work. The state provides benefits to them up to the point that fulfils the difference 
in amount between their own earnings and the minimum cost of living. Its adequacy thereby 
is ever more important. 
5.5 The Strategy of Redistribution 
The distribution of income in Korea was among the best in the developing countries between 
1964 and 1970 (Adelman, 1974: 284-285; Adelman and Robinson, 1978: 45). Adelman and 
Robinson (1978: Ch. 3) carried out the time-series analysis of 1964 to 1970 both in urban and 
rural areas. They concluded that there had been few changes in overall income distribution 
during the period of remarkable economic growth. However, the poorest 20 per cent of the 
households had achieved almost 333 per cent increase in their money income and their real 
income had also more than doubled. In addition, while the relative share of property income 
and wage and salary income had greatly increased up to 33 and 40 per cent respectively, the 
share of agricultural income had equally decreased up to 32 per cent. From their analysis, 
they made two important conclusions. First, the key changes in wage structure which had 
occurred during the period of 1964 to 1970 were the result of market forces. The crucial role 
that could have been played by the unionisation of labour was largely absent from the scene. 
However, the rise of income in agriculture was possible partly due to a high price for rice 
policy controlled by the government. Second, they concluded that a development process 
during this particular period of time had benefited not only upper and middle income groups, 
but also the welfare of the poorest members of the society (Adelman and Robinson. 
1978: 37-47). 
A great many attempts to evaluate the trend of income distribution in Korea was also made 
at the indigenous level especially by those at the KDI throughout the 1980s and the early 
1990s. The pioneering as well as the most well-known study was carried out by a researcher 
at the KDI. In his study, Choo (1979,1982) first criticised Adelman and Robinson's study in 
that thcN, had underestimated or had even failed to include both the lowest income group in 
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farm households and the income of the top decile of urban households (1979: 78-7k)). His 
conclusion nonetheless was similar to Adelman and Robinson's though he had made a great 
effort to rectify the methodological faults. According to Choo's research, the distribution of 
income worsened in the late 1960s but became better in the early 1970s only to again become 
unequal later. Income distribution in farm households (Gini-coefficient was 0.295 in 1970) 
had been relatively lower than that in non-farm households (0.346 in 1970). The urban 
self-employed and employers had been the most unequal category (0.449 in 1976) especially 
after the mid-1970s (Choo, Hakchung, 1979: 91-96). 
Table 5.6 summarises the trend of income distribution in Korea. It follows Kuznets' 
inverted-U hypothesis where income distribution is likely to improve during the phase of 
industrialisation and then follows more unequal distribution during the period of early 
economic development. The overall trend of income distribution became more equal since 
1980 after the rise of income disparity from 1970 to 1980. This was largely due to increasing 
disparity between wage-income and property income earners and between small and large 
firms. The original emergence of these large firms dated back to the early 1960s when an 
export-oriented industrialisation strategy was newly introduced. In turn, the reduction of 
income disparity in different income groups became the main reason for the relatively equal 
distribution of income since 1980 (Song, Byung-Nak, 1997: 175). However, Kwon (1993a: 
70-72) argues that the trend should be more carefully and rigorously analysed. He argues that 
it might have been of less importance to interpret that the more equal distribution of income 
had been due to the mitigation of income differential between farm households and non-farm 
households. The ratio of urban households income to rural households income had in fact 
increased in the early 1980s. It might have also been of more significance to regain the 
vitality in the overall macro-economic condition with reasonably stable prices and 
employment. 
Table 5.6 The Trend of Income Inequality in Korea, 1965-1996 
Cl ini -coefficient 1965 1970 1976 1980 1985 1988 1993 1996 
\Vholc country 0.34x4 0.332 0.391 0.389 0.344 0.335 0.309 0.295 
Urban areas 0.417 0.346 0.412 0.405 0.369 0.349 0.306 0.289 
Rural areas 0.285 0.295 0.327 0.355 0.296 0.289 0.310 0.308 
Smurccs: Reconstructed Table from Choo. Hakchung (1979: 91,93,94): EPB (I986): ASO( 199Sa). 
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The most comprehensive and latest research was also carried out by those at the KDI 
analysing not only income distribution but also wealth distribution (Kwon, Soonwon et al., 
1992). Table 5.7 compares the results produced by Kwon et al. and Choo, both of which used 
different data sources. Choo's study was estimated from the 'yearbook of the urban 
household income and expenditure' and the `farm household economy survey' for income 
distribution. Choo also used the `survey report of the national wealth statistics' published by 
the EPB in 1977 for wealth distribution (see also Choo, Hakchung et al., 1996). On the other 
hand, Kwon et al. 's study was estimated from the `survey of national living standard and 
economic consciousness' conducted by the KDI in 1988. The survey report of the national 
wealth statistics comprises a large number of samples including 9,883 households, while the 
survey of national living standard and economic consciousness constitutes samples of 5,000 
households nationwide. 
Table 5.7 The Distribution of Wealth in Korea (Gini-coefficient) 
Research by Choo (1982: 104) 
Whole Non-farm Wage Self-employed Farm 
country households earners areas 
RC1 0.414 0.482 0.467 0.488 0.239 
RV2 0.523 0.542 0.534 0.551 0.443 
Research by Kwon et al. (1992: 172) 
Income3 Nominal Financial assets-5 Real assets6 
assets4 
Whole country 0.404 0.579 0.770 0.596 
Urban areas 0.373 0.584 0.738 0.604 
Rural areas 0.445 0.549 0.835 0.557 
Notes: 1. Replacement cost (the cost of replacing a piece of capital at the current price); 2. Realisation value (the 
value of a piece of capital when it is sold at the market); 3. Labour income (wages and salaries) plus property 
income (income from rent, interest and dividends); 4. Financial assets plus real assets; 5. The sum of savings, 
shares (stocks), bonds, insurance, and debentures (corporate bonds); 6. The sum of housing, land, automobiles 
and others assets. 
Sources: Choo, Hakchung (19S2), Kwon, Soonwon et a!. (1992). 
However, the validity of Choo's research raises the question of what constitutcs household 
assets in measuring wealth distribution. The survey report of the national wealth statistics 
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comprises housing and durable consumer goods, yet excludes land and financial assets. 
Therefore, the substantial difference between non-farm households and farm households 
may have resulted from the relatively high housing supply rate in rural areas. In fact, the 
proportion of those occupying their own houses in rural areas was 80.8 per cent compared to 
43.0 per cent in urban areas, and 58.7 per cent in whole country in 1980 (NSO, 1998a: 307). 
In the same year, the overall housing supply rate was 71.2 per cent (EPB. 1990: 65: NSO, 
1998a: 305). 
On the other hand, the research by Kwon et al. consisted of almost all assets and shows that 
financial assets were the major factor causing inequality. Nonetheless, its overall reliability 
was challenged by those at the World Bank (Leipziger et al., 1992). Leipziger et al. argued 
that the assets on interest and dividend income had not even captured one quarter of the 
reality. However, they concluded that the overall distribution of wealth in Korea was either 
similar or better than that in advanced industrialised countries of the 1960s. 
The most significant difficulty underlying the measurement of poverty and inequality has 
been a lack of reliable and consistent data (Kwon, Soonwon, 1993a: 70). For example, the 
`yearbook of urban household income and expenditure' and the `farm household economic 
survey' exclude more than 20 per cent of the entire households. This exclusion may be a 
substantial proportion of the bottom and the top deciles of income distribution. These data 
sets also exclude income of the urban employer and of the self-employed which may 
generate a downward bias towards the degree of inequality. In addition, the `yearbook of 
national tax statistics' may not be a valid source of income measure as might be the case of 
other countries. This is because income in the yearbook is likely to be under-reported in 
general. Those in both extremes such as the upper income group and the lowest income 
group are least likely to be correctly reported. Hence, a rather simplistic adaptation of these 
sources is likely to be misleading. 
'o1itical decisions and policy designs in Korea have long been influenced by the way in 
which the criticality of robust empiricism has been belittled. According to policy experts', 
9 
The director of the w elfare policy division at the Ministry of Health and Welfare (Interview with Ice, 
Young-Chan, 24 July 2000. Seoul). And the former researcher at the Korea Dcv'clopment Institute 
(Interview with Kwon, Soonwon, 31 July 2000. Seoul). 
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the most significant problem which Korean social policy has confronted has been a lack of 
basic raw material, especially reliable longitudinal data sets and a lack of a consistent series 
of research. They argue that this overall underdevelopment has given rise to the 
long-standing scepticism about the nature of social policy making in Korea. The making of 
social policy has always been based on short-term plans which often ignores long-term 
consequences. The intended outcomes or effects have not been empirically and cautiously 
examined before a new policy is introduced. In short, new policies have been introduced not 
because of their socioeconomic necessities but because of their potential politicality which 
often fades away along with their political life-span. 
However, progress has been made such as the survey of Minimum Living Standards 
undertaken by the KIHSA every five years since 1988. Another marked progress has been 
made to the first comprehensive household income survey, the `National Survey of Family 
Income and Expenditure'. This survey is based on a sample of 30,000 households, 
representing the entire population. In other words, it is much larger than the `Family Income 
and Expenditure Survey' which has been carried out on a monthly basis since 1993 but 
conducted only in urban areas with a sample size of 5,200 households. The National Survey 
was carried out in 1991 and published in 1993. The second survey was undertaken in 1996 
and published in 1998, and will thereafter be repeated every five years. 
Table 5.8 shows the changes of income distribution that occurred between 1991 and 1996 
based on the `National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure'. These data sets enable us 
to analyse the detailed composition of income distribution of all households in Korea. The 
analysis is estimated on the basis of yearly income by yearly income decile groups instead of 
monthly income by monthly income decile groups. The rationale behind it is that income of 
those in rural areas is more likely to be seasonal. Indirect transfers such as charities to those 
in bottom decile groups are also likely to be of seasonal fluctuation. But also are monthly 
income data for the entire households unavailable. 
Atkinson (1975: 36-40) also points out why yearly income is more favoured than monthly 
income. He argues that when income is measured over a longer period, it becomes less 
unequal. The observed degree of dispersion is likely to be reduced by taking a longer period 
of assessment. Different periods of assessment can be applied to different income groups for 
different purposes. On the one hand. averaging of income is difficult for low income groups. 
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especially to measure the number of people in poverty. On the other hand, however, the use 
of scope over a year for the distribution of income among the population as a whole is more 
appropriate than that over a week. The reason for this is that it is possible to average income 
for the majority of the population, in addition to the fact that it would be misleading to take 
a shorter period for those at the upper end of the scale (Atkinson, 1975: 37). 
Table 5.8 Income Distribution in Korea' (per cent) 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X Corn. 2 
19913 
H 3.12 5.99 7.37 8.73 8.40 10.82 10.98 12.15 14.85 17.59 64.04 
B 1.94 3.77 4.86 5.07 8.96 6.93 10.30 13.04 14.38 30.75 28.82 
P 4.23 3.65 3.29 4.29 3.99 5.95 8.01 10.46 15.41 40.72 3.70 
D 9.75 6.59 6.72 5.40 3.95 6.85 7.64 8.30 25.56 19.24 0.53 
I 18.62 9.76 7.76 7.00 7.97 6.36 7.33 8.71 9.78 16.71 2.91 
G 3.31 5.38 6.51 7.44 8.36 9.37 10.55 12.22 14.64 22.22 100.00 
19964 
H 2.64 5.80 7.49 8.34 9.88 9.45 12.34 12.55 13.87 17.64 59.45 
B 1.23 2.81 3.97 5.97 6.20 9.95 8.50 12.55 17.12 31.70 31.17 
P 3.98 4.08 4.09 3.66 4.83 6.45 6.78 8.48 14.46 43.19 4.94 
D 6.69 10.75 9.61 8.03 6.35 10.32 12.22 6.54 12.26 17.23 0.77 
I 20.41 11.31 8.00 6.77 6.82 8.32 6.44 11.49 9.57 10.87 3.67 
G 2.95 5.03 6.26 7.31 8.34 9.42 10.65 12.27 14.74 23.03 100.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
P 3.41 10.94 0.08 6.18 5.01 11.15 14.55 7.16 12.76 19.76 0.64 
Notes: 1. Yearly income per household by yearly income decile groups and types of income; 2. Composition: 
Percentage of total income; 3. Sample size: 20,765 households of two persons and more, nationwide; 4. Sample 
size: 21,103 households of two persons and more, nationwide; H. Household Earnings: wage and salaries, and 
bonus, including breadwinner's, spouse's, and other household member's earnings; B. Business Income: 
agriculture, forestry and fishery income, subsidiary work, and other business income, including breadwinner's, 
spouse's and other household member's income; P. Property Income, i. e. returns from assets: interest, dividend, 
and rents received: D. Direct Transfers: social security benefits, including pensions and benefits from public 
assistance: I. Indirect Transfers: gifts and assistance, subsidies from other households, and others (indirect 
transfers often refer to taxes in contrast to social security benefits in the literature, see for example Shanahan and 
Tuma, 1994: 734); G. Gross Income: Earnings plus business income plus returns from assets plus direct transfers 
plus indirect transfers: P. Pension: benefits from the National Pension Programme. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table, data adopted and calculated from NSO (1993h: 510,511,1998d: 66,67). 
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Table 5.8 also elucidates that property income was not only more unequally distributed than 
business income but also substantially unevenly distributed between the poorest and the 
richest. These incomes are often underestimated within the measurement of income 
inequality. Further it was indirect transfers, not direct transfers both in 1991 and 1996 that 
made a relatively sizable impact on income distribution. Their share of gross income is also 
considerably higher than direct transfers, contributing 2.91 and 3.67 per cent in 1991 and in 
1996. In contrast, direct transfers accounted for only 0.53 and 0.77 per cent of gross income 
both in 1991 and 1996 respectively. Compared with the result of 1991, distribution of gross 
income in 1996 did not make much progress. The contribution of direct transfers on income 
distribution had made a slight increase, yet indirect transfers still remained to be more 
crucial. In fact, the poorest decile groups received an even lower proportion of direct 
transfers, the overall percentage of which became slightly lower in 1996. 
The final row of Table 5.8 elucidates the profile of pensions, which was included in the 
profile of direct transfers but was separately shown for the purpose of analysis. As seen in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the pension system in Korea contains an explicit redistribution 
component. However, the overall redistributive impact in 1996 was very limited. Those in 
the top income decile received the highest returns perhaps because, as its share of gross 
income shows, the system itself was too immature to be highly redistributive. 
As a whole, neither direct transfers nor indirect transfers had made any significant 
modifications on income distribution. As Piachaud clearly points out (1991: 217), social 
security might be an effective instrument of social justice able to mitigate the effects of social 
and economic change. Yet social security is more or less of no use to mitigate increasing 
inequality of original incomes which comprised more than 95 per cent of gross income both 
in 1991 and in 1996. What is required is not to pick up the pieces but to place them all in 
socioeconomic and political order. 
The impact of taxation and social security contributions on income distribution is analysed 
separately in Table 5.9. This analytic separation is made because available data sets for taxes 
and social security contributions only cover wage workers' households on a monthly basis. 
This is because though both monthly and yearly income data are collected by the `National 
Survey of Family Income and Expenditure, monthly income data are released only for wage 
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workers' households. Also, taxes and social security contributions are considered as 
expenditures instead of income. such that they are only available monthly (for more detailed 
characteristics of the data, see Jacobs, 2000). 
The comparison made between workers' households in 1991 and 1996 shows that the 
percentage of either direct tax or of social security contributions to gross income was less 
than 3 per cent. The overall profile of the level of social security contributions in 1991 was 
also very similar to that of gross income. This may mean that no considerable vertical 
redistribution took place. Nonetheless, the degree of dispersion of the level of social security 
contributions in 1996 made a slight change. This is so in that those in lower income groups 
contributed less than their relative level of gross income but those in upper income groups 
paid more than their relative gross income. Further, whereas the level of gross income and 
that of disposable income (after direct taxes and social security contributions) were not very 
different in 1991, they became more equal in 1996. 
Table 5.9 The Impact of Tax and Social Security Contribution to Income Distribution' 
(Unit: per cent) 
19912 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X Com. `' 
GI 3.44 5.42 6.52 7.52 8.49 9.44 10.79 12.46 14.81 21.11 100.00 
DT 1.65 2.79 3.53 4.40 5.54 7.05 8.90 12.63 17.13 36.38 2.77 
SSC 3.98 5.81 6.86 7.76 8.90 9.50 10.68 12.31 14.83 19.37 2.29 
DI 3.48 5.49 6.60 7.60 8.57 9.51 10.85 12.46 14.74 20.70 94.95 
19963 
GI 4.35 5.65 6.92 7.86 8.52 9.91 10.66 12.70 14.09 19.34 100.00 
DT 1.94 2.56 3.39 4.15 6.58 8.27 10.13 12.74 17.07 33.17 1.60 
SSC 3.12 4.94 5.81 7.26 8.18 9.52 10.84 12.82 14.59 22.92 1.33 
DI 4.41 5.71 7.00 7.93 8.55 9.94 10.66 12.70 14.04 19.06 97.06 
Notes: 1. Decile groups ofwage workers' households by monthly income decile groups; 2. Sample size: 14.1 14 
households of two persons or more, 3. Sample size: 13,158 households of two persons or more; 4. Composition: 
Percentage of gross income; (, I. Gross Income: earnings plus direct and indirect transfers plus returns from 
assets plus business income; DT. Direct Taxes; SSC. Social Security Contributions including pensions and 
social insurance contributions. DI. Disposable Income: gross income minus direct taxes and social security 
contributions. 
Sources: Reconstructed Table, data adopted and calculated from NSO (1')93a: 82-85,1998c: 1)4-9-). 
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In Table 5.9 the impact of tax structure is not clearly revealed in the analysis. Nor does the 
analysis include the impact of indirect taxes which would be more regressive in nature than 
direct taxes. As Table 5.10 shows, tax systems had become less progressive over time. In 
other words, it was indirect taxes that became more proportioned in a tax system. In 
international comparison, only Germany and France have a higher rate of indirect taxes than 
direct taxes. 
Table 5.10 Ratio of Direct and Indirect Tax (per cent) 
Korea (1995-1999) 
Classification 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Internal Taxes Direct 53.4 52.1 49.9 57.9 49.2 
Indirect 46.6 47.9 50.1 42.1 50.8 
National Taxes Direct 46.8 44.4 41.4 48.0 40.5 
Indirect 53.2 55.6 58.6 52.0 59.5 
Tax Direct 54.7 52.9 50.5 55.3 49.5 
Indirect 45.3 47.1 49.5 44.7 50.5 
Selected Industrialised Countries (National Taxes Basis) 
Classification Japan The US The UK Germany Italy France 
(1998) (1998) (1997) (1998) (1997) (1998) 
Direct 59.3 93.2 56.9 45.4 56.7 39.6 
Indirect 40.7 6.8 43.1 54.6 43.3 60.4 
Sources: MoFE (May 2000); NTS (2000). 
All in all, overall policy intervention for income redistribution in Korea has been rather 
modest. Substantial changes have not occurred either through taxes or social security. Only 
unpretentious changes have taken place by the mechanism of indirect transfers. This may 
imply that the role of the state has been limited in reducing inequality. Figure 5.7 illustrates 
that the income gap between the bottom decile group and the top decile group of urban wage 
workers' households has not greatly been moderated even during the period of economic 
growth since 1979. Instead, it has worsened seriously during the period of economic 
downturn since 1997. More rigorous policy intervention is required precisely because social 
problems cannot solely be solved by a mere measurement of economic growth which may 
even exacerbate the polarisation of society in turn. 
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that would reflect the principle of need and the principle of equality. As Titmuss' preferred 
model of social policy outlines, the institutional-redistributive model shaped by social, fiscal 
and occupational welfare becomes more likely to be an effective means to this end (Titmuss, 
1958,1974,1987a). 
5.6 The Conditions of Possibility: Principle and Practice 
The conditions under which ideas are filtered through the institutional process have changed 
greatly over time. But the changes that have occurred do not necessarily assure a balanced 
development of principle and practice. Although there is little doubt that institutional 
configurations of rules and procedures are primary determinants to set the terms for political 
conflicts (Immergut, 1992a, 1992b), this leaves the question of why and how principled ideas 
turn to make negative impact in practice largely unanswered. In other words, the idea of 
rightness and wrongness depends on the context within which rules and norms are exercised. 
The recent policy decision that has enabled medical and pharmaceutical practices to be 
separated within overall health care systems provides an example of how complex social 
policy issues may become in practice. 
The principled idea that separated medical and pharmaceutical practices first appeared in the 
Pharmaceutical Affairs Act of 1963. The precise rational behind its introduction was not 
clear yet it might have resulted from the fact that many other industrialised countries had 
already put this principle into effect. Nevertheless, materialising this principled idea into 
legislation was postponed for another 20 years mainly due to immature infrastructure that 
deferred successive reforms after the military government transferred to an elected one. The 
idea reappeared in 1976 when national health insurance was introduced. For most 
pharmacists, the introduction of national health insurance could weaken the management of 
their pharmacies. In subsequence, the idea's reappearance led to an experimental project in 
a city of southern Korea during 1982 to 1985. The three-stage implementation project was 
proposed by the Committee for National Health Policy right before national health insurance 
was expanded to rural areas in 1988. Yet, both physicians and pharmacists failed to come to 
terms because the former argued for a complete separation but the latter argued for a partial 
separation within the health insurance programme, thereby the project being dissipated (Lee, 
Du-11o et al.. 1992: 317-357). In 1994, the idea became more specified within the 
Pharmaceutical Affairs Amendment Act which ended the dispute on Korean traditional and 
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Western medicine (the historical origins of this dispute date back to the early 1950s, for the 
detailed analysis on this subject, see Cho, Hyo-Je, 1999). This time, there was a special 
emphasis on the misuse and abuse of medical supplies such as antibiotics. In 1997, the 
Defined Daily Dose (DDD) of antibiotics was 33.2 per cent which was much higher than the 
average 21.3 per cent in OECD countries (MoHW, 2001a). According to an additional clause 
to the Act, the separation of medical and pharmaceutical practices would take effect from 
July 1999. 
In December 1997, the Committee for Medical Reform (CMR), the advisory committee for 
the Prime Minister, made a proposal for a `staged plan for the separation of dispensary from 
medical practice'. This plan was three-staged to build up the framework for the separation. 
This staged plan later in May 1998 constructed the Promotion Council for the Separation of 
Dispensary from Medical Practice. The Promotion Council reinforced the CMR's proposal 
to take effect from 1 July 1999 as planned. The proposal itself however was not agreed by 
both physicians and pharmacists. Both the KMA and the KPA presented a petition to the 
National Assembly in order to postpone its implementation one year due to a lack of overall 
preparation. In two months, they also suggested, they would build up a new framework for 
the separation but would agree to the government's proposal otherwise (MoHW, 2000b: 37). 
Mediated by a number of citizens' groups, the KMA and the KPA suggested a new proposal 
to the government in May 1999. In order to design a better enforcement measure, the 
responsible ministry (MoHW) organised an executive committee in June 1999,25 
representatives of which were from civic groups, the press, academia, medical and 
pharmaceutical groups and civil servants. On 27 December 1999, the Pharmaceutical Affairs 
Act was finally amended. However, despite this amendment, medical practitioners went on 
their third-time strike against the proposed reform plan arguing that it would bankrupt many 
of the nation's medical clinics by depriving their major source of income (Korea Herald, 26 
June 2000). 
The representative of medical specialists who participated in the executive committee 
refused to accept the item in the proposal that allows pharmacists to have a discretionary 
power of prescription because physicians would lose their power over the supply of 
medication as a result. By replacing the president of the KMA who made an agreement for 
the revision, physicians exercised their dramatic `exit' from the activity of medical treatment 
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in the form of their third collective action by strike at the expense of the public from 20 June 
to 25 June 2000 (see Hirschman, 1970). This dramatic exit eventually led to another revision 
of the medical reform plan due in July 2000 (CDN, 25 June 2000). The dispute continued 
however since pharmacists refused to participate in the agreement in turn by denouncing the 
government for: 
`bowing to the collective pressure of doctors who are simply pursuing their own 
interests-from now on, we will reject all discussions on ways of implementing the reform 
program, whose principles have been seriously undermined by this illicit compromise 
between the government and doctors' (quoted from the Korea Herald, 26 June 2000)10. 
Three possible scenarios had been addressed to minimise further disputes. First and 
foremost, the government may enforce the divided medical service delivery system as 
planned while promising to reconsider the subsequent problems. This first scenario accorded 
with the policy line of `implementation first, rectification later' which the government had 
consistently pursued as opposed to physicians' view of `rectification first, implementation 
later'. Second, there may be another delay. But this option would be very unrealistic partly 
because the government had maintained the hard line policy to implement it in time and 
partly because even pharmacists had been opposed to the government's potential concession 
to physicians or the delay of the implementation. The third option was to follow the first 
proposal of the plan made in January 1999. This proposal would allow hospitals to have 
dispensaries within their facilities in contrast to the abolition of dispensaries within hospitals 
endorsed by both pharmacists and civic groups. 
10 
Interest group influence of medical professions depends on the institutional context of political 
decision making (Immergut, 1992a, 1992b; Ham, 1992). For example, the decision making in 
increasing the charge for medical treatment in July 2000 was a political compromise between those in 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Finance and Economy, and the Ministry of 
Planning and Budget, and those in medical and pharmaceutical professions. The compromise made in 
September 2000 and January 2001 was also a political decision made by the Prime Minister. The 
executive authority has been dependent on those who have direct interests which has even influenced 
the supposedly highly professionalised posts of those either in the Food and Drugs Administration or 
in the health Promotion Bureau under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The 
director of the Health Promotion Bureau where medical and pharmaceutical affairs are exclusively 
dealt with could be allocated to a specialist regardless of the status of bureaucratic hierarchy of the 
civil service. Nonetheless, the professional nature of the post could not be taken on board because of 
potential misconceptions with partiality for a particular side of interests. 
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In the end, the first scenario has more or less been adopted but at the same time there have 
been a number of subsequent problems. First, the key issue on the public surface has been 
discretionary and alternative power for having prescriptions filled by pharmacists. Yet, the 
essential component behind a series of disputes has been centrally located in the low rate of 
charge for medical treatment for over 20 years. The rate of charge for medical treatment was 
first enacted on 8 June 1977 and implemented from 1 July 1977. It started with a relatively 
modest level which accounted only for 50 to 55 per cent of ordinary charge for the medical 
treatment at that time (CDN, 24 June 2000). This initial rate was one of the lowest in the 
world. In consequence, incomes of physicians have customarily been met by an expedient 
way of three-tiered medical treatment: margins on the price of medicine; extra charges for 
the non-insured medical treatment; and additional charges for the utilisation of the patients' 
ward. This three-tiered medical treatment has been the well-known yet tacitly tolerated 
channels of making extra earnings. One of these channels however has been legally blocked 
by the introduction of the real price for medical supplies since late 1999 in addition to an 
increasing number of medical specialists since 1995. 
Second, those who belong to the KMA and those in the government have failed to build up 
their mutual trust for the last 20 years. The hard policy line of `implementation first, 
rectification later' reinforced by the government had not been accepted by the KMA for two 
reasons. First, there had been no attempt to fulfil the promise that would initiate policy for 
making the price of medical treatment more realistic for over 20 years since 1977. This 
nonfulfillment was precisely because of the weak financial conditions of health insurance 
societies. Second, there had been no fulfilment of the promise to provide 50 per cent state 
subsidies to the health insurance for regional members when it was introduced in 1987 
(Korea Herald, 24 June 2000). For these reasons, the collective actions exercised by medical 
specialists have been solved by the way in which the government has increased the price for 
medical treatment three times from July 2000 to January 2001 of 22.8 per cent in total (CDN, 
17 March 2001). A subsequent increase up to another 20 per cent may have to follow sooner 
rather than later in order to minimise the potential impact on the health insurance fund. 
In sum, the professional roles of doctors and pharmacists largely overlapped for decades. 
Pharmacists were allowed to write prescriptions while doctors were free to dispense 
medications to their patients. Since 1 July 200ft hospitals are prohibited from dispensing 
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medications to outpatients while pharmacists are banned from prescribing medical remedies. 
The purpose of this revision was to reduce high rates of drug-overuse. For the basic principle 
of separating medical and pharmaceutical practices, the White Paper for Health and Welfare 
(MoHW, 2000b: 39) says that `doctors can prescribe special and general medical supplies, 
while pharmacists should dispense those supplies to a prescription. Pharmacists cannot sell 
special medical supplies except having doctor's prescription filled but can sell general 
medical suppliers without doctor's written order'. The principle is simple but why was it so 
difficult to make it work? The answer should be sought by the overall structure of health care 
systems. The separation of medical and pharmaceutical practices has to a certain degree 
made doctors' and pharmacists' tax evasion more transparent since most of their incomes 
would be exclusively revealed by this reform. In spite of its justifiable necessity, it has by and 
large been considered to have caused social distrust and disintegration. In addition to the 
integration of health insurance societies, the separation has enabled both physicians and 
pharmacists to make more profits at the expense of the public on the one hand. Intended 
outcomes of reduction in drug misuse and abuse have not yet been achieved on the other. The 
MoHW has recently announced that health insurance transfers to pharmacies have risen 
almost 13 times and that its transfers to clinics have also risen by 52.2 per cent since its 
implementation in July 2000 (CDN, 16 March 2001). The only solution to stabilise the health 
insurance fund seems to be either the sharp increase of insurance premiums or additional 
support from the national subvention, either of which would inevitably result in the increase 
of the overall burden on the public. In short, the conditions that made this separation so 
difficult resulted from the interplay between ideological and infra-structural policy 
frameworks. 
5.7 Conclusion 
Much that has been discussed in this chapter relates to the contemporary potential for further 
development of the welfare state in Korea. By examining changes that occurred in the policy 
environment over time and policy effects that had an important impact on citizens, it 
acknowledges the argument that `policies have a major influence on mass public, 
generating patterns of behavior (lock-in effects) and interpretive efforts (attempts to identify 
policy effects and trace those effects to government decisions) that have significant political 
repercussions' (Pierson, 1993: 625-626). It was these policies under epochal changes that not 
only made changes in public attitudes and opinion towards economy, democracy, and 
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welfare possible. But also did they transform the politics of poverty and the strategy of 
redistribution that previously underplayed a right to welfare into a more dynamic and 
provocative one. The recent debate on the separation of medical and pharmaceutical 
practices also demonstrates that the interest aggregation between the two groups and their 
prolonged distrust of the government were the result of what happened in the past that in turn 
affects what happens some time later. Physicians and pharmacists are two of the most Nvell 
known interest groups. But their ever-stronger interest aggregation was possible because 
policies generated interests and alliances that subsequently act to protect these interests 
within the policy network. In short, not only do these policy feedback effects constrain policy 
options, they also reshape the conditions under which the state transforms its nature (Box 3 
in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). 
A developmental pattern of economic growth in Korea presumed the redistribution through 
growth thesis which sees progress towards equality and other social aims possible only if 
economic growth is sustained. When this growth state paradigm was challenged by a static 
economy or the impact of recession, however, the rationale that presupposed greater equality 
through the pursuit of growth required a radical revision. The retention of the collectivist 
welfare aspirations that regarded welfare as residual was thereby turning to a universal form 
of welfare arrangements. In part, the financial crisis combined with a new democratic order 
enabled this transformation to occur. In other words, this financial crisis that brought in the 
IMF's 21 billion US dollars bailout package, entailing conditions on opening up the 
economy to foreign competition and increasing labour flexibility (4 Dec. 1997) coincided 
with a period when the opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung, won for the first time in the 
history of Korean politics (18 Dec. 1997). Because economic stabilisation preconditions a 
stable political system, not only did the newly elected `people's government' embark on the 
restructuring in order to lead the nation out of the crisis but also it reshaped the 
`redistribution through growth' strategy into a more productive and more redistributive one 
(i. e. productive welfarism). Restructuring politics by reshaping institutions was the key 
measure the people's government took to this end. As Gough (1996: 25) argues, therefore, 
the effect of social welfare systems on an ever more competitive economy is greatly 
influenced by the institutional reformation and its practice. 
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This linkage between social welfare and competitiveness under a new global order, Jessop 
(1994) and Penna and O'Brien (1996) argue, may have created the conditions that are 
deemed to promote economic competitiveness rather than ameliorating social problems. By 
linking these ideas, the emphasis goes onto that a new global order has impacted upon the 
strategic implication in the social regulation of the new growth regime, not the political 
process or the rationale behind the goals of politics. In other words, as Penna (2001: 153) 
points out, the `emphasis accorded to each [i. e. anti-and modernist politics, e. g. universalism 
and means-testing, social welfare and competitiveness] oscillates in different historical 
periods, but the politics surrounding them are firmly linked to social actors engaged in 
political struggle'. 
The path that reflects this oscillation is contingent on who is deciding what under what 
conditions and in what context. A distinctive path to social and economic development 
should be identified in relation to the context within which the welfare state is formed 
differently. This context varies to the extent which different assumptions, different 
strategies, and different objectives base the formation of the welfare state. For all these 
reasons, we argue, the welfare state in Korea emerged and developed not as part of the 
strategic political performance against what might have ideally been achieved but as the 
strategic political manoeuvre against the complexity and uncertainty of political forces. It 
was this complexity and uncertainty that brought in the discussion of new ideas, new 
institutions, and new norms and rules. 
By underscoring the changes of contextual dimensions, the role of ideas in shaping social 
policy and the uncertainties that frequently condition choices for political actors, this chapter 
seeks to ascertain the `conditions of possibility'. The `conditions' is that through a distinctive 
historical trajectory, a particular set of conditions influence the acceptance of one set of ideas 
rather than another, which in turn determine when change might be possible. This process is 
certainly path dependent whereby the trajectory of change that has constructed a current 
social, political and economic setting conditions the trajectory that follows. It is this path that 
shapes and reshapes the context within which the persuasiveness of ideas depends on the 
way those ideas relate to political forces of the time and that differentiate the setting where 
the interpretation of the same set of ideas diverge. In the concluding chapter that follows, we 
shall explore the logic that underpins this historically distinctive trajectory in shaping social 
policy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusions: The Logic of Possibility 
6.1 Introduction 
`[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when 
they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled 
by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who 
hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years 
back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the 
gradual encroachment of ideas.. . soon or 
late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are 
dangerous for good or evil' (Keynes, 1973: 383-384). 
By taking this assertion seriously, Hall (1989b: 362) argues that `if we want to accord ideas 
an explanatory role in analyses of policy making, we need to know much more about the 
conditions that lend force to one set of ideas rather than another in a particular historical 
setting'. Indeed, Keynesian ideas greatly influenced the emergence of the welfare state but, 
as Hall clearly points out, not in every national setting and certainly not in uniformity. By 
focussing on the role of ideas, this research set out the framework to explain the development 
of social policy in post-war Korea. Instead of emphasising the influence of economic ideas 
alone, we have examined the sorts of ideas, a series of laws, and a framework of legislation 
that matter greatly in shaping social policy within a society (i. e. South Korea) at a different 
stage of industrialisation to Western counterparts, which has begun its economic 
development from different initial levels and cultural traditions and has undergone 
authoritarian governments and military regimes. This research has clearly seen that in Korea 
two social values were becoming predominant and in constant conflict: economic growth for 
the sake of high levels of living, and social policy development for the same purpose. We 
have been concerned with the relationships between these values as they were embodied in 
institutional forms and with the impediments to their realisation in identifying the conditions 
of welfare. 
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to develop a broad view of the factors that 
conditioned the progress of these values from policy configuration through policy 
implementation to policy outcomes and to identify the historical elements that rendered one 
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rather than the other value more influential at one particular time in history than another. The 
analysis proceeds in three stages. The section that follows is designed to summarise and 
integrate the most important points made in the preceding chapters. In the next section, we 
argue that examining the role of ideas in shaping social policy enables us to discern why a 
similar political discourse and set of ideas can produce quite different images of welfare in 
different historical settings. In the concluding section, we demonstrate the value added in this 
research as a whole by underlining the significance of our analysis, pointing out the 
limitations in our material, and suggesting the possibilities of further research. 
6.2 The Logic That Guides the World of Ideas in the World of Political Forces 
The principal theme of this research has been its insistence that we must consider the ways in 
which ideas are formed through a political process if we are to understand why social policy 
is configured in a particular way and why this configuration changes to a certain direction 
over time. In tracing the role of ideas in a historical context, however, the impact of ideas on 
policy change is not always neatly identifiable. In other words, it is difficult not only to pin 
down when ideas actually influence and how they impact on policy-making, but, it is also 
difficult to point to the decisive point at which ideas shape policy because the political 
motivations of those in the decision-making point and the context within which policy is 
being framed make it difficult to prise apart interests and ideas in practice. In order to 
discover any logical sequence of any institutional change that results from the influence of 
ideas, it is necessary to count other influences that go along with it. By identifying these 
factors that may make or mar the progress of ideas, this research has attempted to find the 
logic that underpins the role of ideas in shaping social policy. Four categories of factors (e. g. 
ideas, decisions, conditions, and contexts) seem to have affected the influence of ideas in a 
closely interrelated way. 
Ideas matter because they establish assumptions, justifications, strategies, purposes, and 
means of the course that action takes. By setting out these rules and norms, ideas render 
particular sets of activities coherent and meaningful. Once expressed and articulated, Moore 
(1988) argues, ideas become powerful in favouring one line of activity rather than another. 
As these ideas change, the locus and nature of activities change too. The images that 
conjured up visions of the past formed into a specific set of policy ideas during the period of 
industrialisation in Korea. The images of mass poverty, for example, enabled the military 
255 
government (1961-1979) to develop the idea that economic growth is the only and the best 
way to achieve the resolution of mass poverty, the construction of the welfare state, and the 
promotion of higher living standards. This historically outflanked threat of poverty and risk 
framed the overarching images that economic growth related efforts inter alia would provide 
the social and political basis of the nation-building strategy. Within this framework, as part 
of nation-building strategies, the organising theme of state welfare was to combine the idea 
of relief and labour, thereby preventing welfare dependency. For example, the principle of 
less-eligibility was the central focus around which public assistance was built. A series of 
laws enacted during this period were guided by these ideas and an institutional framework 
for welfare legislation was set to fulfil the minimum requirements in order to come to this 
end. 
To this end, political actors were seeking welfare programmes that could reduce possible 
resistance and legitimate their military nature. As a carrier of ideas, a network of 
knowledge-based communities was created by the key political actors. The primary role of 
these early epistemic communities was to design state welfare programmes that could 
enhance the growth of the national economy. As a late comer to an already well-established 
world of welfare states, Korea had a comparative advantage to learn from what has been 
innovated elsewhere. In the 1960s and the 1970s, most welfare programmes were modelled 
on those of other industrialised countries partly to legitimate them and partly due to lack of 
expertise. However, the existing institutional structure conditioned the ways in which early 
borrowing was shaped. For example, political decision-makers ignored a growing demand 
for unemployment insurance in favour of industrial accident insurance, the underlying 
rationale of which was its relatively advantageous economic and administrative viability (see 
Hall, 1989b). Through the political process, the original ideas were often metamorphosed to 
policies which could meet economic ends. The final decision made by the SCNR against the 
principle of compulsory health insurance in 1963 epitomised the case taken because the 
principle of compulsory participation would be more likely to impose a financial burden on 
both businesses and the government. Epistemic communities were only allowed to be 
influential if their political values were consistent with the overall political values of those 
searching for advice. 
25 6 
As a think-tank of the EPB, the KDI played a more practical role than the CSS by relating 
their ideas to the economic and political problems of the day, thereby attracting the attention 
of those who made a final decision. For example, the KDI's idea to introduce national 
pensions was to encourage cooperative responsibilities for employers and employees 
without the government being part of them. For Park's government, national pensions could 
be an important source of capital mobilisation, the accumulated fund of which could be 
diverted to enhance economic development. Nevertheless, President Park's decision to 
postpone their implementation at the last minute indicates that even the supreme Presidential 
power is constrained by economic conditions. On the contrary, exogenous pressures may 
also give an impetus to social policy over and above economic considerations. For example, 
while the oil crisis of 1973 might have blocked the successful implementation of national 
pensions, international relations between South and North Korea enabled national health 
insurance to become compulsory in the late 1970s. The ideas that previously blocked social 
welfare development on the grounds of economic development was replaced by a more 
positive view on the grounds that welfare would be able to substantiate the social basis 
behind the concept of national security against communism. This idea coincided President 
Park's determination and his subsequent action made compulsory national health insurance 
possible. In short, by examining the particular policy networks or communities involved in 
the process of how an idea has impacted or not impacted on policy, we have found that the 
success of these communities in getting their ideas adopted depends on a successful alliance 
between the political values underpinning their ideas and the dominant political coalition. In 
order for a set of ideas to become a policy, they had to fit in with the given political pattern 
and the given socio-economic paradigm. 
From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, growing labour power and the emerging citizens' 
movement transformed the existing authoritarian rules to a new order. Authoritarian military 
regimes that persisted for almost 25 years were about to undergo a dramatic transition to a 
democratic one. It is argued that policy change during this point of crisis was a reaction to 
changes in demand mobilisation, interest articulation and political perception to them. Yet 
these changes were very unstable and unfixed, often sporadic in appearance, fluctuating in 
intensity, ambivalent in composition. There was no clear pattern and structure nor any degree 
of consistency. National pensions that epitomised the developmental state paradigm and 
minimum wages that reflected the contemporary socio-political unrest and social demands 
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were materialised into legislation on the same day in 1986. The political motivations of 
decision-makers in introducing these social programmes became a growing subject of public 
criticisms. But political regime change did not immediately bring about a radical change in 
the overarching developmental paradigm. The exercising of the presidential veto power at 
the last moment on health insurance integration, for example, showed that the ultimate 
source of power to prioritise political and economic interests remained unchanged. 
Given this, the most important point that we can single out is that the greater the institutional 
changes attempted, the greater are their unintended and largely unexpected repercussions, 
forcing upon those in power the expedient of piecemeal improvisation. Much of the literature 
that emphasised the impact of democratisation tends to ignore the point at which 
democratisation enabled social demands to become the point at issue in a political spectrum. 
Though this effect may not be in hand immediately after institutional and policy change 
occurs, change at one time point influenced what would come next. Change occurred 
because the essential components that maintained the old rules were already rearranged by 
different sets of challenges. During this transitional period, ideas about normative values or 
moral bases of social policy were shaped and propelled forward by previously inactive social 
movements. Through this new source of participation, a prevailing view that used to 
legitimate virtually all the state activities to an economic end was revised and 
re-conceptualised to the view that economic growth is not necessarily a fulfilling condition 
for social policy development. 
Despite this important social policy bearing at this critical juncture, the neo-classical 
economic ideas that underpinned the authoritarian military regimes did not undergo a 
dramatic change. The first civilian government since 1961, the Kim Young-Sam government 
(1993-1997) embraced the idea of globalisation, and attempted to implement a liberalisation 
process in financial markets and institutional structures. Under this political discourse of 
globalisation, growth and distribution were given equal weight in constructing a 
`Korean-style welfare model' while guaranteeing a minimum living standard for all and 
promoting the quality of life. Social policy was interpreted as a mechanism that could 
reconcile human development and labour motivation with social investment, thereby able to 
contribute to overall growth potentiality. Even so, the whole idea of globalisation and a 
`Korean-style welfare model' was to reinforce the urgent necessity of structural adjustment 
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of industry in order to strengthen national competitiveness. Instead of making systems of 
welfare more comprehensive and responsive to a growing social demand. globalisation 
referred that systems of welfare should correspond to an appropriate level of economic 
development in order to pursue a globally applicable social standard. 
Under the Kim Dae-Jung government (1998-present), this linkage has been further 
developed and modified by articulating the idea of `productive welfarism' in which 
productivity and social rights are balanced in a sustainable way. Greatly influenced by the 
financial crisis, the Kim government not only liberalised the market in return for the IMF's 
loan, but it also restructured domestic politics by reforming institutions. It is this productive 
welfarism that made possible public assistance reform (the most symbolic event in the 
history of Korean welfare systems), the integration of health insurance, the integration of the 
self-employed in urban areas into the public pension, and the separation of medical and 
pharmaceutical practices. In the field of economic policy, the Kim government favoured 
neo-liberal underpinnings that provided an ideological justification for a small government, 
activation of the market, and privatisation. In the field of social policy, the state's 
responsibility for welfare reforms was strengthened, and the joined-up solutions such that 
both the state and society must be in charge of social problems underlay all the reform 
measures. The active role of the state in social policy has finally been brought in. For the 
public, the financial crisis changed their value orientations in supporting economic 
development more than democratisation, while at the same time their belief in the state's 
responsibility for individual's security greatly increased. As the most democratised 
government since the nation state was established in 1948, and as the first opposition party 
that became a governing one, the Kim government generated the idea of productive welfare 
that does not necessarily share neo-liberal underpinnings behind economic policy. 
Productive welfarism strengthened the state's responsibility for people's welfare and 
emphasised redistribution, not only through a just market order but also through the state's 
active intervention. Originated from one of the most powerful bearers of ideas (i. e. President 
Kim himself), and theorised by a network of knowledge-based communities, this idea 
connected itself to the most powerful political force, reflecting the economic and political 
problems of the time. 
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Much that has been discussed supports the argument that ideas become powerful in shaping 
social policy, not just because they are autonomous following a logic of their own but 
because they are mediated, modified and sometimes metamorphosed by political contexts, 
conditions and decisions. It is this framework that imposes specific constraints on the choice 
of policy strategies that in turn creates a particular path and reshapes optional choices in 
conflict. For this reason, the ideas that only relate to normative conceptions of what can be 
ideally achieved are less influential than the ideas that identify the historically complex and 
uncertain settings of political forces. By analysing these ideas that accommodate and 
challenge social policy to uncertainty and that differentiate it from other policy areas, we can 
better explain why policy changes occur. In short, ideas are not necessarily a thrall subjected 
to political forces, they can have a good deal of independent force over circumstances (Hall, 
1989b: 369). But, when they connect to the balance of those political forces, they are likely 
to become more powerful than otherwise. It is under this logic that ideas can become 
powerful in reshaping the politics of social policy and it is this ideational logic that can offer 
us the opportunity to analyse institutional possibilities instead of impossibilities, and to fuse 
the politics of change and the politics of possibility. This is because policy-making is a 
process that not only faces constraints but is also a process that requires creativity. For the 
underlying continuity and discontinuity in policy, and policy innovation and change, we 
must recognise that `the knowledge basis of state action, as well as the processes by which 
the state itself influences the development and application of social knowledge, are indeed 
research issues of central importance (Evans, Ruescherneyer, and Skocpol, 1985b: 357-358). 
6.3 When Ideas Become Influential: Continuities and Changes in the Idea of Welfare 
From the analysis of historical continuity and discontinuity in the development of social 
policy, we have found that `political regime change' occurred when there were changes in 
policy instruments, their institutional settings, and the hierarchy of goals behind policy. In 
Hall's term (1993), changes in all these three components of policy cause change in `policy 
paradigms'. Policy paradigms suggest that the `policymaking process can be structured by a 
particular set of ideas, just as it can be structured by a set of institutions' (Hall, 1993: 290). 
But as he also clearly points out, paradigm change is likely to take place when the process is 
initiated by a specific kind of event that proved anomalous within the terms of the prevailing 
paradigm and when there is a shift in the locus of authority over policy. 
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In Korea, this paradigm change occurred in the form of `political regime change' 
accompanied by an identifiable historical event. Changes that occurred in the setting of the 
basic policy instrument at frequent intervals without any clear regularity often took place 
with a given paradigm. The content of social policy, for example, has been incrementally 
structured and readjusted in the light of past experience as well as new conditions. But most 
dramatic changes that altered the setting of policy and the hierarchy of goals and set of 
instruments employed to guide policy were accompanied by `critical junctures' that often 
resulted in political regime change. For example, when the military junta of 1961 to 1963 
changed to an elected government, it shifted towards greater emphasis on economic strength 
and expansion in the general goal orientations of the ruling elite. By creating the multiplicity 
of agencies and the launch of the first five-year economic development plan (1962-1966), the 
major emphasis of the bureaucracy shifted from a control and coordination focus to a 
goal-attainment function. Further, it was after the democratisation movement in the late 
1980s to the early 1990s that the first civilian government (1993-1997) replaced the existing 
economic development plan to the new one not only by dismantling the most prominent old 
policy instrument, the EPB, but also by introducing the idea of a Korean-style welfare model. 
The growth state paradigm began to shift towards a welfare state paradigm that fused the 
ideas of `productivity' and `welfare'. An even more radical shift took place following the 
financial crisis of the late 1990s when the people's government (1998-present) materialised 
the previously less systematised idea of `productive welfare', `market economy' and `liberal 
democracy' into a policy agenda that in turn restructured the existing political institutions. 
The state paradigm no longer remained to be seen as only growth-oriented. For example, the 
state became an active actor in providing a social safety net by reforming the pre-existing 
rules of demographic criteria embedded in public assistance. 
In all of these cases, the settings of a new order and the design of alternative strategies built 
on past experiences. More importantly, the most powerful and decisive factor that shifted 
policy paradigms seems to have been the radical change in the point of decision-making, 
otherwise known as the `locus of authority'. All the critical junctures identified in this 
research reshaped the composition of this decision-making point. In other words, changes 
that occurred only in policy instruments, or their settings, did not necessarily involve the 
appearance of anomalies but change in their goals and orientations were geared by an 
identifiable point of crisis. The financial crisis, for example, was one of the impetuses that 
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enabled the opposition candidate to win the presidential election for the first time. 
Compositional changes in a decision-making point are highly important in understanding 
policy changes not just because these reshape the relations between a set of policy networks 
in the policy process but also because those in this point are the primary actors that can 
empower the idea that may matter most. If an idea originates from this point, it is highly 
likely to be influential by guiding the overall orientation of the government. The ideas such 
as `national security and anti-communism', `economic growth and trickle-down', 
`stabilisation and liberalisation', `globalisation and competitiveness', and `market economy, 
liberal democracy and productive welfare' originated from the top decision-maker: the 
President. It was these ideas that dominated their times, corresponded to the overarching 
policy orientation, and guided policy shifts from one paradigm to another. In short, these 
points of crises that marked critical junctures in the policy process provide us these 
contextual paradigms. The period of continuity can occasionally be punctuated by this 
disjunctive experience of political regime change. 
As most historical institutionalists and proponents of the policy-learning approach argue, 
there is little doubt that changes in policy at time-O affect policy at time-1. By 1995, for 
example, all major social programmes were completed and this completion of the big 
framework has led to a stage of state welfare consolidation. Remaining policy agendas for 
social policy were not to introduce a new innovative policy but to modify and consolidate 
those existing social programmes. The citizens' involvement in social programmes was 
therefore oriented towards state welfare reforms, the quintessential example of which was 
the reform of public assistance. The previous role of epistemic communities was gradually 
infiltrated into these citizens' organisations. In many ways, citizens' groups played a 
coordinating role when there were conflicts between vested interests and principled ideas. 
At the same time, we have found that what has failed to become a policy agenda equally 
contributed to shape the images that greatly influenced what would come next. In other 
words, not only poli'o' made but also policy not made at time-O influenced changes in policy 
at time- I directly or indirectly. In 1987, for example, President Rho exercised his veto power 
in order to block the integration of health insurance funds. Prevailing policy ideas thereby 
failed to materialise into policy initiatives for another decade, even though at that time, there 
weis a broad consensus for the idea of their integration. But, when it reappeared in the late 
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1990s, the idea was strongly opposed by the health insurance societies at workplaces. Also, 
decades of mutual distrust between the government and medical professions culminated in 
and influenced the developmental path of separating medical and pharmaceutical practices in 
1999. 
. 
For national pensions, President Park's decision to postpone their implementation in 
1973 made the political intention of capital mobilisation through national pensions subject to 
societal debate, which later in turn became the EPB's major consideration in redesigning 
national pensions of 1986. These episodes of non-decisions that resulted in the 'suppression 
or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values and interests of the decision 
maker' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 7) suggest not only that policy-makers with power have 
a capacity to keep issues off the agenda which they control but also that policies not made 
have an important impact on later policies. What is left by the policy in the past, whether 
changed or unchanged, often has a selective effect on the strategies for renewal but in 
unpredictable ways. 
All that has been discussed relates to the argument that the inheritance of past policies 
appears to be the single most important element in determining what is feasible at any given 
moment in time. The proponents of the prevailing model of social learning regard this 
argument as one of the principal factors that affect policy change. In Korea, this process of 
social learning became greatly meaningful in two ways. First, social learning effects took 
place in designing the strategies of welfare between social groups. Citizens' organisations 
have learned from past experience that social problems should be tackled more 
comprehensively by legally granted methods of procedure which in turn could achieve social 
cohesion and participation. The process of decision-making became the subject of a form of 
collective resolution on society's behalf that in turn resulted in social solidarity. 
Second, not only are prevailing ideas of the time likely to reflect the ideological construction 
of political goals, they are also likely to construct prevailing images of society at the time. 
The idea of economic supremacy constructed the societal belief that economic development 
would have `trickle-down' effects. For decades, this belief of economic development 
prevailed while there was a de-prioritising other important social issues. As public opinion 
surveys have shown. Korean publics believed that it was individuals that should be 
responsible for their own welfare. This particular set of images of welfare was the result of 
established ideas that were central to policymaking and dominated the institutional settings. 
263 
These images also set the standard for the public to decide what to tolerate and what to resist. 
For instance, there was no powerful questioning or challenging debate on whether the benefit 
level of public assistance was adequate for those in great need to maintain their living 
standard. Poverty was perceived as an individual shortcoming, and support was given only in 
combination with tight controls. Nor was there any doubt about the vulnerability that the 
distributional structure of income was exposed to unprecedented impacts. The strategy of 
redistribution constructed and reflected the societal belief of meritocracy over equity in 
determining pay. In short, a distinctive trajectory that national institutions have followed 
became significantly important by shaping images and beliefs of society. These ideas, once 
institutionally embedded, are likely to shape people's ideas, beliefs and interests. 
All these findings support the model we have developed in the beginning of this research, 
where the ways in which social policy is configured are not in a linear continuum. It is 
therefore worthy to revisit the model which is represented in Figure 6.1. Political 
decision-makers are undoubtedly primary actors in shaping social policy but their decisions 
are greatly constrained or empowered by a set of conditions that are often contextually 
bound. State policies are not only an input measure but also an output and outcome measure. 
The structure and content of state policy, and their impact on citizens provide both incentives 
and resources to individuals, social groups, and state elites. Through this learning effect, 
policies affect the resultant flow of ideas. Images constructed by policy inputs often come 
full circle through resetting prevailing ideas that in turn reshape institutional settings. A 
different set of images is thereby created. Critical junctures are certainly an important 
component that brings about paradigm shift. Yet they are not necessarily a fulfilling 
condition for policy change. Even change in policy paradigm can leave important structural 
and administrative elements unchanged which are likely to become a new source of 
conditions that constrain policy options. 
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Figure 6.1 A Systematic Model for the Social Policy Process 
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For all these reasons, the relationship between economic policy and social policy is in 
essence double-edged. The state's very success in building its role as an autonomous actor in 
economic development may undercut its ability to remain autonomous in social policy 
development. Normative values embedded in social policy are not easily brought out by the 
emphasis on economic policy alone because though economic and social policy may share 
the same purpose of attaining high levels of living, their dominant methods to come to this 
end differ greatly. Economic policy aims to increase the overall size of the pie while social 
policy points to the question of how to divide the pie. The ways in which these two values 
were combined and balanced were contingent on dominant images in society that ideas were 
formed into. As Weber (1991: 280) argues, `very frequently the `world images' that have 
been created by `ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has 
been pushed by the dynamic of interest'. Because the combination of these two values 
provides the impetus for the emergence of the welfare state, the ways in which these values 
are combined may enable us to locate the welfare state in Korea in a distinctive regime 
position. 
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As many of the arguments in this research proclaimed, one of the most distinctive features 
found in welfare systems in Korea is its historically unique pathway that compressed an 
almost three hundred-year phase of welfare state development in Western Europe into half 
a century. In Korea, too, central ideas behind welfare state development such as policing the 
poor, integrating workers by social insurance, social services as an element of citizenship, 
and promoting quality of life have undergone political modifications in historical sequence 
that may be characterised as piecemeal and what Lindblom (1959) terms as a 'muddling 
through' rather than a `fundamental departure to new policy horizons' (Alber, 1988: 454, 
464). Similar to Western Europe, there was a general sequence of introducing social 
insurance (security) systems in Korea, where industrial accidents came first and 
unemployment insurance came last, with sickness (and invalidity) as well as old age (and 
invalidity, survivors) in between (Flora and Alber, 1981: 50). Within this relatively short path 
taken in Korea, there were decisive moments of societal crisis and revolutionary 
transformation, thereby a particular set of discontinuities was witnessed. At the same time, 
more frequent changes in policy instruments and their institutional settings tend to have 
preserved the status quo. In both cases, the present choice can be deeply embedded in 
antecedent conditions to a varying degree of continuities and changes. But when continuity 
prevails over discontinuity as is often the case during the normal period, this present choice 
is likely to be more deeply embedded in preceding conditions. 
For this reason, to identify the conditioning effects of institutional legacy is the key element 
to recognise the pattern of path dependency in which politically strategic attempts to bring 
about change are conditioned by the institutional legacy. In other words, institutions matter 
not just once but twice (Torfing, 2001: 29 1). Past policy determines how policy problems are 
defined and solved in and through informed learning processes. From the findings of this 
research, it is clear that even paradigm shifts that brought about political regime change did 
not necessarily negate the old policy path. This old policy path often reproduced traditional 
dichotomies between social and economic policy and their purposes. At the same time. when 
the institutional framework became destabilised and the institutional barriers to change 
became weakened, most comprehensive yet intensive reforms occurred. This dislocation of 
the policy path was the prime condition that made political regime transformation possible. 
As our central argument proclaimed, institutional change is facilitated by a complex 
interplay of internal sources that hold decision-making power, and both internal and external 
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sources of instability that condition decisions of political incumbents, and historical events 
that dislocate the established continuity of the existing policy path. This argument also 
acknowledges that historical institutionalism provides us with powerful explanatory 
variables in explaining the unique institutional and historical settings characterised by an 
unequal distribution of power and its strong dependence on the institutional structure. But 
equally importantly, these variables require more explicit applications to the context within 
which political actors' power and learning processes embedded in social policy have been of 
great significance. We have also emphasised the need for further explanatory modifications 
that could embrace these rational and normative values. Through these modifications, we 
can have a better grip of not only the impossibility but also the possibility of social policy 
that are likely to be conditioned on the continuity and discontinuity of the previous policy 
path. It is this path dependency that centrally features in the welfare regime approach in 
which different regimes generated a specific pattern of path dependent development 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). As Gough (2000: 9) made plain, a `central tenet of the welfare 
regime approach is that social welfare systems generate interests and alliances which 
subsequently act to protect these interests, imparting to the regime a path of development 
which attains a momentum of its own'. 
6.4 Conclusion: Pathway to a Society of Positive Welfare 
Studies of the role of ideas on policy are by no means a new trajectory. Hall (1989c), for 
example, controls for knowledge of Keynesian ideas of macroeconomic management in 
many countries and accounts for the variety of outcomes on the basis of other variables. 
Goldstein and Keohane (1993b) also explore a variety of issue areas by seeking to show the 
ways in which variations in the ideas available affected policy outcomes. But the research 
design here differs from these studies. While all share the central point of the role of ideas, 
we point to the sources as well as effects of ideas. We also focus on the procedural dynamics 
of the ways in which ideas are formed into shape on the basis of other variables, such as the 
composition of decision-making point, socio-economic and political conditions, institutional 
structures, historical legacies and critical junctures. 
In the context of social policy development in Korea, our contribution to knowledge 
become,, more pronounced since very little contribution has been made within the tradition 
of historical institutional analysis to solving the puzzles of how ideas matter questioning 
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their origins, formulation, diffusion and adoption. By setting out the new framework that 
embraces the constellations defined by the intersection of three dimensions of variables - 
decisions, conditions, and contexts, we have made an original synthesis that could answer 
why one particular idea mattered and why it made a difference. In our model, ideas are 
important because they play a role in mediating the expectations that are necessary for 
political actors to sustain their preferences in historically specific contextual conditions. In 
order to identify these conditions, we have conducted several original case studies using 
primary material as well as already known material but with a new interpretation. Not only 
by emphasising the role of ideas in shaping and reshaping social policy, that in turn 
influences overall images of welfare embedded in society, but also by taking the means-ends 
equation where policy is seen to be more than the intended course of action, our research has 
proposed that we could open the way to developing a greater theoretical synthesis that could 
be considerably relevant for the explanation of real-world social policy processes. 
For many years, scholars have pointed to the importance of the Korean democratisation 
movement in the late 1980s but few of them argued that this period made a contribution to 
shaping social policy due to the absence of visible participation by the labour movement in 
social policy issues. We have, however, argued that this critical juncture should not simply 
be seen as an incremental process. It entailed periods of dramatic reorientation and 
empowered a new source of civic participation in politics. The idea of 'participatory 
democracy' embedded in the social movement of the mid-1990s was carried through when 
the Kim Dae-Jung government established the Tripartite Commission in 1998. By 
embracing the voices of employees, employers, and government, its establishment was 
initially designed to encourage a tripartite consultation mechanism to overcome the 
economic crisis. The Commission, in fact, not only brought two major trade unions together 
to make one voice representing diverse views of labour, but also strengthened the voice of 
labour meaning it is more likely to be heard. But, at the same time, while there were 
occasions that the Commission played an active role in revising and recommending labour 
market reforms, the more progressive of two trade unions refused to take part in meetings of 
the Commissiot-i many times. Further. the empowered voice of labour sometimes became the 
major source that blocked social policy reforrns when their interests were not safeguarded as 
seen in the case of health insurance funds integration. In short, there is little doubt that the 
idea of 'participatory democracy' not only reshaped the relations between a set of policy 
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networks in the policy process but also marked an important critical momentum. But equally 
importantly, this change does not necessarily mean that there is an increasing viability of the 
welfare state option towards societal corporatist arrangements. 
This means-ends equation between the true intentions of state policies and their political 
outcomes also enables us to make careful interpretation of policy outputs. For example. it is 
easy to overemphasise the extended role of the state in social protection largely drawn from 
the claim that Korea has shown the paradoxical hypothesis whereby the role of the state in 
social protection would be retrenched in the era of globalisation. In fact, many policy 
responses to the financial crisis in the late 1990s were formed into shape under severe 
conditional constraints. In part, economic policy reforms were carried out due to the pressure 
from the largest financial commitment in IMF history. But, the most intentional catalyst for 
those reforms was to enhance long-term international competitiveness through promoting 
favourable conditions for international capital so that either direct foreign investment or even 
a speculative influx to the money market could come back to Korea (Appendix 13). In other 
words, the financial crisis was often seen as a failure for economic policy under the Kim 
Young-Sam government (1993-1997) to monitor and control financial flows in the 
international market, thereby being the outcome of its naive efforts for globalisation. Given 
this economic framework, there might have not been many policy options left for the current 
minority government (1998-present) but to increase its commitment to welfare in response to 
this crisis. For this reason, social policy reforms in the era of financial crisis that might have 
been introduced as an emergency measure resulted in the strengthening of the state's role in 
social protection. The meaning of this equation, as our research has illustrated, becomes 
valuable not simply because it produced a different mode of state intervention but because it 
would be likely to unfold this process of political development further over time that is 
theoretically central. 
In order to better understand how this means-ends equation works, therefore, it is necessary 
to examine the flow of ideas. The creation and recreation of these ideas define and redefine 
the relationship between how policies are configured, implemented, and impact on citizens. 
Because ideas require a set of institutional mechanisms that could translate them into reality 
and that could embody a normative system in order to define what is good and bad for 
society, identifying the interaction between ideas and institutions can enable us to discern 
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normative values that are embodied and perpetuated in the mechanisms of state welfare. The 
evaluations of such ideas that impacted on citizens in Korea are currently very limited largely 
due partly to the immature settlement of its institutional root and partly to inconsistent 
longitudinal data sets available. Yet, as we have attempted in the preceding chapters, there 
has been an increasing sign of improvement that further development will be possible sooner 
rather than later. 
For a new democracy, the possibilities for social policy depend heavily on the `implicit social 
contract and the development strategies inherited from prior authoritarian periods'. For this 
reason, `the success of reform requires a new politics, with politicians and parties less 
beholden to the status quo' (Haggard, 2000: 141). By identifying continuities and changes in 
a historical path taken in Korea, we have explored the ways in which democratic progress has 
created pressures for greater attention to social policy in Korea that has later in turn been 
accelerated by the financial crisis. In the analysis of social policy for the newly emerging 
democracies, it is vitally important to examine the effect of the critical juncture intertwined 
with other processes of change. The outcomes during this period of significant transition are 
likely to establish distinct trajectories within which one policy change follows another. 
Korea is in the stage to transform the state from being simply a regulator to more of an active 
provider in welfare provisions. But, this transformation period might confuse the idea that a 
welfare society and a welfare state are inseparable in essence. This is in part because a 
restructuring of the conventional welfare state schemes is to `move from the welfare state to 
the welfare society, with a new and better mix of public and private provision' (Alber, 
1988: 465). This is also in part because this welfare-mix constitutes a society of positive 
welfare to which `individuals themselves and other agencies besides government 
contribute-and which is functional for wealth creation' (Giddens, 1998: 117). It should be 
remembered however that in order for what the (welfare) state does to be legitimatised, the 
ways in which people perceive welfare (i. e. welfare society) must be thought through first 
(Robson, 1976: 174). 
The main features that sustained a claim to be a welfare society in Korea were its sustained 
growth and egalitarian income distributions. The basic premise of this claim was that 
household economics have the capacity to save and 'Confucian family welfare remains an 
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effective functional equivalent to welfare statism' (Esping-Andersen, 1996: 23). Yet, as a 
unit that represents culture-embodiment social structure and that equally signifies family 
values of Confucian ethics, the pro-family arrangement (and the solidaristic family structure 
of welfare) which would encourage the traditional family values, the increasing financial 
capacities of private households and the self-help potential in social networks has lost its 
preconditions. There has been a continuous decline in total fertility rates, a mounting aged 
dependency ratio and decrease in the average number of household members. In a nutsell, 
there is ample evidence that long-term social trends make the potential for self-help in 
private or social networks appear much more likely to decline than to grow. 
Alber (1998: 467) argues that the arrival of a welfare society will not replace the welfare state 
because `private means are sufficient only to supplement public provisions, not to substitute 
for them'. In Korea, as Jacobs (2000) argues, public expenditures on welfare are bound to 
rise. The level of protection will also grow much beyond the level of minimum subsistence. 
Given the structurally advantageous position to become potential vanguards in terms of 
stressing a `social investment strategy' (Esping-Andersen, 1996: 24), Korea might turn from 
its growth-oriented developmental state to the social investment state in the positive welfare 
society. As Giddens (1998: 127-128) agues, this is the state that `expenditure on welfare, 
understood as positive welfare, will be generated and distributed not whole through the state, 
but by the state working in combination with other agencies, including businesses. The 
welfare society here is not just the nation, but stretches above and below it'. By equating the 
idea of `productivity' and `social rights', Korea is in the stage of becoming the productive 
welfare state that no longer maintains the hierarchical nature of the relationship between 
economic and social policies but recognises that the dynamic of economic development is 
only manifested within pronounced articulation of social policy. Social policy can help the 
national economy to grow that in turn requires further social policy reforms. In this equation, 
a society of positive welfare is the value premise that constructs the productive welfare state. 
Here, politics will play a key role in attaining as well as maintaining this equation. Given this 
equation, it remains to be seen whether cumulative legacies and additions culminate in a 
further paradigm shift or in a restructuring of the stature of paradigms within social policy. 
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There also remain questions of global convergence in welfare states whereby productive 
welfare is to be the guiding light of what is also known as a `new convergence thesis', or a 
`second coming of the end of ideology thesis'. Different from the old convergence thesis that 
predicted the emergence and expansion of welfare state along similar patterns in different 
countries, this new convergence thesis foresees a convergence towards welfare state 
retrenchment that in turn brings about fusing the idea of productivity and social rights. For 
Western welfare states, this stage has followed many developmental stages from the birth of 
the welfare state, its consolidation and development, through its golden age, to the crisis of 
the welfare state. In Korea, this similar pattern of `productive welfare state development' is 
not the procedural outcome that has undergone the identical stages of development to 
Western counterparts. There have been a few stages missing in the development of the 
welfare state in Korea. It is therefore interesting to see the ways in which productive welfare 
states are manifested in different context with different historical trajectories of social policy 
development. For this analysis too, it will be critical to examine the `possibility of social 
policy' that gives due weight to the ways in which ideas pass through the screen of political 
opportunity and political possibility in shaping social policy. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 Main Social Policy Legislation from 1960 to 1999 
Year Legislation 
1960 Pension Act for Civil Servants 
1961 Law on Support Responsibility for Orphans in Residential Care 
1961 Special Case Act for Adoption 
1961 Veterans Compensation Act 
1961 Prostitution Prohibition Act 
1961 Children's Welfare Act 
1961 Public Livelihood Protection Act 
1962 Disaster Relief Act 
1963 Pension Act for Military Personnel 
1963 Social Security Related Law 
1963 Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act 
1963 Health Insurance Act 
1963 Pharmaceutical Affairs Act 
1968 Temporary Measurement Act for Self-Support Guidance Services 
1970 Social Welfare Services Act 
1973 Mothers' Health Act 
1973 National Welfare Pension Act 
1976 Health Insurance Amendment Act 
1977 Pension Act for Private School Personnel 
1977 Health Assistance Act 
1977 Health Insurance Act for Civil Servants and Private School Personnel 
1980 Act for Social Welfare Services Fund 
1981 Children's Welfare Act 
1981 Industrial Safety Health Act 
1981 Welfare Act for the Elderly 
1981 Welfare Act for the Disabled 
1982 Livelihood Protection Amendment Act 
1983 Social Welfare Services Amendment Act 
1983 Livelihood Protection Amendment Act 
1986 Minimum Wage Act 
1986 National Pension Act 
1986 Health Act for Mothers and their Children 
1987 Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Amendment Act 
1990 Act for Employment Promotion of the Disabled 
1991 Act for Welfare Fund within the Firm 
1993 Employment Insurance Act 
1994 Basic Act for Social Security 
1998 National Pension Reform Act 
1999 National Basic Livelihood Security Act 
1999 Pharmaceutical affairs Amendment Act 
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Appendix 2 Chronology of the Korean Political Party System 
Politics The Ruling Party The Major Opposition 
Parties 
The First Republic The Liberal Party 
(August 1948 - April 1960) (December 1951 - May 
1961) 
The Second Republic 
(April 1960 - May 1961) 
The Military Junta (May 
1961 - December 1963) 
The Third and Fourth 
Republic (December 1963 - 
December 1979) 
The Pre-Fifth Republic 
(interim period) (October 
1979 - March 1981) 
The Fifth Republic 
(March 1981 - February 
1988) 
The Democratic Republican 
Party (May 1963 - October 
1980) 
The Democratic Justice 
Party (DJP) (January 1981) 
The Korean Democratic 
Party 
(February 1949) 
The Democratic Party 
(September 1955) 
The Democratic Party (the 
new faction of the 
Democratic Party - May 
1961) 
The New Democratic Party 
(the old faction of the 
Democratic Party) 
(February 1961 - May 1961) 
The Democratic Justice 
Party (DJP) (June 1963) 
The Democratic Party (DP) 
(August 1963) 
The People's Party 
(Amalgam of DJP and DP, 
May 1965) 
The New Democratic Party 
(February 1967 - October 
1980) 
The Democratic Korean 
Party (DKP) (January 1981) 
The New Korean 
Democratic Party (NKDP) 
(January 1985) 
The Reunification and 
Democratic Party 
(RDP)(May 1985) 
"' 74 
Politics The Ruling Party The Major Opposition 
Parties 
The Party for Peace and 
Democracy (PPD) 
(November 1987) 
The Sixth Republic 
(February 1988 - February 
1993) 
The Seventh Republic 
(February 1993 - February 
1998) 
The Eighth Republic 
(February 1998 onwards) 
The Democratic Liberal 
Party (UDP + NDRP + 
DJP) (February 1990) 
The New Korean Party 
(former DLP) (December 
1995) 
The Millennium 
Democratic Party (MDP) 
The New Democratic 
Republican Party (NDRP) 
(October 1987) 
The New Democratic 
Coalition Party (NDCP) 
(April 1991) 
The Democratic Party (DP) 
(June 1990) 
The Democratic Party (DP) 
(September 1991) (NDCP + 
DP) 
The United Liberal 
Democrats (ULD) (March 
1995) 
The National Congress for 
New Politics (NCNP) 
(September 1995) 
The Grand National Party 
(GNP) 
The United Liberal 
Democrats (ULD) (March 
1995) 
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Appendix 3 Union Membership and Industrial Disputes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1957 -- 572 ---- 242* - 1958 -- 634 ---- 249* - 1959 -- 547 ---- 280* - 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 16 313 1,820 2,383 9.42 2.97 - 224,420 - 1964 16 341 2,105 2,363 11.49 3.53 47 271,579 - 
1965 16 362 2,255 2,609 11.56 3.72 31 301,523 - 1966 16 359 2,359 2,780 12.12 4.04 35 336,974 - 1967 16 386 2,619 3,040 12.42 4.38 41 377,576 6 
1968 16 385 2,732 3,400 12.14 4.56 35 412,906 -2 1969 16 417 2,939 3,547 12.54 4.79 32 444,783 -10 
1970 17 419 3,063 3,746 12.63 4.92 28 473,259 -2 1971 17 446 3,061 2,923 12.67 5.00 24 497,221 6 
1972 17 430 2,961 4,005 12.87 4.96 18 515,292 - 
1973 17 403 2,865 4,153 13.20 5.00 33 548,054 - 1974 17 432 3,352 4,444 14.76 5.74 108 655,785 - 
1975 17 488 3,585 4,751 15.79 6.42 94 750,235 -6 1976 17 517 3,854 5,140 16.45 6.81 96 845,630 -3 
1977 17 538 4,042 5,714 16.71 7.45 110 954,727 9 
1978 17 552 4,305 6,242 16.90 7.86 99 1,054,608 44 
1979 17 553 4,394 6,479 16.79 8.00 33 1,088,061 3 
1980 16 2,618 - 6,464 14.67 6.93 -140 948,134 101 
1981 16 2,141 - 6,605 14.64 6.89 19 966,738 - 20 
1982 16 2,194 - 6,839 14.39 6.84 17 984,136 -98 
1983 16 2,238 - 7,170 14.08 6.96 26 1,009,881 10 
1984 16 2,365 - 7,631 13.24 7.00 1 1,010,522 16 
1985 16 2,534 - 8,104 12.39 6.70 -7 1,004,398 151 
1986 16 2,658 - 8,433 12.28 6.68 32 1,035,890 11 
1987 16 4,086 - 9,191 13.79 7.75 231 1,267,457 3,341 
1988 21 6,142 - 9,610 17.77 10.12 440 1,707,456 -1,744 
1989 22 7,861 - 10,389 18.60 11.00 225 1,932,415 -257 
1990 22 7,698 - 10,950 17.23 10.43 -45 1,886,884 ---1,294 
1991 22 7,656 - 11,405 15.81 9.66 -84 1,803,408 -88 
1992 22 7,527 - 11,618 14.93 9.11 -68 1,734,598 1 
1993 27 7,147 - 11,794 14.14 8.63 -68 1,667,373 -91 
1994 27 7,025 - 12,325 13.46 8.33 -8 1,659,011 -23 
27fß 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1995 27 6,606 - 12,784 12.63 7.90 -44 1,614,800 -3 3 
1996 27 6,424 - 13,065 12.24 7.68 -16 1,598,558 -3 
1997 41 5,733 - 13,226 11.22 7.03 -115 1,484,194 -7 
1998 43 5,560 - 12,191 11.50 7.01 -82 1,401.940 51 
1999 45 5,637 - 12,522 11.82 7.30 79 1,480,666 69 
Notes: According to the revised Trade Union Act on December 31 1980, previous branches and offices werc 
upgraded to unit level trade unions; * in thousands. 
(1) Year. 
(2) Union by industry. 
(3) The number of trade unions (local chapters, unit union). 
(4) Branch. 
(5) Total number of employees (in thousands). 
(6) The rate of unionisation calculated by (union membership T total number of employees) x 100. 
(7) The rate of unionisation calculated by (union membership = total employed); the number of total employed 
is available in Appendix 12. 
(8) The increase or decrease of the number of trade union members = union membership of current years - 
union membership of previous years. 
(9) The Union Membership (Number of union members), see also Chapter 2, Figure 2.2. 
(10) The increase or decrease of strikes and lock-outs, see also Chapter 2, Figure 2.2. 
Sources: FKTU (1979) Table 6.1. in p. 431 and Table 7.1 in p. 495; ILO (various years); MoL (1971 and 
various years from 1973 to 2000); NSO (1998b: 98,100,1998e: 211,2000c: 182,226). 
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Appendix 4 The Structure of Social Policy in Korea (1998 
Social Security Systems Competent Source of Fund Ministries 
(Organisations) 
Civil Servants MoGAHA Civil Servants and Gov't 
CSPC 
Military Personnel MoND Military Personnel and 
Gov't 
2 Private School Teachers MoE PSTPC Teachers, Gov't, and 
Schools 
National Pension MoHW NPC Employees and Employers 
Industrial Employees MoHW (NFMI) Employees and Employers 
Self-Employed MoHW (NFMI) Insured Persons and Gov't 
3 Civil Servants and MoHW (NHIC) Civil Servants and Gov't; 
Private School Teachers and Teachers, Gov't and 
Schools 
Industrial Accident MoL Employers 
Employment MoL (KWLC) Employers and Employees 
Relief for the Livelihood MoHW 
Health Assistance 
Social Disaster Relief MoGAHA 
Assistance Grain Support for MoAF 
Disaster Relief 
Government 
Veterans Programme PVAA 
Training Programme for MoL 
the Poor 
Public Housing MoCT 
Educational Support MoE 
Social Senior Citizens 
Welfare Unfortunate Women 
Services Children in Need MoHW 
I landicapped 
Vagrants Government 
Health Care for those in MoJ 
Correctional Institution 
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Social Security Systems Competent Source of Fund 
Ministries 
(Organisations) 
Health Care for Military MoND 
Social Personnel 
Welfare 
Services Employment Services MoL (KMA, Government 
KEPAD) 
Special Schools for the MoE 
Disabled 
Notes: 1. Social Insurance; 2. Pension; 3. Health. 
Abbreviations: 
MoHW: Ministry of Health and Welfare 
MoL: Ministry of Labour 
MoJ: Ministry of Justice 
MoAF: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
MoND: Ministry of National Defence 
MoCT: Ministry of Construction and Transportation 
KMA: Korea Manpower Agency 
PVAA: Patriots and Veterans Administration Agency 
KEPAD: Korea Employment Promotion Agency for the Disabled 
MoGAI IA: Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs 
NTS: National Tax Service 
CSPC: Civil Servants Pension Corporation 
PSTPC: Private School Teachers Pension Corporation 
NI'C: National Pension Corporation 
NFMI: National Federation of Medical Insurance 
KWLC: Korea Welfare Labour Corporation 
LPA: Livelihood Protection Act 
HAA: Health Assistance Act 
DRA: Disaster Relief Act 
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Appendix 5 Results of Legislative Bills in the National Assembly of 1948 - 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ist 234 89 145 149 43 106 48.3 3.1 
" 38.0 62.0 63.7 28.9 71.1 
2nd 398 182 216 214 77 137 41 03.4 
" 45.7 54.3 53.8 36.0 64.0 
3rd 410 169 241 157 72 85 42.0 35.3 
" 41.2 58.8 38.3 45.9 54.1 
4th 322 120 202 75 31 44 25.8 21. ti 
" 37.3 62.7 32.3 41.3 58.7 
Sum. 1364 560 804 595 223 372 39.8 46.3 
" 41.1 58.9 37.5 62.5 
5th 280 121 159 59 20 39 16.5 24.5 
" 43.2 56.8 21.1 33.9 66.1 
6th 658 416 242 332 178 154 42.8 63.6 
" 63.3 36.7 50.5 53.6 46.4 
7th 535 244 291 357 123 234 50.4 80.4 
" 45.6 54.4 66.7 34.5 65.5 
8th 138 43 95 39 6 33 14.0 34.7 
" 31.2 68.8 28.3 15.4 84.6 
Sum. 1611 824 787 787 327 460 39.7 58.4 
" 51.1 48.9 41.6 58.4 
9th 633 154 479 544 84 460 54.5 96.0 
" 24.3 75.7 85.9 15.4 84.6 
10th 129 5 124 100 3 97 60.0 78.2 
" 3.9 96.1 77.5 3.0 97.0 
Sum. 762 159 603 644 87 557 54.7 92.4 
" 20.9 79.1 13.5 86.5 
11 `h 489 202 287 340 83 257 41.1 89.5 
" 41.3 58.7 69.5 24.4 75.6 
12`h1 379 211 168 222 66 156 31.3 92.9 
" 55.7 44.3 58.5 29.7 70.3 
Sum. 868 413 455 562 149 413 36.1 90.8 
" 47.6 52.4 20.5 73.5 
ý'ti(1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
13th 938 570 368 492 171 321 30.0 87.2 
" 60.8 39.2 52.5 34.8 65. ' 
14`h 902 321 581 656 119 537 37.1 92.4 
" 35.6 64.4 72.7 18.1 81.9 
Sum. 1,840 891 949 1,148 290 858 37.1 90.4 
" 48.4 51.6 25.3 74.7 
15`h 1,951 1,144 807 1,120 561 659 49.0 81.7 
" 58.6 41.4 57.4 50.1 58.8 
T. S. 8,412 4,007 4,405 6,017 1,648 3,321 41.1 75.4 
" 47.6 52.4 27.4 55.2 
Notes: 
The Constituent National Assembly: 31 May 1948 - 30 May 1950; 
The 2°u National Assembly: 31 May 1950- 30 May 1954; 
The 3`d National Assembly: 31 May 1954 - 30 May 1958; 
The 4`h National Assembly: 31 May 1958 - 28 July 1960; 
The 5'h National Assembly: 29 July 1960 - 16 May 1961; 
The 6`h National Assembly: 17 December 1963 - 30 June 1967; 
The 7`h National Assembly: 1 July 1967 - 30 June 1971; 
The 8`h National Assembly: 1 July 1971 - 17 October 1972; 
The 9'h National Assembly: 12 March 1973 - 11 March 1979; 
The 10'h National Assembly: 12 March 1979 - 27 October 1980; 
The 11`h National Assembly: 11 April 1981 - 10 April 1985; 
The 12`h National Assembly: 11 April 1985 - 29 May 1988; 
The 13`h National Assembly: 30 May 1988 - 29 May 1992; 
The 14`h National Assembly: 30 May 1992 - 29 May 1996; 
The 15`h National Assembly: 30 May 1996 - 29 May 2000. 
ý1) : Percentage of legislative bills in each category. 
The number of total legislative bills. 
(2)1'he number of legislative bills initiated by National Assemblymen. 
(3) The number of legislative bills submitted by the government. 
(4) The number of total approved legislative bills. 
(5) The number of legislative bills amongst (2) category. 
(6) The number of legislative bills amongst (3) category. 
(7) Passage rate of legislative bills initiated by National Assemblymen (5) + (2). 
(8) Passage rate of legislative bills submitted by the government (6) _ (3). 
Sources: SoNA(1950: 98,134,1971: 46,1972: 63,1975: 73,92,1979: 68,1980: 53,1982: 113.1985: 97,1986: 70, 
1988: 93,1992: 144,1997: 171,173,2000: 227,230,382). 
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Appendix 6 The Number of People covered by, the Public Assistance Programme 
st nd rd 123 4th Categorv- of Cc of 
Total Total Class I Cla"S II Pop. Pop. 
1971 283,000 67,501 957,859 - - ;. 98 - 
1972 283,000 60,702 824,138 - - 3.49 - 
1973 283,000 56,177 765,651 - - 3, - - 
1974 283,000 55,491 706,015 - - 3.01 - 
1975 330,000 55,838 903,872 - - 3.66 - 
1976 330,987 54,151 1,631,561 - - 4.70 - 
1977 318,204 52,476 1,726,968 369,204 1,726, O47 5.76 5.75 
1978 289,013 50,200 1,654,622 440,725 1,654,526 5.39 5±7 
1979 318,204 47,287 1,623,898 510,447 1,62 3,675 5.30 5.69 
1980 282,000 47,000 1,500,056 641,732 1,499,958 4.80 5.62 
1981 282,000 47,000 1,760,519 642,434 3,085,451 5.4O 9.63 
1982 282,000 52,300 3,085,566 642,434 3.086,000 8.70 9.48 
1983 282,000 55,605 2,616,335 642,434 3,085,566 7.40 9.34 
1984 282,000 59,558 2,214,101 642,434 2,616,335 6.32 8. ()7 
1985 282,000 63,150 1,928,000 642,434 2,616,335 5.57 7.99 
1986 283,650 70,900 1,819,000 643,000 1,819,000 5.27 5.97 
(1,924,000) (1O. 64)* 
1987 295,000 74,650 1,984,000 650,000 1,984,000 5.65 6.33 
(1,752,000) (1O. 54)* 
1988 318,294 65,020 1,916,757 648,243 1,916,757 5.47 6.1O 
(1,725,000) (l (). -1 oº). 
1989 340,595 79,000 1,932,935 677,000 1,844,000 5.54 5.94 
(1,725,000) (1O. O())- 
1990 339,423 81,383 1,835,385 695,000 1,958,92O 5.26 6.19 
(1,276,469)) (9.17) 
1991 338,168 81,556 1,826,421 01)2,26O 1.826.421 5.11) 
(360.003) (6.65)* 
191)2 338,168 ti . 
271) 1,755,000 692.2(, O 1.755.00O 4.97 5.59 
(24O. OOO) ((). 1-1): 
ýýý 
ist 2nd 3rd 41. b 1c of C'c 0f 
Total Total 
Class I Class II Pop. 1 Pop 
1993 338,168 82,875 1,580,000 666,000 1,580,000 4.5 3 S. 0s 
(120,000) (S. 3 5) 
1994 320,414 81,448 1,501,000 634,843 1,501,000 4.26 4. -,,, -, 
1995 307,401 77,671 1,369,832 619,753 1,369,832 3.89 4.41 
1996 295,767 76,001 1,134,242 606,181 1.134,242 3.3 1 3. s 
1997 296,988 76,769 1,039,908 602,217 1,039,908 3.07 3.5 7 
1998 300,902 76,265 798,020 648,461 674,235_' . 53 
1999 330,745 78,422 766,020 742,844 893,785 2.51 3.49 
(3.72) 
Notes: 1. Percentage of beneficiary (1s', 2" , and 3` categories) to total population; 2. Percentage of bencfici, Ir` 
(4`h category) to total population; 3. when temporary livelihood protection is included (1,745,187+4(,, M58.4(, 3): 
Figures in parentheses refers to medical protection. The first category is subsidised 100 per cent, the second, SO 
per cent, and the third (medical protection), 33-66 per cent from the government expenditure. The medical 
protection scheme was only in operation from 1986 to 1993; Under the 2"d ('atcgory, those accommodated in 
national and public institutes are excluded: * percentage of beneficiaries including those under medical 
protection to the total population. 
Sources: MoHSA (1980: 42,43,150,151,1984: 178,179,180,1988: 175,220-223,1990: 173,210-213), 
MoHW (1996: 170,240-243,1999b: 263,280,281,2000a: 263); NSO (1999b). 
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Appendix 7 Industrial Accident, 1964-1999 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1964 7,698 9,323 64 - 81.798 123.123 1.489 
1965 8,112 - 289 - 161.150 - 9.470 
1966 8,325 10,433 594 563,016 222.456 - 13.096 
1967 8,624 - 1,142 - 336.159 - 18.207 
1968 9,061 2,389 - 488,628 - -1 -1. O ýO 
1969 9,285 - 3,696 - 683.377 - 31.7(15 
1970 9,617 15,469 5,583 1,084,063 779,053 35,389 37,752 
1971 9,946 25,367 7,799 1,251,503 833,441 42,090 44,545 
1972 10,379 25,714 9,375 1,222,962 987,856 45,673 46.603 
1973 10,942 26,870 13,924 1,485,854 1,166,650 58,485 59,367 
1974 11,421 21,528 17,551 1,606,045 1,353.167 70,864 72,000 
1975 11,692 17,108 21,369 1,513,337 1,836,209 79,819 80,570 
1976 12,412 43,416 28,445 2,158,064 2,269,796 94,847 95,289 
1977 12,812 54,806 38,829 2,846,340 2,646,542 117,077 118,011 
1978 13,412 62,217 49,957 3,105,320 3,105,757 138,182 139,242 
1979 13,602 68,785 55,763 3,345,904 3,607,595 128,457 130,307 
1980 13,683 74,090 63,100 3,219,442 3,752,975 112,111 113,375 
1981 14,023 72,070 59,029 3,139,272 3,456,746 116,698 117,938 
1982 14,379 81,136 54,159 3,383,651 3,464,977 136,952 167.810 
1983 14,505 92,093 60,213 3,642,170 3,941.152 157,985 156.972 
1984 14,429 100,061 64,704 4,022,696 4,384,589 150.479 159,300 
1985 14,970 103,747 66,803 4,106,845 4,495,185 140.218 141.8019 
1986 15,505 107,412 70,865 4,461.250 4,749.342 140.404 142.088 
1987 16,354 110,316 83,536 4,795,346 5.356.546 141.485 14 x. 5990 
1988 16,869 116,728 101,445 5,127,972 5,743,970 141.517 142.329 
1989 17,560 121,6 18 118,894 5, '73,169 6,687,821 128.1 3 Ils 134.127 
1990 18,085 128,0(18 129,687 5,365,613 7.542.752 120.966 13 
1991 18,677 137,001 146.284 5.460,794 7.9 2.704 125.755 12'. 169 
"84 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1992 19,033 147,915 154,820 5,882,773 7,058,704 105,330 107,435 
1993 19,328 153,554 163,152 5,733,837 6,942,527 88,817 90,288 
1994 19,905 167,403 182,871 6,085,354 7,273,132 84,480 85,948 
1995 20,432 178,051 186,021 6,167,596 7,893,727 76,388 78,034 
1996 20,817 186,903 210,226 6,236,261 8,156,894 70,188 71,548 
1997 21,106 202,095 227,564 6,342,071 8,236,641 65,732 66,770 
1998 19,994 199,272 215,539 5,785,664 7,582,479 50,561 51,514 
1999 20,281 - 249,405 - 7,441,160 54,534 55,405 
Notes: 
The expansion of coverage: workplaces with 500 employees and more in 1964; 200 and more in 1965; 150 and 
more in 1966; 100 and more in 1967; 50 and more in 1968; 30 and more in 1972; 16 and more in 1973; 
workplaces of mining, five special areas of manufacturing industry such as chemical, oil, coal, rubber, and 
plastic with 5 employees and more in 1976; 10 and more in 1982; since 1986, gradually workplaces with 5 
employees and more in different types of occupation have been included. 
(1) Total employed persons (in thousands): According to the National Statistical Office, Republic of Korea, as 
well as, ILO, `employed persons' include those who work more than 1 hour a week in order to gain income 
during the survey period (in the case of unpaid family workers, 18 hours), and those who are in employment but 
temporarily out of work due partly to vacation, temporary disease, labour disputes and other reasons (NSO, 
1998a: 582). 
(2) Total establishments: establishment employing 10 workers and over until 1975,5 workers and over after 
1976. 
(3) Number of workplaces covered by the Industrial Accident Insurance Programme: Analysis on Industrial 
Accidents. 
(4) Total number of workers in establishment employing 10 workers and over until 1975,5 workers and over 
after 1976. 
(5) Number of workers covered by the Industrial Accident Insurance Programme. 
(6) Number of accidents. 
(7) Number of victims (number affected by accident); in the case of (6) and (7) agriculture, forestry and fishing 
industries were added since 1991. 
Sources: MoL (1971: 224,230,1973: 280,281,1982: 326,1983: 345,1990b: 27,1991: 385,1998: 17,1999a, 
1999b: 394,395,410,2000b: 222); NSO (1998a: 166,1999b, 2000b: 42,2000c: 182); OLA (1964: 2-5, 
1966: 34). 
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Appendix 8 Coverage of the National Health Insurance Programme 1977 - 1999 
(1) (2) (3) (3-1) (4) (5) (6) (-') 
1977 3,140 - - - - 60 1. 'O() 10 9 (59.30) (1.13) (60.43) (39.57) 
1978 3,820 - - - - 58 878 3 2. ()C) 
(63.96) (0.97) , (64.93) (35.07) 
1979 4,852 3,044 - - - 61 7.95 7 2.134 
(48.08) (30.17) (0.60) (78.85) (21.15 ) 
1980 5,381 3,780 - - - 65 9,226 1142 
(47.34) (33.25) (0.57) (81.16) (1 S. S4) 
1981 7,241 3,977 182 - 24 73 11,497 3,728 
(47.56) (26.12) (1.19) (0.16) (0.48) (75.51) (24.49) 
1982 8,998 3,924 310 125 324 122 13,803 3,7 8 
(51.33) (22.38) (1.77) (0.71) (1.85) (0.69) (78.73) (21.27) 
1983 10,572 4,010 298 114 513 171 15,678 3,728 
(54.48) (20.66) (1.54) (0.59) (2.64) (0.88) (80.79) (19.21) 
1984 11,646 4,095 285 106 820 213 17,165 3,259 
(57.02) (20.05) (1.40) (0.52) (4.01) (1.04) (84.04) (15.96) 
1985 12,215 4,210 274 101 954 241 17,995 3,259 
(57.47) (19.81) (1.29) (0.48) (4.49) (1.13) (84.67) (15.33) 
1986 13,294 4,329 241 98 1,130 269 19,361 4.386 
(55.98) (18.23) (1.02) (0.41) (4.76) (1.13) (81.53) (18.47) 
1987 14,971 4,364 227 89 1,320 286 21,257 4,386 
(58.38) (17.02) (0.89) (0.35) (5.15) (1.11) (82.90) (17.10) 
1988 16,269 4,508 6,654 123 1,082 270 28,906 4,290 
(49.01) (13.58) (20.05) (0.37) (3.26) (0.81) (87.08) (12.92) 
1989 16,511 4,471 6,361 12,579 - - 39.922 4.246 
(37.38) (10.12) (14.40) (28.48) (90.38) (9.62) 
1990 16,155 4,603 6,180 13,242 - - 40.180 3.930 
(36.62) (10.44) (14.01) (30.02) (91.09) (8.91) 
1991 16,241 4,616 5,739 14,203 - - 40,799 2.579 
(37.18) (10.57) (13.14) (32.52) (93.41) (6. ý`ýl 
1992 16,140 4,662 5.548 14.979 - - 41.329 2.6,, '-, 7 
(36.67) (10.59) (12.61) (34.03) (91.90) (6.10) 
1993 16,166 4,729 5,584 15.738 - - 42.217 2,366 
(36.26) (10.61) (12.52) (35.30) (94.69) (5.3l ) 
"86 
(1) (2) (3) (3-1) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1994 16,416 4,784 5,571 16,487 -- 43,258 2,136 
(36.16) (10.54) (12.27) (36.32) (95.29) (4.71) 
1995 16,744 4,815 3,877 18,580 -- 44,016 1,990 
(36.39) (10.46) (8.43) (40.39) (95.67) (4.33) 
1996 17,035 4,881 3,419 19,269 -- 44,604 1,740 
(36.76) (10.53) (7.38) (41.58) (96.25) (3.75) 
1997 17,101 4,938 3,477 19,409 -- 44,925 1,642 
(36.72) (10.60) (7.47) (41.68) (96.47) (3.53) 
1998 15,853 4,954 3,387 20,278 -- 44,472 1,323 
(34.62) (10.82) (7.39) (44.28) (97.11) (2.89) 
1999 16,857 4,860 23,467 -- 45,184 1,637 
(36.00) (10.38) (50.12) (96.50) (3.50) 
Notes: 
Unit: In thousands, per cent. 
(1) Industrial workers. 
(2) Government employees and private school teachers 
(3) Regional members (for rural residents; (3-1) regional members (for urban self-employed)). 
(4) Occupational members. 
(5) Voluntary regional members. 
(6) Coverage of health insurance. 
(7) Coverage of health assistance; coverage of (1)-(7) refers to as percentage of the sum of (6) and (7). 
The occupational members and voluntary regional members were integrated with the regional members in 1989. 
Before 1988, the regional members' health funds were still experimental projects. 
(2) and (3) are under the management of the National Health Insurance Corporatio n. 
Since 1 October 1998, (2), (3) and (3-1) have been integrated into national health i nsurance. 
Sources: KMIC (1990: 33); MoHW (1999b, 1999c, 2000a, 2000b); NHIC (1999: 36,37). 
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Appendix 9 An Overview of Principles: The National Pension Programme 
The National Welfare The National Pension Act of 1986 The National Pension 
Pension Act of 1973 Reform Act of 1998 
(1) One tier system: equalised part + earnings-related part 
Citizens aged 18-60 except for those covered by particular The entire population 
occupational pensions; including the 
self-ernoloved in both 
Class 1 (compulsory) - those Class 1 (workplaces participants): 
1 
rural and 
t 
J 
urban areas 
th f in workplaces with more class 1-1 (compulsory) participants 
excep 
particular 
or e 
occupation than 30 employees; class 2 in workplaces with more than 10 pension participants 
(2) (voluntary) - those in employees; class 1-2 (voluntary) and their spouse with 
agriculture and fishery participants in workplaces with no income; those aged 
sectors, and the less than 10 employees; Class 2 18-23 wit h no income 
self-employed (regional participants) class such as students and 2-1(compulsory) those with the soldiers; those under 
state-authorised certificate (e. g. class 1 and 2 doctors, lawyers etc. ); class 2-2 categories of public (voluntary) - the rest of the 
population 
assistance 
(3) MoHSA, NTS MoHSA, NPC MoHW, NPC 
Partial or full costs of 
administration 
Those in class 1 and whose 
(4) monthly income is less than 
15,000 is supported by 1 per 
The full support of the NPC's 
administrative costs 
The exemption of the income tax 
for the participants 
The contributions are tax free 
Administrative costs 
of the NPC. 
One third (2,200won) 
of the contributions 
for those in rural areas 
until 2010. cent 
The contributions are 
tax-free 
(5) Incomplete Funded Scheme 
Class 1: percentage of their Class 1 (those in workplaces): Retirement funds 
standard monthly income percentage of their standard reserved within 
" Employers: 3-4% monthly income companies are 
" Employees: 2-3% Employees and employers: abolished 
" Total: 5-7% 1.5 (1988-1992); 2.0 
Class 2: monthly fixed rate (1993-1997); 3.0 (1998); 9% of the standard 
(900 won), self-contribution 4.5 (1999 onwards) each monthly income is 
(6) Retirement funds reserved applied until 2009 but 
within companies 2.0 it will increase 
(1993-1997); 3.0 (1998) 10.85 (2010-2014) 
" Total: 3.0 (1988-1992); 6.0 12.65 (2015-2019) 
(1993-1997); 9.0 (1998 14.45 (2020-2024) 
onwards) 16.25 (2025 onwards) 
Class 2: 3.0 (1988-1992); 6.0 
(1993-1997); 9.0 (1998 onwards) 
(7) 60 
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The National Welfare The National Pension Act of 1986 The National Pension 
Pension Act of 1973 Reform Act of 1998 
(s) 20 10 
(9) 45 % of the basic pension 70 % of average income decile 60 % of average 
groups income decile groups 
Notes: 
(1) Image of system. 
(2) Coverage. 
(3) Organisations. 
(4) Government subsidies. 
(5) Financing. 
(6) Contribution rate (pay roll tax rate shared equally by both employees and employers in the case of those in 
workplaces) In the case of the self employed in both rural and urban areas, the contribution rate was scheduled 
to increase by 3 per cent in every 5 years maintaining 3 per cent until June 2000 when it reaches 9 per cent in 
2010 but according to the Reform Act it maintains 3 per cent until June 2000 and from July it starts from 4 per 
cent and increases by 1 per cent every year until it becomes 9 per cent in July 2005. 
(7) Age of first award; but in the case of 1998 reform, the minimum age of the first award will increase by 1 year 
in every 5 years from the year 2013. 
(8) Minimum period of contributions. 
(7) and (8)are only applied to the full old-age pension. 
(9) Average gross replacement rate. 
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Appendix 10 Type of Benefit and Eligibility in the National Pension Programme in 
1999 
Eligibility rules 
Level of benefit 
The compulsory The eligibility begins from the 
participation age of: 
period 
1 20 years or more 
2 10 - 19 years 
3 20 years or more 
4 10 years or more 
55 years or more 
60; but 55 for miners and 100 % of BPA+APA 
sailors 
60; but 55 for miners and 47.5 %- 92.5 % of BPA 
sailors +APA 
60 to 64; but 55 for miners 
and sailors 
Varies from 50 % of 47.5% 
of BPA to 90 % of 92.5 % of 
BPA 
55 to 59 
60 (or from 45 to 59 as of the 
year of the programme 
implementation 1988 or 
1995); from 50 to 59 as of 1 
April 1999 
6 Those who become A degree of disability; 1 to 4; 
disabled during the is decided two years after the 
period of insurance first treatment 
7 Paid to survivors of (a) the insured who had died; (b) 
the insured who had been insured for 10 years or 
more; (c) the insured who had been entitled to the 
old-age pension or the disability pension of the 2nd 
or higher degree 
8 Paid to survivors of (a) the insured who had died at 
the age of 60 or more; (b) the insured who had been 
insured for less than 10 years; (c) the insured who 
had been insured for less than 10 years and had lost 
his/her nationality or emigrated from Korea 
75% of 47.5% of BPA+APA 
25 - 70 % of BPA + APA 
1Sc, 2nd and 3rd degree: 100,80 
and 60 % of BPA+APA 
respectively 
4th degree: lump-sum 
payment (2.25 x BPA) 
Less than 10 years: 40% of 
BPA+APA 
10 to 19 years: 50% of 
BPA+APA 
20 years or more: 60% of 
BPA+APA 
Contributions + legally fixed 
interest 
9 Paid to relatives of the deceased whose eligibility Equivalent to the lump-sum 
for the survivors pension or the lump-sum refund is refund within four times as 
not valid much as the insured's 
standard monthly income 
10 Paid to those who have been qualified for disability 225% of BPA 
pension and their invalidity is the 4 `h degree 
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Notes: 
Old age pensions (1) - (5) 
(1) Full old-age pension. 
(2) Reduced old-age pension. 
(3) Old-age pension for those at paid work. 
(4) Early old-age pension for those without income. 
(5) Special old-age pension 
(6) Disability pension. 
(7) Survivors pension. 
(8) Lump-sum refund. 
(9) Lump-sum death payment. 
(10) Lump-sum disability compensation. 
BPA stands for Basic Pension Amount which comprises the average amount of the Standard Monthly Income 
of all who are insured and the average amount of Standard Monthly Income of an individual insured. 
APA stands for Additional Pension Amount which is similar to family allowances, covering dependants of an 
insured such as spouse, children (within two) aged less than 18 or with disability of the 2d degree or higher, and 
parents (including spouse's parents) aged 60 or more or with disability of the 2"d degree or higher. 
Source: MoHW (2000b: 487). 
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Appendix 11 Exports, Imports and Amount of I /C (Letter of Credit) arrivals 
Unit: Million US $) 
Total 
Exports 
(1) Total 
Imports 
(2) Excess of 
Exports 
and 
Imports 
IJC arrivals 
Total Increase 
Rate 
1965 175.1 - 463.4 - -288.3 - - 
1966 250.3 42.9 716.4 54.6 -466.1 - - 
1967 320.2 27.9 996.2 39.1 -676.0 389.6 45.4 
1968 455.4 29.7 1,462.9 46.8 -1,007.5 497.1 27.6 
1969 622.5 36.7 1,823.6 24.7 -1,201.1 682.2 37.2 
1970 835.2 34.2 1,984.0 8.8 -1,148.8 948.3 39.0 
1971 1,067.6 27.8 2,394.3 20.7 -1,326.7 1,273.0 34.2 
1972 1,624.1 52.1 2,522.0 5.3 -897.9 1,935.8 52.1 
1973 3,225.0 98.6 4,240.3 68.1 -1,015.3 3,911.8 102.1 
1974 4,460.4 38.3 6,851.8 61.6 -2,391.5 4,391.5 12.3 
1975 5,081.0 13.9 7,274.4 6.2 -2,193.4 5,437.5 23.8 
1976 7,715.3 51.8 8,773.6 20.6 -1,058.3 7,957.8 46.4 
1977 10,046.5 30.2 10,810.5 23.2 -764.1 9,527.4 19.7 
1978 12,710.6 26.4 14,971.9 38.5 -2,261.3 11,594.8 21.7 
1979 15,055.5 18.5 20,338.6 35.8 -5,283.2 12,731.7 9.8 
1980 17,504.9 16.3 22,291.7 9.6 -4,786.8 15,836.4 24.4 
1981 21,253.8 21.4 26,131.4 17.2 -4,877.7 17,896.1 13.0 
1982 21,853.4 2.8 24,250.8 -7.2 -2397.4 16,096.1 -10.1 
1983 24,445.1 11.9 26,192.2 8.0 -1747.2 17,581.7 9.2 
1984 29,244.9 19.6 30,631.4 16.9 -1,386.6 19,383.9 10.3 
1985 30,283.1 3.6 31,135.7 3.3 -852.5 19,558.2 0.9 
1986 34,714.5 14.6 31,583.9 1.4 3,130.6 25,358.9 ? y. 7 
1987 47,280.9 36.2 41,019.8 29.9 6,261.1 34.784.7 37.2 
1988 60,696.4 28.4 51,810.6 26.3 8,885.8 42,786.9 ? 3.0 
1989 62,377.2 2.8 61,464.8 18.6 912.4 45.53 3.8 6.4 
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Total (1) Total (2) Excess of IJC arrivals 
Exports Imports Exports 
Total Increase 
and 
Imports Rate 
1990 65,015.7 4.2 69,843.7 13.6 -4,827.9 47,519.7 4.4 
1991 71,870.1 10.5 81,524.9 16.7 -9,654.7 50,005.1 5.2 
1992 76,631.5 6.6 81,775.3 0.3 -5,143.7 52,352.3 4.7 
1993 82,235.9 7.3 83,800.1 2.5 -1,564.3 55,594.7 6.2 
1994 96,013.2 16.8 102,348.2 22.1 -6,334.9 64,314.1 15.7 
1995 125,058.0 30.3 135,118.9 32.0 -10,060.9 72,926.3 13.4 
1996 129,715.1 3.7 150,339.1 11.3 -20,624.0 69,732.7 -4.4 
1997 136,164.2 5.0 144,616.4 3.8 -8,452.2 67,615.4 -3.0 
1998 132,313.1 -2.8 93,281.8 -35.5 39,031.3 57,455.9 - 15.0 
1999 143,685.5 8.6 119,752.3 28.4 23,933.2 -- 
Notes: 
Letter of Credit: A document authorising a bank to pay the bearer a specified sum of money, it provides a useful 
means of settlement for a foreign trade transaction, the purchaser establishing a credit in favour of his creditor 
at a bank. Payment by means of a Letter of Credit involves action between two banks, one in the importer's 
country and one in the exporter's country, and has an advantage over a foreign bill of exchange, the acceptor of 
which may be unknown in the exporter's country. 
(1) Growth rate of exports (%) = calculated by {(a total amount of exports in a specific year -a total amount of 
exports in a previous year) =a total amount of exports in a previous year} x 100; 
(2) Growth rate of imports (%) = {(a total amount of imports in a specific year -a total amount of imports in 
a previous year) =a total amount of imports in a previous year} x100. 
Sources: NSO (1999a), MoL (2000b: 2-3). 
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Appendix 12 The Change of Industrial Structure (1957-1999) 
Total Employed Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Persons' Industries2 Industries2 Industries2 
1957 7,874 76.8 2.0 21.2 
1963 7,662 63.1 8.7 28.2 
1965 - 58.7 10.3 31.0 
1967 - 55.2 12.8 32.0 
1968 9,155 52.4 14.0 33.6 
1969 - 51.3 14.3 34.4 
1970 9,745 50.5 14.3 35.2 
1972 10,559 50.6 14.2 35.2 
1973 11,139 50.0 16.3 33.7 
1976 12,412 44.4 21.8 33.8 
1977 12,812 41.7 22.4 35.9 
1978 13,412 38.4 23.1 38.5 
1979 13,602 35.8 23.6 40.6 
1980 13,683 34.0 22.5 43.5 
1981 14,023 34.2 21.3 44.5 
1982 14,379 21.1 21.9 46.1 
1983 14,505 29.7 23.3 47.0 
1984 14,429 27.1 24.2 48.7 
1985 14,970 24.9 24.4 50.6 
1986 15,505 23.6 25.9 50.5 
1987 16,354 21.9 28.1 50.0 
1988 16,869 20.6 28.5 50.9 
1989 17,560 19.6 28.3 52.1 
1990 18,677 17.9 27.6 54.5 
1991 19,033 16.5 27.2 56.3 
1992 19,328 15.8 25.9 58.4 
1993 19,905 14.7 24.5 60.8 
1994 20,432 13.7 23.9 62.4 
1995 20,817 12.4 23.6 64.0 
1996 21,106 11.7 22.6 65.7 
1997 21,048 11.3 21.4 67.3 
1998 19,994 12.4 19.6 68.0 
1999 20,281 11.6 19.9 68.6 
Notes: 1. Thousands; 2. Percent; Primary Industries refer to agriculture, forestry and fisheries; Secondary 
Industries refer to mining and manufacturing; Tertiary Industries refer to service and others. 
Sources: Choi, Jang-Jip (1989: 44); Lee, Sang-Young (1997); NSO (1998a: 163,1999c: 175,2000c: 179). 
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Appendix 13 Foreign Direct Investment by Country (Notification cases) 1977-1999 
(Unit: p er cent / thousand US dollars) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1977 23.39 47.99 4.93 0.63 5.67 4.46 1.30 1.49 10.14 83,626 
1978 26.26 50.86 2.28 4.55 1.78 2.29 - 6.84 5.14 149.426 
1979 24.41 54.62 2.74 2.73 4.16 0.57 1.31 2.43 7.03 191.300 
1980 49.34 29.71 0.35 6.00 1.60 - 1.25 1.49 10.26 143,136 
1981 38.88 24.62 22.11 2.29 - 0.73 0.86 8.26 2.25 153,161 
1982 53.45 21.31 14.35 2.07 0.93 - 2.71 1.70 3.48 189,026 
1983 20.09 62.41 2.56 0.93 0.29 0.58 3.53 2.18 7.43 269,424 
1984 45.77 39.04 0.99 0.86 0.97 5.25 - 4.35 2.77 422,346 
1985 20.29 68.44 2.53 2.12 2.31 0.95 0.09 1.31 1.96 532,197 
1986 35.27 39.09 3.61 1.63 4.34 0.06 1.23 8.88 5.89 354,736 
1987 23.99 46.45 4.32 3.90 4.55 1.06 4.31 5.23 6.19 1,063,327 
1988 22.15 54.23 1.08 5.77 1.70 3.69 3.81 1.90 5.67 1,283,757 
1989 30.16 43.33 3.15 4.04 4.23 3.61 1.79 4.29 6.40 1,090,279 
1990 39.59 29.35 0.37 7.77 5.59 2.80 4.52 2.36 7.65 802,635 
1991 21.25 16.18 0.70 4.87 1.35 2.06 42.94 5.32 5.33 1,395,996 
1992 42.39 17.35 1.07 13.47 2.65 3.26 4.89 4.10 10.82 894,476 
1993 32.62 27.38 7.18 3.44 6.78 3.80 12.57 0.68 5.55 1,044,274 
1994 23.62 32.54 3.28 4.57 1.90 4.28 5.11 0.83 23.87 1,316,505 
1995 33.22 21.55 2.98 2.30 4.47 1.81 8.76 0.51 24.40 1,941,423 
1996 27.35 7.95 7.14 2.96 2.47 2.82 6.40 5.06 37.85 3,202,646 
1997 45.76 3.81 1.21 5.71 3.71 5.89 11.92 1.48 20.51 6,970,915 
1998 33.60 5.70 0.43 8.89 0.68 4.15 14.94 0.86 30.75 8,852.356 
1999 17.57 4.86 5.45 8.41 2.04 5.52 30.52 1.98 23.65 6,542,891 
Notes: 1999 figures are added up from January to June only; (1) The United States; (2) Japan: (3) Hong Kong: 
(4) Germane: (5) The United Kingdom; (6) France; (7) The Netherlands; (8) Switzerland; (9) Others; (I0) TI otal 
100 per cent (thousand US $). 
Source: Reconstructed Table, Calculated from NSO (1999a). 
295 
Appendix 14 Increase of Government Employees (in person; per cent) 
Year Increase in 
Number 
Percentage 
increase 
Year Increase in 
Number 
Percentage 
Increase 
1962 - - 1981 69,464 11.6 
1963 18,539 7.3 1982 -18,044 -2.7 
1964 16,509 6.1 1983 3,063 0.5 
1965 17,082 5.0 1984 6,300 1.0 
1966 27,372 9.0 1985 13,423 2.0 
1967 27,267 8.2 1986 21,033 3. I 
1968 21,963 6.1 1987 13,383 1.9 
1969 16,132 4.2 1988 32,172 4.6 
1970 19,298 4.8 1989 44,121 6.0 
1971 19,288 4.6 1990 36,775 4.7 
1972 1,937 0.4 1991 35,961 4.4 
1973 13,481 3.1 1992 32,097 3.8 
1974 14,390 3.2 1993 13,647 1.5 
1975 12,118 2.6 1994 7,772 0.9 
1976 24,140 5.0 1995 -2,208 -0.2 
1977 16,408 3.3 1996 20,404 2.3 
1978 21,548 4.2 1997 8,453 0.9 
1979 23,400 4.3 1998 -45,766 -4.9 
1980 32,373 5.7 1999 -12,809 -1.4 
Sources: MoGAHA (various years); KIPA (2000). 
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Source: Appendix 14 
Appendix 15 Advance Rate of Graduates to Higher School Level (per cent) 
Year Middle High Higher Year Middle High Higher 
School School Education School School Education 
1976 79.5 75.5 23.8 1989 99.7 94.6 35.2 
1977 84.5 76.8 21.4 1990 99.8 95.7 33.2 
1978 89.7 79.3 22.0 1991 99.8 97.5 33.2 
1979 93.4 81.0 25.9 1992 99.9 98.6 34.3 
1980 95.8 84.5 27.2 1993 99.9 98.2 38.4 
1981 96.5 86.5 35.3 1994 99.9 98.8 45.3 
1982 97.7 86.9 37.7 1995 99.9 98.5 51.4 
1983 98.6 89.4 38.3 1996 99.9 98.9 54.9 
1984 98.8 89.7 37.8 1997 99.9 99.4 60.1 
1985 99.2 90.7 36.4 1998 99.9 99.4 63.5 
1986 99.4 91.2 36.4 1999 99.9 99.4 66.6 
1987 99.5 91.9 36.7 2000 99.9 99.5 68.0 
1988 99.5 93.5 35.0 
Note: higher education includes junior (2 year) college, university of education 
Sources: NSO (1998a: 223,2000c: 237). 
Advance Rate of Graduates to Hiqher Education (% 
Source: Appendix 15 
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Appendix 16 Wage Levels by Educational Attainment (In won; per cent) 
Year Middle School High School 2-Year College College and 
Education or less Education (100.0) Education University 
Education or 
Higher 
1986 250,968 77.6 323,541 100.0 417,361 129.0 718,266 222.0 
1987 279,342 80.3 347,876 100.0 442,487 127.2 779,332 224.0 
1988 339,947 82.1 414,081 100.0 501,402 121.1 839,441 202.7 
1989 404,910 83.1 487,013 100.0 580,133 119.1 930,396 191.0 
1990 476,949 83.8 569,394 100.0 668,200 117.4 1,055,950 185.5 
1991 567,630 84.6 671,103 100.0 787,938 117.4 1,202,953 179.3 
1992 686,481 87.3 786,157 100.0 894,532 113.8 1,326,795 168.8 
1993 776,312 88.1 881,467 100.0 965,408 109.5 1,421,811 161.3 
1994 848,914 86.9 976,699 100.0 1,049,439 107.4 1,521,039 155.7 
1995 959,087 87.2 1,100,306 100.0 1,192,628 108.4 1,715,411 155.9 
1996 1,053,122 85.3 1,234,569 100.0 1,326,790 107.5 1,925,812 156.0 
1997 1,132,589 84.4 1,342,047 100.0 1,428,197 106.4 2,087,824 155.6 
1998 1,119,426 83.9 1,333,672 100.0 1,430,946 107.3 2,109,317 158.2 
1999 1,139,216 86.0 1,324,700 100.0 1,386,529 104.7 2,113,475 159.5 
Sources: NSO (1998a: 256,2000c: 270). 
Wage Levels by Educational Attainment (%) 
(High School Education = 100 %) ; Source: Appendix 16 
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Appendix 17 Wage Levels of Female Labour Force in Comparison (per cent) 
Middle School High School 2-Year College College and University 
Education or Less Education Education Education or Higher 
1991 58.85 60.64 67.93 73.12 
1992 56.88 69.00 69.00 72.86 
1993 56.32 69.67 69.67 74.21 
1994 57.72 70.64 70.64 77.38 
1995 57.88 70.67 70.67 75.94 
1996 59.61 71.98 71.68 76.96 
1997 59.91 71.11 71.11 76.95 
1998 60.17 71.12 71.12 76.61 
Notes: Estimation formula: (real wage of female = real wage of male) x 100 in each year; the reference month 
of the wages is June of each year. 
Sources: MoL (various years, 25 October 1999); NSO (1998a: 256). 
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Source: Appendix 17 
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